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Abstract 
This thesis examines the raison d’etre of the Australian Senate, the upper house of 
the Australian bicameral parliament, established in 1901. It explores the literature 
that might have influenced its establishment and structure, and the attitudes, 
ideals, experience and expectations of the men (and they were all men) who 
initiated its existence and designed its structure during the Federation Conventions 
of the 1890s. It goes on to study whether similar western and British influenced 
institutions were seen as models by the designers of the Senate, followed by an 
examination of its architecture, décor, and procedures, to determine the major 
influences at work on these aspects of the institution. 
The study was undertaken in view of the paucity of studies of the history and role 
of the Senate in relation to its powerful influence on the Government of Australia. 
Its structure can allow a minority of Senators to subvert or obstruct key measures 
passed by the lower house and is a serious issue for Governments in considering 
legislation. Answers are sought to the questions of how and why it was conceived 
and created and what role it was expected to play. The study does not extend 
beyond 1901 when the Senate was established except to examine the Provisional 
Parliament House, opened in 1927, which realised the vision of the Convention 
delegates who determined that the Senate was the house we had to have. 
The research approach began with an exhaustive study of the Records of the 
Federal Conventions of the 1890s, where the Constitution of Australia was drawn 
up, along with contemporary writings and modern comment on such institutions. A 
study of the men who designed the Senate was carried out, augmented with field 
visits to the Australian State Parliaments. Research was also conducted into upper 
houses identified by the delegates to the Australian Federal Conventions, to 
consider their influence on the design of the Senate. 
The conclusion is that the Senate was deliberately structured to emulate the then 
existing British system as far as possible; it was to be an august house of review 
and a bastion against democracy, or at least a check on hasty legislation. The 
delegates showed no desire to extinguish ties with Great Britain and their vision of 
 v 
an upper house was modelled directly on the House of Lords. The vast majority of 
delegates had cut their teeth in colonial upper houses, which were themselves 
closely modelled on the Lords. To not establish a Senate would have been to turn 
their backs on themselves. The Senate then, is not a hybrid of Washington and 
Westminster: the influence of the United States was limited to the composition of 
the Senate and its name and mediated through the filter of its British heritage. The 
example of other legislatures was unimportant except where it solved problems 
previously experienced in the Colonial Councils and which might have otherwise 
occurred in the Senate. The Senate was the upper house we had to have; it was a 
decision that was taken before the delegates even met. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Why does Australia have a Senate? 
It passes the wit of man to construct an effective Second Chamber. Goldwin Smith. In J.A. 
Marriott, Second Chambers: an inductive study in Political Science, Oxford, 1927. p.1. 
 
Why is there a silence on the creation of the Australian Senate? Did it emerge fully 
fledged from the minds of the Convention delegates and was there ever really any 
choice? In 1889 Henry Parkes (1815–1896), a flamboyant New South Wales 
politician, declared that Australia’s Federal Parliament would comprise ‘a 
Parliament of two Houses, a House of Commons and a Senate’. Delivered in rural 
Tenterfield, New South Wales, it was the speech which is credited with 
precipitating the events that led to Australian Federation in 1901. The speech 
made a clear assumption of the establishment of a Senate.1 Parkes’ prediction was 
duly fulfilled in the Australian Constitution that came into effect in 1901, five years 
after his death, which stipulated that: ‘the legislative powers of a Commonwealth of 
Australia shall be vested in a Federal Parliament which shall consist of ‘the Queen, 
a Senate and a House of Representatives’.2
Unlike the other two component parts of the proposed Parliament, a Senate was 
neither strictly necessary nor strictly modelled on the British Constitution. This is 
what makes it the most interesting. If it was not necessary why was it established? 
The focus of this thesis is how a Senate, an upper house, came to be an 
established and powerful player in Australia’s Parliament. The Monarch was 
necessary as Australia did not intend to secede from the British Empire (as it was 
 
                                            
1 Ken Halliday, Parkes Federation Call to the People, (Observatory Hill: NSW National Trust of 
Australia, 1999), p.23. 
2 Australian Constitution, Chapter 1, Part 1, Section 1. 
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then) which meant that the consent of the Monarch was required to lawfully 
federate the separate colonies: a House of Representatives, an elected Chamber, 
was essential as the keystone of democracy representing the people—the 
taxpayers, but where was the need for a Senate? This is not so clear. There is a 
silence in the historiography on the inclusion of a Senate in the legislature: it is 
looked upon as a given and studied mostly in its role rather than its gestation. 
Of course there were many factors—local and international, economic, social and 
political—which led to Federation and, along with it, the creation of a Senate. It 
could be argued that Federation was simply a compromise, a pragmatic solution 
that fitted the exigencies of the situation at the turn of the century. Similarly, there 
was understandably the sheer difficulty of getting people to imagine, still less agree 
on, some alternative. This is not a study of those factors except to the extent that 
they affected the views and actions of the Convention delegates who crafted the 
draft Constitution submitted to the putative nation in a referendum. The pressure to 
reach agreement was underpinned by a potent mix of ideas, emotional 
attachments, and previous experience, evident in a close study of the delegates. 
They are the subject of this thesis. 
Beginning with Parkes’ speech, the assumption that there should be two Houses in 
an Australian Parliament is apparent throughout the subsequent serious moves 
towards Federation. Samuel Griffith, a Queensland politician and delegate to the 
1890 Conference and the 1891 Convention, followed Parkes, saying: ‘there should 
be two Houses of Legislature, in one of which the several colonies should have 
equal representation, the other being chosen by the electors of the Colonies in 
proportion to population’.3
The principle that there should be two Houses of Legislature, one directly and 
equally representing the States, while the other directly represents the people 
of the whole Commonwealth, in proportion to population, may, apparently, be 
 He persisted in his opinion in comments he made later in 
a critique of the 1897 draft bill, though some doubts seem to have arisen: 
                                            
3 John M. Williams, The Australian Constitution: A Documentary History, (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2005), p.37, from Griffith’s Suggested Instructions to the Constitutional Committee 
in 1891, paragraph 2. 
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taken to be generally accepted as the only basis upon which Federation is at 
present possible.4
I take it there is no one here who will for one moment imagine that any form of 
government by a Parliament consisting of one House, could be designated a 
Federation.
 
The ‘may’, ‘apparently’, and ‘generally accepted’, reveal some reservations in 
Griffith’s mind and possibly reflect the recently articulated sentiments of the 
emerging Labour party. The Labour party consistently opposed the establishment 
of a Senate because it considered equal representation of the States, whatever 
their population, was undemocratic. The party’s opposition could also be attributed 
to the view that the upper houses of the Colonies, where members were either 
nominated for life or elected on a property qualification, were seriously 
undemocratic. 
Edmund Barton, also a New South Wales politician and Convention delegate, 
echoed Parkes, and Griffith at his most confident, in his opening speech to the 
1897 Convention in Adelaide, declaring: ‘this Convention approves of the framing 
of a Federal Constitution which shall establish … a Parliament, to consist of two 
Houses, namely, a States Assembly or Senate, and a National Assembly or House 
of Representatives’. He at least had no doubts: he followed this up in the same 
speech with this unqualified message: 
5
No one challenged him. In fact ‘Federation’ simply means a union of States without 
any requirement for a second house, which Garran considered was not absolutely 
essential to the system of Federation.
 
6
The absence of any real dissent among the delegates clearly demonstrates that 
the concept of a two house legislature was so firmly embedded in the Australian 
psyche (or at least that represented at the Convention) that, though questions 
 
                                            
4 Ibid., p.617. 
5 OR, 23 March 1897, p.21. References to Official Records listed below are referred to in the 
footnotes as OR, with date and page numbers to facilitate finding the reference in both the 
electronic and published versions of the records. 
6 Robert Randolph Garran, The Coming Commonwealth, an Australian Handbook of Federal 
Government, (Sydney, London: Angus & Robertson, Simpkin, Marshall, 1897), p.30. 
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remained as to the role and structure of an upper house, its inclusion was never 
questioned and the proposal for two houses for the federal government went 
unchallenged. 
The first major step towards federation was an Australasian Federation Conference 
held in Melbourne in February 1890. It was the first of the series of Convention 
debates in which the final shape of Australia’s Federal Government was hammered 
out. At the Conference the unquestioned assumption of two houses was 
immediately apparent. In a speech, by Thomas Playford of South Australia, the 
major models of a States’ House were drawn from both the negative and positive 
examples of Canada and the United States: 
We do not require a great Dominion Parliament, such as exists in Canada, 
relegating, as it does, all local Legislatures into mere parish vestries. We 
require something in the shape of the Government of the United States, 
where clearly defined powers are given to the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, and where all other powers not specified are left to be 
exercised by the local States and constituencies.7
This is not to say there were no dissenting voices, but mostly they came from non-
participants, with, as noted, the nascent Labour party the most vocal. In the 1897 
Convention election New South Wales Labour candidates campaigned on a policy 
which included opposition to an upper house, but none was elected. Other 
resistance came from those who remembered the difficulties with Colonial 
Councils, some of whose members were nominated for life and difficult to 
dislodge.
 
8 A small minority in the Assembly of Victoria made a vigorous attack on 
the concept of a Senate and its powers during the consideration of the 1891 Draft 
Bill. It was even moved by one member of the Legislative Assembly, Sir Bryan 
O’Loghlen (1828-1905), that the provision for an upper chamber be struck out. The 
motion was defeated.9
                                            
7 OR, 6-14 February 1890, p.18. 
8 New South Wales and Queensland Councillors were nominated for life. 
9 Victorian Parliamentary Debates, vol.66, quoted in E.M. Hunt, American Precedents in Australian 
Federation, (New York: Columbia University Press; London P. S. King, Ltd., 1930), p.100. 
 In the Convention debates themselves there is only slight 
evidence of anti-Senate sentiment. For example Henry Higgins as late as 1897, 
commented mildly: 
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I was exceedingly amused at the debates in South Australia on this subject. 
We found member after member saying that he saw no need for a second 
house at all. Member after member said, ‘What is the use of a Senate, it is 
not wanted.10
And Josiah Symon, in the same discussion on what should be the name for the 
Upper Chamber, said: 
 
if it is to be a second chamber in any sense of the term at all, one would think 
… there ought to be some different character about it in some way or other so 
as to differentiate it from the other chamber, otherwise what on earth is the 
good of having it?11
To which Higgins, clearly an opponent of the idea interjected, not so mildly: ‘Just 
so; what is the good?’ A survey of the newspapers of the day shows that the 
debates were dutifully reported and opinions of the role and structure of the Senate 
freely aired, but there was little comment on the actual establishment of an upper 
house. One paper, the Worker, did make a forceful attack on the idea 
 
12 and at a 
meeting on Federation held in Adelaide in 1897 it was reported that the speaker 
was interrupted by a lone voice shouting ‘What is the use of a Senate?’ No one 
else took up the cry and the meeting proceeded peacefully.13
It is clear that Australia’s Constitution framers, the delegates to the Federation 
Conventions in the 1890s, looked to two major models for their ideas: the 
Westminster, or British, system and the Constitution of the United States. The first 
choice was the British system of responsible government with the executive power 
vested in the lower house—the system upon which the legislatures of all the 
Australian Colonies were based. It was not an entirely satisfactory model as 
membership of the Upper House, the House of Lords, was hereditary and based 
on class and privilege, not applicable to the Australian situation. As such it was 
 These few weak 
dissenting voices were drowned out by the stronger voices in support of Federation 
and an overwhelming conviction that there would be two houses in the new 
Parliament. 
                                            
10 OR, 9 September 1897, p.261. Records of the debates in the South Australian Parliament on this 
subject suggest Higgins may have been exaggerating. Debates in the SA Legislative Council and 
Assembly, June – August 1897. 
11 OR, 10 September 1897, p.300. 
12 Worker, Sydney, 20 February 1897. 
13 South Australian Register, 5 February 1897. 
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inappropriate as a model for a ‘modern’ democracy such as Australia which had no 
hereditary aristocracy ‘born to rule’. Australia’s Colonial Parliaments, all of them 
bicameral legislatures from the 1850s and modelled exclusively on the British 
system, were also major models for the Federal vision even though it is clear that 
not all colonies were happy with their upper houses, especially Victoria, which had 
an elected upper house, albeit with a prohibitive property qualification, and which 
had proved to be obstructive.14
It is a tribute to the hidden power of tradition and inertia in the governing of 
human beings that fundamentals of institutional design are rarely laid open to 
full appraisal.
 The solution was found in the United States’ model 
and was to structure the upper house as a States’ house, its members elected by 
the States (erstwhile Colonies) to protect their interests.  
These models were all of Anglo-Saxon origin and culture— akin to Australia—and 
all had upper houses. This made the establishment of an Australian upper house 
acceptable and even compelling, but based as much on sentiment and tradition as 
political logic. As Patterson and Mughan have argued: 
15
The decision was justified by supporters on the grounds that a ‘States’ House’ was 
necessary to represent the interests of the separate States as a counterpoint to the 
interests of the population at large which would mean the legislature would be 
dominated by the larger or more populous states. The upper house was also 
envisioned as a house of review, which would calm the unbridled passions and 
irrational legislation which might result from a democratically elected lower house. 
As Ged Martin put it ‘It was generally agreed that British colonies should have 
British-style bicameral Legislatures, in which the upper chamber would restrain the 
popular enthusiasms … of the lower’.
 
16
                                            
14 See L.F. Crisp, Australian National Government, (Hawthorn, Victoria: Longman, 1965), p.325. 
15 Samuel C. Patterson and Anthony Mughan, ‘Senates and the Theory of Bicameralism’ in Samuel 
C. Patterson and Anthony Mughan, Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World, eds. 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999), p.9. 
16 Ged Martin, Bunyip Aristocracy, (Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), p.39. 
 It was a dearly held fantasy that an upper 
house would somehow be a more intelligent, reasonable and judicious assembly 
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than a lower house, in spite of clear evidence to the contrary. Ged Martin has aptly 
summarized the situation in Canada: 
The nominated upper houses of other colonies inspired little respect or 
confidence. Appointed for life legislative councillors were likely to confuse 
the checking of gusts of popular passion with the imposition of rejected 
ideas.17
The Federation Conventions were held in Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide, 
beginning in 1890 with a Conference in Melbourne which drew up the procedures 
for a formal Convention. The first of these was held in Sydney in 1891 and the last 
went on for three sessions in Adelaide and Sydney in 1897, and Melbourne in 
1898. The debates at the Conference of 1890 and the Convention in 1891 differed 
in structure from the Convention of 1897-8, a difference which affected the final 
result brought about in the Convention of 1897-8. The Conference of 1890 was 
more exploratory though with serious intent and did achieve some notable results, 
chief of which was the draft constitution drawn up by Andrew Inglis Clark, a 
Convention delegate from Tasmania, in 1891. This formed the foundation of the 
Commonwealth of Australia Bill submitted to the Colonies in 1891 for their 
consideration. Though allowed to lapse at that stage, it became the basis of the 
final version. 
 
The major difference between the three meetings was that the delegates to the 
1890 Conference and the 1891 Convention were appointed by the parliaments of 
the six Australian Colonies, plus two appointed by the legislature of New Zealand. 
Delegates to the Conventions of 1897–8 on the other hand were elected by the 
people, except those from Western Australia. The elections of delegates to the 
1897-8 Convention were conducted in accordance with Enabling Acts passed in 
each Colony, which were all substantially the same as that passed by the 
Parliament of New South Wales as the Australasian Federation Enabling Act 1895. 
The Act was described as ‘An Act to enable New South Wales to take part in the 
framing, acceptance, and enactment of a federal Constitution for Australasia’. New 
Zealand did not participate in the last Convention, deciding not join a Federation, 
                                            
17 Ibid., p.42. 
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and Queensland failed to pass the enabling legislation, though retaining an interest 
in the proceedings.18
The hiatus from 1891 occurred for several reasons but was due mainly to the 
failure of the New South Wales Parliament to proceed and the other parliaments 
were equally irresolute. Despite this inaction the Federation issue was not allowed 
to die but was kept alive and in the public eye by organisations and individuals 
outside the parliaments, and some politicians. These influences led to a 
Conference of Premiers in 1895 which agreed to a series of steps conceived by 
John Quick, a Victorian lawyer and Convention delegate, to convene another 
Federal Convention to consider and frame a constitution.
 
19
Running to over 6,000 pages, the proceedings of the Conventions were faithfully 
recorded and published in the Records of the Australasian Federal Conventions of 
the 1890s. Produced in the Hansard tradition using reporters from the Colonial 
parliaments, every word spoken by the delegates was recorded for posterity. 
Complete with comprehensive indexes, lists of delegates and careful dating, the 
Records provide an accurate account of the proceedings and are a fascinating 
window onto the past. It is revealing to discover the foresight of some of the 
delegates and how they anticipated problems that might arise. For example: the 
party system, not then fully realized; whether the Governor-General should be 
elected; and universal suffrage; were all discussed, the latter topic of special 
interest to the South Australian delegates where women had been enfranchised in 
 The steps proposed the 
election of delegates to a new Convention tasked to frame a constitution that would 
be presented to the people of each Colony at a referendum and, if approved, 
presented to the Imperial Parliament to enact the required legislation to bring it into 
being. These programmed stages, spurred on by the failure of the earlier attempt 
at Federation, were the key to keeping the final Convention on course and bringing 
about a successful conclusion. 
                                            
18 Frank R. McGrath, The Framers of the Australian Constitution and Their Intentions, (Sydney: 
Frank McGrath, 2003), p.70. 
19 J.A. La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution, (Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 1972), pp.88-90. 
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1894. Adult suffrage was eventually accepted for the Australian Parliament in 
1902. 
In seeking the genesis of the Australian Senate, or Upper House, one is naturally 
drawn to a study of the debates of the Federal Conventions. It was in the course of 
these deliberations that the final version of the Australian Constitution was drawn 
up and the decision that the Australian Federal legislature was to be a bicameral 
parliament was accepted. The records constitute the main primary source of this 
thesis and cast a revealing light onto the characters, aspirations and expectations 
of the delegates charged with this critical task. 
Ostensibly, a study of these lengthy debates would reveal the source of the 
delegates’ ideas and their basic attitudes on the concept of Federation, as well as 
the structure of a Federal legislature. To some extent they do, but the major issue 
of whether or not to have two houses of Parliament received little attention from the 
delegates. The vision of bicameralism was present and dominant from the 
preliminary skirmishes and appears in every document related to Federation. 
There were lengthy and occasionally acrimonious debates about the role of an 
upper house and the extent of its powers in relation to the lower house, especially 
regarding financial affairs, but there is no evidence in the records to suggest that 
the actual institution of a Senate was ever seriously disputed. This may have had 
something to do with the fact that the debates were formal affairs with most of the 
major speeches prepared in advance. The result is a degree of repetition and few 
surprises in their arguments as the delegates single-mindedly pursued their 
respective goals. Their ideas had already been worked out and in many cases 
already presented to and accepted by their respective Parliaments. It is also 
possible that informal discussions may have taken place where agreements about 
some issues were made before the formal debates. So the historian must dig 
deeper for the true source of the preconceptions of the delegates in regard to the 
institution of an upper house and this is one of the aims of this thesis. 
The theories of critical junctures and path dependence form the theoretical 
framework of this thesis. Drawn from social science these theories help to explain 
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the ready acceptance of a Senate by Australia and the dependence on the major 
models of Britain and the United States for its structure and role. Ruth Berins 
Collier and David Collier have defined a critical juncture as a ‘period of significant 
change’ and argued that in some cases what is presumed to be a free choice of 
action appears in fact to be deeply embedded in antecedent conditions that define 
and delimit agency. They further argue that during a critical juncture actors make 
contingent choices and these set a trajectory that is difficult to reverse.20
The critical juncture theory is extended in this case by reference to ‘path 
dependence’, a theory originally applied to technological change, which holds that 
certain technologies can achieve an initial advantage over alternative technologies 
and prevail in the long run, even if the alternatives might have been more efficient. 
This argument can be precisely applied to politics because, like technology, politics 
involves elements of chance and choice but once a path is taken it becomes 
‘locked in’ and strategies are adjusted to accord with the prevailing or pre-existing 
system.
 The 
critical juncture, or ‘period of significant change’ underpinning this thesis is the 
period between 1890 and 1900 when the Constitutional Conventions worked out 
and established a federal Government for Australia. The antecedent conditions 
which defined and delimited the choices of the Convention delegates were found in 
the existing Australian Colonial governments and the Westminster system. The 
United States’ Constitution was also an important model but it must be 
remembered that it too had its roots in the British system and, as we shall see, 
shared many of its procedures and practices. 
21
                                            
20 Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1991), pp.27, 29. 
21 Kathleen Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', Annual Review of Political 
Science, June 1999, p.385. 
 The concept of increasing returns as applied to technology is a feature of 
path dependence and explained by Paul Pierson, an American Professor of 
Political Science, as the probability of further steps along the same path increases 
with each move down that path because the costs of exit rise. In one major article 
Pierson argued that increasing returns mean that once a country has started down 
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a track the costs of reversal are very high.22 He also argues that the strong status 
quo bias associated with most political institutions often make path dependent 
effects particularly intense in politics.23 The path taken by the Colonial Parliaments 
was a powerful influence on the decisions taken in the structuring of the Australian 
Senate to continue along the same path; an attitude strengthened by the weight of 
the legacy of British tradition inherited by the decision makers. In politics the added 
factors of inertia and tradition often bring about a climate of resistance to change in 
a process once it has been adopted and established, because the policy makers 
‘are constrained in what they can conceive of by these embedded cultural 
constraints’.24
These theories do not fully explain the reluctance of the delegates to bring in new 
ideas but they are relevant to the issue, especially the Colliers’ argument that 
antecedent conditions define and delimit choice. Some historians writing about 
Federation have also recognised an unseen and unexplained power, something 
other than logic, influencing the delegates. For example, Geoffrey Bolton referred 
to ‘subliminal influences in the shaping of an Australian nation’.
 
25 Tradition and 
inertia, which Patterson and Mughan called the ‘hidden power’, are other 
influences cited by historians to explain the resistance to new ideas by the 
Convention delegates.26
Historians and political scientists have failed to give the decision to establish a 
Senate any systematic attention, relying instead on passing references and casual 
remarks. Years before the concept was spelled out J.A. Marriott, an English writer, 
leading constitutional scholar and a member of Parliament, alluded to the path 
dependence phenomenon in a disparaging phrase describing the Senate as a 
 
                                            
22 Paul Pierson, 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics', The American 
Social Science Review, June 2000, p.252. 
23 Ibid., p.261. 
24 Kathleen Thelen, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, pp.369-404. 
25 Geoffrey Bolton, Edmund Barton: The One Man for the Job, (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & 
Unwin, 2000), p.16. 
26 Patterson and Mughan, eds., Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World. 
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‘constitutional fetish’,27 and Galligan and Warden saw it as ‘probably inevitable’28 in 
the same way as Scott Bennett concluded that it was ‘accepted automatically’.29
men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they 
do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The 
tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a night-mare on the brain of 
the living.
 
Perhaps it can also be explained by the words of Karl Marx: 
30
The undebated assumption that there would be an upper house in the Australian 
Parliament is reflected in the silence on the part of historians and political scientists 
on the subject and has led to the gap in the literature on the history of the 
Australian Constitution. As the issue was not debated and there are no records of 
suggestions of any alternative and only minor resistance, historians, like the 
delegates to the Constitutional Conventions, have accepted a Senate without 
question. Rarely rating a separate title, even in its modern incarnation, it has been 
taken for granted as a natural and necessary phenomenon. One major exception is 
Platypus and Parliament by Stanley Bach.
 
This thesis will argue that the establishment and structure of the Australian Senate 
was the result of a path dependent attitude on the part of the delegates and their 
Colonial parliaments. It was ‘accidental’ in the sense that it was not actually 
planned but based, with few deviations, on the preconceived model omnipresent in 
speeches, authorities and historical antecedents, and that the Conventions merely 
tinkered with the structure to shape the new upper house. It was a decision taken 
with the heart as much as with the head. 
31
                                            
27 J.A. Marriott, Second Chambers - an Inductive Study in Political Science, New, revised and part 
rewritten, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1927), p.5. 
28 Brian Galligan and James Warden, 'The Design of the Senate', in The Convention Debates 1891 
- 1898, ed. Gregory Craven, (Sydney: Legal Books Ltd, 1986), p.91. 
29 Bennett, The Making of the Commonwealth, p.112. 
30 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: With Explanatory Notes, (New York: 
New York, International Publishers, 1964), p.15. 
31 Stanley Bach, Platypus and Parliament: The Australian Senate in Theory and Practice, 
(Canberra: Department of the Senate, 2003). 
 Bach, an American Constitutional 
historian, focused on the current differences between the United States Senate 
and the Australian Senate, and gave only a brief summary of the historical 
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contexts. Nevertheless, its very appearance serves to underline the dearth of 
material focusing solely on the Australian Senate and its historical antecedents. 
A review of the literature on the Australian Senate shows that the silence was 
deafening. The review includes some of the many specialised works on Australia’s 
constitutional history, a selection of political science writings on the subject of 
bicameralism in general and in Australia in particular, and finally some general 
histories to ascertain what the student of history might learn from them about the 
origins of the Senate. Few of the works focus directly on the Senate, which usually 
appears as part of a wider study and then often as a fait accompli. Some 
concentrate on its role and responsibilities but offer no examination of the 
decisions which led to its existence. The selected specialised works, the 
Constitutional histories and political scientists are categorised into two groups: 
those which ignore or dismiss the question of why a Senate; and those which 
choose to address the question. 
Of those historians who chose to play down the question, Quick and Garran set the 
pace in their magisterial work The Annotated Constitution of the Australian 
Commonwealth. The question of whether there should be an upper house was 
tersely addressed in their essay on bicameralism, to be quickly disposed of in the 
following extract: 
Apart from the philosophical and practical arguments in favour of a two-
chambered legislature as against a single-chambered legislature, a political 
union on the federal plan could not have been accomplished without the 
constitution of two Houses to represent the composite elements of the 
union.32
Quick and Garran do not provide the aforesaid philosophical and practical 
arguments but refer to other writers who advance the arguments that a single 
house leads to despotism, is inclined to adopt hasty and one-sided views, or is 
‘inclined to radicalism or even anarchy’.
 
33
                                            
32 John Quick and Robert Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 
1995 ed., (Sydney: Legal Books 1901), p.386. 
33 Ibid., p.387. 
 This was a popular view expressed 
colourfully by William Russell, a delegate from New Zealand, in the Convention of 
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1891, as the ‘cyclonic effects of popular gusts of passion’ and Alfred Deakin added 
a remark about the ‘spectacle of a democracy carried hither and thither by violent 
impulses to opposite points of the compass within short periods of time’ which 
might eventuate without a more sober upper house to exercise restraint.34
In a separate section on the Senate, Quick and Garran relied heavily on the 
experience and commentaries on the United States Constitution by such people as 
Joseph Story and Roger Foster, though these were based on a United States 
Senate appointed by the State legislatures, rather than the manhood suffrage 
eventually proposed for the Australian Parliament.
 This 
view was not unique to Deakin or Russell but was an unhappily pessimistic, though 
widely held, view that democratically elected people’s representatives need some 
restraining influence to prevent national disaster. 
35 Clearly, writing in 1901, the 
year of Australian Federation, Quick and Garran were relying on the past and 
especially on the model of the United States, rather than closely considering the 
question or admitting of any alternative. For example, they dismissed the failure of 
the ten Labour candidates in New South Wales to be elected as delegates to the 
1897 Federal Convention, as due to their ‘impossible programme’, a programme 
that called for a legislature of only one chamber.36 Yet there was a substantial vote 
for one of these candidates (J.S.T. McGowen). In Victoria, as early as 1891, an 
Assembly member (Sir Bryan O’Loghlen) argued for a unicameral Parliament and 
in 1897 one Labour politician, William Arthur Trenwith, was elected to the 
Convention.37
Quick and Garran relied heavily on the major argument that the provision of a 
Senate was a necessary concession to the smaller states to secure their support 
for Federation. This argument is frequently presented and rarely questioned. Yet 
the example of Queensland, not represented at the 1897 Convention but which 
 
                                            
34 OR, 5 March 1891, pp.64, 75. 
35 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, ed. Melville M. Bigelow, 
Fifth ed., vol. I, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1891); Roger Foster, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States, (Boston: Boston Books, 1896). 
36 Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, p.163. 
37 Victorian Parliamentary Debates, vol. 61, 1891, p.884 et seq.  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 15 
 
quickly became a partner when Federation became a reality, suggests this was not 
necessarily the case. Western Australia was also reluctant on financial grounds but 
was persuaded to join at the very last moment by Joseph Chamberlain, then British 
Colonial Secretary.38 Whether they would have joined the Federation if a Senate 
had not been included in the Constitution is a matter for conjecture but other 
examples were to hand: for example in the United States and Canada smaller 
states had applied to join already successful Federations. While there is no 
evidence that the smaller colonies would have joined without an upper house that 
would act as a state-based counter-weight to a lower house where representation 
was based on population,  Andrew Inglis Clark for one, argued that a Federation of 
Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania would be a very good thing 
as a beginning, pointing out that in Canada there were originally only four colonies, 
others joining at different dates.39
A decade after Quick and Garran, Bernhard Ringrose Wise, a New South Wales 
barrister who had been a delegate to the 1897 Convention, did not address the 
topic at all in his work The Making of the Australian Commonwealth 1889-1900, 
apparently taking it for granted, as did other Convention delegates, that the Senate 
or upper house in the tradition of a Westminster Parliament was ‘a matter of 
course’. He quoted Parkes as saying that the scheme of the Federal Government 
‘it is assumed’ would follow closely upon Canada’s example with a Governor-
General and a ‘Parliament consisting of a Senate and a House of Commons’.
 Quick and Garran’s further comments on a 
Senate focused in detail on the powers, responsibilities and representation in the 
House, but without any further questioning of the need for such a body. 
40 In 
his book he preferred to focus on the ‘Compromise of 1891’ which gave the States 
equal representation in the Senate in exchange for equal power over legislation 
except for financial matters. Like Quick and Garran, he dismissed the Labour policy 
of unicameralism as an ‘impractical programme of one Chamber’.41
                                            
38 La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution, p. 260. 
39 OR, 11 February 1890, p.29. 
40 Bernhard Ringrose Wise, The Making of the Australian Commonwealth, 1889-1900, (London: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1913), p.12. 
41 Ibid., p.219. 
 This 
dismissiveness reflects a general attitude among delegates to the intrusion of the 
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working classes, or masses, into the political process, a fear of what J.S. Mill called 
‘uncontrolled democracy’.42
The first foreign commentator to discuss the Australian Government was Erling M. 
Hunt, an American historian writing in the 1930s. He also saw the provision of a 
Senate or second house in the Australian Parliament as a given. He referred to 
Parkes writing before the Melbourne Conference that ‘parliament would consist of 
a senate and a house of commons’ and says that this was accepted by federal 
leaders in 1890 and remained a major plank in the Constitution. ‘This’ he said ‘was 
accepted as a matter of course in both federal conventions’.
 
43
Hunt did discuss opposition to the proposal but said it was ‘rare and weak’, as 
indeed it was in the Convention debates. He also went a little further and discussed 
opposition to a federal Senate in the Colonial Parliaments and press, citing the 
motion in the Assembly in Victoria in 1891. He records that in 1897 there was 
opposition in the Victorian and New South Wales Assemblies, and in the South 
Australian Assembly two Labour members were of the same opinion. Hunt 
dismisses these instances as isolated and ineffective but they can now be seen as 
the emerging power of the ordinary citizen and of the Labour party.
 
44
Writing at about the same time as Hunt, Ernest Scott, an eminent Australian 
historian and academic, contributed a lengthy and comprehensive article in The 
Cambridge History of the British Empire, where he treated the bicameral solution 
more as a question of the Senate’s role rather than its existence.
 The Labour 
party was still in its infancy in the 1890s but already a strong and lusty infant, 
nourished perhaps by the memory of the events in Britain where the Great Reform 
Act of 1832 had resulted in fairer representation in the House of Commons and 
considerably weakened the House of Lords. 
45
                                            
42 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, ed.John Gray, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), p.384. 
43 Hunt, American Precedents in Australian Federation, pp.100-101. 
44 Ibid. It is not true to suggest that the ordinary citizen was opposed to bicameralism. 
45 Ernest Scott, 'The Federation Movement and the Founding of the Commonwealth', in The 
Cambridge History of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), pp.428-
453. 
 He called it the 
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‘fundamental problem of the federal system: how to reconcile the principles of 
government by the will of a majority of the people, and government by the will of a 
majority of the States’.46
This expedient also had the merit of affording a rational basis for a second 
chamber in the bicameral system postulated by British tradition and 
Australian experience.
 The solution to this was, he said, a two-chambered 
legislature as found in the systems of Switzerland and America. Interestingly he 
commented: 
47
The Senate merited a separate chapter in the 1949 work of L. F. Crisp, The 
Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia. A revised edition 
was published in 1965 titled Australian National Government but the chapter on the 
Senate was not much changed from the earlier edition.
 
The words ‘expedient’ ‘rational’ and ‘tradition’ suggest that not only practical factors 
were at work here, but also a subliminal imperative that insisted on a bicameral 
legislature and that the example of America, which had implemented the system in 
the 18th century as a ‘compromise’ to persuade the smaller States to join the 
union, was enough to justify the establishment of a similar upper house in 
Australia. 
48
Crisp did not examine the reasons behind the establishment of the Senate in the 
chapter, though he gave close attention to the Convention debates and arguments 
about its powers and role and elaborated on the perception of a ‘fear of the 
masses’ as a factor in support for Federation generally. He saw the industrial 
strikes of 1890–1 as strengthening this fear and quoted a New South Wales 
conservative politician, Bruce Smith, as describing the Labour party as ‘ignorant of 
history, of economics and sociology’ and arguing that: ‘This growth upon our body 
  
                                            
46 Ibid., p.434. 
47 Ibid. 
48 It is the later edition which is referred to here. 
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politic can now be removed for all time by the proposed union of the Colonies’.49
Crisp based his comments on the fact that both Griffith and Clark, who were 
instrumental in drawing up the draft Constitution, were heavily influenced, along 
with many others, by the United States example, and concentrated on the pressure 
for a ‘strong’ Senate, rather than any discussion on the need for one.
 
His prediction turned out to be wildly inaccurate. 
50 He argued 
that the demand for a ‘strong’ Senate came from financial and conservative 
interests, implying perhaps, though he has not articulated this point, that this was 
the case for having a Senate at all. These interests, he claimed, saw Federation as 
a potential bastion against socialism and hoped to shape the States’ House in the 
image of their colonial upper houses by providing that it be indirectly elected by the 
State Parliaments where in any joint sitting propertied interests could almost 
certainly carry the day. The idea of popular direct election of the Senate was of 
concern in this case ‘for not even America had gone that far at that time’.51
J.A. La Nauze, whose The Making of the Australian Constitution is a seminal study 
of Australia’s Constitutional history, is another historian who maintains the silence. 
His is an authoritative history of the steps that led to the making of the Australian 
Constitution from 1890 onwards, covering the progress of the convention debates 
and the characters of individual delegates. It is comprehensive in its coverage, 
masterly in its assessments and written in a clear and accessible style. The first 
mention of the Senate is a quotation without comment from the 1891 resolutions 
that Parliament should consist of a ‘Senate and a House of Representatives’.
 
52 La 
Nauze points out that the first drafts of a Federal Constitution were prepared by 
Inglis Clark of Tasmania and Charles Cameron Kingston of South Australia for the 
1891 Conference. Both of these men were strongly influenced by the American 
model and La Nauze observed that there were few original points in either of the 
drafts, implying that their idea of a Senate came from that source.53
                                            
49 Crisp, Australian National Government, pp.16-17. 
50 Ibid., p.18. 
51 Ibid., p.19. 
52 La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution, p.37. 
53 Ibid., p.24. 
 La Nauze went 
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on to address in detail the problems of how the division of powers and 
responsibilities of the two houses should be carried out. There was never any 
question in his study of whether anyone felt there was a need or role for an upper 
house. He is among the great majority of historians who, along with the Convention 
delegates themselves, considered the provision of an upper house to be beyond 
question. 
John Hirst is another. He also sees the fundamentals of the Australian Constitution 
as mainly borrowed from the American example and ‘readily agreed to’. This of 
course included a Senate.54 Hirst discusses the problems of marrying the 
Westminster system of ‘responsible’ Government with the American system of a 
separate executive, and the decision to make the Senate an elected house, as 
opposed to the then American system of a Senate nominated by State legislatures. 
Some saw the idea of an upper house elected on a democratic franchise as almost 
a contradiction in terms, and Hirst quotes Henry Dobson as being ‘flabbergasted at 
this proposal being carried through the Convention without resistance’. The 
argument that won the day however was that ‘Since these electorates had returned 
to the Convention delegates of such high quality, the system was to be 
continued’.55
These issues are important but the fundamental issue of why it was thought, or 
assumed, that an upper house was necessary again did not concern Hirst. He did 
examine the question of ‘Why does the crown feature so prominently at the very 
heart of the new Government?’ because there was some argument in the debates 
suggesting that the constitution should make it clear that the executive power of 
the monarch was to be wielded by the ministers not the Monarch. Eventually the 
point was settled that the Ministers would be ‘the Queen’s Ministers of state for the 
Commonwealth’.
 
56
                                            
54 J.B. Hirst, The Sentimental Nation: The Making of the Australian Commonwealth, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p.101. 
55 Ibid., p.160. 
56 Ibid., p.31. 
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A more recent writer, Frank R. McGrath, a New South Wales lawyer, has 
attempted to unravel the intentions of the Constitution framers. This was not an 
easy task as the delegates themselves were not always clear on their intentions, 
torn as they were between a desire, for the most part, for a federated Australia, 
and a strong self-interest to protect the rights of their individual States. McGrath’s 
work clearly explained the various serious issues facing the delegates. He 
considered that the Senate was one of the most important issues before the 
Conventions and in his discussion has covered the usual responsibilities 
suggested for an upper house: the supervisory process of an upper chamber as a 
check on ‘hasty and ill-considered legislation or a brutal majority’, and the 
implications of the word ‘upper’, but he has not addressed the reasoning behind 
the creation of a Senate.57
There was a clear desire to create an effective check on radical action by the 
representatives of a bare majority of the Australia-wide electorate.
 He is one of the majority who see the inclusion of an 
upper chamber as inevitable. So, to him, the original intentions of the framers of 
the Constitution were to have a Senate as an active and important part of the 
Australian legislature: a House of Review and a check on the lower house. 
58
Stanley Bach, as already mentioned, is an American Constitutional historian and 
his work focused on the differences between the United States Senate and the 
Australian Senate, with only a brief discussion of the historical context. His is a 
significant addition to the literature on the Senate but his only comment on 
bicameralism is ‘however, the agreement among the Australian states in the 1890s 
required the creation of a bicameral Parliament’.
 
59
Those then are the principal constitutional historians who have seen the creation of 
a Senate as predestined, but others have considered the question in more detail. 
The earliest of these is Robert Randolph Garran in The Coming Commonwealth, 
published in 1897. Garran, who later a co-authored with John Quick The Annotated 
Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth discussed above, was a lawyer and 
 
                                            
57 McGrath, The Framers of the Australian Constitution and Their Intentions, p.45. 
58 Ibid., p.62. 
59 Bach, Platypus and Parliament: The Australian Senate in Theory and Practice, p.14. 
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active supporter of Federation. He wrote this work to summarise and explain 
Federation to his readers—Australians considering Federation. In it he discussed 
the system of two legislative chambers as a feature frequently associated with 
Federation though, interestingly, ‘perhaps not essential to it’. The existence of two 
chambers in England instead of perhaps three or four, he suggested, quoting E.A. 
Freeman, author of an authoritative work on Federation, was more or less an 
historical ‘accident’ but has a special fitness in a Federation in order to provide 
separate representation for the States.60
There will probably be no difficulty in deciding in favour of a two-chambered 
legislature, seeing that two Chambers are the rule throughout the British 
possessions, and that in a Federation there is a special reason for a Second 
Chamber to represent the States.
 The system was, Garran claimed, 
profoundly influenced by the American Union. Later he observed that the proposed 
Federal Parliament ‘undoubtedly will consist of the Queen and two representative 
Houses’ and: 
61
                                            
60 Garran, The Coming Commonwealth, pp.30-32; E.A. Freeman, History of Federal Government in 
Greece and Italy, ed. J. B. Bury, (London: Macmillan, 1893), Freeman’s work is discussed in a later 
chapter. 
61 Garran, The Coming Commonwealth, an Australian Handbook of Federal Government, p.126. 
 
Though Garran did not see a Senate as inevitable but as ‘more or less an historical 
accident’, in a clear example of path dependence he did accept the two major 
rationalisations for a second chamber: first we must have one because of the 
British example and second because, like the United States example, it would 
provide representation for the member states. Moreover, Garran recognised that 
not withstanding the revolution, the United States system also owed much to the 
British path. The reasons he gives are not completely convincing but Garran’s work 
itself illustrates how profound and irresistible were the main influences and 
pressures at work on the founders of the Constitution: history and expedience. 
Scott Bennett is one of the few commentators to identify the silence on the creation 
of a Senate: 
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One constitutional issue over which there was little debate in the 
Conventions was the provision that the national parliament was to be 
bicameral.62
He did not address the question in any detail but argued that the idea of a 
bicameral parliament stemmed from the experience of the delegates in their own 
colonies and the influential examples of the United States and Canada, suggesting 
that the concept ‘seemed to have been accepted automatically’.
 
63
Bennett does acknowledge that Labour party candidates for the 1897 Convention 
campaigned on a policy opposed to an upper house. He points out that, as only 
one (William Trenwith) was elected and he did not voice that opposition in the 
debates, it was not heard. Bennett also cites the Worker’s opinion which argued 
strongly, if not always coherently, against an upper house, demonstrating that 
there was an alternative point of view.
 
64 After this brief discussion Bennett moved 
on to the major issues of the powers of the putative Senate: equal representation 
and financial powers. He did not cite the debates in the Colonial parliaments, of 
which those in New South Wales were the most cogently argued by the Labour 
party which actually proposed an amendment that would have eliminated the 
Senate. An interesting aspect of this debate was the emphasis on the inevitability 
of a second house in that the speakers against a Senate almost invariably 
commented that they knew this amendment would be negatived but they felt it 
must be said.65
Another modern historian who questioned the bicameral solution, albeit 
unpublished, is Jennifer Hutchison. Hutchison examined whether the Senate 
fulfilled the expectations of its founders in the period from 1901 to 1975; 
expectations which she said ‘even at that time were somewhat naive and over-
optimistic’.
 
66
                                            
62 Bennett, The Making of the Commonwealth, p.112. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., p.131. 
65 New South Wales Debates, 8 July 1897, pp.1787-1810. 
66 Jennifer Margaret Hutchison, 'The Australian Senate 1901-1972' (Unpublished PhD thesis, 
Australian National University, 1976), p.1. 
 She discussed the ‘ready acceptance of bicameralism’ and concluded 
that ‘Bicameralism was accepted because of British, American and local Colonial 
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practice and Federalism was a scarcely questioned model’.67
Hutchison also outlined some of the theoretical arguments for a second chamber: 
as a balance between the executive and the legislature; restraint on the ‘unbridled 
power of a single chamber’; and a revising role or check on the sometimes hasty 
decisions of a first chamber. She points out that bicameralism had been adopted 
by a number of European countries perhaps ‘merely as an incidental aspect of a 
system these countries desired to emulate’. She extrapolates that this was possibly 
because of Britain's ‘record of stability in government concurrent with adaptation to 
and absorption of demands for alleviating the political power of the aristocracy’ 
which ‘was admired throughout Europe’. She argues that bicameralism in the 
British colonies has been attributed to ‘mere imitation of the mother country’ and 
quotes Marriott’s phrase that bicameralism was a ‘constitutional fetish’.
 Hutchison 
recognised the gap in the historiography and, to substantiate her conclusion, 
analysed the legacy of the Westminster system where, with other political 
scientists, she found that bicameralism can be interpreted as an ‘accident of 
history’. 
68
Brian Galligan and James Warden did not dismiss or ignore the question of 
bicameralism in their erudite discussion of ‘The design of the Senate’ but they did 
not treat it in depth. They merely reported that ‘all agreed that there was to be a 
Senate’ and ‘because of their political socialisation in English and Australian 
parliamentary traditions, the founders, who were colonial parliamentarians, took 
legislative bicameralism for granted’ and ‘that it was probably inevitable’.
 
69 The 
authors also cited the influence of the American example, and, unusually, 
mentioned some opposition, if in a roundabout way:70
the views of Deakin and his radical nationalist colleagues implied the 
abolition of both federalism and the Senate. The claims that federalism is an 
anachronism and the Senate is undemocratic have enjoyed widespread 
 
                                            
67 Ibid., p.59. 
68 Ibid., p.25. 
69 Galligan and Warden, 'The Design of the Senate', pp.89-111. 
70 Ibid., p.91. 
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support in Australia because they appeal to the populist democratic 
sentiments of our Westminster parliamentary tradition.71
Barton would have strongly disagreed with this assessment: As he put it:‘I take it 
there is no one here who will for one moment imagine that any form of government 
by a Parliament consisting of one House, could be designated a Federation’.
 
72
But no one can suppose that any pressure in favour of traditional forms would 
have been brought to bear upon the democratic communities in Australasia 
and South Africa, had they preferred to strike out a new path for themselves. 
But with unbroken unanimity they have adhered to the old. Again we must 
ask: Why?
 
Galligan and Warden were writing in 1986 and did not address the question of 
whether or not a senate was necessary. 
In strong contrast to most historians, at least one student of political institutions has 
actually questioned the need for a Senate in Australia. Marriott questioned why 
what he called ‘the civilised world’ preferred bicameralism and why Australia, 
among other colonial polities chose that system: 
73
Marriott cited the familiar arguments in support of second chambers: a 
‘counterpoise to democratic fervour’; the safety which lies in ‘sober second 
thoughts’; and the value of delay; but he said these familiar arguments no longer 
seem valid. He went on to suggest that the ‘only satisfactory appeal … is the 
appeal to history; the only safe guide, that of experience’ and suggested that 
perhaps ‘the world has set up a constitutional fetish’. Have the newer democracies 
such as Australia simply followed ‘sheep-like a misguided leader; or that 
institutions have been unintelligently imitated without sufficient regard to 
conditioning circumstances?’ or is it that under very different conditions 
bicameralism is a natural, not artificial growth?
 
74
Marriott sought answers in history by discussing the origins of second chambers 
and how they evolved from representing the various divisions in English society 
 
                                            
71 Ibid., p.101. 
72 OR, 23 March 1897, p.21. Ibid., p.102. 
73 Marriott, Second Chambers - an Inductive Study in Political Science, p.2. 
74 Ibid., p.3. 
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from the 13th century, when the model Parliament summoned by Edward I in 1295 
represented this principle. By the middle of the 14th century it had evolved into a 
‘Commons’ House of Parliament and a House of Lords in which form it more or 
less endured until the 20th century.75
Marriott also addressed the friction which had frequently occurred between the two 
Legislative Chambers in the Australian Colonies and of which the Convention 
delegates, practising politicians for the most part, were well aware. He considered 
it remarkable that ‘in the long discussions which preceded the consummation of the 
Federal Commonwealth no proposal for the erection of a unicameral legislature 
ever obtained any serious or influential support’.
 His is an interesting discussion and relevant 
to Australia as the Australian Senate can be traced back to these early 
parliamentary structures. This is clear in the frequent references to the British 
House of Lords as a role model for an Australian upper house in the Convention 
debates. 
76 This comment supports his 
argument that it was history and experience, or even what he calls a ‘constitutional 
fetish’ that persuaded the constitution makers to establish a Senate and 
underpinned the more practical arguments for State representation or a House of 
Review.77
Path dependence or other indications of subconscious, maybe even irrational, 
behaviour do not enter the arguments of English writer and politician H.B. Lees-
Smith, a Liberal MP who had joined the Labour Party and in 1931 was, briefly, a 
Cabinet Minister. Lees-Smith saw second chambers as a ‘clumsy and complicated 
addition to the structure of Government’. Expounding on the virtues and vices of 
second chambers he is most interesting in addressing the question ‘Are the 
Dangers of Single Chambers Serious?’ Lees-Smith challenged the idea that a 
 With this evocative phrase Marriott forcibly expressed the reasoning 
behind the theory of path dependence. Had the term ‘path dependence’ been 
available he would surely have been tempted to use it to explain the ‘subliminal’ 
behaviour of the legislators. 
                                            
75 Ibid., pp.5-6. 
76 Ibid., p.112. 
77 Ibid. 
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second chamber can restrain any hasty actions of a democratically elected house: 
‘This view takes no account of the potent influences of the general election that is 
to come’ he argued. In this he has followed and quoted from Walter Bagehot who 
suggested famously that a ‘steady opposition to a formed public opinion is hardly 
possible in our House of Commons, so incessant is the national attention to 
politics, and so keen the fear in the mind of each member—that he may lose his 
valued seat’.78
More recent publications include Helen Irving’s collection of essays entitled To 
Constitute a Nation. Here there are no suggestions that a Senate was unnecessary 
and of the several entries on the subject none question the need for an upper 
house. Irving’s work mainly addressed the issues of equal representation of the 
States and the attitude that this was regarded as undemocratic but necessary to 
persuade the smaller States to join the federation.
 Lees-Smith’s section on the Australian legislature is historically 
thorough but made no further comment on why a Senate was included in the 
structure of the Federal Parliament although his views on second chambers as 
‘clumsy and complicated’ were quite clear. 
79
George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money attempt to unravel the complexities of 
bicameralism with a view to identifying the effect of bicameral legislatures on 
political outcomes. In the section titled ‘Bicameralism in historical perspective’ they 
examined the historical background and experiences of several legislatures. Their 
discussion reinforces the view that the English model from the 14th century was 
the primary example, though underpinned by the ancient Greek theory of mixed 
government.
 
80
                                            
78 H B Lees-Smith, Second Chambers in Theory and Practice, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 
1923), pp.38-39. 
79 Ibid., p.147. 
80 George Tsebelis and Jeanette Money, Bi-Cameralism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), pp.15, 21. 
 They have also ranged further to discuss the evolution of bicameral 
legislatures from earlier unicameral legislatures in 18th and 19th century Europe, 
such as Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands. They touched upon modern 
federal systems and, though highly theoretical, their discussions have relevance to 
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the Australian situation in delineating the effects of bicameralism on political 
programmes, though without an answer to the question ‘Why a Senate?’ 
Political scientists Samuel C. Patterson and Anthony Mughan, in a wide-ranging 
discussion of bicameralism, discuss the development of European parliaments that 
included ‘second chambers’ or ‘upper houses’ suggesting that this is an indication 
of the pre-eminence and survival of aristocracy. Even though ‘senates have long 
outlived their original purposes and justification’, they argued, ‘they have, in one 
way or another, been transformed into modern, viable Parliamentary institutions’.81 
Like Meg Russell (Reforming the House of Lords, 2000) they noted that in ‘the 
English-language literature there is very little about parliaments that has focused 
on upper houses’.82
Though Patterson and Mughan’s discussion focused on the American experience it 
does have relevance to the Australian situation. For example they claimed that the 
division of the American National Legislature into two bodies was little debated in 
1787 and has been taken for granted ever since; a scenario repeated in 
Australia.
 
Instead of ‘path dependence’ Patterson and Mughan use the phrase ‘hidden 
power’ but it too suggests that a powerful layer of sentiment can overcome 
pragmatism in institutional decisions. This is revealed most clearly in the continuity 
of tradition, ceremonial and symbolism in the procedures of the Senate and which 
can be traced back to the House of Lords. This aspect will be explored in a later 
chapter. 
83
                                            
81 Patterson and Mughan, eds., Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World, p.ix. 
82 Ibid., p.x. Meg Russell, Reforming the House of Lords: Lessons from Overseas, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p.44. 
83 Patterson and Mughan, eds., Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World, p.9. 
 The major justification for the United States was that it would conciliate 
the small States by giving them the same representation as the larger States—that 
is, two Senators each. This aspect did not translate well into Australia because with 
only six states, two Senators each would not have provided enough members for a 
functional House. The solution in the Constitution was to provide for six senators 
from each State. 
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Patterson and Mughan delved into the origins of bicameralism as a 
representational basis for social classes and discussed the house of review theory 
as a restraint on the lower house which might be ‘liable to err … from fickleness 
and passion’ against which a second chamber would provide ‘a necessary 
defence’.84 Along with theoretical discussions, Patterson and Mughan’s book 
includes essays by contributors on various bicameral legislatures. Australian 
political scientist, John Uhr, contributed the Australian article entitled: ‘Generating 
Divided Government: The Australian Senate’. Uhr’s contribution does not discuss 
the reasons for a Senate but concentrated on its role as a house of review and a 
platform for minority voices, especially after the introduction of proportional 
representation: another silence.85
Alastair Davidson, an Australian political scientist, again does not question the 
establishment of a Senate in his book The Invisible State, only recognising that it 
was preordained at the 1890 Conference which approved the establishment of a 
Parliament to ‘consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives’. He discusses 
some of the convention debates about the Senate and argues that it was 
envisaged in the beginning that it would not be representative of the monied 
interests, but of the people, in contrast to the Colonial upper houses. His major 
discourse including the Senate, is on the thorny issue of relations between the 
houses and the solution to deadlocks, but he makes no comments on whether the 
institution was really necessary.
 Political scientists showed more interest in the 
question of whether an upper house is necessary, but their conclusions suggest 
that the strongest motivating factors are history and tradition. Unsurprisingly path 
dependence is a theory developed by political scientists. 
86
Moving on from political scientists, I reviewed ten general histories of Australia 
published between 1916 and 2004 to ascertain what the general reader might learn 
 
                                            
84 Ibid., p.14. 
85 John Uhr, 'Generating Divided Government: The Australian Senate', in Senates in the 
Contemporary World, ed. Samuel C. Patterson and Anthony Mughan, (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1999), pp.93-119. 
86 Alastair Davidson, The Invisible State: The Formation of the Australian State 1788 - 1901, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 231–234. 
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about the origins of the Senate from these works. As general histories, often 
covering a broad time span and wide range of topics, they cannot be expected to 
discuss Parliamentary issues in detail. Nevertheless, it is at least curious that the 
structure of Parliament receives so little attention and the Senate even less. 
Those who skirt the issue include: W. K. Hancock87; B.K. de Garis in F. K. 
Crowley’s book of essays;88 and C.M.H. Clark.89 The Oxford Companion to 
Australian History does not include a discussion of Parliament.90
Historians who did include some discussion of Parliament provide meagre detail. 
An exception is Ernest Scott who provided a quite expansive paragraph on the 
subject of Parliament and the structure of the Senate, without questioning the need 
for it.
 
91 Discussion of Parliament by other historians included R.A. Gollan in 1955, 
who considered federation and some aspects of the structure and powers of the 
Senate,92 and John Molony, who provided a discussion on federation with a brief 
summary of the structure of the Senate,93 while Stuart Macintyre confined his 
discussion to the differences in representation of the two houses.94 Frank Welsh, in 
the last work in this selection, accepted the establishment of the Senate without 
question or comment.95
This survey of the literature on the Australian Senate and its origins suggests that 
attitudes to it range from acceptance to apathy. The brief attention from historians 
suggests that many appear to have accepted the Constitution makers’ decision in 
 All of these are excellent works on the broad issues of 
Australian history but the student would need to go elsewhere to read about 
Parliament and the Senate. 
                                            
87 W.K. Hancock, Australia, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1930). 
88 B.K. de Garis, ‘1890-1900’ in Frank Crowley, A New History of Australia, (Melbourne: William 
Heinemann, 1974), pp.216-59. 
89 C.M.H. Clark, A History of Australia, vol. V (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1981). 
90 The Oxford Companion to Australian History, ed. Graeme Davison, et al., (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
91 Ernest Scott, A Short History of Australia, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1936). 
92 R.A. Gollan, 'Nationalism, the Labour Movement and the Commonwealth', in Australia: A Social 
and Political History, ed. Gordon Greenwood (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1955). 
93 John Molony, The Penguin History of Australia, (Ringwood: Penguin, 1987), pp.185-189. 
94 Stuart Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
p.138. 
95 Frank Welsh, Great Southern Land: A New History of Australia, (London: Allen Lane, 2004). 
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this regard in the same frame of mind—as a matter of course—as the delegates to 
the Conventions, leading to an odd silence on the establishment of this significant 
third arm of the Australian legislature. The inescapable conclusion is that the initial 
motivation was based upon tradition, the colonial experience of the Constitution’s 
authors, and inertia, or the heart ruling the head, if they ever actively considered it 
at all. The decision was justified by constructing it as a States’ House and a house 
of review, but these factors followed the initial decision to create a second 
chamber. 
What this brief survey shows is that few historians or political scientists have 
thoughtfully addressed the question ‘Why a Senate?’ Only Garran considered it in 
any detail and his conclusion that it was ‘more or less an historical accident’ is 
surely wrong.96
If we turn to works which discuss the architecture, ritual, practices and procedures 
of Australia’s six parliaments, again we find little work of analysis. The main works 
in this genre are from the English canon and are mostly quite recent. They are 
interesting for the light they shed on Australia’s parliamentary practices, which 
contain some of the clearest evidence of path dependence. The main sources of 
these publications are the Parliaments themselves, usually in the form of publicity 
pamphlets or commissioned books. Although they address the architecture, ritual 
and procedures they are usually brief and selective, revealing another silence or 
gap in the historiography. Primary sources on the topics are scarce and 
fragmentary and only occasionally appear in official sources such as Parliamentary 
debates. Administrative files on the subject are scattered and elusive if they can be 
traced at all. Some questions remain unanswered except in general terms. 
Records of the acquisition of a Black Rod in Tasmania’s Parliament, for example, 
can not be traced despite extensive searching by the Parliamentary historian.
 It was an ‘accident’ that was bound to happen. 
97
This aim of this thesis is to ask why Australia has a Senate. Why? Because no-one 
else has. Scholars, historians and political scientists have not asked this question 
 
                                            
96 Garran, The Coming Commonwealth, an Australian Handbook of Federal Government, pp.30-32. 
97 Personal communication with Terry Newman, Parliamentary Historian, Parliament of Tasmania, 
27 May, 2008. 
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and although they have struggled over its role, structure and activities, they have 
been silent on the reasons for its establishment in the first place. This thesis will 
look beyond the current literature and examine the major players in the debates for 
clues as to where their ideas came from and why a Senate was accepted so 
readily. 
The thesis seeks to answer the question by approaching it from two distinct but 
complementary directions: first a study of the intellectual forces found in the 
Convention Debates to identify the attitudes, hopes and aspirations of those 
making the decisions on Australia’s Parliament; followed by fieldwork in the State 
and Federal parliaments to observe the working of practices, rituals and symbols at 
first hand. The methodology undertaken for the thesis was to begin with a study of 
the records of the debates of the Conventions of the 1890s which drafted 
Australia’s Constitution. Running to several thousand pages these five volumes, 
which George Reid enumerated as ‘one volume of moderate size … one volume of 
1,110 pages’ and ‘two volumes of 2,544 pages’, formed the basis of the exhaustive 
research into the various influences on the delegates in their deliberations on the 
establishment of the Senate.98
The thesis is structured in eight chapters, the Introduction setting out the context of 
the question, the gap in the research, a theoretical framework, a review of the 
literature, the aims of the project and a description of the methodology. This is 
followed by chapters analysing the comments of the delegates in the debates to 
seek, in turn, which constitutional authorities they were familiar with and possibly 
 Australian State Parliaments and the Federal 
Parliament supported this primary study, which sought detailed, local knowledge 
and primary information on the processes involved in establishing and maintaining 
the separate upper houses in their traditional role, as well as the attitudes and 
experiences of parliamentarians. An added feature of the research was to 
personally observe the procedures, rituals and ceremonies of the State 
Parliaments as legacies of Westminster and to examine how and if these had been 
adapted by the Australian Senate. Was this another example of path dependence? 
                                            
98 The Right Honourable Sir George Houston Reid, My Reminiscences, (London: Cassell and 
Company Ltd., 1917), p.163. 
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influenced by, their visions of an ideal senate and an ideal senator, followed by 
three chapters on the influence of the models the delegates looked to in structuring 
the second chamber. These included the major models of Westminster, Canada, 
Washington and the Colonial Parliaments, extending to aspects of other 
Constitutions discussed by the delegates. The final section deals with how 
Parliamentary buildings, internal architecture, procedures, rituals and ceremonies 
reflect the heritage of Westminster. 
I will argue that the decision to adopt a Senate was taken with both head and 
heart. The heads assumed that a second chamber was needed to placate the 
putative States or to restrain a fledgling democracy. The hearts yearned for a 
second chamber for historical and sentimental reasons that sometimes conflicted 
with the ‘head’ and are best understood as an effect of what social scientists call 
path dependence. Australia ultimately has a Senate largely for the same reason 
that the carpets and seats in the chamber are red. 
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Chapter 2 
On Whose Authority? 
 
Federation is not a question of textbooks. Henry Higgins, OR, 10 September 1897, p.346. 
 
Higgins’ impatient remark takes us to the heart of a question not previously 
explored in any detail by students of Federation: how important were learned 
authorities in shaping the system that was ultimately adopted? Ironically, the 
erudite and urbane Victorian lawyer regularly invoked learned authority in his 
contributions to debate, as did many of his colleagues. Who were these authorities 
and in what context were they introduced? The chapter which follows will 
systematically explore the citation of learned authority by the delegates; first it will 
identify and discuss the authorities cited and their works and then explore the 
influence of those referred to by various delegates, with a special focus on how 
their reading might have influenced their attitudes to the future structure and 
expected role of the Senate. I will argue that although some authorities were very 
influential they were not decisive in shaping the Australian Federation and in 
particular the Senate. Rather, learned authority was used to buttress existing 
viewpoints, it did not create them, and on at least one important issue the same 
authority was cited in support of opposite sides of the same argument. The chapter 
will also examine reasons for the increased use of authorities as the 1890s wore 
on. By authorities I refer to recognised writers, historians, and political scientists 
who published works relating to federations and constitutions up to 1898, and 
which could have been read by the delegates. 
Some delegates demonstrated, even occasionally showed off, a thorough 
knowledge and understanding of the literature on federations, but it is possible that 
others read very little. Australian Constitutional historian J.A. La Nauze argued that 
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‘only a minority could be justly described as well-informed’.1 It can be assumed that 
most of the delegates would have been familiar with a manual by Richard Chaffey 
Baker which was distributed to the delegates before the first Convention in 1891.2
In his manual Baker described the American, Canadian, Swiss and South African 
Constitutions for the information of the delegates which provided them with a 
summary of the basic principles of Federation in a readily accessible form. In 1897 
he published a further work, a pamphlet on various forms of executive government, 
for the benefit of delegates wishing to unravel the thorny problems of the topic—
one close to Baker’s heart.
 
The work was published in May 1891, after the first Convention, to satisfy the many 
requests for copies Baker received from interested parties and so would also have 
been available to delegates to the 1897–98 Convention. Baker was a lawyer and 
politician who served in South Australia’s Parliament from 1868 to 1901, in both the 
Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council, and was President of the Council 
from 1893. He attended both the Conventions but not the 1890 Conference, and 
was elected Chairman of Committees in 1897–98. In 1901 he became the first 
President of the Australian Senate. His was an important contribution to the work of 
drawing up Australia’s Constitution. 
3
La Nauze suggested that the delegates might also have read other ‘elementary 
text books’ including Robert Garran’s The Coming Commonwealth.
 He also provided a list of other authorities for the 
further edification of the delegates. Baker’s guide is a valuable insight into who 
were regarded as authorities at the time of the Conventions. Although not all the 
writers he recommended were referred to in the debates, enough of them were to 
conclude that many took Baker’s advice seriously. 
4
                                            
1 J.A. La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution,, (Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 1972), pp.272-3. 
2 Richard Chaffey Baker, A Manual of Reference to Authorities for the Use of the Members of the 
Australasian Convention Which Will Assemble at Sydney on March 2, 1891, (Adelaide: 
W.K.Thomas & Co., 1891). The schedule of books recommended by Baker are listed at Appendix 1. 
3 Richard Chaffey Baker, The Executive in a Federation, (Adelaide: C.E. Bristow, Government 
Printer, North Terrace, 1897). 
4 La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution, p.273; Robert Randolph Garran, The 
Coming Commonwealth, an Australian Handbook of Federal Government, (Sydney, London: Angus 
& Robertson, Simpkin, Marshall, 1897). 
 Garran’s work 
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was not published until 1897 and so was not available to the earlier meetings of 
1890 and 1891. Alfred Deakin, a delegate from Victoria and a future Prime Minister 
of Australia, described it as ‘one of the most lucid and well digested political 
handbooks which we possess on this important subject’.5
Apart from Baker’s manual, which was a useful introduction and probably a spur to 
the delegates to read about the theories of federalism, the principal published 
authority was without doubt James Bryce. His name crops up frequently in the 
debates, usually in relation to his magnum opus The American Commonwealth.
 The delegates’ readings 
naturally enough covered all the issues associated with federation, including the 
questions of bicameralism and upper houses. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the decision to establish a bicameral Parliament for Australia had been 
accepted without question before the Conventions even began, so it was not then 
an issue, though occasional remarks from delegates suggest that it was not 
forgotten. 
6 
According to Edwin Blackmore, Clerk to the 1897–8 Convention,7 Bryce’s work lay 
on ‘the Table’ throughout those proceedings.8
                                            
5 OR, 30 March 1897, p.288. 
6 James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, 1st ed., Three vols., (London: Macmillan, 1888). 
7 Edwin Gordon Blackmore, Clerk of the Legislative Council and of the Parliament of South 
Australia and later the first Clerk of the Federal Senate. 
8 La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution, p.273. 
 The American Commonwealth was 
first published in 1888 and was the earliest work to comprehensively address the 
institutions of the United States. It is a work of extraordinary brilliance and was 
published at a very opportune time for the Australian Federation Conventions. A 
distinguished British historian and statesman, Bryce published works on history 
and biography, as well as a study of South Africa after a visit to that country in 
1897. Born in Belfast and with strong Scottish links, he was also an MP and 
cabinet minister, facts which, by the mid 1890s, would have given his views greater 
weight than those of many scholars. That Bryce was extensively read by many 
delegates is clear from the number of times he was quoted in the debates. He was 
even quoted before the 1890 Conference when Parkes referred to him on the 
subject of the government’s dependence on the will of the lower house, which 
meant that ‘no great scheme’ was possible because of the brief rule of 
Chapter 2: On Whose Authority 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
governments under the parliamentary system. Parkes then compared it with the 
United States ‘that unequalled system’ in which the congress had no control over 
the executive, the president.9
In that monumental work by Mr. Bryce, 
 Already in 1889 the comparative merits of the two 
systems were being considered and the opinion of Bryce taken seriously. 
His name first appeared during the 1890 Conference where The American 
Commonwealth was given this glowing testimonial by Deakin: 
The American Commonwealth, are 
summed up, in the most perspicuous and able manner, almost all the 
lessons which the political student could hope to call from an exhaustive, 
impartial, and truly critical examination of the institutions of that country with 
which we are so closely allied. As a text-book for the philosophic study of 
constitutional questions it takes its place in the very first rank.10
For a more general approach to the history of federalism, Edward Augustus 
Freeman was the main authority for those described by La Nauze as ‘the more 
literate’ delegates, especially Josiah Symon and Patrick Glynn who both quoted 
from him extensively.
 
This was not all Deakin said about Bryce’s work. He went on to expound from 
Bryce various facets of the American Constitution of 1787. His discussion revealed 
that he was thoroughly versed in Bryce’s work and admired it greatly. He also 
demonstrated his admiration and knowledge of the Constitution of the United 
States. Only Deakin quoted from Bryce in 1890, but undoubtedly many of the 
delegates went home and read the work, for it was referred to often in the 
subsequent Conventions. The inclusion of Bryce in Baker’s list would also have 
encouraged study of his work. 
11 Freeman (1823–1892) was an English historian and a 
prolific writer. He was appointed Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford in 
1884. His first book was a History of Architecture (1849), and he went on to publish 
on a wide range of historical and political matters in reviews, books and articles.12
                                            
9 A.W. Martin, Henry Parkes: A Biography, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1980), p.381. 
10 OR, 10 February 1890, p.25. 
11 E.A. Freeman, History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy, ed. J. B. Bury, (London: 
Macmillan, 1893); La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution, p.273. 
12 Margaret Drabble, ed., The Oxford Companion to English Literature, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1985). 
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His best known work was his five volume History of the Norman Conquest (1867-
79), his longest completed book, which was read by at least one delegate, Andrew 
Inglis Clark of Tasmania. Clark considered Freeman to be ‘the English author who 
has studied the most closely, and written the most exhaustively on federal 
government’.13 Another of Freeman’s works, The Growth of the English 
Constitution, was referred to by Isaac Isaacs and it is quite likely that other works 
of his were known and read by the delegates.14
Bryce had been a student of Freeman’s and wrote a not entirely uncritical 
appreciation of him and his work for the English Historical Review in 1892.
 
15 
Latterly Freeman’s work is not held in high regard. According to the Oxford 
Companion to English Literature he was handicapped by an ‘uncontrollable 
prolixity’ and that the ‘selectivity of his sources and his eccentric handling of them 
meant that his work was already being superseded when he died in 1892’.16
Goldwin Smith (1823–1910) was another favourite authority among the delegates, 
his name cropping up to support a variety of speakers and arguments. He was 
included in Baker’s list with reference to a journal article ‘The Canadian 
Constitution’ in 1887.
 
Nevertheless his opinions and conclusions on the principles of Federation were 
taken very seriously by the delegates to the 1897–8 Convention. 
17 First mentioned in 1890 by Deakin he was referred to again 
in 1891 by Edmund Barton, Baker, John Alexander Cockburn, again by Baker, 
Cockburn and Simon Fraser, in 1897, and in 1898 by Isaacs and Glynn.18
                                            
13 OR, 11 February 1890, p.35; 11 March 1891, p.243. 
14 Ibid., 26 March 1897, p.180. 
15 James Bryce, 'Edward Augustus Freeman', The English Historical Review VII, July 1892. 
16 Drabble, Oxford Companion to English Literature, p.368. 
17 Goldwin Smith, ‘The Canadian Constitution’, Contemporary Review, July 1887. 
18 OR, Deakin, 13 February 1890, pp.96, 98; Barton, 6 March 1891, p.92; Cockburn, 3 April 1891, 
p.712, 16 September 1897, p.878; Baker, 6 March 1891, p.110, 23 March 1897, p.29; Fraser, 24 
March 1897, p.80; Isaacs, 9 February 1898, pp.719, 758, 10 March 1898, p.2183; Glynn, 11 
February 1898, p.854. 
 There is 
a preponderance here of South Australian delegates which indicates the influence 
of Baker’s advice on their readings. A pattern can also be seen to emerge of 
delegates, after hearing the names of certain authorities and seeing them 
recommended in Baker’s manual, taking the logical course of reading the works for 
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themselves. In this the different pattern of electing delegates to the Conventions, 
and the break between 1891 and 1897, may have played a part in encouraging the 
delegates to read recognised works on federation, giving them time to study the 
subject more closely as well as considering the possibility of being elected as a 
delegate. 
It was Deakin again who gave the lead on Goldwin Smith as only he mentioned 
him in 1890, though he did not mention him at subsequent meetings. A British 
historian, Goldwin Smith’s reputation rested mainly on his book Canada and the 
Canadian Question (1891).19 This came after the article recommended by Baker 
but was probably a useful reference for the delegates who viewed Canada as an 
example of a successful Federation of separate British colonies and looked to the 
Canadian experience for models and danger signals. Smith’s opinions of the 
Canadian federation were not flattering, especially his unfavourable views on the 
idea of a nominated Senate.20 The Canadian Senate was nominated and, in 
Smith’s opinion, did not work well.21 Not everyone admired his work, Fraser 
advising the Convention that Goldwin Smith was ‘thoroughly disrated in that part of 
the world’ [Canada].22
An interesting and seemingly restless character, Goldwin Smith was a prolific 
writer, expounding his controversial views on democracy, imperialism, and studies 
in social science and literature, and it is likely that other works of his were familiar 
to the delegates, The United States: an Outline of Political History (1893), for 
example. Also a professor of modern history at Oxford he later left England for the 
United States where he held the professorship of English and Constitutional history 
at Cornell University until 1871, when he moved to Toronto, where he remained for 
the rest of his life. Goldwin Smith’s history has lost much of its credibility because 
of his extreme racist views, especially his anti-Semitism. As Hugh Tulloch, an 
 
                                            
19 Goldwin Smith, Canada and the Canadian Question, (London: Macmillan, 1891). 
20 OR, Barton, 6 March 1891, p.92. 
21 Canada’s Senate is still an appointed body. Smith, Canada and the Canadian Question, p. 163. 
22 OR, 24 March 1897, p.80. 
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English historian writing in 1988, put it: ‘In isolation Smith succumbed to a racial 
paranoia’.23
Another authority recommended by Baker was Albert Venn Dicey (
 
1835–1922), a 
Professor of Common Law at Oxford. He was a respected constitutional theorist 
whose work An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885) was 
regarded as a seminal work and guide to the understanding of the British 
Constitution. His biographer, Richard Cosgrove, commented, ‘The clarity of his 
prose made the work accessible to a wide spectrum of educated opinion’. He goes 
on to say that Dicey reduced the complex topic to three concepts: parliamentary 
sovereignty, the rule of law, and constitutional conventions (unwritten rules).24 
Three of Dicey’s works were listed by Baker, but the one of most interest to the 
delegates was An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885), 
sometimes referred to simply as The Law of the Constitution. Andrew Joseph 
Thynne and Cockburn quoted Dicey twice in 1891, and though neither of them 
name the work, Cockburn speaks of his ‘admirable work on Federal 
Government’.25 In 1897 Isaacs brought Dicey in to support his argument against 
equal representation in the Senate and named his source as Dicey’s The Law of 
the Constitution.26 In 1898 Bernhard Ringrose Wise also brought Dicey and the 
same work into his argument on legal matters.27
 Though not mentioned by other delegates it can be assumed that with Baker’s 
recommendation and Dicey’s reputation as a leading constitutional scholar of his 
day, his work was not unfamiliar to the delegates and must have had some 
influence on their thinking. Bryce, Freeman, Goldwin Smith and Dicey were 
colleagues and contemporaries in the Oxford milieu of their era and were familiar 
 
                                            
23 Hugh Tulloch, James Bryce's American Commonwealth: the Anglo-American Background, 
(Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society: the Boydell Press, 1988). 
24 Richard Cosgrove, ‘Dicey, Albert Venn, (1835-1922)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
2004, vol.16, p.44. 
25 OR, 10 March 1891, p.198. 
26 Ibid., 10 September 1897, pp.212-3. 
27 Ibid., 1 March 1898, p.1686. 
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with each other’s views. Bryce even dedicated his American Commonwealth to 
Dicey.28
Walter Bagehot, a 19th century British economist and commentator, was another 
English authority referred to by the delegates, though mostly in the later stages in 
1898.
 
29 His book The English Constitution, first published in 1867, explored the 
constitution of the United Kingdom and considered the contrasts between the 
British and American systems. Bagehot’s work came to be regarded as a standard 
work on government and his observations on the role of the monarchy and the 
executive influenced interpretations well into the 20th century.30
Some less frequently cited authorities were the more specialist writers John 
George Bourinot (1837–1902), a Canadian author, and Erskine May (1815–86), a 
parliamentary specialist whose views on procedure were canvassed by some 
delegates. Bourinot and May were writers with some points in common. Both were 
parliamentary officials and both wrote accounts of parliamentary procedure as they 
saw it in their respective institutions. Bourinot, a journalist and parliamentary 
reporter, was an officer of the Canadian Senate and House of Commons. He 
derived his authority from his experience in these positions, and in his role as Clerk 
of the House of Commons would have advised the Speaker and other members on 
parliamentary procedure. La Nauze unkindly described him as ‘one of those worthy 
parliamentary officials who (like Blackmore in his own sphere) were content to 
compile rather than analyse’, and his work as ‘mostly … uncritical and 
 For the delegates 
it was Bagehot’s decided views on the superiority of the British cabinet system of 
government over the United States Presidential system, which he considered to be 
flawed and inflexible, that were particularly relevant. His work provided his readers, 
amongst whom were Baker, Glynn, and Isaacs, with insights, information and 
conclusions on various aspects of constitutions and of government. 
                                            
28 Tulloch, James Bryce's American Commonwealth: the Anglo-American Background, pp.37-8, 21, 
26, 38-44. 
29 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, (London: C. A. Watts, 1964). 
30 Joseph Hamburger, ‘Bagehot, Walter, (1826–1873)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
2004, vol.3, pp. 218–224. 
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descriptive’.31 Baker listed two of Bourinot’s books in his manual: Federal 
Government in Canada (1887) and the Manual of the Constitution of Canada. But 
from the quotations mentioned in the debates it is clear that other works of his were 
read by delegates. Joseph Abbott for example described Bourinot as ‘a great 
constitutional writer … who is accepted as an authority on most matters relating to 
parliamentary law, and who is continually quoted as a constitutional authority 
throughout the British Empire’.32 First referred to by John William Downer in 1891, 
he was also quoted by Isaacs and Deakin in 1897 and Symon in 1898, usually on 
procedural matters.33
May served a long period at Westminster. He rose through the ranks from assistant 
librarian to become Clerk of the House of Commons from 1871 to 1886. During his 
service he wrote several works on Constitutions but it was his Parliamentary 
Practice, first published in 1841, that would have been of most interest to the 
Convention delegates. His work was not listed by Baker but it had been used by 
the New South Wales parliament. In 1851, according to May’s biographer, William 
McKay, the Speaker of the New South Wales Legislative Council told May that his 
work was indispensable to the ‘colonial legislatures’.
 
34 From this it seems that other 
Australian legislatures used his work and that delegates with a parliamentary 
background would have been familiar with his writings. He did not appear in the 
debates until 1898 when only Baker and Barton referred to him in a discussion on 
the finer points of procedures relating to petitions and Bills.35 May edited a further 
eight editions of Parliamentary Practice and it is still updated and in print.36
                                            
31 La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution, p.274. 
32 OR, 11 March 1898, p.2287. 
33 Abbott referred to an article ‘The Canadian Dominion and proposed Australian Commonwealth: a 
Study in Comparative Politics’, Ibid., 1 March 1898, p.2287; Downer, referred to ‘an essay on 
Canadian Federation’, Ibid., 3 April; 1891, p.715; Symon referred to a ‘valuable article in the Arena’, 
Ibid., 31 January 1898, pp.344-5. Isaacs did not specify his source, Ibid., 26 March 1897, p.175. 
34 William McKay, ‘May, Thomas Erskine, Baron Farnborough, (1815–1886)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, 2004, vol.37. pp. 561–563. 
35 OR, Baker, 4 March 1898, p.1869; Barton, 8 March 1898, p.2061. 
36 Sir Donald Limon, ed., Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of 
Parliament, (Butterworths, London, 1997). 
 
Undoubtedly Bourinot and May had a strong influence on the procedures for the 
new Federal Parliament. 
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Other authorities mentioned by the delegates, though not obscure or minor in their 
own right, did not feature often in the debates. These included classical writers 
relating to ancient or older constitutions and some contemporary writers whose 
work only touched on the business of the debates or who were referred to 
infrequently. In this regard and in a fine show of erudition and a scholarly duel with 
Symon, Higgins managed to introduce six authorities and some classics in one 
speech on 10 September, 1897.37
Burke (1729-1797) was not an obscure figure but was only twice mentioned in the 
debates. A statesman and an 18th century political thinker and parliamentarian he 
played a prominent part in all major political issues in Britain for about 30 years 
after 1765, when he was elected to the British House of Commons, and remains an 
important figure in the history of political theory. John Bagnall Bury was a classical 
scholar and editor of Freeman’s History of Federal Government, to which he added 
some thoughts of his own, while Montesquieu was a major figure of the French 
Enlightenment credited with being one of the principal inventors of political 
science.
 It was an impassioned speech against equal 
State representation in the Senate and he brought in Edmund Burke, Edward 
Freeman, John Bury, Montesquieu, Bishop Thirlwall and Strabo to support his 
argument. The debate on the controversial question of whether there should be an 
equal number of senators for each State had references to eight authorities by six 
delegates and became a battle between Symon and Higgins, who held opposite 
views on the question. 
38 Bishop (Connop) Thirlwall (1797-1875) referred to once, was one of the 
more obscure authors cited. His claim to constitutional fame stems from his History 
of Greece (1835-1844) and a translation of Niebuhr’s History of Rome. His brief 
mention and the dates of his work suggest that his influence on the delegates was 
probably negligible and pertained to the Grecian system of Government, a 
recognised antecedent for Federal Government.39
                                            
37 OR, 10 September 1897, p.348. 
38 Peter V. Conroy Jr, Montesquieu Revisited, ed. David O'Connell, vol.829, (New York: Twayne 
Publishers, 1992), cover essay.  
 Equally obscure was Strabo 
39 The Skythian Campaign, www.metrum.org/perwars/skyth.htm. Accessed 16 July 2008. 
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(63BC–24AD), a Greek geographer and philosopher, whose work Geographica 
impressed Higgins with its description of the Constitution of the Lykian League.40
Higgins had more to say on 15 September when he introduced Benjamin Franklin 
(1706–1790), the American constitutionalist and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) a 
noted philosopher whose works are legion, but in this case his essay ‘Of a Second 
Chamber’ in On Liberty was the source of Higgins’ comments.
 
41 His argument here 
is on the perceived necessity of a second chamber and he introduces his speech 
with the words: ‘I submit, that in no form of government are two houses 
necessary—I hope I shall not be taken as advocating that there should be only one 
house in this government’. It is difficult to interpret this remark in any other way, 
especially as he goes on to say ‘As Benjamin Franklin said a long time ago, the 
system of having two houses does bear a resemblance to trying to drag a cart with 
one horse in front and one horse behind, one horse pulls one way and the other 
horse pulls the other way’.42 Higgins seems to contradict himself here but 
underlying his comments is his opinion, never openly expressed, that an upper 
house was an anachronism. His biographer comments that Higgins ‘had little time 
for States rights’, rights which were the main justification for a Senate.43
William Edward Hartpole Lecky (1838–1903) was another of the authors referred to 
infrequently in the debates, mostly in reference to the referendum. Lecky was an 
Irish historian whose major work was an eight volume History of England in the 
Eighteenth Century (1878-1890). This, says Joseph Spence, his biographer, was 
regarded ‘as a manual for Irish politics’.
 In this 
speech he goes as far as he ever does but as the decision for bicameralism was 
now irrevocable he was circuitous in his comments. 
44 Thomas Playford quoted from it as early 
as 1890,45 but it was another and later one of his works, Democracy and Liberty
                                            
40 OR, 10 September 1897, p.348. 
41 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. John Gray, (Oxford University Press, 1991,) 
pp.384-392. 
42 OR, 15 September 1897, p.790. 
43 John Rickard, H.B.Higgins: The Rebel as Judge, (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p.94. 
44 Joseph Spence, ‘Lecky, (William) Hartpole, (1838–1903)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, 2004. vol.33, pp.27–32. 
45 OR, 13 February 1890, p.13. 
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(1896), to which Dobson and Isaacs referred when they cited him in 1897 and 
1898. In this work Lecky referred to the ‘tyranny of the majority’ a phrase used by 
Dobson, while Isaacs cited Lecky’s work in reference to the idea of a referendum: 
‘It is to be remembered … that the referendum is not intended as a substitute for 
representative government’.46
Judge Joseph Story, an American lawyer, whose work Commentaries on the 
Constitution was recommended by Baker, was an authority used more frequently 
by the delegates. Symon, when introducing him into the debates, prefaced a 
quotation from him with this accolade: ‘Mr. Justice Story … probably one of the 
greatest constitutional writers who ever lived in the United States or any other 
country, and an authority whose value will not be questioned’.
 
Other authorities cited included a Canadian parliamentary writer, Alpheus Todd 
(1821-1884). An official in the Canadian parliament, Todd made a study of 
responsible parliamentary Government and focused on the role of the crown and 
its representative in the Colonies, the Governor-General. Under the principle of 
responsible government, executive responsibility resides in the Prime Minister, who 
is leader of the House with the greater financial powers. In turn the Prime Minister 
is responsible to the other Ministers who form a Cabinet, through them to the 
Parliament and through Parliament to the people. Todd’s work Parliamentary 
Government in the Colonies, was recommended by Baker and referred to in 
discussions on the constitutional role of the Governor-General and the Crown in 
the Australian Constitution as well as consideration of some military issues. 
47
 … he points out two grounds for the existence of the senate, and 
emphasises a double reason for its existence in connection with our proposal. 
The senate is not merely a state house-it is something more; it is also a 
revising chamber … which we determine shall be free from the faults, … of 
 Story’s work was 
the basis of a lively discussion between Symon, Wise and Barton on equal 
representation and the existence of the Senate, on 10 September 1897. Wise 
quoted from Story in this way:  
                                            
46 Ibid., Dobson, 15 September 1897, p.637; Isaacs, 10 March 1898, p.2184. 
47 Ibid., 10 September 1897, p.294. 
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the revising chambers of the separate colonies, by being more in touch with 
popular sentiment. 
To which Higgins riposted: ‘Why is a state house particularly fit to be a revising 
chamber?’48 As has been shown Higgins doubted the need for an upper house and 
he then brought the verbal jousting to a close with the remark that heads this 
chapter: that ‘Federation is not a question of text books’. This he immediately 
followed up with a remarkable speech citing a plethora of textbooks, perhaps to 
demonstrate that he, at least, was as well read as anyone else.49
An American academic and political scientist, John William Burgess (1844–1931) 
was drawn on by some delegates, including Baker, Symon, Isaacs and Glynn. His 
works were not in Baker’s list but his 
 
Political Science and Constitutional Law and 
Sovereignty and Liberty were both mentioned by name. Glynn and Isaacs were 
familiar with his works and quoted him to support their arguments on Constitutional 
amendments. Burgess was the author of several works on constitutional and 
political subjects, and was a respected authority in these matters.50
Dobson, in an anecdotal and rather obscure argument about democracy, brought 
in Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) and Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881). His 
remarks had little to do with the works of either of these writers but revealed that 
Dobson himself was hostile to the idea of democracy.
  
51 Words of wisdom were 
also drawn from United States politicians; Woodrow Wilson’s work Congressional 
Government for example.52
This summary of authorities referred to by the delegates shows that at least some 
of them had read widely on the subject of federation, most often in relation to the 
American experience. Baker’s manual was probably well perused and his list of 
recommendations would have provided a valuable guide to the other delegates. 
Isaacs, Higgins, and Glynn were the most frequent users of quotations and their 
 
                                            
48 Ibid., p.326. 
49 Ibid., p.346. 
50 Ibid., 9 February 1898, p.719. 
51 Ibid., 23 February 1898, p.1404. 
52 Wilson was an American politician and lawyer who went on to become, in 1912, the 27th 
President of the United States. 
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range of authors was wide. Baker and Deakin also used quotations frequently and 
joined in discussions on the views of various authorities to validate their arguments 
or to confound those of other delegates. 
There is evidence in the records that the quoting of authorities was not always well 
received. Downer, for example, mocked Higgins and his reliance on James Bryce: 
‘I have the greatest respect for Mr. Higgins, and I humbly follow Mr. Bryce when 
Mr. Bryce happens to agree with my own views’. This comment conveys a hostile 
attitude on the part of Downer to the use of authorities by delegates to make a 
point. He may have considered that the delegates should be more independent in 
their views rather than ‘humbly’ following the dictates of ‘authorities’ such as Bryce, 
however well regarded. He followed this up later in a tart response to an 
interjection from Barton when he said ‘I am simply dealing in a spirit of humility with 
Mr. Higgins and his authority, Mr. Bryce’.53
Higgins, a frequent user of quotations, was also the least tolerant of others’ use of 
authorities. His cantankerous remark about text books came during an argument 
with Symons which seemed to be about who could demonstrate a more learned 
approach.
 Clearly Downer was not impressed with 
Bryce. 
54 The exchange ended with this closing remark from Higgins: ‘there has 
been no attempt to justify this equal representation, except by reading from text 
writers a sort of loose statement as to the American system as matters of fact’.55
                                            
53 OR, 29 March 1897, p.209. 
54 Ibid., 10 September 1897, p.349. 
55 Ibid. 
 
Clearly Higgins was also becoming impatient with the constant parading of 
authorities, though he himself quoted frequently even ostentatiously from several 
sources, but perhaps he could perceive that opinion was mostly against him on this 
point. Symon, also a frequent user of quotations, provided another illustration of 
impatience with authorities and expressed the feelings of some delegates on the 
matter when he prefaced a speech with: ‘I do not propose to deal with the matter 
academically for more than one single moment’ and then, after making his point 
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‘this is the only academical quotation with which I shall trouble hon. members’.56 
There were others who showed a reluctance to quote from authorities and 
apologised to delegates for doing so. Wise, for example, when he quoted from 
Story prefaced his speech with: ‘I am very unwilling indeed to quote authorities, but 
so many authorities have been already quoted that I cannot help referring to a 
quotation from Mr. Justice Story’.57
The first authority to consider is Richard Baker, the only Australian authority 
referred to by the delegates, apart from the brief mention of Garran. The works 
cited were the manual he provided for the instruction of the delegates in 1891 and 
 
Authorities seem to have been used to bolster the views of the speakers with 
credibility as well as a perception of learning, but adverse comments about 
quotations reflected a disinclination on the part of some of the assembled 
delegates to accept such counsel and a sense that authorities had been overused. 
Wise’s professed unwillingness to cite authorities suggested a degree of self-
sufficiency in his mind and the minds of other delegates who considered that 
Federation was a test of self-reliance and independence and resented the foisting 
of the views of outsiders into the debates. Wise and others may also have found 
some of the quotations superfluous, or irrelevant, or time wasting, especially, for 
example, in the extended exchange between Symon and Higgins. 
The next section will examine the topics and arguments delegates drew from their 
reading and how they may have been influenced by them, with a focus on the 
question of an upper house. There were four major issues on which authorities 
were called upon to support opposing arguments in the debates involving the 
Senate and its role: the methods of electing senators; equal representation of the 
States; the power of the Senate in regard to money bills; and whether the Cabinet 
system of responsible government or the American system of divorcing the Ministry 
from the legislature was the most appropriate. 
                                            
56 Ibid., p.291-2. 
57 Ibid., p.326. 
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the later manual on the executive in a Federation. James Munro acknowledged 
Baker’s contribution early in the 1891 Convention: 
We have come here to frame a constitution, and the instructions that were 
given to us, I am happy to say, are very clearly laid down by the hon. member, 
Mr. Baker, in the book which he was good enough to distribute amongst us.58
In 1897 Bernhard Wise described it as a ‘book to which frequent reference has 
been made’.
 
59
in a pamphlet issued by Sir Richard Baker, … he points out that the essence 
of Federation is that a citizen has got two citizenships—he is a citizen of the 
Federation for federal purposes, and a citizen of the State for State 
purposes.
 Higgins called upon his views most frequently, quoting him on three 
occasions in 1897, all from the pamphlet. He was particularly taken by Baker’s idea 
of dual citizenship: 
60
There must be a dual citizenship. In a Federation the people are citizens of 
two different nationalities, if I may so express myself. They are citizens of 
the States and also of the Federation. Both the States and the Federal 
Governments act directly on them. In the particular form of union, which in 
contradistinction to Federation is called Confederation, the government of 
the central body acts upon the States as States, and not upon the individual 
citizens of the States as citizens of the central Government.
 
 
Deakin also used Baker’s concept of dual citizenship and repeated a quotation, 
used by Higgins only a few days earlier, to support the view that you cannot have 
responsible Government in a federation: 
61
                                            
58 Ibid., 5 March 1891, p.46. 
59 Ibid., 1 March 1898, p.1687. 
60 Ibid., 24 March 1897, p.97. 
61 Ibid., 30 March 1897, p.286. 
 
The quotations were used in the discussion on whether the two houses should 
have equal powers or that the power to initiate and amend money bills should be 
the sole prerogative of the lower house, the basis of responsible government. It 
was Baker’s strongly held view that responsible Government, or the Cabinet 
system, was incompatible with Federation: 
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I do not say that we cannot form a workable government with the executive 
form of cabinet; but I do say that you cannot form a workable federal 
government, that the machine will not work in the manner intended—at all 
events, it will not work in the manner I intend, it will not work in the manner 
the people in the smaller states intend—it will result in an amalgamation 
instead of a federation.62
Although Baker was influential, it was Bryce who was most frequently quoted and 
referred to during the debates. His name was invoked on no less than 45 
occasions, mostly in 1897, and by many delegates. Of course many references 
were only slight and not necessarily quotations or citations of his work in support of 
an opinion. Nevertheless, these figures suggest that he was widely read, even by 
those who made no reference to his work, and it can be speculated that the actual 
references would reflect only some of the ideas the delegates drew from him. One 
delegate commented ‘I dare say hon[ourable] gentlemen have nearly all of them 
very carefully read the admirable work of Mr. Bryce’.
  
Although he pursued his ideal energetically, Baker signally failed to persuade the 
Conventions to abandon the principle of a traditional Cabinet system on the 
Westminster model, a system then in place in all Australian Colonial Parliaments. 
Nevertheless, Baker would have had a strong personal influence on the thinking of 
the delegates as a respected parliamentarian; he was elected Chairman of 
Committees in the 1897–8 Convention. He made his views well known during the 
debates and through his publications, but tradition and sentiment underpinned by 
the effect of path dependency, won the day, together with a perception that two 
houses with equal powers could lead to serious conflict. The familiar and 
comfortable system of responsible Government as practised in Westminster and 
the colonial parliaments was adopted for the federal sphere. 
63 Deakin referred to Bryce 
most frequently and, as mentioned earlier, it was he who strongly recommended 
Bryce’s The American Commonwealth to the delegates at the 1890 Conference.64
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63 Ibid., Rutledge, 9 March 1891, p.147. 
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Deakin also held a long correspondence with Bryce on aspects of Australia’s 
Federation.65
Bryce’s work on the American Constitution was used as an authority and guide for 
the framing of a new Australian Constitution in the Australian Convention debates. 
This illustrates the close links between the three countries and their governance 
and clearly demonstrates the evolution of the Australian Constitution from the two 
major models of the United States and the British. It is apparent from the first 
comment on Bryce by Deakin that he was greatly admired and respected as a 
scholar. His work is a comprehensive coverage of all aspects of the United States 
Constitution and La Nauze has gone so far as to suggest that because of the 
influence of Bryce’s work on the ideas of the delegates, he could be counted as 
one of the ‘fathers’ of the Australian Constitution.
 
66
Deakin first quoted Bryce early in 1890, recommending Bryce’s work to the other 
delegates and then extolling the United States system as described by Bryce. 
Quoting extensively he commended the ‘sovereign authority’ and complete 
independence of the United States Federal Government from the State 
Governments and discussed the merits of referendums and General Elections. In 
this he drew attention to the Canadian and Swiss systems with the conclusion, 
 
To indicate the progress in thinking from the early days of the 1890 Conference to 
the final days of the 1898 Convention, the use of authorities in the separate 
meetings will now be addressed in chronological order. Only three authorities were 
cited in 1890: Bryce, Freeman and Goldwin Smith. These references were 
probably a spur to delegates at the later Conventions to study other works on 
federation. As discussed in the Introduction, the 1890 Conference was set up to 
consider how to proceed to Federation and it recommended the subsequent formal 
convention of 1891. Discussion at the conference was on a more general level 
than subsequently and although delegates aired their views on various aspects of 
the Federation proposal, they were there mainly to map out the way forward. 
                                            
65 Papers of Alfred Deakin, NLA, MS 1540. Also available in NLA Digital Collections website. 
‘Manuscripts, NLA’. 
66 J.A. La Nauze, 'Who Are the Fathers?’ Historical Studies, Vol.13, No.51, October, (1968). 
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drawn from Goldwin Smith, the Canadian constitutional writer, that the Canadian 
Government was deficient in not having the benefit of a referendum provision in 
their Constitution. The idea of a referendum was drawn from the Swiss and 
Canadian experiences substantiated by Bryce and Smith to support the view that it 
should be included in the Australian Constitution.67
Clark brought Freeman into the discussion to suggest there was a sentimental 
strand in the Federation proposal. ‘After all, sentiment is the basis of more than 
one-half of human life’. This remark was based on an article by Freeman 
discussing the practical and the sentimental in politics.
 
68 Clark used this argument 
to support his own view that Australia should not adopt the Westminster system of 
responsible government but adopt the American system of divorcing the executive 
from the legislature in these words: ‘that what had been in the early stages of every 
political question derided and ridiculed as its sentimental aspect afterwards proved 
to be its real practical aspect’.69
The 1890 Conference closed with agreement on a series of Resolutions to be 
considered by the forthcoming Convention which opened in 1891. It began with a 
preliminary discussion on the principles of Federation and gave the delegates a 
chance to air their views on a multitude of issues before settling down to seriously 
consider the Resolutions. In the preliminary discussions Baker made an 
extraordinary speech calling on such authorities as Woodrow Wilson, Bagehot and 
Bryce to support his fervent argument against a Westminster style responsible 
government. ‘I think I shall show that all powers shall be concentrated in one 
branch of the legislature, in which the majority, and the majority only, shall rule’.
 Here he saw the adoption of the American system 
as the ‘sentimental’ proposal but which would ultimately be found to be the 
‘practical‘ system. The discussion of the ‘sentimental’ against the ‘practical’ aspects 
is another view of the emotional and path dependence influences bearing on the 
delegates’ decisions, though argued in a more complex and cerebral manner. 
70
                                            
67 OR, 13 February 1890, pp.25, 26, 95, 96, 98. 
68 E.A. Freeman, ‘Sentimental and Practical Politics’, Princeton Review 1, 1879. pp.312-344. 
69 OR, 11 February 1890, p.35. 
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But the main authorities referred to in 1891 were: Bryce(6) Goldwin Smith(3), 
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Dicey(3), Freeman(1), Bagehot(1) and Bourinot(1). Bryce was the dominant 
authority and was quoted by Deakin, Rutledge, James Lee-Steere, Nicholas 
Brown, and Charles Kingston, on various topics, including the powers of the 
proposed two houses, the method of selecting Senators, and how to deal with 
possible deadlocks. Deakin used him to support his views on the powers of the 
proposed upper house compared with the American reality, saying ‘If we endow 
them with an absolute veto, we must mean them to exercise it’.71 Deakin and 
Baker both cited him to support opposite views on the question of equal powers for 
the two houses and Lee-Steere used Bryce to support the same argument, quoting 
him as saying there had never been any serious deadlock between the houses in 
the United States: ‘How are the rights of the smaller colonies to be safely guarded 
unless the senate we are about to establish is to have rights co-ordinate with those 
of the lower house?’72 Co-ordinate was the term used to describe equal powers of 
the two houses.73 Rutledge made a thoughtful speech using Bryce’s words on the 
difference between European upper houses and the United States Senate. In 
particular he drew the comparison that European upper houses were divided on 
the lines of wealth and power, while the proposed Australian upper house should 
be more in the shape of the American Senate.74
                                            
71 Ibid., 5 March 1891, p.78. 
72 Ibid., 1 April 1891, pp.543-4. 
73 Oxford English Dictionary says: 1. Of the same order; equal in rank, degree, or importance (with); 
opposed to subordinate 
74 OR, 9 March 1891, p.147. 
 This did not add much to the 
discussion except to demonstrate that Rutledge had read Bryce and suggested he 
supported an American model of federation. 
Bryce had written extensively and comprehensively on the issue of equal powers, 
which focused mainly on whether the Senate should have the power to initiate, 
amend or reject money bills. This was a major topic and hurdle for the Conventions 
and was argued fiercely, the smaller States calling for equal powers for both 
houses, and the larger states resisting and calling for a more powerful lower house. 
This issue also impinged on the issue of a cabinet system of Government—the 
system eventually adopted. 
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Bryce’s views on upper houses were canvassed again by Deakin on the method of 
selecting senators. Opinion was divided over whether nomination or election was 
the best method. As several of the Colonies appointed their upper houses there 
was strong support for the nomination principle in 1891. Barton, a supporter of the 
election of senators, drew Goldwin Smith into the discussion. Smith had called 
nomination a ‘barefaced proposal’ and Barton warned the Convention that: 
If you resolve to accept the Constitution of the United States Senate for our 
federal constitution you will find it to be an almost absolute necessity of the 
case that all your second chambers in your individual states shall be 
elective.75
the institution of responsible government, notwithstanding the carping, and 
sneering, and adverse criticisms to which it has been subjected from time to 
time has, on the whole, worked fairly well.
 
His argument, somewhat difficult to follow, suggests that under the nomination 
principle senators would be chosen by State Councillors, some themselves 
nominated. This, he thought, would make it necessary to have elective upper 
houses in the States to avoid too much power going into the hands of an unelected 
minority. Brown introduced Bryce in a discussion of responsible government as 
understood in the Australian colonies and about which there was considerable 
conflict: 
76
Thynne brought in Dicey to support his views on Federation and focused on the 
necessity for an ‘immutable Constitution … or at any rate one that could only be 
changed by some authority above and beyond the ordinary legislative bodies’. This 
was an early argument, not here clearly articulated, for a referendum. He also 
quoted Dicey to argue that the laws of the states should be subordinate to the laws 
of the Commonwealth.
 
77
                                            
75 Ibid., 6 March 1891, p.92. 
76 Ibid., 10 March 1891, p.210. 
77 Ibid., 6 March 1891, pp.105-6. 
 Baker supported this argument by quoting Goldwin Smith 
and suggesting that the Canadian system of a central Government with more 
power than the States, or in Canada’s case the Provinces, was disruptive and 
should not be adopted: 
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each province of the Dominion of Canada is constantly trying to get the 
better of its neighbours, trying to obtain more from the federal government; 
and I am afraid that the authors of the Canadian federation, in mixing up 
federal finance with provincial finance have laid the seeds of the dissolution 
of that union.78
It was left to Clark to introduce the other big gun among the authorities, Freeman, 
who only appeared once in 1891. Clark invoked Freeman to suggest that to 
structure a sound Federation they must ‘depart from the beaten track’. This was in 
response to an argument from Duncan Gillies who recommended following the 
path of experience.
 
79 The ‘path of experience’ is precisely how the modern concept 
of path dependence is used in a social science context. Elements of a strong path 
dependency influence are evident here when Gillies was confronted with the 
sustained, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance by Clark. The major arguments 
using Bryce’s work in 1891 were on the questions of the relative powers of the two 
houses, how to deal with deadlocks and the method of the selection of senators. 
Bryce favoured the election principle, not then in practice in the United States, and 
his authority was used by Kingston to support this view: ‘… bad candidates will 
have less chance with the party at large and the people than they now have …’80 
The Canadian example was also cited by Downer quoting from Bourinot and 
introducing the question of conventions, and their place in government. 
Conventions, or unwritten rules, were at the heart of the Westminster tradition.81
As in 1890 the major points of conflict in 1891 emerged as: equality of 
representation in the Senate; responsible Government; election of senators; and 
the relative powers of the two houses. These issues were contentious throughout 
the conventions and were eventually settled only in 1898 when the final version of 
the Constitution Bill was produced. It can be seen that the authorities, particularly 
Bryce, were very influential in shaping the ideas of the delegates in these matters, 
both those who quoted them and those who listened to the arguments. The 
 
                                            
78 Ibid., p.110. 
79 Ibid., 11 March 1891, p.231. 
80 Ibid., 2 April 1891, p.596. 
81 Ibid., 3 April 1891, p.715. 
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quotations from the Canadian writers illustrate that the Canadian influence and 
example were well considered, though not usually in a positive light. 
As noted the delegates to the 1897 Convention were elected by the Colonies on a 
manhood suffrage, not nominated by the Parliaments as in the previous meetings, 
though many of the same delegates attended. They were now more prone to quote 
from authorities, presumably having done their homework. Isaac Isaacs was 
perhaps the best read of the delegates and one of the ablest and best informed 
members of the convention but his pedantic excesses irritated colleagues 
especially Barton, the Convention leader.82 Among other works Isaacs had read all 
five volumes of Elliot’s Debates on the United States Conventions which would 
have given him a sound basis for his opinions on the United States Constitution.83 
The delegates were also more conscious of their responsibility now they were in 
the final stages of the process of drafting a Constitution. Growing attendant 
publicity reflected the increasing gravity of their discussions and they turned to 
recognised authorities to strengthen the case for their decisions. The propensity to 
quote learned authorities at this stage sprang from a need to provide guidance to 
their colleagues and the public and add legitimacy to their arguments. It was a 
demonstration of erudition and scholarship which gave their comments added 
authority. The last Convention was a long drawn out affair, spread over three 
sessions. Queensland failed to send delegates to this Convention due to difficulties 
with its Parliament, but Samuel Griffith, the Queensland Attorney-General, kept in 
touch with the proceedings. Griffith had been a key player in the drawing up of the 
Bill of 1891 and E.M. Hunt, an American historian writing in the 1930s, describes 
him as ‘one of the leading authorities on the American Constitution’.84
                                            
82 Geoffrey Sawer, The Australian Constitution, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service), 1975), p.22. 
83 Zelman Cowen, Isaac Isaacs, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.56; Jonathon Elliot, 
The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution as 
Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, 5 vols., (New York: Burt 
Franklin, 1787). 
84 E.M. Hunt, American Precedents in Australian Federation, (New York: Columbia University Press; 
London P. S. King, Ltd., 1930), p.19. 
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Twenty-one authorities were quoted in the 1897–8 Convention. Their comments 
were not all in reference to the Senate, and here I will focus only on arguments 
concerning the structure and role of the proposed upper house. Again most of the 
debates were concerned with the four great questions: equality of representation in 
the Senate; election of Senators; the relative powers of the two houses; and 
responsible Government, plus the provision for deadlocks, a difficult and complex 
problem which occupied many days of debate. 
Bryce again dominated the references, being cited 23 times and by 11 delegates.85
In 1897 Bryce’s authority was called upon on a range of issues which reflects the 
thoroughness of his work. Higgins brought him in first in a long speech in the 
general discussion before the Convention got down to the real business of 
considering the Clauses of the Draft Bill in detail. He quoted Bryce on the election 
of senators, the powers of the central Government, responsible Government and 
the question of the equal number of senators for each state.
 
The other most frequently quoted writer was Freeman with 15 mentions. The work 
of these two writers and the guidance of Baker’s manual provided a framework for 
the debates on the decisions facing the delegates. The less frequently quoted 
writers also added more food for thought and strength to their arguments, though 
some delegates found the introduction of authorities to be a tiresome and 
unnecessary intrusion. The views of Bryce and Freeman on the election of 
senators and equal representation were adopted but Baker’s passionate support 
for the American model was not enough to convince the delegates. It is ironic that 
for all the guidance his readings must have provided to the delegates, his opinions 
did not prevail. 
86
                                            
85 The delegates were: Higgins, Downer, Fysh, Deakin, Glynn, Barton, Kingston, Dobson, Isaacs, 
Symon, and Forrest. 
86 OR, 25 March 1897, pp.98-101. 
 Downer also brought 
in Bryce on the election of senators, arguing with Higgins’ interpretation and said 
he had come to ‘an absolutely different conclusion’ from Higgins. Downer had 
earlier expressed his dislike of placing too much reliance on the words of learned 
authorities and seemed to particularly resent the reliance on Bryce. It also comes 
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down to a matter of interpretation and his claim that he had come to an ‘absolutely 
different conclusion’ to Higgins, demonstrated the danger in attributing too much 
influence to learned authorities. In the end the decisions had to be made on the 
facts and the circumstances. Downer did admit that he had changed his views over 
time and now, in 1897, supported the election of senators against nomination so 
the debates and discussions had some influence on the voting patterns in the 
divisions.87 Kingston also cited Bryce on the issue of the election of senators and 
apprised the Convention that he had been in correspondence with Bryce on the 
topic. He had, he said, sent Bryce a copy of the draft Bill, asking for comments 
upon it. He reported that Bryce had replied favourably saying he was pleased ‘to 
express his most delighted approval’.88 This conflicts with Bryce’s comments in a 
letter he wrote to Barton in 1900 when the delegates were in London to negotiate 
the passing of the Bill and in which he described it as a ‘very scanty, fragmentary, 
and imperfect sketch of a Federal Constitution’.89
The issue of responsible government saw Bryce again brought in to support 
arguments. Fysh, in a speech supporting the concept, referred to Bryce and said 
he had come to the conclusion that if responsible government had been the case in 
England at the time of the American Conventions then the Americans probably 
would have adopted it.
 
90 Deakin contributed an unusual remedy for disputed 
legislation, drawn, he said, from both Bryce and Bourinot. He proposed that there 
should be a provision for legislation passed by both Houses to be open to 
challenge by the Senate representatives of any State and the opinion of the 
Supreme Court sought; the operation of the legislation to be suspended until a 
decision was made. ‘Oh that would never do’ interjected an unidentified Hon. 
Member at this suggestion, which, unsurprisingly, did not get anywhere.91
                                            
87 Ibid., 29 March 1897, p.209. 
88 Bryce, quoted by Kingston, OR, 10 September 1897, p.288. 
89 Cited in Geoffrey Bolton, Edmund Barton: The One Man for the Job, (St. Leonards, Australia: 
Allen & Unwin, 2000), pp.209-10. 
90 OR, 29 March 1897, p.243 
91 Ibid., 14 April 1897, p.582. 
 The 
issue of deadlocks, together with equal powers for both houses were raised by 
Glynn and Dobson, and the reading of Bryce convinced them and Deakin that the 
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powers of the houses should be co-ordinate.92
Higgins was strongly against equal representation in the Senate and argued, citing 
Bryce, that equal representation had been ‘futile’ in its objectives because there 
had never been any difference of interests between the larger and smaller states in 
the United States. Glynn also used Bryce on the same point to refute Higgins’ 
argument and support the case for equal representation.
 This was also Clark’s firmly held 
view, but they were in the minority. 
93 This echoes the 
debates of 1891 when Deakin and Baker both cited Bryce to support opposite 
views on the question of equal powers for the two houses, and Lee-Steere used 
Bryce to argue for equal representation quoting him as saying there had never 
been any serious deadlock between the houses in the United States. To put this 
into perspective Bryce’s words were ‘There had never, in point of fact, been any 
division of interests or consequent contest between the great States and the small 
ones’.94 Yet in the September Convention Isaacs quoted Bryce as saying that 
frequent collisions did happen in the US, though ‘no great block occurs’.95
Bryce’s wisdom was brought in on other issues as well as the Senate’s role, the 
debate on taking grievances to the Privy Council for example, on 31 January 1898. 
Glynn also quoted him on the question of the Senate’s power to amend money 
bills, and to argue against co-ordinate powers. He suggested that it had been 
known for the lower houses of some parliaments to send doubtful but popular bills 
to the upper house in the hope that the upper house would amend and return 
them. These comments were made in the argument about responsible government 
and the fear that co-ordinate powers would bring about deadlocks. Glynn quoted 
 This is 
an indication that interpretation has a significant bearing on the use of authorities to 
support or counter arguments. 
                                            
92 Ibid., 15 September 1897, pp.584, 637. 
93 Ibid., 15 April 1897, pp.646, 665. 
94 Bryce, The American Commonwealth, p.129. 
95 OR, 16 September 1897, p.663. 
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Bryce as saying ‘you cannot possibly have co-ordinate powers wherever there is 
responsibility’.96
During a discussion on money bills Dobson again showed off his scholarship 
quoting from several authorities, ‘I am told, … by Bryce, by Leeky [sic], by 
Sedgwick, and every writer that I have read, that democracy is on its trial’. He used 
these writers to support his opposition to any provisions against deadlocks and 
quoted McMillan as saying that the only check on the ‘tyranny’ of the lower house 
is the second chamber, and that manhood suffrage may be the ‘basis of a 
tyranny’.
 
97
Forrest: No these are words which I used myself. 
 Dobson firmly believed that democracy would lead to the ‘tyranny’ of the 
majority and the end of law and order. As two of these authors were rarely quoted 
and Dobson’s views were notoriously conservative, cautious and resistant to 
change, the influence of this speech was probably not very great. 
The respect and familiarity and even affection with which Bryce was regarded is 
revealed in an amusing exchange when Forrest, rather pompously, began a 
speech on the relative powers of the State and Federal Governments. George Reid 
interrupted saying: ‘Is that in Bryce?’ 
Reid: They sound exactly like Bryce. 
Forrest: The words are my own. 
Reid: Bryce's book was not published then, but the style is the same. 
Holder: Perhaps Mr. Bryce copied Sir John Forrest.98
                                            
96 Ibid., 14 September 1897, p.536. 
97 Ibid., 15 September 1897, p.637. 
98 Ibid., 1 March 1898, p.1703 
 
Some of the restlessness of the delegates can be seen in this light-hearted 
exchange. They were now in the sixth month, spread over a year, of their 
deliberations, and with the end clearly in sight, more lengthy, repetitive arguments 
and personal parading of pomposity, could not be readily tolerated. 
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These were the more significant references to Bryce’s work in the 1897–8 debates. 
It can be seen how much he was relied upon for clarification and understanding of 
many aspects of federalism and especially so in regard to the Senate. 
The other major authority on whom the delegates relied heavily was Freeman. In 
1897 he was quoted or referred to many times, principally by Glynn, Isaacs, 
Symon, Cockburn, and Fysh. He entered the 1897 debate, introduced by Glynn, in 
the general discussion before the debate proper began. Glynn was discussing the 
Constitution of Canada, which he described as ‘more of the old and gradually 
becoming obsolete form of monarchical government’ whereas Australia would be a 
‘crowned republic’.99 Freeman reappeared when Isaacs quoted him in praise of the 
English Constitution, which had grown from ‘original principles’.100
Glynn reintroduced Freeman to support the provision for equal numbers of 
senators for each State, a principle valiantly but vainly fought against by Higgins. 
Glynn quoted Freeman and his description of ancient Greek States which followed 
this principle.
 Here we can 
see not only Freeman’s influence but also the influence of Canada’s experience, 
British tradition, the conflict between tradition and innovation, and the sentimental 
and the practical. 
101 Symon followed him with a series of quotations from Freeman to 
support the concept of equal representation, refuting Higgins’ vociferous and 
passionate arguments for proportional representation and observed: ‘that principle 
of state equality was established centuries before the United States Constitution 
was ever dreamt of’.102
Symon’s speech led him into a lively discussion on ancient civilisations including 
the Achean Assembly, an early example of federation. This provoked Higgins to 
interject testily ‘It was merely a league’ to which Symon riposted saying that 
Higgins did not know what he was talking about and that ‘we are all capable of 
 
                                            
99 Ibid., 24 March 1897, p.73. 
100 Ibid., 26 March 1897, p.180. 
101 Ibid., 15 April 1897, p.663-4. 
102 Ibid., 10 September 1897, p.292. 
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enlightenment’.103 A lively debate ensued with Symon pontificating upon ancient 
Greek civilisations and Higgins, Carruthers and Deakin interjecting witty remarks 
about ‘a flood of democracy’. Symon continued on his Freeman theme on equal 
representation and brought in Story’s work on the United States Constitution to 
further strengthen his arguments, the gist of which was that the United States 
Constitution was an excellent model.104
Other authorities cited in the 1897–8 Convention, mostly on issues other than the 
structure and role of the Senate, were Dicey and Lecky, already mentioned, 
Bourinot mainly in relation to legal matters and the right of appeal to the Privy 
Council. Isaacs did bring Bourinot in to emphasise that the ‘want of a cabinet 
system was one of the disadvantages of the United States Government’, an 
argument for responsible government which impinged on the powers of the 
Senate. Sidgwick was also referred to in this speech as finding a co-ordinate 
second chamber an alien element in Parliamentary Government.
 Isaacs entered the lists with Freeman on 
the same day and issue, in support of equal representation in the Senate. It is clear 
that Freeman’s work on early Greek constitutions was extensively used to support 
the case in the Conventions for equal representation in the Senate. 
105
I am urging … that to call in the electorate as a whole to determine that kind 
of dispute …  is undesirable, … and I will adopt the words of Bagehot, who 
says that to do so would be to submit to the government: ‘Of immoderate 
persons far from the scene of action’.
 Sidgwick did 
not appear frequently being cited only by Isaacs, a very well read delegate. He was 
quoted on how to deal with deadlocks, as in favour of referendums, perceiving the 
upper house as check on the lower House, and supporting the concept of 
federation. Dicey appeared more frequently, quoted by Isaacs, Cockburn and 
Wise, in relation to interpretation of the Constitution and the relative powers of the 
Federal and State governments. Bagehot made a brief appearance when Wise 
quoted him on referendums saying: 
106
                                            
103 Ibid., p.294-5. 
104 Ibid., 10 September 1897, p.294-5. 
105 Ibid., 26 March 1897, p.175. 
106 Ibid., 10 March 1898, p.2195. 
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Bagehot clearly feared the tyranny of the majority.107
Story was another legal authority also called upon to substantiate arguments about 
equal representation in the Senate. His authority was sought on the necessity to 
constitute the Parliament as two houses, one representing the people and one the 
States. In this debate he was quoted frequently along with other authorities and it 
was here that Higgins was driven to his acerbic comment that ‘Federation is not a 
matter of textbooks’.
 
108
It can be clearly seen that the learned authorities were important though not all-
important, in shaping the system that was ultimately adopted. Their most valuable 
contribution was to provide a platform and starting point for debate on complex 
issues, such as the basic conflict of whether to follow the United States example or 
the Westminster system of Government. Many delegates had studied the subject 
of federalism carefully from the authorities and, using their past parliamentary 
experience and by taking part in the debates, were able to draw their own 
conclusions from their readings. The most vociferous were for the most part well 
read on the relevant issues and had formulated their ideas from a variety of 
sources, strongly supported by recognised writers on the several aspects of 
federalism. The role of learned authorities, though resented by some delegates, 
 
The debate on the role of the Senate was heated and several authorities made a 
brief appearance: Burke, Lecky, Mill, Franklin, Burgess, Emerson, Carlyle, and 
May. The points raised included the power to amend money bills for the Senate, 
the question of whether referendums should be incorporated in the Constitution, 
the problem of deadlock provisions, the role of the Senate as a check on the lower 
house, and Constitutional amendments. May appeared in March 1898 cited by 
Baker and Barton on points of procedure. Todd made a late appearance entering 
the discussion on 10 March 1898 introduced by Deakin. He was quoted on the role 
of the Governor-General in military matters, and the question of whether the right 
of appeal to the British Privy Council should be abolished. 
                                            
107 For discussion of Bagehot see Norman St John-Stevas, Walter Bagehot, (London: Longmans, 
Green, 1963): Harry R. Sullivan, Walter Bagehot, (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1975). 
108 OR, 10 September 1897, p.348. 
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was a useful tool to justify or counter arguments and interpretation was a 
significant factor in the use of these works. By 1897–8 attitudes and opinions had 
matured and though the authorities were respected they were not necessarily 
influential in changing or creating viewpoints. The authorities helped to provide a 
framework for the debates and their views became more important as the issues 
came to a head. The increasing use of authorities is instructive, revealing a 
contradiction between Federation as an expression of independence and the 
reliance on learned authorities to validate opinions and decisions. This is no cause 
for criticism. In doing so they were not unlike the men who devised the Constitution 
of the United States or those who wrote the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen for France.109
                                            
109 Declaration of the Rights of Man – 1789, Approved by the National Assembly of France, August 
26 1789, Yale Law School, The Avalon Project, 
 They too had relied on models such as those from 
classical Greek and Roman examples and consulted learned authorities such as 
Montesquieu and Aristotle. 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp. Accessed 28 November 2008. 
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Chapter 3 
In Their Own Image: did the delegates to the Conventions see 
themselves as models of an ideal senator? 
the most august assembly.1
The memorable Convention met in Sydney on March 2, 1891. I call it 
‘memorable’ because it was beyond all dispute the most august assembly 
which Australia had ever seen, and because the majority of its members were 
men who yielded to none of their compatriots in their fitness to do the work 
which had to be done. If we apply the democratic rule, and apply it strictly, 
these men had all risen to positions of eminence in their respective 
countries—some to the highest positions—by their own merits and force of 
character, without any of the aids of fortune; and their number included all the 
Prime Ministers of Australia, and nine others, including Sir George Grey, 
Duncan Gillies, and Sir Thomas McIlwraith, who had held the office of Prime 
Minister in former Governments. They had been elected by all the Parliaments 
of the colonies, and, therefore, in a constitutional sense, they represented all 
the people of Australia.
  Henry Parkes 1891. 
 
This telling phrase by Henry Parkes and typical of his lofty rhetoric was his proud 
view of the delegates, which of course included himself, assembled for the 1891 
National Australasian Convention in Sydney. Parkes, a distinguished New South 
Wales politician and a recognised leader of the cause of Federation, thought highly 
of his colleagues, and the whole paragraph containing the quotation above is 
included here as an indication of the sort of men Parkes saw as members of the 
1891 Convention: 
2
Parkes’ words provide a participant’s view of the delegates as fitting 
representatives of the Australian people and within it can be discerned a vision of 
the character of a future Senator from a leading observer. Some of the delegates in 
 (my emphasis) 
                                            
1 Henry Parkes, Fifty Years in the Making of Australian History, (London: Longman and Green, 
1892), Chap. XIII. p.366. 
2 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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1891 were indeed ‘august’ in the literal sense of the word. Nine had been knighted, 
including such Federation luminaries as Samuel Griffith, then Premier of 
Queensland, Parkes himself, and both the New Zealand delegates, Harry Albert 
Atkinson and George Grey. There were other opinions on the character of the 
assembly of 1891 that were not so glowing: Brisbane’s Courier for example 
reported that it was ‘a Convention necessarily including so many second-rate 
politicians’. 3 Both Parkes and the Courier had a point. It was a mixed bag of first 
and second rate politicians, but not as mixed as all that given that only one 
delegate, James Walker, a banker, had never served as a politician before 
becoming a delegate to the 1897 Convention. His activities as a member of the 
Australasian Federal League of New South Wales and his lucid financial analysis 
of federation at the Bathurst Convention in November 1896, were factors in his 
election as a delegate.4
If, … we patiently address ourselves to our task, then I think not only will our 
work endure, and our names be handed down with respect to the third and 
the fourth generations, but millions yet unborn will be taught to revere for all 
time the names of those who, in this year 1897, were assembled in this 
National Convention.
 
Parkes’ stress on the memorable aspect of the 1891 Convention was due, he 
claimed, to the character of the delegates. The Convention was indeed 
memorable, as was the later Convention of 1897–8, but more because of its 
achievements than its participants. In fact, the Conventions and their participants 
are only vaguely remembered by the citizens of Australia. There are no glorious 
commemoration ceremonies, only a few monuments to their achievements, such 
as the plaque on the outside wall of South Australia’s parliament to commemorate 
the meeting there in 1897, and in 2001 only a low-key centenary celebration of 
Federation. This is ironic in view of this remark of John Alexander Cockburn: 
5
                                            
3 Brisbane Courier quoted in SMH 20 March 1891. 
4 Brian Galligan and James Warden, 'The Design of the Senate', in The Convention Debates 1891 - 
1898, ed. Gregory Craven, (Sydney: Legal Books Ltd, 1986), p.91. 
Kathleen Dermody, ‘Walker, James Thomas, (1841-1923)’, in The Biographical Dictionary of the 
Australian Senate, v.1. 1901-1929, (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press), p.35. Geoffrey Bolton, 
Edmund Barton: the One Man for the Job, (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2000), p.140. 
5 OR, 30 March 1897, p.349. 
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That the delegates were all industrious, successful citizens who had achieved 
‘eminence’ by their own efforts was true. None had inherited great wealth or 
position. Many were or had been elected leaders in their Colonies and had 
achieved recognition and status in their community. In this respect Parkes 
considered they fairly represented all the people of Australia. But did they? He 
based his judgement on the fact that the selected delegates were particularly fit to 
do the work because of their achievement of eminence. Most of them had achieved 
this through politics and, as he pointed out, several had been Prime Ministers. In 
this respect he could have been pleading his own case, as a man who had risen to 
prominence and a senior position in Government from a humble background. 
Parkes’ achievements were very real and he was proud of them and the men he 
commended were those whose achievements matched his own. His view supports 
the main argument of this chapter: that the Convention delegates saw the future 
‘ideal senators’ as men just like themselves, men fashioned ‘in their own image’. 
Other writers have commented on the characteristics of the Convention delegates, 
notably Geoffrey McDonald.6 McDonald’s is an extensive and detailed collective 
biography of the eighty-four Australian delegates to both the 1891 and the 1897–8 
Conventions. It is a work of prosopography—defined by Lawrence Stone as ‘an 
investigation of the common background characteristics of a historical group … by 
means of a collective study of their lives’.7 McDonald’s conclusion was that they 
were ‘active, enterprising, and colourful men who ambitiously strove after power’. 
Hunt, in another prosopographic discussion of the delegates, summed up saying 
that ‘many were excellently qualified for their role, and if others were not, the sum 
of individual experience was impressive’.8
                                            
6 G. McDonald, ‘The Eighty Founding Fathers’ Queensland Historical Review, 1968, pp.38-51. 
7 Lawrence Stone, 'Prosopography', Daedalus 100, Winter 1971, 
8 E.M. Hunt, American Precedents in Australian Federation, (New York: Columbia University Press; 
London P. S. King, Ltd., 1930), p.16. 
 Other historians were not so impressed. 
John Rickard described the delegates as ‘by and large, the old established political 
leaders of their colonies’ who saw themselves as there to safeguard the interests 
of their colonies rather than to stimulate new visions of Australia or find new 
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leaders to express them.9 Crisp argued ‘it was for the most part the big men of the 
established political and economic order, the men of property or their trusted allies, 
who moulded the federal Constitution Bill’ and La Nauze found that in 1891 some 
of the delegates knew little more about federalism than that it was a system of 
government, but added that this had improved by 1897.10 Newspaper comment 
was not flattering either: historian Frank Crowley found that some reporters said 
there was a danger that the proceedings would 'perish of much talking' and added 
that perhaps this was to be expected from such a gathering of ‘politicians who had 
this once-in-a-Iifetime opportunity to display their … principles, while also 
eloquently proclaiming their genuine desire to bring to an end colonial 
provincialism’. He quoted newspapers as saying ‘modesty was in short supply; 
vanity in abundance’.11
It was true that all the delegates had achieved distinction and personal prosperity 
by their own efforts. It was also true they had no monopoly on this achievement. 
Many distinguished and successful people from different backgrounds, who might 
have had the ‘fitness to do the work which had to be done’, were not present at the 
Conventions. Those missing included women, church representatives, the working 
class and even one of the Colonies—Queensland, which failed to send delegates 
to the 1897–8 Convention which actually drafted the final Constitution. Had 
Queensland been represented the Convention is likely to have voted to restore 
powers to the Senate fully equal in every respect to those of the House of 
 The conclusion from these writers was that it was men of 
influence and prosperity who drafted the Constitution but that they were not 
particularly clever or well-informed. They were all experienced in Australian political 
life and this, together with the interests of their own colonies always in mind, were 
the major influences on their decisions. 
                                            
9 John Rickard, H.B. Higgins: The Rebel as Judge, (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p.92. 
10 L.F. Crisp, Australian National Government, (Hawthorn, Victoria: Longman, 1965), p.14. J.A. La 
Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1972), 
p.272. 
11 F.K. Crowley, Big John Forrest: 1847–1918: A Founding Father of the Commonwealth of 
Australia (Perth, University of Western Australia Press, 2000), p.173. 
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Representatives, and it is doubtful whether the south eastern colonies would have 
accepted a federal Constitution of this kind.12
The fact that there were no female delegates reflected the attitudes and 
conventions of the era when women had yet to break down the many prejudices 
and barriers against them taking part in public life. South Australia had given 
women the vote in 1894 and one brave soul, writer and social activist, Catherine 
Helen Spence, at the advanced age of 72 years, stood for election to the 1897 
Convention as a delegate for South Australia. She received 7,282 votes and came 
twenty-second out of thirty-three candidates.
 
13 Her failure to be elected reflects the 
attitudes of the times rather than her undoubted abilities. The closest women came 
to taking part in the Conventions was to be allowed to observe the delegates at a 
banquet for 900 male guests in the Centennial Hall in Sydney on 14 March 1891, 
preceding the Convention. One reporter patronisingly commented: ‘The galleries 
were crowded with ladies, who apparently took great interest in the proceedings’.14
Apart from the gender exclusion and Queensland’s absence in 1897–8, another 
section of society conspicuous by its absence was the Church. The Christian 
Church in the 1890s was a potent force in society as is evident in the 41 petitions 
to the 1897–8 Convention requesting recognition of the Christian religion in the 
Constitution.
 
15 It was duly recognised in the Preamble with the words ‘humbly 
relying on the blessings of Almighty God’, introduced by Patrick McMahon Glynn, 
an Irish born barrister and one of only two Catholics at the Convention.16
                                            
12 Space prevents a full exploration of these issues in a thesis focused on the Conventions. 
13 Susan Magarey, Unbridling the Tongues of Women, (Marrickville, NSW: Hale & Iremonger, 
1985), p.162. 
14 Adelaide Observer, 23 March 1891. 
15 The majority of the petitions were from Protestant churches such as Methodist, Presbyterian, 
Congregational, with only one from a Roman Catholic Church, that of South Australia, OR, ‘Index to 
Subjects’, Adelaide 1897. 
16 OR, 2 March 1898, p.1732. 
 The 
decision to open proceedings in Parliament with a prayer and the inclusion of God 
in the oath of allegiance are other acknowledgements of the religious or spiritual 
basis of Australian society but there was no official religious representation in the 
Conventions themselves. Catholic Archbishop Moran of Sydney did stand for 
Chapter 3: In Their Own Image 
 
 
 69 
 
election to the 1897 Convention, much to the horror of some Protestant citizens 
who feared sectarian conflict, but he failed to gain a place, much to the relief of 
said citizens.17 Stafford Bird of Tasmania had been a dissenting minister before he 
became a politician and Deakin said of him that he was ‘as sound and sober in 
thought as he was solemnly impressive in appearance and manner’.18 The 
delegates were secular statesmen, and though most professed a religion, mainly 
the Protestant Christian faith, they were not officers of their churches.19
The other major distortion lay in the uneven socio-economic representation of 
society. The delegates were necessarily drawn from the more affluent and 
educated citizens because only those with sufficient finances and leisure could 
meet the demands of taking part in the proceedings. This meant the exclusion not 
only of the working class and smaller business men but also of more prosperous 
citizens who could not afford to dedicate the time and effort necessary to attend the 
Conventions. From today’s point of view the absence of the Labour party is a 
glaring exclusion, but Labour was still in its formative years in the 1890s. Although 
Labour candidates stood for election, especially in New South Wales where the 
party fielded ten candidates, only one Labour man, William Trenwith from Victoria, 
was elected and his views were more liberal than socialist. In spite of these 
exclusions Bernhard Wise considered the representation at the 1891 Convention to 
be an ‘accurate’ reflection of public opinion even though it was ‘not truly 
representative’.
 
20
                                            
17 G. McDonald, 'The Eighty Founding Fathers', p.49. 
18 Alfred Deakin, 'and Be One People' with an Introduction by Stuart Macintyre, (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1995), p.32. 
19 For a comprehensive discussion of religion and the Conventions see Richard Ely, Unto God and 
Caesar: religious beliefs in the emerging Commonwealth, (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 
1976). 
20 Bernhard Ringrose Wise, The Making of the Australian Commonwealth, 1889-1900, (London: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1913), p.135. 
 The decision that the delegates to the 1897 Convention should 
be elected by manhood suffrage with each State as one electorate, was the major 
inclusive factor in 1897, allowing most of the adult male members of Australian 
society a voice, but even this failed to change the social composition of the 
delegates to any significant degree. Though fifty-five per cent of the eligible voters 
Chapter 3: In Their Own Image 
 
 
 70 
 
turned out, Davidson has argued that the ‘popular mandate … returned the old 
guard of 1891’ to the 1897 Convention.21
The major and unchallenged decision to establish a bicameral parliament had 
already been taken when the Conventions met, and came about in large part 
because the political socialisation of the founders in English and Australian 
parliamentary traditions ensured they ‘took legislative bicameralism for granted’.
 
22 
John Rickard also saw political socialisation as the basis for the undebated 
decision. In his biography of Henry Higgins of Victoria, he argued that Higgins was 
typical of his colleagues who ‘had very fixed notions … which were the product of 
each colony’s history’. For Stuart Macintyre, the ‘new nation was at the mercy of its 
progenitors’.23
The bicameral system adopted under these influences includes as a central feature 
an ‘upper’ house and is found in many legislatures. American political scientists, 
Loewenberg and Patterson, in their book Comparing Legislatures, noted that the 
need for an upper house ‘originated in the essentially pre-democratic view that the 
representation of the nation required both an upper and lower house, in the class-
conscious sense of “upper” and “lower”’.
 
24 In the concept of the proposed Senate 
as a house of review can be discerned the ‘class-conscious’ sense of the ‘upper 
house’ as noted by these authors, and the shadow of the British House of Lords in 
its ancient role as a representative of the aristocracy or ruling classes. In Australia 
it was envisaged at the Convention debates that the upper house would be a 
repository of dignity, justice and wisdom with members directly chosen, in the 
Constitution Bill of 1891, by the ‘Houses of Parliament of the several states’ and 
though this was changed in 1898 to the decision to elect senators by manhood 
suffrage, the perception of an ‘upper’ house as a superior body persisted.25
                                            
21 Alastair Davidson, The Invisible State: The Formation of the Australian State 1788 - 1901, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.233. 
22 Galligan and Warden, 'The Design of the Senate', p.91. 
23 John Rickard, H.B. Higgins: The Rebel as Judge, p.92; Deakin, 'and Be One People' with an 
Introduction by Stuart Macintyre, p.xx. 
24 G. Loewenberg and S. C. Patterson, Comparing Legislatures, (Boston: Little and Brown, 1979), 
p.121. 
25 Draft Constitution Bill 1891, Part II, The Senate, Section 9, p.946, OR, 2 March 1891. 
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1891 decision remained the shadow of aristocratic domination of Government, or 
of a privileged class, and it is reminiscent of the idea of creating a colonial 
aristocracy that had been canvassed in New South Wales in the 1850s (and in 
Canada in the 18th century) but which was never popular or practical. 
Nevertheless some of the traditions and perceptions of an upper house can be 
found in the notion that part of its role was to moderate or monitor the decisions, 
perceived as possibly rash, of the lower house. 
The role of the upper house as a house of review and a repository of wisdom was 
a concept firmly held by many delegates. John Forrest, Premier of Western 
Australia, articulated the perception of superiority in 1891: ‘It seems to me that the 
senate … will be an august and experienced body’.26
but how frequently do we know Governments and majorities that have been 
obliged to resist the action of the Second Chamber and are then faced with 
the difficulties of a deadlock and the inconvenience of a penal dissolution?
 The word ‘august’, was also 
used by Parkes, and is a clear sign of the ideas of the desired nobility of the upper 
house. The word ‘experienced’ suggests maturity, an appropriate quality for a 
Senator. Forrest did not say how this was to be achieved, but he was a supporter 
of a nominated Senate and like Parkes may have envisaged himself and men of 
his calibre as being role models for the new Senators. The decision that Senators 
should be elected by adult male suffrage was made early in the 1897-8 Convention 
and must have diluted this expectation. 
The vision of Senators being ‘dignified’ and ‘august’ and qualified to make fair and 
wise decisions on policies is a strange attitude of politicians, all of whom had 
experienced upper chambers and their obstructive and delaying tactics on policies 
with which they disagreed. Victoria had suffered much in this respect and Graham 
Berry, a one-time Premier, bitterly commented: 
27
The reference to a ‘second’ rather than an ‘upper’ chamber speaks volumes. Berry 
spoke from experience. He could foresee the possibility of a federal version of 
Victoria's Black Wednesday of January 1878, when the Council stubbornly refused 
 
                                            
26 OR, Forrest, 6 April 1891, p.732. 
27 Ibid., 15 April 1897, p.658. 
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supply for a finance bill and, as Premier, he had retaliated by dismissing 200 civil 
servants on economic grounds.28 The opposing view came from John Forrest, a 
delegate from Western Australia, a smaller state, which feared the domination of 
the larger states in Parliament. He argued strongly for a powerful Senate, able to 
reject and amend all proposed legislation except the annual appropriation bill. This 
included taxation, loans, customs and excise.29
I think the chief reason why this plan [election] has commended itself to many 
hon. members has been the result of the election of members of this 
Convention. They cannot but think that a system which worked so well and so 
wisely in returning such, able, true, and patriotic members to this Convention 
as they themselves are must be an excellent plan and one likely to work well 
in the future. I am quite prepared to admit that it has worked exceedingly well 
during the first election.
 This struck fear into the eastern 
politicians many of whom had ‘fought pitched constitutional battles’ with their upper 
houses over money bills. Why then did this naïve expectation of justice and 
wisdom in a federal upper chamber arise and why was it so steadfastly held by 
men who had experienced the difficulties an upper chamber could cause? Was it 
simply a matter of path dependence and tradition or did the delegates honestly 
envisage a Senate peopled by eminent and successful men such as themselves 
who could impartially employ these qualities from the depths of their knowledge 
and experience? There is some evidence that this was a ‘subliminal’ thought in the 
minds of the delegates. The thought emanated from the mouth of one of the 
delegates, Sir John Forrest (WA): 
30
Were the delegates of such excellent quality as Forrest thought in 1897 and 
Parkes in 1891? To answer this question this chapter will take a closer look at the 
delegates as individuals. La Nauze said of the Conventions that ‘there is much yet 
to be recovered from the debates about the types, the assumptions and the 
abilities of the men who represented the public and parliamentary life of Australia’ 
 
                                            
28 Paul de Serville, Pounds and Pedigrees: the Upper Class in Victoria 1850-80, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), p.116. 
29 Crowley, Big John Forrest: 1847 - 1918: A Founding Father of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
p.176, 
30 OR, Forrest, 13 September 1897, p.361. 
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in the Conventions.31 Anthropologist Clifford Geertz also thought we could learn a 
lot about personality by looking at ‘how people present themselves to themselves 
and to one another’.32
The delegates from 1890 to 1897–8 were drawn from each of the six existing 
Australian colonies plus three from New Zealand. Eighty-four men in all took part, 
some taking part in all the federation meetings. The difference in the method of 
election to the two Conventions, almost a decade apart, did affect the composition 
of the meetings, though not by as much as one might expect. Over a period of 
almost ten years a significant number of delegates, about 20%, attended both the 
Conventions and one or two were also at the 1890 Conference. The repeat 
appearance of so many delegates demonstrates that they were drawn from a small 
pool and supports the contention of Earl Grey, (British Colonial Secretary, 1846–
1852) who recommended a one-chamber parliament for colonial governments on 
the grounds that there were not enough men who had both the wealth and the 
ability to be members of a parliament of two houses. He said that bicameralism: ‘in 
a community not numerous enough to furnish more than a few persons qualified for 
such duties, is to substitute two comparatively ineffective bodies for one of a 
superior character’.
 On this basis a study of the backgrounds of the delegates’ 
lives has been undertaken to paint a picture of the kind of men who felt themselves 
so admirably qualified to participate in the drafting of a Constitution for a federal 
Australia. This will be followed by a selection of quotations taken from the 
convention debates to learn how the delegates ‘presented themselves’ to each 
other and to establish their mental images of future senators. Will they, like Parkes 
and Forrest, betray their vision of men like themselves as ‘ideal senators’? 
33
                                            
31 La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution, p.29. 
32 C.Geertz, ‘On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding’, American Scientist, 63, 1 1975, 
p.48. Quoted in Paul A Pickering, 'The Class of 96: A Biographical Analysis of the New Government 
Members of the Australian House of Representatives', Australian Journal of Politics & History 1998, 
p.95. 
33 Earl Henry George Grey, The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration, 2 vols., 
(London: R. Bentley, 1853), p.97. 
 Here a British Cabinet Minister revealed that he was less 
attached to the bicameral system than the colonial politicians. By the 1890s and on 
a national rather than a Colonial basis, this situation was improving in Australia but 
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the argument still had validity, especially for a national body that would require an 
increase in the number of members required overall. Marriott held similar views to 
Earl Grey and wrote in 1927: 
The truth is that representative government is apt to be successful only 
when there is a considerable leisured class upon which the Legislature and 
Executive can draw. Such a class is the product of centuries of civilisation. 
The Australian Commonwealth is less than thirty years old.34
It was considerations like this that only those of the leisured class could afford to 
be active politicians that eventually led to the payment of salaries to members, a 
long standing part of the British radical programme and designed to encourage 
those of lesser means to stand for parliament. By 1897 what Marriott described as 
the ‘advancing tide of democracy’ 
 
35
To undertake a broad survey of all eighty-four delegates to both Conventions 
would be to repeat much of McDonald’s detailed analysis, as well as the work of La 
Nauze and Hunt. Therefore the detailed prosopography for this study has been 
limited to the delegation from Victoria in 1897–8.
 was gathering strength and the nomination 
principle had been discarded for the Senate in favour of elections by adult male 
suffrage. 
36
largely composed of the old-fashioned squatter type … The typical 
Councillor was a long-established and wealthy resident, … a member of 
 I have selected this delegation 
because it was a typical delegation which had experienced many obstacles and 
bitterness in dealing with its Council or upper house and because the last 
Convention was the one that drew up the final version of the Constitution. 
The Council the Victorian delegates knew was an elected house but with a 
prohibitive property requirement and it had proved a difficult and stubborn partner. 
Geoffrey Serle found that until at least 1890 the Victorian Legislative Council was: 
                                            
34 J.A. Marriott, Second Chambers - an Inductive Study in Political Science, (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1927), p.117. 
35 Ibid., p.v. 
36 All information on individual delegates was taken from their entry in the Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, unless otherwise noted. 
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the Melbourne Club, of good family background rather than a self-made 
man.37
 
 
The same description could be applied to the upper houses of each colony in 1890 
and is in stark contrast to Parkes’ view of the Convention delegates as ‘self-made’ 
men ‘without any of the aids of fortune’. 
The situation led to the uneasy relationship between the two Victorian chambers 
and also affected other Colonies, so the experience was typical and may have 
played a part in the decision to have an elected Senate, an idea fiercely resisted in 
1891, but accepted without debate in 1897–8. All the Victorian delegates were, or 
had been, politicians and would have been aware of the nature of the relationship 
between the two houses of Parliament and the role played by the Legislative 
Council. These factors would have been very much in their minds as they 
discussed the structure of a federal upper house. 
A systematic analysis of the backgrounds and biographical characteristics of the 
Victorian delegates has been carried out to reveal common experiences and traits, 
to examine to what extent the backgrounds of these delegates reflect what they 
saw as an ‘ideal senator’, and if the typical Victorian delegate could be seen as a 
model of his ideal Senator. 
A biographical analysis of the Victorian delegation to the Federation Convention in 
1897-8 shows many things but the most noteworthy is the similarities in life 
experience, education and age in the data. Nationality and heritage especially were 
major areas of conformity: five were born in Australia; of the others, three were 
born in England, one in Ireland and one in Canada. They were all of British 
heritage, though one, Isaacs, also had a Jewish heritage but had been culturally 
assimilated into the British way of life by his Jewish parents. They had left their 
native Poland in the 1840s to settle in London and later migrated to Victoria where 
they retained their adopted culture. 
                                            
37 Geoffrey Serle, 'The Victorian Legislative Council, 1856-1950', Historical Studies: Australia and 
New Zealand, 1954, p.192. 
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Table 1. Members of the Victorian Delegation to the 1897-8 Convention 
Name Honours  Title House 
Sir Graham Berry K.C.M.G. Speaker Legislative Assembly 
The Honorable Alfred Deakin  Member Legislative Assembly 
The Honorable Simon Fraser  Member Legislative Council 
Henry Bournes Higgins  Member  Legislative Assembly 
The Honorable Isaac Alfred Isaacs  Attorney-General Legislative Assembly 
The Honorable Alexander James Peacock  Chief Secretary Legislative Assembly 
John Quick  Member Legislative Assembly 
William Arthur Trenwith  Member Legislative Assembly 
The Honorable Sir George Turner K.C.M.G. Premier Legislative Assembly 
The Honorable Sir William Austin Zeal K.C.M.G. President  Legislative Council 
 
The Victorian delegation can be compared with the Convention delegates as a 
whole in this respect. In the 1891 Convention only 16 of the 46 members were born 
in Australia; of the 50 delegates to the 1897 Convention 26 were Australian born 
23 were born in the British Isles and one (Fraser) in Canada.38
The marked increase in the number of delegates born in Australia is a sign of the 
changing demographic profile of Australia as native born began to outnumber 
British born. Of the delegates born in other parts of Empire the length of time they 
had been in Australia varied greatly from Parkes, a New South Wales delegate, 
born in England in 1815, arrived in 1839, to Higgins born in Ireland in 1851, arrived 
in 1870. The strong British presence in the Conventions is a reminder of the 
overwhelming Britishness of 19th century Australia. To these delegates the British 
Parliament was an ancient and honourable institution with strong and binding 
traditions, and it was their loyalty to these traditions that explains why the British 
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bicameral system was accepted by the delegates as a sound model for the new 
Australian legislature. 
Table 2. Early Life experiences of delegates from Victoria 
 
Age was not so uniform. The average age of the Victorian delegates in 1897 was 
49 years and, though mostly in their forties and fifties, they ranged from 36 
(Peacock) to 75 (Berry). This compares with the Conventions overall where the 
median age was fifty and the oldest delegates, both Tasmanians, were Adye 
Douglas, 82 in 1897, and William Moore, 80. Walter James, 34, was the 
youngest.39
Religion was another consistency in the delegation. Eight of the delegates followed 
versions of the Protestant Christian faiths, such as the Church of England and 
Methodism. The two exceptions were Isaacs, who retained his Jewish religion, but 
only Trenwith was an atheist. That there were no Catholics among the Victorian 
delegates reflects the general ethos of Australia at that time when Catholics, a 
 
                                            
39 Ibid. 
Name 
 
Age 
1897 
Where 
born 
Parents Education Religion Early 
Occupation 
Berry, Graham 
 
75 England Tradesman Elementary Anglican Storekeeper 
Tradesman 
Politician 
Deakin, Alfred 41 Australia Clerk,  
Shopkeeper 
Grammar 
Melbourne Uni 
Anglican Teacher 
Fraser, Simon 65 Canada Farmer Elementary Anglican Business 
Higgins, Henry 46 Ireland Minister 
Church of 
Ireland 
Elementary 
Melbourne Uni  
Anglican Teacher 
Lawyer 
Isaacs, Isaac 42 Australia Tailor Elementary 
 Melbourne Uni 
Jewish Teacher 
Lawyer 
Peacock, 
Andrew 
36 Australia Draper Elementary Anglican Mining,politics 
Quick, John 45 England Farmer Matriculation 
Melbourne Uni 
Methodist Casual work 
Lawyer 
Trenwith, 
William 
51 Australia Convicts Home 
Self Taught 
Atheist Bootmaker 
Trade 
unionist 
Turner, George 46 Australia  Cabinet Maker Matriculation 
Melbourne Uni 
Anglican Clerk 
Lawyer 
Zeal, William 49 England Wine Merchant Private Schools 
Diploma in 
eng/surveying 
Anglican Surveyor 
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large minority group, were still regarded with some mistrust, this despite the fact 
that Victoria had had two Catholic Premiers, Gavan Duffy and John O’Shanassy. 
There were only two Roman Catholics in the whole Convention: Patrick McMahon 
Glynn and Richard Edward O'Connor.40
The consistency of the Victorian delegation is also apparent in their social status at 
birth: none of them were born to wealth and only Trenwith had been born into 
poverty. They were mostly the sons of moderately successful tradesmen, though 
Higgins was the son of a clergyman in the Church of Ireland and Zeal’s father, a 
wine merchant, was quite prosperous. Ambitious parents helped some succeed; 
others made it by personal ambition and abilities, such as Trenwith whose parents 
had both been convicts in Tasmania. His father had been a bootmaker, a trade 
which Trenwith also took up when he left home at about the age of thirteen. He 
soon became involved in the Launceston Working Man’s Club where he learned 
self-reliance and independence, as well as boxing, debating and self-education. At 
the Convention he represented the working class in the archetypical role of the 
radical shoemaker, as discussed in Hobsbawm’s article on the strength of the 
radical and intellectual activities often found in the trade. Hobsbawn found 
shoemakers had a reputation as the ‘ideologists of the common people’ and, as a 
trade, had in the 19th century a reputation for radicalism.
 
41
This analysis matches what McDonald tells us about the delegates generally. They 
were not born into wealth or prestige either but, like the Victorians, were not poor 
or under-privileged. They were the sons of ministers of religion, military officers, 
minor public servants, farmers and labourers and some were from pastoral or 
political families.
 
42
                                            
40 Alfred Deakin, The Federal Story: The Inner History of the Federal Cause, 1880-1900, ed. with an 
Introduction by J.A. La Nauze, (Parkville, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1963), p.63. 
41 Eric Hobsbawm and Joan W. Scott, 'Political Shoemakers', in Worlds of Labour: Further Studies 
in the History of Labour, (London: Weidenfield & Nicholson, 1984), p.104. 
42 McDonald, 'The Eighty Founding Fathers', p.38. 
 Parkes’ words quoted earlier about the quality of the delegates 
to the 1891 Convention were equally true of those of the 1897-8 Convention. 
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The unremarkable family backgrounds of the delegates meant that, for most, 
formal schooling ended at the elementary level, though Trenwith was taught by his 
mother and later self-educated and Deakin attended Melbourne Grammar School 
and later graduated in law from Melbourne University. Zeal acquired a professional 
qualification as a surveyor and engineer in England before migrating to Australia. 
Several pursued higher education later in life and four qualified as lawyers: Turner, 
Quick, Isaacs, and Higgins. With the already qualified lawyer Deakin, this meant 
there were five lawyers representing Victoria at the Convention: a proportion which 
carried throughout the whole Convention, where out of a total of fifty delegates, 
twenty-five were lawyers. Davidson has argued that the Constitution Bill was 
drafted by lawyers ‘the same men who had run the colonial states for fifty years’ 
and these statistics generally support his argument.43
Before entering politics most of the delegation had been employed in lower middle-
class occupations, except for Trenwith who worked in his trade until elected as the 
member for Richmond in 1889 at the age of fifty-one. He had been deeply involved 
in trade unionism in the 1880s, which prepared him for the demands of political 
office. The early occupations of the remainder of the Victorian delegation ranged 
from Trenwith, the bootmaker and trade union official, to entrepreneur Fraser, 
storekeeper Berry and mining business official Peacock. Higgins, the son of a 
clergyman, worked as a clerk in Ireland before emigrating to Melbourne with his 
family in 1870, where he qualified as a teacher. In later life all the delegates were 
successful self-made men, having achieved either wealth or status or both through 
successful business enterprises or public office. Simon Fraser became wealthy 
from construction, grazing and banking activities and Graham Berry, from humble 
beginnings, had served in Parliament for several periods over forty years before 
the Convention and had risen to Ministerial level and the Premiership at various 
times in his long career.
  
44
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The employment pattern of the larger group of delegates is more difficult to analyse 
in detail but it compares with the Victorian delegation. McDonald found that many 
were professionals and forty-nine were engaged in various industries such as 
pastoralism, commerce, mining, finance, agriculture, manufacturing and other 
forms of business. He concluded that they were capitalists and part of a capitalist 
milieu of investment, trade, production and company administration. He found them 
enterprising and acquisitive profit seekers. This bears out Crisp’s argument that the 
delegates were the ‘big men of property or their trusted allies’.45
The pattern of employment of the Victorian delegates had changed from mostly 
lower-middle class occupations by the time of the 1897 Convention and the 
occupation of nine of them was as a member of parliament. Seven were members 
of the Legislative Assembly, including the Premier (Turner), the Speaker (Berry), 
and the Attorney General (Isaacs); two were Councillors including the President 
(Zeal).The odd man out in this category was John Quick who, though not a current 
member of Parliament, had been a member of the Assembly from 1880 to 1889. 
He had been active in the preconvention years working towards federation and it 
was he who devised the successful programme for bringing Federation into reality. 
Altogether, the delegates had an average Parliamentary experience of thirteen 
years ranging from a low of three (Higgins) to a high of forty (Berry). Two, Zeal and 
Turner, had also served as municipal councillors. Given this strong representation 
of the politically active at the Convention it is easy to understand how past political 
practice became a powerful factor in the attitudes of the delegates. In terms of 
political experience the Victorian delegation was comparable to the delegates as a 
whole, where all except one were, or had been, active in Australian politics and 
would have been familiar with governmental procedures.
 It is possible that 
the delegates’ business interests encouraged them to look beyond the horizons of 
one colony. A growing realisation of the connections between the colonies was 
characteristic of that generation. 
46
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James Thomas Walker had not been a Member of Parliament47 and according to 
La Nauze, contributed little to the debates. He had been a bank manager and had 
written and lectured on federal finance and might have expected to be on the 
finance committee where his real expertise lay, but he was placed on the judiciary 
committee and perhaps this contributed to his silence.48 He did distinguish himself 
however by conferring the name ‘Senate’ on the upper house. The decision had 
been to name the upper house the States’ Assembly’ when Walker interjected 
saying ‘In place of States Assembly I propose that we should call it ‘Senate’. This 
was carried 27 votes to 21.49
Ideologically the delegates in this study were Protectionists. In Victoria, as John 
Rickard has noted, ‘to oppose protection … was, particularly for a liberal, political 
folly’.
 
50 Higgins and Deakin were both liberals and supported, or at least did not 
actively oppose, protectionism as in Victoria the two were compatible. With this in 
mind seven of the delegates were declared protectionists including Deakin who 
had changed his views, having been influenced by David Syme of the Melbourne 
Age.51 Exceptions were Berry, a radical whose agenda for reform was more 
ambitious than the Liberals and who was vehemently opposed to the conservative 
ideology and obstructionism of members of the Legislative Council; Trenwith, the 
Labour man, and Fraser who was ‘anti-socialist’. There were no organised political 
parties in the 1890s except the emerging Labour Party and politicians were 
described according to their expressed views by such terms as radical, socialist, 
liberal, and conservative, in addition to Free Trade and Protectionist. John Rickard 
has argued that in the 1890s ‘in both colonies [Victoria and New South Wales] 
there seemed to be a large political majority in favour of ‘liberal’ policies.’52
                                            
47 Galligan and Warden, 'The Design of the Senate', p. 91, n.6. 
48 La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution, pp.101, 120-122. 
49 OR, 13 April 1897, p. 481. 
50 John Rickard, ‘Higgins, Henry Bournes (1851-1929)’ in Australian Dictionary of Biography, online 
edition, 2006. Melbourne University Press. http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/adbonline.htm. 
51 R. Norris, 'Deakin, Alfred (1856-1919)', in Ibid. 
52 John Rickard, Class and Politics, New South Wales, Victoria and the Early Commonwealth, 
(Canberra. Australian National University Press, 1976), p.83. 
 None of 
the historians writing on the Victorian delegates specifically addressed the ideology 
of the delegates except in such blanket terms. Crisp, for example, discussed the 
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ideology of the delegates in relation to their views on States’ Rights in the debates 
and mentions liberals, conservatives and occasionally democrats.53 The terms are 
imprecise especially as delegates changed their views on such things as whether 
or not senators should be elected.54
Name 
 The general view of the delegates’ ideologies 
as a whole, as expressed by historians, is that they were a mostly conservative 
group but there was a leavening of more liberal thinkers such as Deakin, Baker, 
and Higgins. To some extent this supports the perception—actually fiction—that 
the members of the colonies’ Upper Houses were free from the taint of party 
affiliation. 
Table 3. Later life experience of delegates from Victoria up to 1897 
 
Occupation 
before politics 
Years in 
politics 
Club 
member etc. 
 
Home 
Property 
Marital 
Status/children 
Berry, Graham 
 
Early Politician 40 years No  M. 
m.1, 11 ch 
m.2, 7 ch. 
Deakin, Alfred 
 
Lawyer 8 No 
Social Gentry 
Register  
University Debating 
Club 
ANA* 
South Yarra M. 3d 
Fraser, Simon 
 
Entrepreneur 12 Australian Club Toorak Mansion 
Property in Qld. NSW. 
Vic. 
M. 3s.1d. 
Higgins, Henry 
  
Lawyer 3 University Debating 
Club 
Mansion in Malvern M. 1s. 
Isaacs, Isaac 
 
Lawyer 5 Freemason 
ANA* 
Country House 
Mt.Macedon 
M. 2d. 
Peacock, 
Andrew 
 
Mining 
Politics 
8 Freemason 
ANA* 
Unmarried  
Quick, John 
 
Lawyer 9 Yorick Club 
Freemason  
ANA* 
Quarry Hill M. 1d. 
Trenwith, William 
 
Trade union 
official 
5 No  M.(1896) 3s. 1d. 
Turner, George 
 
Lawyer 8 
Councillor 
No 
ANA* 
St. Kilda M. 1s. 1d. 
Zeal, William 
 
Surveyor 
politician 
19 
Councillor 
No Toorak S. 
* ANA Australian Natives Association 
The ideology of the delegates would have been influenced by their life experiences 
and by the time of the conventions they were all experienced politicians who had 
been involved in public affairs for most of their adult lives and had achieved a 
                                            
53 Crisp, Australian National Government, pp.14-17. 
54 For the study of the Victorian delegates I have followed the assessments in the Australian 
Dictionary of Biography as the most consistent classification of their ideologies. 
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moderate social status and comfortable level of prosperity. Some were to rise 
higher and three were to become senators in the first federal Parliament, as were 
seven Convention delegates from other States. Except for Simon Fraser, who 
owned properties in Queensland and New South Wales as well as Victoria, the 
Victorian delegates were not wealthy men but all had achieved a level of financial 
independence and a place in their society. They lived in modest, middle class 
Melbourne suburbs, except for Higgins who had built a mansion in Malvern, Isaacs 
who had a country house at Mount Macedon, and Fraser who ‘resided genteely in 
his villa at Toorak’.55
The delegates were active participants in Melbourne society, though not at an elite 
level. The late 19th century was the era of Clubs for Gentlemen but these either 
had not attracted many of the delegates or they may have failed to be admitted. 
For example, none belonged to the elite Melbourne Club, the most exclusive in 
town with membership strictly limited according to rules supposedly based on a 
man’s character and occupation. Simon Fraser belonged to the Australian Club, a 
less exclusive establishment set up as an alternative to the Melbourne Club, and in 
a different part of town, and John Quick was a member of the Yorick, a club for 
men ‘sympathetic with Literature, Art or Science’.
 Peacock married after the Convention and only Zeal 
remained unmarried. The eight who married became the fathers of between one 
and four children. Berry had the largest family of eleven children by his first wife 
(eight survived him) and seven by his second wife. Peacock had no children. 
56
                                            
55 McDonald, 'The Eighty Founding Fathers', p.47. 
56 Serville, Pounds and Pedigrees, pp. 360, 366. 
 Three of the delegates were 
Freemasons, (Isaacs, Peacock, and Quick) and Deakin, though not a clubman, 
was listed in the Social Gentry Register. Delegates were active in other areas—
both Deakin and Higgins had been members of the Melbourne University Debating 
Club and five were members of the Australian Natives Association (ANA) which 
was a key supporter of the Federation movement. Initially the ANA was open only 
to those born in Australia, but John Quick was allowed to join in an honorary 
capacity and worked to promote support for Federation among other members. 
Such activities exposed them to society in general and added to a public profile 
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beyond their political careers. By contrast, Victoria’s upper house was regarded as 
‘pastoralist-dominated’ and a gross plutocracy. It was viewed as the legislative arm 
of the Melbourne Club and more than a third of men elected to the Upper House 
were members.57
If the delegates did not qualify or were not interested in joining the more elite 
established clubs this may have been because they were already and 
automatically, members of an exclusive club as members of Parliament. It was a 
club which, as well as facilities such as a library, dining room and meeting rooms 
other than the Chambers, bestowed a sound social standing, a level of 
companionship within a circle of friends, colleagues and acquaintances and entry 
to the highest levels of society such as functions at Government House. The 
entertainments provided at the Convention for the pleasure of the delegates are an 
indication of their status in society. In Sydney in 1897, a heavy social programme 
included ‘a public conversazione, a banquet, a night at the theatre to see The 
French Maid, a moonlight harbour excursion, a government house ball, a tattoo, 
several garden parties and at-homes, an excursion along the Hawkesbury River 
and another to attend the Newcastle Centenary Celebrations’. This was an 
exhausting but pleasurable itinerary which was wittily criticised by one reporter as 
‘Federation by Festivity’.
  
 58 An added celebration was the sudden marriage on 11 
September 1897 of one of the delegates, Patrick McMahon Glynn, who escorted 
his new bride to the Government House Ball. He had written to her proposing 
marriage during a sitting of the Convention and they were married within the week. 
The Melbourne Argus christened him ‘An ardent Federationist’ for his romantic 
deed, while the Bulletin felt that he had brightened the Convention with his ‘meteor 
like rush into matrimony’.59
                                            
57 Ibid., pp.93, 96, 90. 
58 Crowley, Big John Forrest: 1847–1918: A Founding Father of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
pp.190-191. 
59 Gerald O'Collins, Patrick McMahon Glynn: A Founder of the Australian Commonwealth, 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965), pp.128-9. 
 The social round would have been beneficial as well as 
pleasurable to the delegates, introducing them to the delegates from other colonies 
and the elites of the land, and broadening their appreciation of the concept of a 
federated Australia.  
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Other opportunities for broadening the mind for the delegates came with travel. 
Those born overseas and who had spent some years of their youth in other 
countries (Berry in England, Fraser in Canada, and Higgins in Ireland) had 
international experience but extended travel itself was not a frequent activity and 
what there was was mostly official rather than voluntary and mainly to England. 
Berry was in England on Government business in 1878 and again as Agent-
General in London from 1886 until 1891. Turner, with other Premiers attended the 
celebrations in London for Queen Victoria’s jubilee in 1897—mid-Convention—and 
Fraser represented Victoria at the Ottawa Conference in 1894. Fraser had also 
toured Europe and America in 1883 and, in 1886 Higgins took an extensive 
honeymoon trip which included India, Egypt, France, England, Scotland and 
Ireland. While in London he arranged to be called to the Bar ‘consuming the 
requisite eighteen dinners at the Inner Temple’.60 The most extensive travel by one 
of the Victorian delegates was undertaken by Deakin who visited America in 1884-
5, where he was deeply impressed with what he learned. He visited the West coast 
to study irrigation and also took the opportunity to visit the East coast. There is no 
evidence that he ever visited Washington or Congress but he was impressed 
enough with Bryce’s work The American Commonwealth to strongly recommend it 
to the delegates at the 1890 Conference as ‘a text-book for the philosophic study of 
constitutional questions’.61 The extensive diary of his travels in the United States 
reveals his admiration for the American way and he clearly drew some of his ideas 
on Federation from his visit to the United States as well as from Bryce.62 Further 
travel came in 1887 when he went to London to attend the Colonial Conference 
where he ‘attracted favourable attention’.63
The Victorian delegates’ experience of travel was typical of those of the 
Convention as a whole for whom travel was also restricted mainly to Europe and 
Britain, whether privately or to study, to tour, on commercial business or 
 
                                            
60 Rickard, H.B. Higgins: The Rebel as Judge, p.66. 
61 OR, 10 February 1890, p.25. 
62 J.A. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp.166-8. 
63 Hunt, American Precedents in Australian Federation, pp.20-21. Deakin had also visited Ceylon 
and India in 1890 to study irrigation. See J.A. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin: A biography, (Melbourne, 
Melbourne University Press, 1965), Vol.1. p.133. 
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sometimes to represent their Colony on Government business or at conferences. 
Some of the delegates from other Colonies, such as John Cockburn, decided to 
spend their declining years there.64 Exposure to the United States federal system 
was not as frequent as to the British system but Andrew Inglis Clark, Tasmanian 
Attorney-General, and member of the 1891 Convention, like Deakin, travelled to 
America and greatly admired the federal system.65 From these travel experiences, 
especially to Britain, came a deepening influence of British culture on the minds of 
the delegates which added further strength to the force of path dependence. It was 
here, to invoke Marx’s words again, that they encountered the ‘tradition of all the 
dead generations’.66
This biographical analysis of Victorian delegates’ backgrounds, experience and 
education shows that they were middle-class, middle-aged and, for the most part 
established men of influence, position and achievement. Typically they were 
Protestant and married with children. Among them were also men of experience, 
energy and deep convictions, such as Higgins and Deakin while others were less 
active. Berry, now an ageing politician whose fire was fading, was mostly silent as 
was Peacock, whose comparative youth and inexperience suggest a lack of 
confidence in such an ‘august’ company, though he was famous for his ‘bizarre’ 
and loud laughter.
  
67
Does this examination show that in biographical terms the subset of ten Victorian 
Convention delegates embodied the characteristics of the kind of man they 
envisaged as an ideal senator: of strong British connections; Christian and 
Protestant; industrious; respectable; a worthy, middle-aged, middle-class, 
prosperous family man with a significant stake in society? Though not born wealthy 
 The more open minded among them were not radicals or 
extremists but were liberals, moderates: men like Henry Higgins and Alfred Deakin, 
and in the wider field of the Conventions as a whole Inglis Clark, Richard Baker 
and Henry Parkes. 
                                            
64 McDonald, 'The Eighty Founding Fathers', p.40. 
65 Crisp, Australian National Government, p. 18. 
66 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: with explanatory notes, (New York: New 
York, International Publishers, 1964), p.15. 
67 La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution, pp.102, 151. 
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nor of society’s elite, they had achieved a quasi-elite status through their own 
energy, diligence and talent. From unprivileged family, educational and 
employment backgrounds, they had become successful and esteemed politicians 
of moderate liberal or conservative views, with sound social connections with one 
another, their families, their society at large and their political colleagues. 
Comparing them with the total membership of the Conventions they were typical of 
the representation. They were a meritocracy and quite a different breed to the 
squattocracy described by Serle as members of Victoria’s Legislative Council in 
1890. The Council had been dominated by gentlemen and members of polite 
society from its inception in 1855–6 and in the early days many Councillors were 
members of the Melbourne Club. This dominance was reduced by the latter part of 
the century but criticisms continued as the conservative Legislative Council, 
elected on a franchise of wealth and composed mainly of rich men, blocked the 
wishes of the democratic Assembly.68
What I mean is an upper chamber, call it what you may, which shall have 
within itself the only conservatism possible in a democracy—the 
conservatism of maturity of judgment, of distinction of service, of length of 
experience, and weight of character.
 
To dig a little deeper, I have studied speeches from all the Conventions, beginning 
in 1891, to gain some insight into the delegates’ views on the ‘ideal senator’. The 
first indications of the perceptions of an ideal Senate in the 1891 Convention came 
from Henry Parkes in his introductory remarks in the first discussion of the 
structure of the legislature. He described his idea of the Senate in these words: 
69
This could fairly be said to describe the Convention delegates, at least in their own 
estimation, and is evidence of Parkes’ idea of a superior body of men. Coming 
from the chairman himself, it was quite likely to influence the views of some 
delegates. Parkes was followed by John Gordon who commented, with no 
evidence at all, that ‘The senate will probably be the better house of the two!’
 
70
                                            
68 Serville, Pounds and Pedigrees, p.143. 
69 OR, 4 March 1891, p.26. 
70 Ibid., 4 March 1891, p.37. 
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did not indicate why this should be so but it illustrates that he, at least, had 
internalised the notion of a house of superior character. 
An indication of the influence of Parkes’ words came later in the debate when 
Edmund Barton reiterated his prescription: 
the President told us that in the senate we seek to create as lofty, as 
dignified, an upper chamber as we can, and we seek to create it as nearly 
on the British model as we can.71
John Macrossan then expressed the hope that men would aspire to becoming 
senators as he considered they did in the United States: ‘owing to the power and 
dignity which our senate will possess’. Here the ubiquitous idea of power and 
dignity being important requisites for the Senate is clearly expressed and 
Macrossan continued in this vein with the remark that the Senate would possess 
superior influence ‘by its superior ability, being the elected of men who are 
themselves elected for their ability by the different states’.
 
72 So the notion of 
superiority was added to the qualities of an upper house and clearly connected to 
the principle of nomination by the state parliaments. John Downer also had little 
doubt about the sort of body the Senate should be: ‘the senate should be a house 
of high dignity and of great authority’.73 The erudite William McMillan expressed 
another view that saw the Senate as ‘attracting the best men of Australasia within 
its four walls’ and it would not be ‘of the pettifogging character that it would 
interfere with every jot and tittle connected with expenditure’.74
That the Senate would naturally attract men of superior ability was a recurring 
theme. As Stafford Bird enunciated: ‘If we acknowledge that those who are to be 
members of the senate are men of good standing, men of good judgment, if we are 
going to have men of this class, why hesitate to give them the power claimed for 
them by some to deal with bills of all kinds?’
 
75
                                            
71 Ibid., 17 March 1891, p.411. 
72 Ibid., 17 March 1891, p.436. 
73 ibid., 18 March 1891, p.472. 
74 ibid., 3 April 1891, p.718. 
75 Ibid., 6 April 1891, p.728. 
 John Forrest was in no doubt about 
the qualities of the ideal Senate: ‘I believe that they will be, if anything, a superior 
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body, thoroughly representative, wise, and patriotic,’ and added what a superior 
body we intend to create’.76 George Dibbs, speaking in support of a nominated 
Senate said ‘I do not know a more refined process by which you could make a 
more perfect, and independent, and probably intelligent senate than that’.77 He 
went on to say that he would vote for nomination because it would produce the 
‘best men … a body of men whose weight, whose experience, and whose 
intelligence will be felt throughout the country; a senate which … will command the 
full confidence and respect of the people’.78
The superior house envisaged by the delegates would in their view be inhabited by 
elite individuals. In 1891 it was foreseen that senators would be ‘men of character 
and position’; they would have ‘maturity of judgement, of distinction of service, of 
length of experience, and weight of character’.
 
79 Capable and eminent men would 
aspire to be senators, owing to the power and dignity of the Senate which would be 
a superior body. Senators would be the ‘best men … whose weight, experience 
and intelligence would be felt throughout the country. They would be men of good 
standing and good judgment’.80
These fulsome comments were made when, with an implicit or subliminal desire to 
restrain democracy, the delegates had agreed that the States’ legislatures would 
be responsible for the selection and nomination of Senators. By 1897 things had 
changed and democratic principles had gained strength enough for the idea of 
direct election of the Senators by the people of each State to be accepted. The 
resolutions put before the 1897 Convention included an uncompromising clause 
which stated explicitly that ‘The senator’s [sic] shall be directly chosen by the 
people of the state as one electorate’.
 
81
                                            
76 ibid., 6 April 1891, p.732. 
77 Ibid., 6 April 1891, p.753. 
78 Ibid., 6 April 1891, p.755. 
79 Ibid., 2 March 1891, p.26. 
80 Ibid., 7 April 1891, p.755. 
81 Ibid., 13 September 1897, p.361. The Resolution was debated and passed in September 1897. 
 This did not silence those who saw the 
upper house as an elite institution, but it provided a new context for the rhetoric. 
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Early in the 1897 Convention Richard Baker impatiently attacked the pervasive 
notion of the superiority of the proposed Senate and those who saw it as an elite 
institution, even an imitation of the House of Lords. ‘I cannot help thinking’ he 
quipped: 
that it is extremely difficult for some people to get out of their heads the idea 
that the Senate is a kind of glorified Upper House; they cannot appreciate the 
fact that the Senate represents the people as fully as the House of 
Representatives.82
Though the comments about the superiority of the Senate were less emphatic in 
1897, Downer still saw the Senate as ‘lordly’ as well as ‘important and dignified’.
 
Baker had a point. He was passionate in his opposition to ‘responsible 
government’, the model favoured by most delegates and eventually adopted. He 
wanted the Senate to be constructed on similar principles to the United States’ 
body and argued his case with fervour and conviction, but could not dent the 
stubborn desire for a ‘dignified’ upper house. In many ways he was the exception 
that proves the rule. 
83 
McMillan, waxing eloquent as was his wont, saw the Senate as a ‘great moderating 
assembly’, envisaging an assembly of judgement, wisdom and patriotism, a 
chamber of character, where moderation would rule and the members, men with 
experience and wisdom, would be ‘touched with the glory of the upper house’.84 
Glory is a strong and colourful word in this context, conjuring up visions of 
grandeur and magnificence, hardly democratic virtues. McMillan seems rather 
confused in his vision of the Senate. What he seems to be saying is that by 
becoming Senators those elected would be imbued with the required virtues of 
experience and wisdom simply by association. He combines this thought with an 
articulation of the house of review concept: ‘a moderating assembly’, a view further 
underscored by O'Connor who saw the Senate as a ‘steadying and controlling 
influence’.85
                                            
82 Ibid., 23 March 1897, p.30. 
83 Ibid., 29 March 1897, p.209. 
84 Ibid., 8 September 1897, p.219. 
85 Ibid., 24 March 1897, p.56. 
 In the speeches extolling the hoped for qualities of an upper house 
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and its members, the recurrence of many of the words explains to some extent 
how it was evisioned by the majority of the delegates, excluding Baker who had 
severely rebuked the delegates about the idea of a ‘glorified upper house’ early in 
1897.86 For most delegates the Senate would be an elite and gracious institution 
inhabited by wise, experienced politicians, men of remarkable qualities, dispensing 
wisdom and justice which would ‘temper the possible democratic excesses of the 
lower chamber’.87 In the delegates’ language of representation can be detected a 
Burkean understanding of parliamentary representation. Edmund Burke, a leading 
Whig parliamentarian, in 1774 famously expressed the notion of representation as 
‘Your representative owes you not his industry only, but his judgement and he 
betrays instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion’.88
While in 1891 delegates thought that the nomination principle would safeguard the 
choice of Senators and ensure they would have the desired qualities and 
characteristics, in 1897, with the decision for direct election of Senators, there was 
no such guarantee and there was less discussion of this aspect in that Convention. 
Was this because the delegates considered there would be less control on the type 
of men selected to serve than there would have been with the nomination 
principle? Perhaps, but the fact that the delegates to the 1897 Convention had 
been elected on the same principle now proposed for the Senators was probably 
equally influential. Though the change had been accepted without demur, John 
Forrest was not convinced. He still thought that nomination would be best and 
‘more likely to yield good results than the plan proposed in this bill’. In the same 
speech, however, he described the 1897 delegates as ‘able, true and patriotic’ and 
commended the idea of election for senators as an ‘excellent plan’, which quite 
contradicted his earlier thought. 
 
89
                                            
86 Ibid., 23 March 1897, p.30. 
87 Ged Martin, Bunyip Aristocracy, (Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), p.41. It is interesting to note the 
exalted expectations of delegates about the membership of the Senate were not reflected in the 
actual results of the 1901 Federal elections when eight Labour members held the balance of power. 
88 Paul A. Pickering and Alex Tyrrell, The Peoples’ Bread: a history of the Corn Law League, 
(London and New York, Leicester University Press, 2000), pp.179-180. 
89 OR, Forrest, 13 September 1897, p.361. 
 It was an ironic comment as his own Colony had 
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not elected its delegates, they had been selected by the parliament, but he may 
have been in the process of changing his mind. 
Able, true and patriotic is a pleasing description of the Convention delegates. 
Ability they had demonstrated in their careers, and true implies trust in and loyalty 
to colleagues and country. Patriotic, a word Forrest and other delegates used 
frequently and ambiguously, is usually taken to mean love of one’s country—the 
new Australia in this context. Here I suggest Forrest also envisaged a continued 
loyalty to Britain, the country and culture which he and the Convention embraced 
as their own and had voted to retain in the Parliament they were constructing. 
Forrest also issued a dire and prescient warning in the same speech, saying that 
direct election would mean: ‘instead of having the voice of the people represented 
… you will have a host of cliques and rings voting by ticket from one end of the 
country to the other’.90
Without undertaking an exhaustive content analysis, a study of the 
words most frequently used by the delegates to describe the ideal 
Senate and Senator reinforces the idea that the Senate was foreseen as 
a noble and stately institution: words such as: maturity, dignity, 
authority, and judgement occur often. Barton wanted ‘as dignified an 
upper chamber as we can’;
 This was a forecast of the emergence of political parties and 
their future dominance over both houses of parliament even the Senate, the States’ 
House. 
91 Macrossan saw ‘a strong and powerful 
senate which will have dignity and authority’ and ‘a superior body’ with 
‘men of maturity of judgement, distinction, service, length of 
experience, and with capable and eminent men’.92 Downer also saw ‘a 
house of high dignity’ … ‘knowing its importance and its dignity’; and 
with ‘superior ability and influence’. 93 Downer’s ‘lordly’,94
                                            
90 Ibid., 13 September 1897, p.362.  
91 Ibid., 17 March 1891, p.411. 
92 Ibid., 17 March 1891, p.436. 
93 Ibid., 18 March 1891, p.472. 
94 Ibid.,, 29 March 1897, p.209. 
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with more than a hint of sarcasm, and McMillan’s ‘glory’95 directly evoke 
a vision of splendour and betray a subliminal notion of an upper class in 
the upper house. Wisdom and character also made frequent 
appearances, complemented by O'Connor who foresaw a ‘steadying, 
controlling and moderating influence’.96 Important, strong and powerful 
were other favourites and Dibbs’ contribution was a Senate ‘perfect, 
independent and probably intelligent’ even if he sounded a little 
uncertain about the last attribute.97 Weight appeared occasionally as 
well as experience and intelligence. Baker saw the senators as men of 
‘character and position’98 and Bird added ‘men of good standing, of good 
judgement’.99
Though the biographical data suggest that the delegates were all very similar men, 
some were more prominent and active than others.  Leaders such as Henry 
 
‘Dignity’ was a great favourite evoking a vision of personal as well as institutional 
formality, decorum and courtesy, as would be fitting in a house of such excellence. 
The use of the word further emphasises the vision in the delegates’ minds of an 
elite house in a class distinction sense and one superior to the ‘lower’ House of 
Representatives. This was a lofty vision, yet the remarkable aspect of these aims is 
that no-one suggested how they could ensure such a splendid result. Perhaps 
McMillan’s argument had influenced them: that simply being elected as Senators 
would imbue the elected with the necessary qualities, touching them with the ‘glory’ 
of the upper house, or perhaps they were unable to discard the idea of nomination 
even though election had been agreed upon. It is possible that the lack of debate 
on the topic of election had caused some delegates to forget the change of method 
of appointing Senators, though the fact that the most eloquent descriptions of 
superiority were made in 1891 suggests that not all of them had. 
                                            
95 Ibid., 8 September 1897, p.219. 
96 Ibid., 24 March 1897, p.56. 
97 Ibid., 6 April 1891, p.753. 
98 Ibid., 1 April 1891, p.544. 
99 Ibid., 6 April 1891, p.728. 
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Parkes, Alfred Deakin and Edmund Barton were all experienced politicians and 
major influences on the direction of the Conventions. Staunch conservatives such 
as John Forrest and Henry Dobson expressed their views strongly but were not 
supported in the divisions. Andrew Clark and Richard Baker, supported by Deakin, 
spoke out strongly against responsible government but they failed to convince the 
Conventions. Higgins, in his vehement opposition to equal State representation in 
the Senate, presented the views of the major colonies, but the fear that less 
powerful colonies would not then join the Federation persuaded even some who 
agreed with him to vote for equal representation. The views of the more vocal 
delegates were the most evident but not necessarily the most important or 
influential. The less obvious delegates, those who said little, were equally important 
because their votes carried the decisions. James Lee Steere and William Loton for 
example, were almost silent but they voted loyally along with their leader, John 
Forrest, along conservative lines.100
The delegates’ ideas of a Senate arose from their own service in the colonial 
parliaments and their grounding in British culture. They held on to these ideals with 
tenacity because they believed that their model of an upper house was not only 
appropriate but necessary and would strengthen and safeguard the Federation by 
providing a higher authority on all legislation. From their speeches in the debates 
 Their enthusiasm for Federation was, like their 
leader’s, at best lukewarm. 
Though the delegates had arrived at the Convention from different routes they had 
by then achieved similar positions in society and could now be seen as something 
of a homogenous group. This resulted in complementary opinions and values 
which enabled compromise on difficult decisions, such as the dilemma over equal 
representation for the States in the Senate. They were confident that the decisions 
they made in regard to an upper house were correct and would ensure its stability 
and its ‘dignity’ by the election of good, sound citizens—such as themselves—to 
the Senate. 
                                            
100 Deakin, The Federal Story: The Inner History of the Federal Cause, 1880-1900, p.60. 
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and from their biographical backgrounds, it may be concluded that the delegates’ 
vision of future Senators was very much in their own image. 
Chapter 4: The Wisest, the Safest, the Best 
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Chapter 4 
‘The Wisest, the Safest, the Best’1
 
: Colonial Upper Houses as 
models 
Henry Parkes expressed this heartfelt sentiment about the bicameral style of 
legislature as existed in Britain, in a speech to the New South Wales Parliament in 
1873. It was a sentiment that prevailed when the meetings of the Federal 
Conventions took place in the Legislative Assembly Chambers of the various 
Australian Colonies in the 1890s.2 As the Convention delegates, in the stiff, dark 
suits and top hats of the era, assembled to debate a new constitution for Australia, 
a stately accoutrement of power confronted them: at the head of the Chamber a 
Speaker’s Chair, often ornately fashioned and on a plinth or platform, would face 
the delegates, seated in green leather armchairs or benches arranged in a horse-
shoe pattern. Though not as elaborate as the Legislative Council Chambers, the 
Assembly Chambers were formally laid out and furnished with heavy, ornate 
furniture and fittings that breathed power, dignity and authority.3
                                            
1 Henry Parkes, Speeches, (Melbourne: George Robertson, 1876), p.356. 
2 Sydney, 1891, Legislative Assembly Chamber; Adelaide, 1897, House of Assembly Chamber; 
Sydney, 1897, Legislative Assembly Chamber; Melbourne, 1898, Legislative Assembly Chamber. 
3 The plans of the various chambers differ in detail but present a similar layout and arrangements. 
 The trappings of 
Australian lower houses were also reminders of their predecessor and model, the 
House of Commons in Britain, and were designed to reflect the furnishings of that 
Chamber. To add to the solemnity of the proceedings the rules of debate in the 
Conventions were managed by staff of the Colonial Assemblies and followed the 
pattern of the standing orders of the lower houses, themselves based upon the 
procedures of the House of Commons. In these surroundings and with these 
formalities it is easy to imagine tradition and history weighing heavily on the 
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shoulders of the delegates. Powerful encompassing forces, reminders of past 
glories and intimations of future triumphs, would constrain choices. 
This chapter will explore the historical development of the colonial Constitutions 
and their upper houses to discover what influence they had on the decisions of the 
delegates in regard to the Australian Senate. All but one of the delegates were 
familiar with the model of Government in their home Colony and would naturally 
have been deeply influenced by their experiences and the historical traditions 
found there, in tandem with a strong sense of their British national heritage and 
perception of the British Parliament. To what extent did their vision of an ideal 
parliament draw upon these factors? 
Five Australian Colonies achieved responsible self-government in the 1850s: New 
South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia in 1856, and Queensland 
from its first establishment as an independent Colony in 1859. Western Australia, 
settled later, achieved independence in 1890. Self-government in all of the 
Colonies except Queensland was preceded by a gradual evolution from autocratic 
rule by a Governor, first to representative institutions without a responsible 
executive and later to full independence and ‘responsible government’.4
The history of the New South Wales parliament is necessarily longer than that of 
the other Colonies as it was the first Colony on the continent, but as it was the 
model and trailblazer for the rest of Australia its early history is included as part of 
the histories of the other Colonies. The first form of Government in Australia was in 
New South Wales and began, as noted above, with autocratic rule by a Governor 
who was answerable to Britain. The Governor’s rule was absolute until 1823, when 
a five-member legislature was established by Britain as an advisory Council to the 
Governor (then Sir Thomas Brisbane) and its members were senior officers 
responsible to him. The Council had no law-making powers and the Governor was 
not bound to follow their advice. Only the Governor could initiate a Bill and he could 
override the Council even if it disagreed with his proposal, but legislation that was 
 
                                            
4 J.A. Marriott, Second Chambers - an Inductive Study in Political Science, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1910), p.152. 
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‘repugnant to the laws of England’ was prohibited.5 This Council was the first 
legislative body in Australia and passed its first Act on 25 August 1824. 
Membership was increased to seven members in 1825 and included John 
Macarthur, a wealthy and influential pioneer sheepman who had ‘boasted that he 
was responsible for the recall of several Governors’ and who represented the 
landed interests; thus the wealthy free settlers first gained a foothold in the 
government of the Colony.6
The Act provided for a unicameral legislature of thirty-six members, twelve of 
whom were nominated by the Crown and appointed by the Governor, himself a 
member, and the remaining twenty-four were elected by a male franchise based on 
property qualifications. The Governor now had no immediate control of the Council 
and in 1843, the introduction of a Speaker meant he ceased even to be a 
member.
 In 1829 the Council was again increased, this time to 
fifteen members and the Governor’s powers were reduced. Transportation of 
convicts to the colony ended in 1840 and in 1842 the British Government passed 
New South Wales’ first Constitution Act. 
7 The body was still known as the Legislative Council. By 1851 
membership had increased to 54, of whom 18 were nominated and 36 elected by 
male franchise, again based on property qualifications, and its powers were 
increased to include legislative authority and financial powers.8
The Australian self-government process got seriously under way in 1850 when the 
Imperial Parliament in Britain passed ‘An Act for the better Government of Her 
Majesty’s Australian Colonies’. This Act provided for self-government by 
 The Council 
continued in various forms as a unicameral, partly elected and partly nominated 
body until the granting of responsible government in 1856 when, as will be 
discussed later, it was succeeded by a traditional bicameral legislature. 
                                            
5 A.C.V. Melbourne, Early Constitutional Development in Australia, ed. R.B. Joyce, (St. Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press, 1963), pp.98-103. 
6 Ibid., p.113. John Hirst, Australia’s Democracy: a short history, (Crows Nest, Australia: Allen & 
Unwin, 2002), p.12. 
7 Gareth Griffith and Sharath Srinivasan, 'State Upper Houses in Australia', (Sydney: New South 
Wales Parliamentary Library, 2001), p.27. 
8 Barbara Page, 'The Legislative Council of New South Wales: Past Present and Future', (Sydney: 
Parliament of New South Wales, 1990), p.1. 
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unicameral Legislative Councils in South Australia (which had never been part of 
New South Wales), Van Diemen’s Land (later Tasmania, separated from New 
South Wales in 1825) and Victoria, separated from New South Wales under this 
Act. Each Council was to comprise two-thirds elected and one-third nominee 
members, the total number to be determined by the Governors and existing 
Councils. The Act also authorised the setting up of bicameral parliamentary 
systems in those colonies to establish: ‘instead of the Legislative Council, a 
Council and a House of Representatives, or other separate Legislative Houses’ 
(my emphasis). It also gave authority to each of them to draft a Constitution to 
provide a framework for responsible government. The phrase ‘or other separate 
Legislative Houses’ suggests that a certain latitude was present in the possible 
structure of the proposed parliaments.9
The passing of the Act was followed in December 1852 by the Colonial Secretary 
in Britain (Sir John Pakington, and in the following year, his successor the Duke of 
Newcastle) writing to the Governors of New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia encouraging them to draft constitutions under Act of the 1850.
 
10
Bicameralism, as provided for the colonies, was undoubtedly due to an instinctive 
notion, in both Britain and Australia, that it was the best model, or, as Henry Parkes 
put it ‘the wisest, the safest, the best’.
 
Pakington suggested these constitutions provide for bicameral legislatures with 
elected Lower Houses, (in effect responsible government) though he did not 
specify either election or nomination for the upper houses. He knew the British 
Government would have the final say. 
11
                                            
9 An Act for the Better Government of Her Majesty’s Australian Colonies, 1850, Section XXXII. 
10 Anna Munyard, ‘Making a Polity’ in Dean Jaensch, ed, The Flinders History of South Australia: 
Political History, (Adelaide: Wakefield Press, 1986), p.68. 
11 Parkes, Speeches, p.356. 
 The idea was further strengthened by 
deference to the British Government, whose approval was necessary for the legal 
validity of the independence of the colonies. For example, instructions from London 
in a Despatch from the Colonial Secretary to the New South Wales Governor (Sir 
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Charles FitzRoy) in 1853, contained an extract from a Report from the Select 
Committee on the New Constitution, (1853) which directed that: 
Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies has 
recorded it as his opinion, speaking of course, on behalf of the Imperial 
Government, that it is the conviction of Parliament, that, in regard to all 
points affecting internal Government in the Colonies having local 
representation, the general principles common to Great Britain and her 
Colonies must be applied. (my emphasis)12
On this basis the NSW Legislative Council was given the task of drafting a 
constitution to provide for responsible government. The resulting Constitution 
provided for a bicameral parliament with an elected lower house, the Legislative 
Assembly, and a nominated upper house, the Legislative Council. For the Council 
a minimum of 21 members, nominated by the Governor was specified but, 
crucially, no upper limit; in fact 32 members took their seats at the first sitting.
 
13 
The first members of the new Council were appointed for five years. Five years 
later members were to be appointed for life. There were no specific property 
qualifications for appointment, the only condition being that members had to be at 
least twenty-one years of age and male, but those selected to serve as Councillors 
tended to be prominent, wealthy and older citizens with conservative views.14 The 
powers of the two houses were to be equal except that only the Assembly could 
originate money bills but there was no prohibition on the Council amending or 
rejecting them. All Bills had to be passed by both Houses before they could be sent 
to the Governor for assent.15
                                            
12 ‘Report of the Select Committee on the Changes in Administration under the new Constitution Act 
of 1853; Despatch from Lord John Russell’, in Documents relating to Constitution of Responsible 
Government in New South Wales, p.11. Held in Archives of New South Wales, Parliament House, 
Sydney. 
13 Griffith and Sharath Srinivasan, 'State Upper Houses in Australia', p.27. 
14 Parliament of New South Wales, 'History of the New South Wales Legislative Council', (Sydney: 
Parliament of New South Wales, nod.) p.4. 
15 Constitution of New South Wales, 1855, Section 1, p.407. 
 In these matters the drafters of the Federal 
Constitution showed little imagination in their work, emulating almost to the letter 
the Constitution of the oldest Colony, except that the Federal upper house would 
not have the power of amending money bills. 
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Nomination of the upper house, or Council, was agreed to even though the Select 
Committee found the instructions from the Duke of Newcastle, then Colonial 
Secretary, to ‘admit of some latitude of discretion on this most important subject’. 
However it found no reason to depart from the ‘Declaration and Remonstrance of 
5th
They desire to have a form of Government based on the analogies of the 
British Constitution. They have no wish to sow the seeds of a future 
democracy. But the object they have in view is … placing a safe, revising, 
deliberative, and conservative element between the Lower House and Her 
Majesty’s Representative in this Colony, they do not feel inclined to hazard 
the experiment of an Upper House based on a general Elective Franchise. 
They are less disposed to make the experiment as such a Franchise, if once 
created, will be difficult to be recalled.
 December, 1851’ drawn up by the colonists and agreed to by Sir John 
Pakington, Colonial Secretary, on 15 December 1852, and which included 
provision for a nominated Legislative Council: 
16
That Act authorises the Crown, whenever it thinks proper to confer any 
hereditary title of rank, or dignity, to annex thereto an hereditary right of 
being summoned to the Legislative Council.
 
It was also in this report that the creation of a colonial version of the aristocracy 
was seriously canvassed: 
17
Here was clearly laid down the raison d’etre in the minds of the legislators for an 
upper house: to buffer the colony from the presumed hasty, or ill-considered, 
legislation that might be passed by an elected lower house, and it was this fear that 
persuaded the Councillors to decide that the members of the new Legislative 
Council be nominated. An elected upper house would give too much influence to 
popular power, and ‘a society which accepted that men naturally fitted for the 
Legislative Council should be offered a place in it would be safe from 
democracy.’
 
18
                                            
16 Report of the Select Committee on the Changes in Administration under the new Constitution Act 
of 1853. 
17 Ibid. 
18 J.B. Hirst, The Strange Birth of Colonial Democracy: New South Wales 1848-1884, (Sydney: 
Allen and Unwin, 1988), p.36. 
 This principle, suggested but not imposed by the Imperial 
Government, lies at the heart of all Australian Colonial Upper Houses and was 
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clung to, in spite of changing views on democracy since 1832, upon the 
establishment of the Federal Senate in 1901. 
The new Constitution for New South Wales was passed by the British Parliament in 
1855. The idea of a hereditary right to sit in the Council, though seriously 
considered, was eventually rejected and the new Parliament first sat on 22 May 
1856.19 The record of the Legislative Council of New South Wales is one of discord 
and conflict with the Legislative Assembly. On several occasions it defeated 
measures brought forward by the Government, and attempts to reconstruct, or 
abolish it, began in 1860 when the Council defeated Premier William Forster’s bill 
to reconstruct the upper house.20 The issue came to a head in 1861 when the 
Council refused to pass Robertson's Land Bill, an important legislative measure. 
This brought about the tactic of ‘swamping the House’ by Premier Charles Cowper. 
The tactic was to request the Governor to appoint new councillors in order to allow 
the legislation to pass. In this instance twenty-three new appointments were made. 
The Governor, John Young, received a stern rebuke from the Colonial Office for 
consenting to this measure, with the instruction that, in future, disputed legislation 
should not be allowed to pass by these means.21 In spite of this admonition the 
strategy was used subsequently and the number of Councillors tended upward. By 
1861 good sense began to prevail as Councillors came to realise that conservative, 
resistant to change, obstructive behaviour was not in the best interests of good 
government. Fears that unreasonable hostility could lead to its abolition, also 
probably persuaded the Council to gradually become less controversial and accept 
that the elected House was supreme in money matters. Reform of the Council 
itself, however, was consistently rejected and by 1900 eight attempts at 
reconstituting the Council had failed.22
                                            
19 Griffith and Sharath Srinivasan, 'State Upper Houses in Australia', p.27. 
20Lynn Lovelock, ‘A History of Controversy over the role and functions of the Legislative Council’, 
The Parliamentarian, Issue 2, New South Wales, 2005, p.48. 
21 J.A. Marriott, Second Chambers - an Inductive Study in Political Science, New, revised and part 
rewritten ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927), p.156. 
 
22 ‘The Council Under Threat’, in Role and History of NSW Legislative Council, 1999, p.5. 
www.parliament.nsw.gov.au. Accessed 11 December, 2008. 
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As noted above, in early Australian examples, Councils modelled on the British 
House of Lords toyed with the idea of establishing an aristocracy, as provided for in 
the Act of 1851. Canada had already set the example with a serious proposal to do 
this in 1791. John Graves Simcoe (the first Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada 
from 1791-1796) believed that the province should be made 'as nearly as may be a 
perfect image and transcript of the British Government and Constitution'.23 The 
idea was ridiculed in Britain by Charles James Fox, a prominent Whig politician, as 
‘a kind of second-rate, half-hearted House of Lords in the wild woodland’.24 The 
provision remained in the Constitution despite such derision but was probably the 
reason it was never implemented. This scenario was repeated in New South Wales 
in 1853 and equally ridiculed as a ‘Bunyip Aristocracy’. The full accounts of these 
colonial aristocratic aspirations are to be found in Martin’s comprehensive history, 
The Bunyip Aristocracy.25
Victoria is the smallest of the mainland Australian states in land area but one of the 
most populous, as it was at the time of the Federal Conventions. It was also a 
 Here it serves to illustrate the reliance some colonial 
legislators placed upon British heritage and imperial rule in establishing their 
versions of an upper house. 
The instructions from the Colonial Office provide an eloquent illustration of the way 
the Imperial government viewed the development of self-government in its 
Australian Colonies. It also explains why the Colonies followed the British example. 
It was not only a matter of copying the mother country but recognition of the need 
to gain British approval for the new constitutions, all grounded in an instinctive 
feeling of the superiority of the system. The question is: would Britain have 
accepted a unicameral legislature for New South Wales if a serious proposal had 
been made? As a serious alternative was never proposed it is a question for 
conjecture, but the answer for the colonies is perhaps not, but for the Federal 
House, perhaps. 
                                            
23 Ged Martin, Bunyip Aristocracy, (Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), p.27. 
24 W.R. Wilson, Historical Narratives of Early Canada, 2004. 
http://www.uppercanadahistory.ca/pp/pp1.html. Accessed 17 June 2008. 
25 Martin, Bunyip Aristocracy. 
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wealthy and fertile colony and regarded as one of the strongest states. It began in 
the 1830s when illegal squatters began to move into the area which was originally 
part of New South Wales.26 The district was then governed from Sydney and in 
1836 was officially recognised as the Port Phillip District. By 1835 a community had 
been founded and a small but steady stream of settlers moved into the district and 
the settlement gradually grew into the city of Melbourne. The colony was not 
settled under official auspices but owed its origin to immigrants from Van Diemen’s 
Land, where good land was becoming scarce and ‘every Tasmanian (sic) knew 
that attractive land lay on the other side of the Bass Strait’.27 Many enterprising 
pastoralists from Van Diemen’s Land flouted the ‘law which placed the northern 
mainland out of bounds’ and settled there.28 A Superintendent, Charles La Trobe, 
was appointed in 1839 as the Crown’s principle representative in the district, 
responsible to the Governor of New South Wales. The Port Phillip pioneers soon 
found that administration from faraway Sydney was unsatisfactory and, feeling they 
could better manage their own affairs began to call for independence. In response, 
in 1843, the district was given representation of six members in the Legislative 
Council of New South Wales. This also proved unsatisfactory as the Council 
consistently favoured New South Wales in its decisions and, in terms of time and 
money, the distance was too great an obstacle for the local Council 
representatives. As the district continued its development, calls for independence 
grew stronger. This eventually came with the Proclamation of the Imperial Act on 
13 January 1850 ‘for the better Government of Her Majesty's Australian Colonies’ 
which permitted the creation of three self governing colonies: Van Diemen’s Land, 
South Australia and Victoria.29
As a result of this Act Victoria was separated from New South Wales on 1 July 
1851, and proceeded to enact its provisions, which called first for the establishment 
 
                                            
26 A detailed account of early settlement can be found in A.G.L. Shaw, A History of the Port Phillip 
District: Victoria Before Separation, (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1996), pp.32–43. 
27 Geoffrey Blainey, A History of Victoria, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.17. 
28 Geoffrey Serle, The Golden Age, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1963), p.1. 
29 The name of Van Diemen’s’ Land was changed to Tasmania in 1855; see Terry Newman, 
Becoming Tasmania: renaming Van Diemen’s Land, (Hobart, Parliament of Tasmania, 2005), 
p.137. 
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of a Legislative Council. Writs for the election of the first Legislative Council of 
Victoria were issued on 1 July 1851 and polling took place on 11 and 18 
September 1851. As laid down in the Act the first Victorian Legislative Council was 
a part elected and part nominated body, which first met on 11 November 1851. 
There were thirty members: twenty elected on a stringent property franchise and 
the remainder appointed by the Lieutenant Governor, Charles La Trobe.30 The 
Council remained as a unicameral legislature until 1856 and was responsible for 
drafting a new Constitution to provide the framework for responsible government. 
The Constitution was drafted by a ‘Constitution Commission of the Legislative 
Council’ set up after Colonial Secretary of State, John Pakington, had indicated by 
despatch on 15 December 1852 that ‘it would not be inappropriate for the Council 
to develop a Constitution’.31
One of the principal issues for the Select Committee of the Legislative Council, set 
up in 1853, was what form the upper house should take. There were three 
possibilities: a fully nominated Council as in New South Wales, a part elected, part 
nominated Council as in Victoria since 1851, or a fully elected house in keeping 
with the strengthening democratic attitudes. These were becoming more evident 
since the disruptions on the Victorian goldfields in 1854, though they were 
balanced by many who believed property ownership was a necessary prerequisite 
for moral and political leadership.
 
32 The Select Committee recommended that: ‘The 
upper house was to consist of the educated, wealth (sic) and more especially the 
settled interests of the country—that portion of the community naturally indisposed 
to rash and hasty measures’.33
                                            
30 R.D. Lumb, The Constitutions of the Australian States, (St. Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press, 1972), p.25. 
31 Raymond Wright, A People's Counsel: A History of the Parliament of Victoria 1856–1990, 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.15. 
32 R. Wright, 'The Legislative Council: Retain, Reform or Abolish', (Melbourne: Victorian 
Parliamentary Library, 1984), 
33 Geoffrey Serle, 'The Victorian Legislative Council, 1856–1950', Historical Studies: Australia and 
New Zealand, 1954, p.186. 
 In the event the Council was a compromise. It was 
to be an elected body, but on stringent membership and voter eligibility criteria to 
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ensure members were prosperous and responsible citizens who would act as a 
sobering influence on the popularly elected and less responsible Lower House.34
In this election, held in the spring of 1856, Victoria blazed a trail in introducing the 
secret ballot—a world-first—and providing for a fully elected upper house. With 
these exceptions the Constitution was in traditional form, structured on traditional 
lines. It laid down that there were to be two houses, as in the ‘mother country’: a 
lower house, the Legislative Assembly and an upper house, the Legislative 
Council. The Legislative Council was assigned two major responsibilities in the 
Constitution as recommended by the Select Committee: to protect the interests of 
the propertied, the wealthy and the educated and act as a house of review and a 
restraint on the inevitably more ‘radical’ Assembly.
 
35
Membership for the new Council was set at thirty, five for each of the six Provinces; 
members were to be male and aged over 30 years; their full term of office was ten 
years, or twice that of the members of the Assembly. Six members were to retire 
every two years to be replaced with new members, which meant that the house 
was indissoluble; they were not paid and property qualifications were stringent for 
both electors and members. The Select Committee of 1853 recommended that ‘a 
high freehold qualification should be required … to ensure ... that it may consist of 
men who may reasonably be expected to possess education, intelligence and 
leisure to devote to public affairs’.
 
36 Its powers were equal with the Assembly 
except it could not originate money bills, though, unusually, the power to reject 
money bills was formalised.37
                                            
34 The Legislative Council: Retain, Reform or Abolish? Victorian Parliamentary Paper, 84/1. 
35 Ibid., p.2. 
36 Serle, 'The Victorian Legislative Council, 1856–1950', p.186. 
37 Constitution of Victoria, 1855, Section LVI. 
 There was no procedure for the resolution of 
deadlocks. It was considered normal parliamentary processes would deal with 
these. All Bills had to be passed by both houses before they could be presented to 
the Governor for assent and there were provisions for alterations to the 
Constitution, which had to be passed by an absolute majority in both houses. 
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The restrictive qualifications, the deliberate decision not to provide any deadlock 
mechanisms, and the fact that it was to be ‘indissoluble’ reinforced the definition 
and public image of the Council as a powerful force for conservatism. Only in the 
restriction on money bills were its powers limited. The first elected bicameral 
Parliament of Victoria assembled on 25 November 1856, just six months after the 
first sitting of the New South Wales Parliament on 22 May 1856.38
The Council took full advantage of its powers and the 1860s and 1870s saw 
numerous clashes between the two houses. From the outset Bills were either 
rejected outright or passed by the Council only after significant compromises had 
been extracted from the Assembly. Education, land, mining, protection, direct 
taxation, payment of members were just some of the legislative issues rejected, 
delayed or emasculated by the Council. Supply was rejected in 1865-7, and 1877, 
and deadlocks became a feature of Victorian Parliamentary practice.
 
39 Under these 
pressures Government became unstable and changed hands twenty-nine times 
between 1856 and 1901.40
South Australia was not a breakaway from New South Wales but was established 
in 1834 as a free colony under the South Australia Act. The Act included a promise 
of representative Government when the population reached 50,000. From the 
beginning South Australian colonists were committed to democracy and 
representative government and had a strong sense of being different from the 
other colonies because they had never accepted convicts. When they came to 
draft their first constitution in the 1850s they could have been influenced by their 
difference and history, but the end result was not so very different from the other 
colonies.
 This then, was the parliamentary background that the 
Victorian delegates took with them to the Federal Conventions. 
41
                                            
38 Wright, A People's Counsel: A History of the Parliament of Victoria 1856–1990, pp.110-111. 
39 Retain, Reform or Abolish, p.2. 
 
40 Parliament of Victoria, Historical Overview, Parliament of Victoria, 
http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/hist.html. Accessed 5 August 2008. 
41 Lumb, The Constitutions of the Australian States, p.29. 
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The first settlers arrived in South Australia in 1836 and the first Government was 
established under Governor Hindmarsh, appointed by the British Government. The 
new settlers had no official voice in how they were governed and, as in other 
Colonies, the Governor ruled with the assistance of an appointed Executive 
Council. In 1851 the Imperial Act of 1850 authorised South Australia, as in New 
South Wales and Victoria, to form a partly elected, partly nominated, legislative 
council for the Colony and to draw up a constitution providing for a bicameral 
system and responsible government, subject to British government approval.42
In accordance with the suggestions in the despatch from Pakington in 1852, and as 
occurred in New South Wales and Victoria, a Select Committee of the Council was 
established which recommended the formation of a bicameral legislature. Both 
houses were to be elective and electors for the Council had to satisfy property 
qualifications.
 The 
Council was established in 1851. It comprised twenty-four members, eight of whom 
were nominated by the Crown and sixteen returned by the electors of sixteen 
electoral districts, who had to meet a property qualification. This hybrid Council of 
appointed and elected Members continued as the unicameral Legislature of South 
Australia until the inauguration of responsible Government in 1857. 
43
The first Legislative Council in 1857 was elected by the whole colony voting as one 
district and there were eighteen members. As in Victoria voting was by secret 
ballot. Councillors were to be male and aged over 30 years, their term of office was 
twelve years with six members retiring every four years, to be replaced by newly 
 In 1855–56 the Legislative Council passed the Constitution Bill, 
which was proclaimed on 24 October 1856 by the Governor, Sir Richard Graves-
MacDonnell. The form of the new Parliament was the traditional structure of two 
houses: a lower house, the Legislative Assembly and an upper house, the 
Legislative Council. The bicameral Parliament of South Australia first met on 
Wednesday, 22 April 1857, just five months after the new Victorian Parliament and 
less than a year after the New South Wales Parliament. 
                                            
42 Ibid., p.31. 
43 Munyard ‘Making a Polity’ in Jaensch, The Flinders History of South Australia: Political History, 
p.67. 
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elected members and it was to be indissoluble;44 Members of the Council were not 
paid; the Council’s powers were equal to those of the Assembly except it could not 
originate money bills; all Bills had to pass both Houses before being presented to 
the Governor for Assent and there were no provisions for the resolution of 
deadlocks. There was no ruling on the subject of amendment or rejection of money 
bills, which quickly became a bone of contention.45
The male franchise of the Council was based on a property qualification which was 
lower than for the Victorian upper house, making for a wider franchise in the colony 
though still limiting it to the more prosperous and leisured members of society. This 
was in effect, as Griffith and Srinivasan have argued: ‘the price to be paid for the 
support of conservative opinion which saw the Council as protecting the rights of 
property, and especially rural property, against possible incursions by those who 
had little’.
 
46
The imbalance of powers caused a dispute on the first day of the new Parliament 
when the Council amended a money bill as it would an ordinary bill. The Assembly 
contended that the Council had no right to amend money bills but could only pass 
or reject them. The dispute was partly resolved by a ‘compact’ in 1857, which was 
adopted by resolutions of both houses.
 
47
every session of parliament after 1857 was replete with disagreements 
between the houses, conferences of managers and the application of a veto 
by the Legislative Council.
 The compact defined those Bills (all 
money Bills) that the Council could not amend in the ordinary way but allowed the 
Council to ‘suggest’ amendments in such Bills except Appropriation Bills. This did 
not stop the bickering and as Dean Jaensch commented: 
48
Just as in Victoria, the South Australian government was chronically unstable and 
there were forty different ministries between 1857 and 1893.
 
49
                                            
44 Constitution of South Australia, Section 2. 
45 Ibid., Section 1. 
46 Griffith and Sharath Srinivasan, 'State Upper Houses in Australia', p.9. 
47 P.A. Howell, ‘Constitutional and political development, 1857–1890’; in Jaensch, The Flinders 
History of South Australia: Political History, p.164. 
48 Cited in Griffith and Sharath Srinivasan, 'State Upper Houses in Australia', p.9. 
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and New South Wales counterparts the South Australian delegates also failed to 
take lessons from their experiences. 
By 1881 the continuous dissension between the houses forced some changes in 
the Council: membership was increased from eighteen to twenty-four and the 
previous single, whole-State electorate was divided into four six-member districts.50 
More importantly, also in 1881, the first provision in Australia for dealing with 
deadlocks, either by a double dissolution of the Parliament or by the creation of two 
new members for each of the new districts of the Legislative Council, was added to 
the Constitution. It was as Griffith and Srinivasan have commented a ‘convoluted 
mechanism’ which other observers saw as being there to preserve the power of the 
upper house.51 R.L. Reid, an Australian political scientist, thought that 'any 
Government would shrink from involving itself in the protracted “deadlock” clauses 
of the constitution, particularly in view of the fact that at the end of the process it 
might be no better off than before'.52 The mechanism has never been used but 
remains in force in substantially the same form to this day, under Section 41 of the 
‘Constitution Act 1934’.53
Changes after 1881 came in 1887 when Parliament passed an Act to give all 
Members of Parliament a salary of £200 a year, which opened up Parliament and 
political life to ordinary wage earners, and in 1894 the South Australian Parliament 
granted women with the necessary qualifications the right to vote for both Houses 
of Parliament.
 
54
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50 Griffith and Sharath Srinivasan, 'State Upper Houses in Australia', p.9. 
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South Australian delegates came to the 1897 Convention from a Parliament where 
the Council or upper house had twenty-four members elected by four districts with 
six members each who were paid £200 a year. Voting was by secret ballot. 
Councillors were required to be male and aged over 30 years, their minimum term 
of office was six years and half the members retired every three years, or at each 
election. By this means, as in other Colonies, the Council was to be indissoluble. 
The Council’s powers were equal with the House of Assembly except it could not 
initiate or amend money bills, but it could send suggestions for amendments to 
such bills.55 This procedure was unique to South Australia and was to be adopted 
for the Federal Constitution. It is possible that the idea was drawn from Section 28 
of the Act which allowed the Governor to transmit a message to the Council or the 
Assembly ‘suggesting’ amendments to a Bill presented to him for assent. This also 
appears in the Victorian Act in Section 36, but does not appear to have ever been 
used. Winthrop Hackett mentioned it at the 1891 Convention, so it was not 
unknown. Though he commented that ‘under most of our constitutions, he [the 
Governor] can communicate—I do not say as to money bills, but as to other 
legislation—by message any amendment he thinks it desirable to make in a bill 
after it has passed both houses’ the provision does not appear in any other 
Constitution.56
Tasmania is Australia’s second oldest settlement. It was established in September 
1803 as Van Diemen’s Land and, until 1812, was divided into two counties 
administered from Sydney. In 1812 Colonel Thomas Daley was appointed first 
Lieutenant Governor of the whole Colony and on 3 December 1825 the island 
became a Colony in its own right. A Warrant constituting a single chamber 
parliament, a Legislative Council, was proclaimed at Hobart by Governor Darling of 
 As in other Constitutions, all Bills had to be passed by both houses 
before they could be presented to the Governor for Assent but, again unique to 
South Australia, there was a complicated procedure to break deadlocks that, for all 
practical purposes, was unworkable. 
                                            
55 A full account of the adoption of the suggestions procedure is to be found in Boyle Travers 
Finniss, The Constitutional History of South Australia: During Twenty-One Years, (Adelaide, 
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New South Wales. At the same time he proclaimed the Island’s administrative 
independence from New South Wales.57
There is an essentially democratic spirit which actuates the large mass of 
the community and it is with a view to check that spirit, of preventing it 
coming into operation, that I would suggest the formation of an Upper 
Chamber.
 
From 1825 the Colony was governed by a Lieutenant Governor, Colonel Sir 
George Arthur, and a Legislative Council of six members. In 1828 the Council was 
increased to fifteen: eight official nominees and six people’s nominees with the 
Governor presiding. In March 1848 the Governor, Sir William Denison, suggested 
to English authorities that the Colony ought to have two representative Chambers. 
He did so because he felt that: 
58
As Griffith says, this was a view firmly grounded in the class model of bicameralism 
and echoed the views of other Colonies in their desire for an upper house, though 
an underlying reason was to give the House a more permanent nature and to 
reflect a high property franchise.
 
59 Townsley considered it was also ‘to guard 
against hasty and inconsiderate legislation by securing due deliberation previous to 
the final adoption of any legislative measure’. Governor Denison’s proposal 
however, was rejected by the Colonial office as an ‘untried form of constitution’.60
As in other colonies, in response to the Imperial Act of 1850, the Council was 
increased again in 1851 to twenty-four members and its composition changed to a 
partly elected and partly nominated membership: sixteen elected by restricted 
property franchise and eight nominated by the Governor, who now ceased to be a 
member.
 
61
                                            
57 Carrel Inglis Clark, The Parliament of Tasmania: An Historical Sketch, (Tasmania: H.H. Pimblett, 
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 In furtherance of other provisions of this Act, in 1854 a select committee 
of the Legislative Council presented a report and a draft constitution that 
recommended the creation of a bicameral Parliament. There were very serious 
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discussions in the Committee’s report, including a prolix and protracted explanation 
of why the Committee had not considered the establishment of a peerage. The 
usual compelling reasons were put forward and embellished with the comment that 
‘all proposals for a Colonial Peerage … have been met with derision’. This led to 
the decision to establish an elected upper chamber.62 This time the Imperial 
Government did not demur. The Act received Royal Assent on May 1, 1855, the 
island was renamed Tasmania in the same year and responsible government was 
established in 1856. The new bicameral Parliament met for the first time on 2 
December 1856.63
The new Legislative Council of Tasmania had fifteen members elected from single-
member divisions and the number was increased from fifteen to nineteen by 1898. 
The franchise for the Council was manhood suffrage at the age of twenty-one with 
a property qualification requiring a ‘freehold estate of the annual value of fifty 
pounds sterling money’.
 
64
According to Griffith, the Council’s relationship with the Assembly was a stormy 
one. One month after the opening of the first parliament in December 1856, a 
disagreement over money bills led to a ‘Managers’ Conference’ to define the 
powers and duties of both houses with respect to the problem of supply. The 
Conference failed. The problems did not go away and in 1899 the Government 
prepared a case for the Privy Council in London on relative powers, but leave to 
 Members of the Council had to be thirty years of age, the 
term of office was nine years with five members retiring every three years and five 
new members elected. The Council could not be dissolved. The powers of the two 
houses were equal except that only the Assembly could originate money Bills, a 
provision that, as in other Constitutions, soon caused dissent. 
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have the case heard was refused.65
Queensland’s capital city of Brisbane was established in 1825 as a penal 
settlement for more difficult convicts. It officially closed in 1839 and the land 
prepared for sale to permanent settlers.
 This then was the situation in Tasmania when 
it sent delegates to the Federal Conventions. 
Queensland was the only colony to have a parliament from its inception—on 
separation from New South Wales on 6 June 1859. The New South Wales 
Constitution Act 1855 had provided the legal framework to establish representative 
government in Queensland from the time the new Colony was created in 1859. 
66 As the economy grew and the population 
expanded, a separate sense of identity emerged and the people began to 
recognise the importance of Brisbane as a port and urban centre. The physical 
remoteness of the colony from the centre of government in New South Wales 
caused dissatisfaction with the administration and calls for self-government arose. 
In 1851 a public meeting was held to urge separation from New South Wales and 
petitions in favour of separation from the parent colony were signed and forwarded 
to the Imperial Government. However it was not until 1859 that separation was 
granted.67
Queensland’s Parliament was established under an Imperial Order-in-Council in 
1859, prescribing the ‘establishment of a legislature therein … as nearly 
resembling the form of Government and legislature which should be at that time 
established in New South Wales’ and including provision for an upper house, a 
Legislative Council and a lower house, a Legislative Assembly.
 
68
The new Legislative Council was to comprise ‘at least five’ male nominees, of 
twenty-one years of age, appointed by the Governor of New South Wales, Sir 
William Denison. They were to serve for five years and subsequent appointments 
were to be made for ‘the term of their natural lives’. There was no upper limit on the 
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number of Councillors and Governor Denison appointed eleven members on 1 May 
1860. Later that month the number was increased to fifteen. The powers of the two 
houses were to be equal except that all Bills appropriating public revenue, or 
imposing tax or impost, were to originate in the Assembly. All Acts had to be 
passed by both Houses before they could be presented to the Governor for 
Assent.69 First elections were held in 1860 and the Queensland Parliament first 
met on 22 May of that year.70
The initial concern of the first Governor, Sir George Bowen, and the first Premier, 
Robert Herbert, was finding an adequate number of suitable candidates for the 
Council, ‘for all the more active and influential politicians, desire seats in the Lower 
House’. Nor was the Governor convinced the nominee system was the best, 
although he thought that the Council ‘will prove an obstacle to any too hasty 
legislation’, thus echoing the view that the democratically elected lower house 
needed a restraining influence.
 
71
During the election campaign for the first Assembly, some politicians argued 
against an upper house. One of them saw it as ‘positively obstructive, and because 
the best men would choose to sit in the lower chamber it would become a refuge 
for the politically destitute’.
 
72 Calls for the abolition of the Council arose as early as 
1861 and the Moreton Bay Courier joined this call, saying the Council was ‘a 
contemptible instrument of bad government and causes much unnecessary 
expense.’73
The Order-in-Council was an unsatisfactory document with somewhat vague 
provisions and in 1867 a ‘Bill to Consolidate the Laws relating to the Constitution of 
the Colony of Queensland’ was passed to clarify the powers of the Legislature. The 
Act did not greatly affect the powers of the Council: the power to originate money 
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bills remained the prerogative of the Assembly and there was still silence on 
whether it could amend money Bills, so the difficulties continued until 1885; 
Councillors were still nominated for life and no limit was placed on their number. 
The number fluctuated as Premiers manipulated their ability to appoint new 
members and by 1864 there were twenty-three Councillors compared with twenty-
six MLAs. There were calls for the Council to be elected but, as Harding 
commented, ‘It would be a strange Government … which voluntarily surrendered 
the possession of the ultimate sanction’. He also pointed out that events in Victoria 
in the 1860s and 1870s gave vivid demonstrations of the power an indissoluble 
and elected Chamber could wield.74
Despite the Bill to Consolidate the Laws relating to the Constitution of the Colony of 
Queensland, difficulties, which had begun early, continued over the issue of 
whether the Legislative Council had the right to amend money bills. As in other 
constitutions, both the Order-in-Council and the ‘Consolidation’ Bill had been silent 
on this issue and in 1885 the question was referred to the Privy Council in London. 
The gist of the wordy and pedantic request was: whether the Constitution Act of 
1867 conferred on the Legislative Council powers co-ordinate with those of the 
Legislative Assembly in the amendment of all Bills, including money Bills; and 
whether the claims of the Legislative Assembly as set forth in their message of 12 
November, were well founded? In an amazingly succinct response to the 
Queensland Parliament the Privy Council replied ‘the first of these questions 
should be answered in the negative and the second question in the affirmative’. In 
other words the Legislative Council did not have that right.
 
75
This then was the structure of the Queensland Council when the delegates 
attended the Federation Conference in 1890 and the Convention of 1891. 
Queensland failed to send delegates to the 1897–8 Convention, reflecting the 
inherent instability of its Governments. There was some participation in that 
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convention however, in the person of Samuel Griffith, now Chief Justice of 
Queensland. He was consulted during the Adelaide proceedings and wrote to 
some delegates advising them to insist on the Senate’s right to amend money bills. 
Baker also sent him some reports and added ‘We miss you very much’. Griffith 
read all the public reports from Adelaide and wrote a criticism of the draft 
constitution in May 1897, distributing copies to the Queensland parliament and to 
members of the convention.76
The colony of Western Australia evolved from a concern in Sydney in 1826 that the 
French were showing interest in unoccupied parts of the Australian continent. In 
response to this concern Governor Darling sent Major Lockyer with a detachment 
of soldiers and convicts to occupy King George Sound with a view to taking 
possession of the western part of the continent. Accordingly, Captain James 
Stirling in HMS Success surveyed the coast from King George Sound to the Swan 
River and recommended it as suitable for settlement and the formation of a colony. 
On 1 June 1829, he arrived at Swan River in the Parmelia with 800 intending 
settlers. This is the date from which the colonial history of Western Australia 
commenced.
 
77 The constitutional origin of the colony is contained in the Imperial 
Act of 1829 and the first legislative body was a Legislative Council that first met on 
7 February 1832, presided over by Stirling, who had been made Governor of the 
Colony. Stirling nominated four other members to assist him, though he was the 
final arbiter of legislation.78
The Western Australian economy was slow to develop and it was thought that the 
transportation of convicts to the colony could stimulate the economy by building 
roads and other public works. Accordingly, at the request of the Western Australian 
Colonial Administration, the first 75 convicts arrived in 1850. Their arrival delayed 
responsible government as the Imperial authorities would not approve a partly 
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elected Council because the convict system required the British Government to 
provide the bulk of expenses for the Colony. Transportation ceased in 1868.79
Western Australia was not mentioned in the Australian Constitutions Act of 1850 
but from 1870 to 1890 a system of representative Government was developed in 
the same way as had occurred in other Colonies. In 1870 Government was by a 
Legislative Council of twelve elected members and six nominated by the 
Governor.
 
80 In 1889 the British Parliament enacted a Constitution passed by the 
Legislative Council of Western Australia. The Bill had to be referred to Britain for 
Royal Assent before it became operative because Western Australia had not been 
included in the 1850 Act. Delays in Britain prevented it from becoming law until 15 
August 1890 and it came into operation on 21 October of that year.81 Under the 
Constitution the Parliament’s powers and functions were to be similar to the other 
colonies: ‘To this legislature it was proposed to give powers and functions similar to 
those of the eastern Colonies’.82
The new Constitution provided for a traditional bicameral Parliament. The upper 
house, the Legislative Council, was nominated by the Governor and comprised 
fifteen (male) members of at least twenty-one years of age. A property qualification 
applied to both houses.
 
83 In 1893, when the Colony’s population reached 60,000, 
and in accordance with the provisions of the 1890 Act, the Council became an 
elected body of twenty-one members with three members from each of seven 
provinces and there were restrictive voting qualifications.84
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 The full term of office 
was six years and, as was the practice in other Colonies, members were to retire in 
rotation—in Western Australia seven every two years. The powers of the two 
houses were equal except that only the Assembly could initiate money bills. All bills 
had to pass both Houses before they could be presented to the Governor for 
Assent and there were no deadlock provisions. There were further reforms in 1899 
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but as these were not in place during the Conventions they will not be discussed 
here except to note that women were given the vote in 1899, soon after the matter 
was discussed at the 1897 Convention. 
These then were the Constitutions and upper houses with which the Convention 
delegates were familiar. That all upper houses or Legislative Councils had very 
similar structures was not surprising because they were all based upon the lines of 
the British Constitution and advice from Britain. What then were the experiences of 
the delegates of these structures and how, if at all, did they affect their decisions 
on the Federal Senate? Did they consider them to be a sound basis or model for 
the Federal Senate or did they seek to change the structure to avoid some of the 
problems of the colonial upper houses? To examine this I will turn to comments 
made by delegates to the Conventions about their Legislative Councils, to find how 
much they were influenced by their experiences in their Colonies. Special note has 
been made of those delegates who were, or had been, Councillors or Upper House 
members and those who were Assembly members, by adding MLC or MLA to their 
references. This is to establish what, if any, differences existed in their attitudes to 
the idea of an upper house in the Federal legislature. 
There is plenty of evidence of conflict in the Colonial Parliaments from 1856. In all 
of them the main bone of contention was the imbalance of power in regard to 
money bills. Samuel Griffith (MLA), a proponent of equal powers for both houses, 
commented in 1891 that the controversy over this imbalance was a fuss over 
nothing: 
There is no doubt that this idea of money bills is a fetish peculiar to 
Australia. It is a fetish which is not worshipped in any other part of the world; 
it is not worshipped even in the United Kingdom.85
The use of the words ‘worshipped’ and ‘fetish’ suggest strong feelings on the part 
of Griffith, yet the superior power of the lower house in regard to finances was a 
traditional feature of responsible government. It applied in all British colonies, 
including Queensland, as well as in the United Kingdom, though the British custom 
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was not enshrined in a Constitution but operated as a convention. Griffith’s remark, 
coming from so eminent a personage, a QC, MLA and former Queensland Premier 
(1883–1888), serves to illustrate how the British Upper House and its customs 
were venerated, even if not always understood. Interestingly the major clash over 
the budget between the Houses of Parliament in Britain was still over two decades 
in the future. 
All the Australian colonial constitutions provided that only the lower house could 
originate money bills, but, except for Victoria where there was a provision for the 
upper house to reject money bills, they did not legislate against amendments or 
rejections; yet all Bills had to pass both houses before they could be sent to the 
Governor for Assent. This was interpreted by the Councils as giving them the 
power of rejection or amendment of money bills—a power used liberally in some 
but not all Colonies. The Legislatures, as has been shown, tried to deal with this 
problem in various ways. The South Australian Parliament made a ‘compact’ that 
the Council would not amend money bills but might send ‘suggestions’ for 
amendments to the Assembly; the Queensland Council appealed to the Privy 
Council in London to rule that it did have the power, but the appeal was refused; 
the Tasmanian Parliament tried a managers’ conference but it failed.86
La Nauze recognised there was serious conflict in Victoria where the power of 
rejection was legitimised and commented that the Victorian Parliament had a 
‘history of bitter experience of clashes between their Assembly and Council’.
 
87 
Arthur Berriedale Keith, a Colonial Office official from 1901 to 1914, and 
constitutional law scholar, also used the word bitter about Victoria when he argued 
that the conflicts there ‘have been the most prolonged and … with the most 
bitterness’.88
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 Lyne (MLA) also used the word in 1897 about the New South Wales 
Parliament: 
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What is the use of the machinery created in the first instance when the work 
of the house of representatives can be blocked: by the upper chamber? We 
have had bitter experience of that in this colony on more than one occasion. 
The work done after arduous labour by the Legislative Assembly has been 
absolutely vetoed by the Legislative Council. Will the hon. and learned 
member, Mr Barton, tell us that if work is done in the house of 
representatives which the senate has the power of vetoing, the senate will 
not exercise that power?89
Lyne’s comments present the argument succinctly and he was echoed several 
times by other delegates. The question of money bills was the most fiercely argued 
and the acrimony engendered by the question is a testimony to the difficulties the 
delegates had faced in the colonial parliaments on the same question. The sole 
power of originating such bills was conceded, reluctantly by some Convention 
delegates, to the lower house of the Federal Parliament so the most bitter 
arguments were centred upon whether the Senate could amend or reject them. In 
this respect the South Australian Parliament’s solution of giving the upper house 
the option of sending ‘suggestions’ for changes to these bills was seriously 
considered and eventually adopted. For the Federal Parliament amendments by 
the Senate to money bills were to be expressly prohibited by the Constitution but 
the ‘messages’ procedure was adopted and formalised as ‘requesting by message’ 
any amendment; outright rejection was not prohibited.
 
90
The idea of suggestions was first raised in 1891 by Edmund Barton (MLA) who 
seemed to think that the practice was also used in Tasmania, though I can find no 
evidence of this. Thomas Playford (MLA) and William McMillan (MLA) were at odds 
on the issue in 1891. Playford claimed that the idea had ‘worked for years’ in South 
Australia
 
91 while McMillan ridiculed it and emphasised that though it might be a 
‘practice’, it had never been enacted.92
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 ‘It was’ he said ‘the most clumsy, the most 
undignified, and the most humiliating procedure that could ever be enacted’. Bolton 
Stafford Bird (MLA) added to the argument saying that in Tasmania the upper 
house had considerable power in dealing with money bills but ‘no great evil’ had 
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ever come of the upper house amending such bills and he thought ‘it exceedingly 
strange’ that the delegates were unwilling to give the Senate more power in this 
regard.93
The argument about suggestions arose because the Constitutional Committee of 
the 1891 Convention had included the practice in its draft constitution. Playford, a 
member of the Committee, defended the idea saying ‘suggestions have been 
respectfully treated and considered by the lower house … after having been quietly 
and intelligently debated’.
 This suggests that in many cases (and parliaments) common sense 
prevailed, and though in Tasmania amendments were not formally prohibited, the 
attempted recourse to the Privy Council in 1899 suggests that perhaps all was not 
as harmonious as Bird implied. 
94 Winthrop Hackett (MLC) thought the idea ‘given in the 
South Australian Constitution and exercised in Tasmania’ a good one and it had 
been adopted in Western Australia.95
A sour note was struck in the debate on suggestions when Richard Baker (MLC) 
contradicted his fellow South Australian, Thomas Playford (MLA), saying that the 
Council ‘never does make suggestions with respect to tariff or appropriation bills’.
 Hackett was scarcely accurate about either 
colony as it was not actually part of South Australia’s Constitution, as was forcibly 
pointed out by McMillan, nor was it a recognised procedure in Tasmania, and I 
have not been able to find any evidence of the procedure being invoked in the 
Western Australian Parliament. 
96
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This turned into a ‘yes/no’ argument between a Councillor and an MLA. Another 
South Australian, Charles Kingston (MLA), cut in on this argument saying 
suggestions had been made by the Council about loan bills. Baker would not have 
it, and commented bitterly if ‘ignoring suggestions is treating them respectfully, he 
is quite right’. This acerbic comment is perhaps more revealing than it sounds as it 
suggests that the system did not work to everyone’s satisfaction. The argument 
continued with John Bray (MLA) breaking in and saying he had a record of the 
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Council making suggestions about a tariff bill, twenty-five in all and all being 
accepted. 
The argument about money bills was carried on into the 1897 Convention when 
Edward Braddon (MHA) claimed that the Tasmanian Council had the right to 
amend money bills. In this he was correct in that the Tasmanian Constitution did 
not expressly prohibit amendments. He argued that the Senate should also have 
this right, as the Senate, which would be a fully elected body, could not be 
compared to the Councils.97
Were the delegates overly influenced by their colonial experiences in the argument 
on suggestions? The result, that the Senate was not given the power of amending 
money bills, only the power of rejection with the concession that it could send 
‘suggestions’ for amendments to the lower house, indicates that they were certainly 
influenced but, after all the arguments, could only agree on a weak compromise to 
deal with the problem. The situation in the Colonies was that the Councils were 
only prevented from initiating money bills. That the power of amendment or 
rejection was not prohibited by most colonial Constitutions gave rise to the 
bitterness of the conflicts in the Colonial parliaments. The delegates were probably 
aware of the effect of the British 1832 Reform Act, which had forced the House of 
Lords to cede its power of amendment or rejection of money bills, even though this 
was never formally ‘enacted’.
 
98 It was not until 1911 that the superiority of the 
House of Commons over the House of Lords in Britain was formally recognised but 
that superiority had been informally recognised since the passing of the Reform Act 
of 1832.99
                                            
97 Ibid., 24 March 1897, p.63. 
98 J.A. Marriott, English Political Institutions: An Introductory Study, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1910), p.163. 
99 Michael Rush, 'The House of Lords, the Political Context', in Paul Carmichael and Brice Dickson, 
eds. The House of Lords: Its Parliamentary and Judicial Roles (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999), p.7. 
 As McMillan correctly asserted, the power of ‘suggestion’ was never in 
the South Australian Constitution, but the ‘compact’ arrangement in that Colony 
had the same effect. The question of amendment or rejection of money bills by the 
upper house had also been bitterly contested in Tasmania and Queensland, and 
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was one which a managers’ conference (Tasmania) and an appeal to the Privy 
Council (Queensland) had failed to settle. 
The conflicting merits of a nominated Senate and an elected Senate were fought 
out in the 1891 Convention. The conclusion was a decision for a nominated 
Senate—democracy still being seen as a threat. The idea of nomination did not 
please everyone and George Dibbs (MLA) perhaps expressed it best: 
I for a long time have believed in the existence of a nominee upper house. 
To-day I do not. To-day I believe in an elective upper house, and looking at 
our Colony—for that one's own colony is the place where we get the most 
experience—and seeing the appointments made from time to time by 
ministers in power of men utterly unfit to be senators or legislators, I think 
the time has arrived when that power should be taken out of the hands of 
ministers, and in some form left in the hands of the people.100
His experience was probably similar to that of other delegates, with the result that 
in 1897 the decision was made that the federal upper house should be elected, or 
it may have been the entry of the Labour party into politics that changed their 
thinking. In the 1897 Convention the matter was resolved without any further 
debate, though Josiah Symon still expressed reservations saying that he thought 
election by the State Legislatures in some respects would ‘be a very good thing’.
 
101
The other major issue that gave rise to serious debate based upon colonial 
experiences was whether women should be enfranchised for the Federal 
Parliament. South Australia led in this regard, having given its women the vote in 
 
The rejection of a nominated Senate and property qualifications for electors, and 
even the lower age qualification for the federal Senate, set at over 21 years, are all 
clear indications of the advance of democratic thinking, coupled with the 
experiences of the delegates in dealing with the difficulties caused by restrictive 
requirements on electors or parliamentarians, mainly property and age 
qualifications, which limited the pool of candidates for election and resulted often in 
a concentration of prominent, wealthy and conservative citizens in the Legislatures. 
                                            
100 OR, 6 April 1891, p.752. 
101 Ibid., 25 March 1897, pp.136-7. 
Chapter 4: The Wisest, the Safest, the Best 
 
 
125 
 
1894.102
Henry Higgins of Victoria claimed to be a ‘strong advocate’ of ‘womanhood 
suffrage’ but not yet and not for the Federation.
 Since then the enfranchisement of women had been debated in most 
Australian parliaments and at the 1897 Convention some delegates quoted 
examples in support of or against the issue, but though it had been debated or 
even considered, only in the South Australian Parliament had the idea got past the 
intransigent Council Members. 
103
Suppose we adopt a Federal Constitution, which practically provides for 
manhood suffrage, can we expect to get the votes of those women in the 
first referendum to disfranchise themselves?
 This, claimed George Turner 
(MLA) ‘would shut women out’. The main arguments were pragmatic: that the 
states where women’s enfranchisement had already been rejected would not 
accept federation if women were to be given the federal vote, while South 
Australia, whose women had the vote, countered with the threat that South 
Australia would not join the Federation unless women were enfranchised for the 
new Parliament. The most cogent argument for women’s enfranchisement came 
from Frederick Holder (MLA) who said: 
104
In the event a practical solution was reached: for Federation electors would be the 
same as they were for each of the more numerous houses of the States, that is the 
lower houses, ‘until Parliament otherwise provides’. This at least left the door open 
for women’s enfranchisement on a Federal level by the new Parliament. In 1902 
women were eventually given the right to vote in Federal elections. The States 
 
Women in South Australia had voted for delegates to the 1897 Convention and 
would be qualified to vote for the proposed Constitution. Perhaps some delegates 
had forgotten this. 
                                            
102 Audrey Oldfield, Woman Suffrage in Australia: A Gift or a Struggle? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992) p.39. 
103 OR, 25 March 1897, p.104. 
104 Ibid., 26 March 1897, p.150. 
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followed with NSW in 1902, Tasmania in 1903, Queensland in 1904, and finally 
Victoria in 1908.105
The delegates did not specifically introduce their own legislatures into the debates 
very frequently, nor were there noticeable differences in the attitudes of members 
of the upper and lower houses except in the exchange on how suggestions were 
handled in South Australia’s Parliament. This is probably because the parliaments 
were all so similar and so familiar. The long discussion on ‘suggestions’ where 
South Australia had broken the mould, was the most fiercely argued in relation to 
colonial comparisons. The ‘suggestions’ idea was the only one that was adopted 
from one colony’s approach to the problems of disputes over money bills. As 
deadlock provisions were not in place in most colonies—and where they were they 
were difficult to use—the provision of a procedure for dealing with deadlocks was 
one of the few major points of difference between the structure of the Legislative 
Councils and the proposed Federal Senate. The fact that, as we have seen, many 
delegates were all too familiar with the difficulties caused by intractable upper 
houses but still prescribed a bicameral Parliament for the putative nation, is worth 
lingering over. On one level it is an unambiguous example of the heart ruling the 
head. Clearly the force of tradition was too strong to resist. The theory of path 
dependence allows us to consider this force in more analytical terms. In this 
chapter it can be seen that the delegates constructed a constitution that reflected 
their experiences and heritage with only slight deviations from the path set out in 
their own legislatures, and even from medieval times. Departures from the beaten 
path, for example manhood election of Senators, are as much due to the 
strengthening forces of democracy in British based legislatures as to the 
enlightened debate in the Conventions. Colonial Parliaments represented a path 
dependence from which it was difficult to stray, regardless of their acknowledged 
problems. Moreover, for all their faults, upper houses were a powerful bulwark for 
those who were haunted by the prospect of majority rule. Having said that, this 
chapter shows that some delegates were not acutely familiar with their own 
 Western Australia had enfranchised its women in 1899. 
                                            
105 Helen Irving, ed., The Centenary Companion to Australian Federation, p.375. 
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Parliaments and practices and in their occasional references to them they often got 
it wrong. Their less than perfect knowledge did not deter them from embracing the 
precedents and in the structure of the future Senate they replicated the difficulties 
of the Colonial Constitutions. This suggests that the most potent motivating force in 
their decisions to create a Senate in the image of the Colonial Houses was more 
emotional than intellectual. 
The result was that overall the configuration of the new Parliament and its upper 
house, after months of debate, was to be in the same pattern as the old. In this the 
Federation Conventions can be seen as a ‘critical juncture framework’ as outlined 
by Ruth and David Collier.106
                                            
106 Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1991), p.29. 
 From their British heritage to their modern colonial 
experiences the delegates were emotionally driven to conform to the traditional 
format with only a few departures from the ‘norm’. 
This chapter has shown that the six Australian colonial upper houses were strong 
precedents for the structure of the Federal upper house. They were immediate and 
familiar models, but the historical traditions which added substance to the views of 
the delegates can be traced back even further, to the ancient world and later 
Britain and Europe. Many delegates were aware of the wider world and brought 
their experiences into their thinking on the structure of a future Senate. These 
influences will be elaborated upon in the following chapter, which will look at the 
role other and older models in Europe played in defining the structure of the 
Australian Senate. 
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Chapter 5 
The Lamp of Experience 
 
 
Historians old and new have, implicitly and explicitly, suggested that ‘models’ were 
influential in shaping the Australian Constitution, particularly in relation to the 
Senate. Some invoke ancient Rome and Greece; most refer to the United States’ 
Senate and the British House of Lords; others suggest that the Australian colonial 
parliaments were the primary models. Here, for example, is what the seminal 
Australian constitutional historians Quick and Garran (1901) said on the topic of the 
Australian Constitution: 
[It] … is an adaptation of the principles of British and colonial government to 
the federal system. Its language and ideas are drawn, partly from the model 
of all modern governments, the British Constitution itself; partly from the 
colonial Constitutions based on the British model; partly from the federal 
Constitution of the United States of America; and partly from the semi-federal 
Constitution of the Dominion of Canada; the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth, therefore, is not an isolated document. It has been built on 
traditional foundations. Its roots penetrate deep into the past.1
La Nauze concentrated on the structure of the Constitution as a whole, but drew on 
Inglis Clark’s draft of 1891 to emphasise the United States Senate as the major 
model for the Australian Senate. ‘For the composition of his Senate Clark followed 
the American model’.
 
This is the conclusion in a nutshell. However, it is only a conclusion; the authors do 
not specify the reasoning behind the statement. 
2
                                            
1 John Quick and Robert Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 
1995 ed. (Sydney: Legal Books 1901), p.vii. 
2 J.A. La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution, (Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 1972), pp.25-27. 
 In contrast to Quick & Garran, La Nauze made no reference 
to ancient regimes or to the British House of Lords. Erling M. Hunt, an American 
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commentator, clearly saw the United States as the major model for the Australian 
Senate. This much is evident from the title of his book, though he does not see the 
Senate as a ‘slavish copy’ of the American model. He tells us that Canada, 
Switzerland, the German Empire, and Norway were also referred to in relation to 
certain issues such as the referendum, the composition of the Senate, and 
deadlock provisions.3
Separate chambers date from ancient times and the original purpose was to allow 
representation of different groups of interests and classes. They were a device to 
allow sections of society, other than the elite or nobility, a voice in government. The 
privilege was still limited to the more prosperous and powerful citizens but the 
device of separate chambers contributed to a more acceptable and therefore more 
stable government. Ancient Greek philosophers, including Aristotle, advocated 
such a ‘mixed’ government and it has influenced parliamentary philosophy on a 
global scale and for many centuries. The ancient Greek and Roman examples 
were a strong influence on the evolution of modern federations and Meg Russell, in 
her discussion of the origins of second chambers, notes that the ‘existence of 
multi-chamber parliaments may be traced back to ancient Greece and Rome’. She 
 
These are examples of the general position of historians on the subject of 
precedents for the Australian Senate; but it is not the whole story. In fact, there has 
not been a systematic discussion of upper house models explored by the 
delegates themselves before they made their decisions on the structure of the 
Senate. The obvious models, the Australian colonial upper houses, have been 
discussed in the previous chapter. The following two chapters ask: what other 
models were discussed in the Convention debates and what issues were they 
introduced in relation to? I will argue that the Senate was not just a ‘Washminster’ 
hybrid; it drew on various models from the ancient and modern worlds. This 
chapter will examine models from the ancient world and modern Britain and 
Europe. 
                                            
3 E.M. Hunt, American Precedents in Australian Federation, (New York: Columbia University Press; 
London P.S. King, Ltd., 1930), pp.15-16. 
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saw the Athenian people’s chamber, which comprised representatives from each of 
the ten tribes, as a precursor of modern federal chambers or Senates.4 In their 
study of bicameralism Tsebelis and Money argued ‘there is considerable continuity 
from ancient Greece to the 18th century … the two legislative bodies represented 
different classes or groups of citizens’.5 Bicameralism then, was a pre-democratic 
principle in that the upper chamber represented the powerful and wealthy of 
society, while the lower chamber represented the less patrician citizens, though still 
those with some status and wealth. As Loewenberg and Patterson put it the 
division of the legislature into both ‘an upper and a lower house was originally a 
class conscious sense of “upper and lower”’.6
The same reason which induced the Romans to have two consuls makes it 
desirable there should be two chambers: that neither of them may be 
exposed to the corrupting influence of undivided power, even for the space of 
a single year.
 John Stuart Mill also had something 
to say about second chambers, for and against, and ascribed the genesis of the 
idea to the Romans: 
7
Consuls were the chief magistrates of Ancient Rome, at first both were patricians 
then, from 367 BC, one was required to be a plebeian.
 
8
Of all principles on which a wisely conservative body, destined to moderate 
and regulate democratic ascendancy, could possibly be constructed, the best 
seems to be that exemplified in the Roman Senate, itself the most 
consistently prudent and sagacious body that ever administered public 
affairs.
 Mill also expressed great 
admiration for the Roman Senate: 
9
Mill wrote this in 1861, after the crisis of the Great Reform Act in Britain in 1832, 
which, he argued, had undermined the power of the House of Lords. 
 
                                            
4 Meg Russell, Reforming the House of Lords: Lessons from Overseas, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), p.20. 
5 George Tsebelis and Jeanette Money, Bi-Cameralism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), p.13. 
6 G. Loewenberg and S.C. Patterson, Comparing Legislatures, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p.121. 
7 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. John Gray, (Oxford University Press, 1991), 
p.385. 
8 Nathaniel Harris, History of Ancient Rome, 2003 ed. (London: Chancellor Press, 2000), p.9. 
9 Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, p.388. 
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I will argue that the concept of an ‘upper’ house as a patrician institution still 
lingered in the minds of the Convention delegates despite their declared 
democratic principles. As we have seen, in many respects the delegates were 
creatures of habit and their experience and education unconsciously caused them 
to regard second chambers as ‘upper’ houses and institutions of greater distinction 
than lower houses. This disposition, I suggest, influenced the decision to establish 
an upper house in the first place and then to regard it as the superior body. 
There is little overt evidence that the Convention delegates were influenced by 
ancient examples, though most of them were either well educated or well read. 
Edmund Barton, for example, enjoyed a classical education at Sydney University 
and so had a strong grounding in the Greek and Roman classics. Geoffrey Bolton 
argued in his biography of Barton that the ‘same Greek and Roman precedent 
would become one of the subliminal influences in the shaping of an Australian 
nation’.10
                                            
10 Geoffrey Bolton, Edmund Barton: The One Man for the Job, (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & 
Unwin, 2000), p.16. 
 Barton was not alone among the delegates in having received a classical 
education and other delegates would have been familiar with these early 
precedents. Bolton’s use of the word ‘subliminal’ is relevant in relation to Greek 
and Roman influences on the delegates, because there is only minimal mention of 
them in the Convention debates. The only evidence of the influence of antiquity 
came in a spirited exchange on the issue of equal representation of the States in 
the Senate, on 10 September 1897. On that day the ancient Greek legislatures of 
about the third century B.C., the Lykian League and the Achaean Assembly were 
drawn into the discussion by Josiah Symon and Henry Higgins. As has been 
shown, Higgins was a vociferous opponent of equal representation of the States in 
the Senate, and Symon was an equally vociferous supporter of the concept. It is 
evident from their passionate duel that both felt that history was on their side. Here 
though, the interest is in their learned comments on these ancient Greek 
federations. Symon, in a long speech, compared the ancient Achaean League to 
the modern constitution of the United States, citing it as an example of a successful 
federation which gave equal representation to each member city and claimed that 
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that was the example the United States had followed. Higgins riposted with another 
ancient example to support his view that equal representation is undemocratic by 
citing the Lykian League, whose cities were represented by members according to 
their population. One source suggests it was actually the Lykian League on which 
the United States Constitution was modelled.11
A more visible relationship to antiquity is in the name the Senate for the upper 
house. The name came to Australia indirectly from the Roman Empire via the 
United States. It is an ancient word which, literally, means ‘council of old men’. The 
word is also used in other contexts, mostly academic, to describe various 
authoritative bodies, particularly in some major British universities. The history of 
the word is a complex and tortuous tale but historians Patterson and Mughan, as 
well as Russell, tell us that the majority of second chambers of today take the 
name from the famous council of elders of ancient Rome which held sway during 
the second century BC.
 The question of equal 
representation in the Senate was a bitterly fought out verbal battle and was in 
many ways an echo of the United States Convention debates, where the same 
issue attracted passionate argument. In America the resolution or compromise, 
known as the ‘Connecticut Compromise’ was to agree to equal representation of 
the States in the Senate in order to persuade the smaller states to accept 
federation. The Australians accepted this view after lively debates, and followed 
suit. 
12
                                            
11 OR, 10 September 1897, pp.292, 348. New York Times, 19 September 2005, ‘Lycian League 
Parliament Building Identified’. 
12 Samuel C. Patterson and Anthony Mughan, eds., Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary 
World (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999), Russell, Reforming the House of Lords: 
Lessons from Overseas, p.19. 
 Roger Foster in his Commentaries on the Constitution of 
the United States points out that the Americans themselves simply borrowed the 
name: ‘the United States took the name from the body which ruled ancient Rome, 
the Roman Senate. … This was a body of warriors with whom the king or Chieftain 
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held his councils of war’.13 The United States and Australian Senates more closely 
resemble the Roman Tribunate as legislative bodies rather than warriors.14
As delegates used different names at different times this led to some confusion 
until James Walker interjected, as noted in Chapter 3, suggesting it should be 
called the Senate because ‘It is much simpler, and we all know what it means’. 
This did not please Edmund Barton whose Constitutional Committee had chosen 
the name ‘States Assembly’. He, not surprisingly, protested vigorously but in vain 
at the amendment, which was quickly passed.
 
The comments of the delegates suggest that it was the historicity of the name that 
was the major influence in the naming of the Australian upper house. It overcame 
all other suggestions made in earnest deliberations to give the house a name that 
would properly reflect its declared purpose of representing the interests of the 
separate states: ‘States Assembly’ or ‘Council of States’. In the early Convention 
debates ‘Senate’ was used frequently but not solely to describe the proposed 
upper house but, in the 1897 Convention, the Constitutional Committee charged 
with the duty of selecting a name for the upper house, decided upon ‘States 
Assembly’.  
15 The amendment was strongly 
supported by George Reid who said the word ‘commends itself to an English 
community far more than this Frenchified title’, which was a sly reference to the 
name of the French Parliament: the ‘Estates General’. Reid and Barton were 
political opponents in the NSW Parliament and this could be an indication of Reid’s 
hostility to Barton as much as support for the new name.16
Walker’s amendment made perfect sense to most of the delegates and can be 
seen as more evidence of a ‘subliminal’ influence, or the heart ruling the head. 
Another ‘subliminal’ influence could have been that the name ‘States Assembly’ 
 
                                            
13 Roger Foster, Commentaries on the constitution of the United States, historical and juridicial: with 
observations upon the ordinary provisions of state constitutions and a comparison with the 
constitutions of other countries, p.459. 
14 Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, p. 415. Quick & 
Garran draw from Roger Foster. 
15 OR, 13 April 1897, p. 481. 
16 Ibid. 
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has no poetic resonance and would bring a tedious problem with apostrophes, 
though the compilers of the records of the debates conveniently ignored this 
grammatical aspect. La Nauze later wryly observed that the change saved the 
country from the perpetual irony of a second chamber with a meaningless name, 
for the Senate very quickly abandoned its States’ focus to become, like the House 
of Representatives, a house dominated by political parties.17
The House of Lords emerged in Britain in the 14th century and is one of the 
earliest examples of an upper chamber in the modern world. It has been highly 
influential in the development of bicameralism across the globe, not just in British 
societies. Bicameralism and the concept of an upper and lower house evolved in 
Britain as a result of a split in the Great Council, an assembly of the chief 
landholders of the kingdom, ecclesiastical and lay, which met to advise the king 
and agree on taxation.
 
The other ancient model, though not as venerable as the Greek and Roman 
examples, was the British House of Lords. This was the institution with which the 
delegates were familiar from their own traditions and heritage. The House of Lords 
was a major model for many modern upper houses. It was not a very practical 
model, dating as it did from the Middle Ages and based upon out-of-date principles, 
foremost of which was that its members were there on a mainly hereditary basis, 
which was unacceptable in the Australia of the 1890s. This did not deter the 
Convention delegates, who were staunchly British and, though they accepted that 
the hereditary principle was impractical for Australia, still saw the institution as a 
model in other ways: as an integral part of an Australian bicameral parliament; as a 
house of review, or check on the lower house; and in its procedures, ceremonies 
and rituals, many of which were incorporated into the procedures of the Australian 
Senate and modelled on the example of the Colonial Legislative Councils. 
18
                                            
17 La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution, p.141. 
18 A. Lawrence Lowell, The Government of England, vol.1. The MacMillan Company, 1921, p.394. 
 The Council, the ‘most venerable of all British institutions 
reaching back beyond the Norman Conquest and beyond King Alfred, into the 
shadowy regions of Teutonic antiquity’ had previously expanded its membership 
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from feudal lords to include Burgesses representing local communities.19 When 
these different ‘estates’ began to meet separately, this marked the emergence of 
an upper chamber comprising the aristocracy and bishops, sitting in their own right, 
and a lower chamber representing counties or boroughs, and called the 
Commons.20
By the end of the 19th century, when Australia was considering a new Constitution, 
the composition of the House of Lords included all of the ‘peers of the realm’, by 
whatever title, and the English Bishops (4). Other members included Irish peers 
(28) and Scottish representative peers (16), appointed on various principles. The 
Crown, or the ‘ministry of the day’, had unlimited power to create hereditary 
peerages.
 
21 In 1830 the number of peers was 401; by 1899 the number had 
increased to 591, and the House was the largest second chamber in the world. 
Only ‘peers of the realm’ were members of the House by virtue of descent and 
were summoned to Parliament by a writ of summons from the Sovereign, though 
they did not all attend.22
The division of powers between the houses is a critical factor in the smooth 
functioning of a legislature as a whole and the powers of the House of Lords were 
an important consideration for the delegates in designing their upper house. The 
House of Lords had a two-fold role in the British Parliament in that its powers were 
both judicial and legislative. Judicial authority was rejected as a role for the 
Australian Senate; instead a separate judiciary was established along the lines of 
the United States Constitution, another important model to be considered in the 
 The composition of the Lords was clearly not a suitable 
model for the Australian situation but other factors influenced those delegates who 
saw it as a model for Australia, the most important being its powers in relation to 
the lower House of Commons. 
                                            
19 James Bryce, 'Conference on the Reform of the Second Chamber: Letter from Viscount Bryce to 
the Prime Minister', (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office: 1918; Reprinted for the Legislative 
Assembly of New South Wales 1929), p.5. para. 18. 
20 Russell, Reforming the House of Lords: Lessons from Overseas, p.20. 
21 Lowell, The House of Lords, vol.1., p.395. 
22 J.A. Marriott, Second Chambers - an Inductive Study in Political Science, New, revised and part 
rewritten ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1927), p.55. 
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next chapter. The legislative role of the Lords in the 1890s was however a clear 
model for the delegates and was used to both support and undermine arguments 
about the Senate’s powers in relation to the lower house. In this role at this time 
the Lords had co-ordinate authority over legislation together with the Sovereign 
and the House of Commons, except that the imposition of taxation was the sole 
prerogative of the Commons. In this the Lords’ powers were limited, not by statute 
but by convention and precedent, which in Britain were as binding as statutes. 
Apart from this limitation both Houses could originate, amend or reject any Bill, and 
before any legislation could become an Act it must have the concurrence of both 
Houses and the Crown.23
The Great Reform Act of 1832, which sought to modernise what was a corrupt and 
unjust voting system for the House of Commons, weakened the Lords. It did not 
affect the Lords’ powers directly but its difficult passage and the circumstances 
leading up to it considerably lowered its status. The Bill took eighteen months to go 
through Parliament because successive versions were rejected by the upper house 
and its final passage was preceded by serious public unrest amounting almost to 
civil war. After two parliamentary dissolutions, the Whig leader, Earl Grey, was 
returned to power as Prime Minister. To enable the Bill to pass the House of Lords, 
Grey requested the King (William IV) to create 50 or more peers to achieve a 
majority in favour of the Bill. This was not an unprecedented manoeuvre: in 1711 
Queen Anne had created twelve new Tory peers to secure a majority in favour of 
peace with France, so the threat was real.
 
24 In the event the threat itself was 
sufficient, the Tory leader, the Duke of Wellington, allowed the Bill to pass by 
instructing the Tory Lords not to oppose it any longer. The Lords passed the Bill in 
1832 without the King having to agree to this tactic. According to Bagehot, ‘It is the 
sole claim of the Duke of Wellington to the name of a statesman that he presided 
over this change’.25
                                            
23 Ibid. 
24 Eric Edgar Hewitt, Upper Houses, (Melbourne: Viridia Books, 1996), pp.60-61. 
25 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, (London: C. A. Watts, 1964), p.128. 
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This calendar of events and the passions it aroused seriously damaged the status 
of the House of Lords in the public mind and subsequently the threat of creating 
more peers was always a silent factor when the rejection of Bills from the House of 
Commons was considered. Not only did the passing of the Bill make the Commons 
a more representative institution but the public anger that had accompanied and 
forced the change brought recognition of the emerging strength of the democratic 
element in society and in Government. What it did not do was to greatly increase 
the numbers in the Commons or bring about a golden age of democracy. Although 
the corrupt voting system had been rationalised and a fairer distribution of 
electorates enacted, the actual process did not change: a property qualification 
remained on the suffrage, excluding the vast majority of people who owned little 
and it was still necessary to meet a stringent property qualification to stand for 
election, which meant that participation in Government on any level remained 
limited to the wealthy and the aristocracy. It was not until further reform acts, in 
1867 and 1884, that voting rights were gradually extended further to include those 
lower down the class ladder.26 Australia’s Colonies were well ahead of the Mother 
country in this regard. The Australian delegates would have taken these factors 
into account in their deliberations on the powers of the Senate. Earlier John Stuart 
Mill had offered an apposite comment: ‘So soon as conventional rank and 
individual riches no longer overawe the democracy, a House of Lords becomes 
insignificant’.27
A study of the comments of the delegates during the Conventions reveals a 
dichotomy in their views of the House of Lords. They were at once admiring, even 
deferential, but also critical and disparaging. Disparaging comments came early in 
the 1891 Convention when Samuel Griffith, in his introductory speech declared that 
the powers of the Lords ‘have become considerably diminished, and are now 
principally those of a checking and a useful revising body’.
 
28
                                            
26Eric Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: An Economic History of Britain since 1750, (London: 
Weidenfield & Nicholson, 1968), p.102. 
27 Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, p.21. 
 That there was a 
28 OR, 4 March 1891, p.31. It is notable that the delegates to the Conventions, although generally 
thought to be sympathetic to the concept that Ireland might have the same degree of autonomy as 
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dilemma at the heart of the discussions involving the British upper chamber is 
evident: there was a desire to emulate the Lords but a problem in that it did not fit 
the Australian situation. This was best expressed in an admiring remark by Alfred 
Deakin in 1891, who asserted: 
I believe that we cannot have a better ideal for our second chamber than the 
House of Lords as its functions are now interpreted; at the same time I will 
confess to honourable members that in defining its exact position we might 
possibly have some difficulty.29
there is in England an upper chamber infinitely superior to any of the same 
character of which we know anywhere else … the House of Peers … holds a 
body of men at this day who have no superiors on the face of the earth as a 
governing body.
 
This was in the early days of the 1891 Convention and it is possible Deakin, as a 
supporter of the US model and opposed to the British concept of responsible 
government, hoped that the role and powers of the Senate might eventually differ 
in important respects from those of the Lords. Henry Parkes had no qualms in 
expressing deference combined with admiration of the Lords. In the early days of 
the 1891 Convention he declared: 
30
Parkes continued his fulsome praise of the Lords, saying that Australia should take 
what he called ‘the lamp of experience held out by England and by no other 
country’. He also considered that the upper chamber of the ‘old land’ was ‘more 
illustrious’ as well as of great ability, learning and service to the state. He 
emphasised the superiority of the Lords over the United States Senate when he 
referred to the ‘Charles Sumner’ incident with these words: ‘in the House of Lords 
no peer, no illustrious 
 
statesman was ever stealthily approached with an intention 
to beat out his brains’. 31
                                                                                                                                     
the Australian colonies or Canada enjoy, did not comment on the rejection of Home Rule for Ireland 
in 1886 and 1893. 
29 Ibid., 5 March 1891, p.74. 
30 Ibid., 16 March 1891, p.447. 
31 Ibid. 
 This was a reference to an ugly episode in the bitter 
conflict over slavery in the United States, when a congressman from South 
Carolina beat anti-slavery activist Senator Charles Sumner unconscious in his seat 
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for his views. Sumner was seriously injured and took three years to recover.32
The main point of contention in the debates, and one in which references to the 
Lords were frequent, was the division of power between the houses over money 
Bills. As discussed above, by the 1890s this power was limited for the Lords by 
Convention, but some delegates, mainly from the smaller states, sought completely 
equal powers for the Senate, including over money Bills. In this regard Griffith 
denied the validity of the Lords as a model for the Senate: ‘The House of Lords is a 
very peculiar institution—it is peculiar in its constitution and in its history; and there 
is every reason in the world why it should not interfere with the taxation of the 
people.’
 
Parkes was implying that United States Senators were inferior in quality to the 
members of the House of Lords and his reference to this dreadful incident 
suggests that he was not impressed with the United States model of a Senate. 
33
The idea that there should be any financial limitation on the powers of the Senate 
brought angry responses from delegates. John Macrossan of Queensland seemed 
to think that the idea of copying the Lords in this respect was an indication of 
‘obsequiousness’ and carrying out an ‘aristocratic idea’. He saw the House of 
Lords as ‘having no real power whatsoever’ and accused the delegates from 
Victoria and South Australia as wanting the Senate to be a ‘counterpart of the 
House of Lords’. He suggested, disparagingly, that the Lords was a ‘feeble’ 
institution and should not be the template for the Senate in relation to money bills, 
and persisted in the notion that the smaller states wanted a counterpart to the 
Lords. Macrossan concluded with the statement: ‘We are here to preserve our 
state rights. We are not here to make a senate which shall be a counterpart of the 
 Members of the House of Lords, unlike members of the proposed 
Australian Senate, were not elected by the people, or taxpayers, and in Griffith’s 
view should not interfere in money matters. 
                                            
32 Biographical Directory of the United States Congress: 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/Featured_Bio_Sumner.htm. Accessed 
5 August 2008. 
33 OR, 17 March 1891, p.428. 
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House of Lords’.34
William McMillan also referred to the Lords while speaking on the powers of the 
proposed Senate in 1891. He considered that the new upper chamber would not 
be ‘a nominee chamber, not an upper chamber like the House of Lords’. It is true 
that the Senate was to be an elected chamber, but, as noted above, in its 
legislative role the final shape of the Senate was to be a close copy of the Lords.
 This comment is ironic in that the final shape of the Senate was 
to be very much a counterpart or duplicate of the House of Lords in its role as an 
upper house, except in its composition. It is ironic that those who sought greater 
power for the upper house were seeking a house more like the Lords of old which 
was more than the equal of the Commons. 
35 
McMillan may also have hoped for a radical reform of the traditional structure and 
powers of the Australian upper house. He had occasionally let drop remarks that 
suggested he was not wholly in favour of a Senate at all. Thomas Playford spoke in 
support of the concept of responsible government, which he argued, was never 
achieved in England until ‘the co-equal power was taken from the House of 
Lords’.36 Playford maintained that the concept of responsible government 
combined with two absolutely co-equal houses would not work. This argument is at 
the heart of what Galligan calls the ‘hybrid synthesis’ of the Australian Constitution, 
which gave executive power to the lower house, but gave the upper house, equal 
in all other respects, no power in respect of money bills except absolute rejection.37
Like a fort which has only one big gun, and that big gun so powerful and so 
uncertain in its effect that they hardly dare to let it off, because it may burst 
and injure those who occupy the fort and possibly blow it to pieces. This big 
gun is the power of refusing to grant supplies and so thus cause the stoppage 
of all the functions of government.
 
Baker recognised a danger here describing, in graphic terms, how this would make 
the Senate: 
38
                                            
34 Ibid., p.433. 
35 Ibid., 3 April 1891, p.719. 
36 Ibid., 6 April 1891, p. 734. 
37 Brian Galligan, A Federal Republic, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.86. 
38 OR, 17 September 1897, p.785. 
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George Dibbs had the final and in this instance, derogatory, word on the Lords in 
1891. He considered that the British Constitution was ‘a worn out theory’ as 
regards the Lords and he claimed that in England there was an attempt being 
made to reform it which he hoped ‘may succeed’. Dibbs was speaking here in 
support of the United States model for ‘a powerful Senate’ and he supported equal 
powers combined with responsible government, a combination that many, including 
Deakin and Playford, saw as unworkable.39
After an interval of six years, the 1897 Convention met to resume the task, 
uncompleted in 1891, of drafting a constitution for the Australian Commonwealth. 
The example of the Lords and Great Britain remained a consideration, if not cited 
quite so often. William Lyne suggested that the Constitution should provide against 
any secession, such as had occurred in the United States and should be as flexible 
as the British Constitution.
 The powers of the Lords over finances 
were not finally removed until 1911. 
40
I admit that we must here deviate from the British Constitution and give the 
Senate powers which have ceased practically to belong to the House of Lords 
for a long period.
 George Reid suggested deviating from the ‘strict lines’ 
of the British Constitution to give the Senate the power to reject money bills, 
though not to amend them: 
41
 Reid saw the question as one of ‘great moment’ to the smaller states, that they 
have some power over money bills, and professed support for their concern, a 
support which he expressed again in his next speech.
 
42 Glynn rather vaguely 
added the thought that the power of the Lords could not be justified in Australia 
because it would be ‘inconsistent with the principle of popular supremacy’ and that 
‘the Lords must give way to the Commons’. He thought that this was what would 
happen here and to him, as a supporter of co-ordinate powers, this would not be a 
good thing. 43
                                            
39 Ibid., 6 April 1891, p.752. 
40 Ibid., 6 March 1897, pp.161-2. 
41 Ibid., 30 March 1897, p.275-6. 
42 Ibid., p.276. 
43 Ibid., 9 September 1897, p.277. 
 Glynn, as with some other delegates, seemed a little vague on the 
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actual powers of the House of Lords and a veil of ignorance distorted the debates 
on the topic. 
That there was some uncertainty of how the structure of the proposed Constitution 
should proceed was evident in the vacillation of Richard Baker. In 1891 he was 
initially a firm supporter of the ‘British form of Constitutional Government’. He 
changed his views early and became a strong advocate for the adoption of the 
United States system, justifying his change of heart because he had ‘looked at the 
Lords from the point of view of a possible imperial Federation’, and concluded with 
some relish and little relevance, that if this was to come about then the ‘House of 
Lords would undoubtedly have to be swept away’. In this speech Baker was 
referring to an idea that all members of the then British Empire might federate 
under a central Government, an idea which did not have much support from 
anywhere. In his speech Baker pointed to the example of South Australia, his 
home colony, saying that its Legislative Council, or upper house, ‘must always be 
looked upon as holding a position somewhat analogous to the House of Lords’, but 
that would not necessarily work in the Senate. The upper house, the Legislative 
Council, in South Australia had equal powers with the lower house except for the 
initiation of money bills, but as Baker was a determined opponent of the concept of 
responsible government he wanted a Senate more closely modelled on the United 
States example. From this position he went on to attack the supporters of 
responsible government as being ‘imbued with its excellence because they 
themselves have succeeded and occupied such prominent positions under that 
form of constitution’.44 Baker is articulating here the main theme of the theory of 
path dependence which explains the forces that result in the clinging to old ways, 
in spite of difficulties encountered in the past.45
It was possible for delegates to draw diametrically opposed conclusions from the 
same set of circumstances. Hackett made it clear that there was uncertainty, or 
 
                                            
44 Ibid., 18 March 1891, pp.466. 
45 Paul Pierson, 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics', The American 
Social Science Review, June 2000. 
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perhaps more open minds, concerning what shape the Senate should take and he 
made a valid point during a discussion on its powers in regard to money bills: 
I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that we are now entering upon an 
unknown sea. We are creating a constitution of which almost everything is 
undefined. We have little in the past to argue from, we have absolutely 
nothing in the future but the purest efforts of imagination and it may be that 
it would be best for that constitution to run on the lines which have been 
established in England and the colonies for so many years.46
The topic of possible disagreement between the two houses led to the major 
debate in which models were cited. This was an issue which affected both houses 
 
Hackett was defending his change of mind from supporting full powers of 
amendment of money bills for the Senate into opposition to that concept. In doing 
so he showed great insight into the opportunities for creating a constitution of 
originality and imagination. He also pinpointed the greatest obstacle to that 
achievement, the reliance on the past in the form of the constitutions of the 
Colonies and Great Britain, another clear example of the lure of the existing path. 
The end result was that the powers finally allocated to the Senate in the 
Constitution were almost identical to those of the House of Lords at that time: the 
powers of the two Houses of Parliament would be equal in all respects except for 
money bills. In Australia this was embodied in the written Constitution, whereas for 
the Lords it was enshrined in convention. In the case of serial rejection of bills the 
power of the Senate was to be tempered with the possibility of the dissolution of 
Parliament; in the Lords it was tempered with the threat of the creation of more 
peers to enable a bill to pass. The threat to the Lords was much more immediate 
than the threat of dissolution of the Australian Parliament, an act which, as finally 
designed, requires time and consideration before it becomes possible. The building 
up of the safeguard against disagreement was a painful and arduous debate and 
the outcome is unique. But there is little doubt that the need to have some method 
of reining in an obstinate upper house was recognised by the delegates from both 
the British experience and their own. 
                                            
46 OR, 14 September 1897, pp. 551-6. 
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and is included because it precipitated a core provision in the Constitution closely 
related to the eventual powers of the Senate. The issue arose from the bicameral 
system and the proposed imbalance in powers of the two houses. It was a vexed 
question and took five days of intensive debate (15 to 21 September 1897) to 
resolve. George Reid recalled in his memoir that it was a most ‘troublesome’ 
debate on an issue which created numerous difficulties.47 During the debate many 
models were referred to and each section was bitterly contested. The major model 
was the House of Lords and, as noted earlier, perhaps this was due to, as Geoffrey 
Bolton put it, a ‘subliminal’ desire, amounting almost to a need, to emulate the 
British system, combined with the knowledge of the difficult circumstances of the 
passing of the Reform Act of 1832.48
We are not dealing with the House of Lords, who represent only a section of 
the people … when we have a senate resting on the bedrock of manhood 
suffrage, the senate representing the whole manhood, and in some colonies 
the whole womanhood also, of the country— cannot conceive a case where 
there would be a necessity for mechanical means to get rid of deadlocks.
 
The clause under discussion was a new clause—57(a)—to manage the issue of 
possible deadlocks between the Houses. The Assembly of New South Wales had 
put the Clause forward during the April until September suspension of the 1897 
Convention, after the draft Constitution had been circulated to the States for 
comment. This much-disputed question led to complex and tedious arguments and 
a variety of solutions. One of the problems was that a number of members did not 
think any provision for the solving of deadlocks was necessary and were especially 
opposed to the idea that a referendum might be the solution. Simon Fraser put his 
point of view forcefully: 
49
A vote on 15 September 1897 finally decided, by 30 votes to 15, that a provision of 
this sort was necessary.
 
50
                                            
47 The Right Honourable Sir George Houston Reid, My Reminiscences, (London: Cassell and 
Company Ltd., 1917), p.160. 
48 Bolton, Edmund Barton: The One Man for the Job, p.16. 
49 OR, 15 September 1897, p.566. 
50 Ibid., 16 September 1897, p.708. 
 This in itself presented another problem: that there were 
no exact models on the breaking of deadlocks to follow. Of the Australian Colonies 
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only in South Australia had provision been made, but it was clumsy, probably 
unworkable and had never been used.51
In attempts to resolve the predicament delegates sought examples from other 
countries, several in a negative way. Frederick Holder cited both the Lords and his 
home state of South Australia in his speech on the matter. He explained that in 
South Australia the Governor was empowered to issue writs for an additional 
number of members of the Legislative Council to enable disputed legislation to be 
passed, (though he failed to mention that it had never been used) an idea parallel 
to what could be done in the Lords and in New South Wales. Isaac Isaacs pointed 
out that it had been done in Canada, and Deakin added that it had also been done 
in New Zealand: Queen Anne certainly started something in 1711. Holder saw that 
what he called a ‘safety valve’ was necessary, but the examples he cited were 
simply not practical for the Senate.
 
52
That the example of the House of Lords was foremost in the minds of many 
delegates was evident in the number of references to it, even though its solution to 
such a situation was clearly inappropriate for the Australian Senate whose 
membership was fixed. Joseph Abbott saw no reason for a ‘safety valve’ as in his 
opinion the Lords ‘had never failed to give way to public opinion’. This suggests 
either that Abbott thought that the Reform Act of 1832 was ancient history or that 
he was not aware of that crisis, another indication of the shortage of accurate 
historical knowledge among the delegates. From this shaky premise he concluded 
that the Senate would not challenge the lower house on serious questions, a 
conclusion he was not alone in holding. He was ambivalent about solutions to the 
deadlock crisis but was prepared to listen to suggestions.
 
53
George Reid seemed to have mixed feelings about the Lords, introducing the 
British example with the observation: ‘If we are to proceed on the lines of the 
 
                                            
51 Dean Jaensch, ed. The Flinders History of South Australia: Political History. (Adelaide: Wakefield 
Press, 1986), p.372. 
52 OR, 15 September 1897, pp. 561-2. 
53 Ibid., p. 569. 
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British Constitution, we have very little to guide us’.54
I feel all the prouder of our connection with the mother country when I reflect 
that in spite of the House of Lords there is no country in the world where 
public opinion in its broadest form has so much weight.
 He cited the Lords and the 
power of public opinion again by referring to the effects of the 1832 Reform Act. 
Though he supported the case for a method of dealing with deadlocks he still cited 
the Lords and the power of public opinion, even though its unique method of 
resolving deadlocks could not be applied in the case of an Australian Senate. He 
made an impassioned and very lengthy speech on the proposal of a dissolution 
followed by a referendum to break deadlocks. He recognised that the British 
Constitution was not a model in this regard and he loyally expressed admiration for 
the British Constitution but was reserved about the Lords: 
55
Fraser, in an almost impenetrable speech, seemed to be defending the Lords and 
the Canadian Senate as well, as houses ‘which could not be dissolved’. Reid 
responded heatedly revealing his thoughts about upper houses in Australia: ‘There 
are houses which we know of in Australia’ he said ‘which have developed a spirit of 
arrogance and self-sufficiency quite beyond that of the House of Lords’. He went 
on to criticise members of upper houses as seeming to be the ‘embodiment of 
immovable and absolute power, which I have not found anywhere in ancient 
history. The simple reason is that the breath of the people cannot be brought to 
bear upon them at a critical moment’. Reid was speaking from experience as a 
member of the New South Wales Legislative Assembly and its conflict with the 
Legislative Council, members of which were nominated for life. He was a supporter 
of the idea of a referendum to resolve disputes and recourse to people power was 
 
The ‘in spite of’ is a revealing phrase and his was not the only reliance on public 
opinion as a powerful incentive for the resolution of deadlocks. 
                                            
54 Ibid., 16 September 1897, p.649. 
55 Ibid., pp.653-4. 
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at the heart of the argument of whether there should be restraints upon an upper 
house. He clearly thought there should be while Fraser thought otherwise.56
The pragmatic and intelligent Isaacs also referred to the Lords and the effects of 
the 1832 Reform Act on its powers. He supported Reid’s view that the Constitution 
should be ‘founded’ on the British model, so far as that is ‘applicable’ but would 
‘scarcely go further back than 1832’. It was not until then, he thought, that 
representative Government truly existed; before that, he observed, it was ‘still in 
the womb of time’. Deadlocks, he argued, are now easily dealt with in Britain ‘not 
because there are checks and balances, not because we have to depend on the 
mere good will or the moral silent force of public opinion … but because it is 
recognised that in the last resort there is only one power in the nation’.
 
57
That the Lords should be so frequently referred to in these debates suggests that 
most of the delegates were conscious of the effects of the 1832 Reform Act, as 
well as the impracticability of applying the British solution to Australia; it explains 
the frequent references to ‘public opinion’ as a possible decider and is strongly 
indicative of the weight of tradition which is accounted for by the theory of path 
dependence. The debates demonstrated that the delegates were not the best 
informed of scholars yet were prepared to argue from a position mostly based on a 
combination of emotion and past experience. Some were imbued with the vision of 
the qualities of the House of Lords as their rightful inheritance, even while they 
were committed to ideas of democracy. They wanted their Senate to be as nearly 
as possible a colonial House of Lords while demonstrating a democratic approach: 
a difficult task. Hunt saw the greater disparity in population and wealth between the 
larger and smaller states of Australia as leading the larger colonies to insist upon a 
provision for the breaking of ‘deadlocks’ though it is possible that the experience of 
 He was 
clearly referring to the power of the Prime Minister to request the Sovereign to 
create more Lords. He did not make any suggestion as to how to apply this in 
Australia. 
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the delegates in their colonial legislatures was more influential.58
The Norwegian model attracted the interest of the delegates mainly for its method 
of dealing with deadlocks or disagreements between the Houses. Lyne mentioned 
Norway early in the preliminary debates of the Adelaide Convention in 1897. In 
considering the possibility of a deadlock he described the solution to the situation 
in Norway as ‘the two houses sitting together’ to debate a disputed measure and 
noted that ‘a measure must be carried by a two-thirds majority’. He recommended 
this procedure for settling deadlocks in the Australian Parliament because ‘the 
possibility of a crisis is then alleviated at any rate, if not absolutely prevented’.
 It is also possible 
that the rough passage of the 1832 Reform Act through the British Parliament may 
have had some influence on the insistence upon such a provision. The example of 
1832 was a clear reminder that the British system was evolving and changing to 
meet new circumstances and this licensed them to tinker with it. 
Despite their emotionally ingrained attachment to British tradition, clearly 
demonstrated in their comments on the virtues of the House of Lords, the 
delegates had few qualms about exploring other possible models and, on the 
thorny question of deadlocks, others models were diligently sought. Norway, 
Austro-Hungary, France, Belgium, and Switzerland were brought into the 
argument, as were the United States and Canada—discussed in the next chapter. 
Other issues also were canvassed in the light of the practices of other 
Constitutions in sometimes wide ranging but occasionally superficial discussions. 
These will now be addressed. 
59
The model of Norway reappeared most frequently during the protracted debates on 
deadlocks later in the year. James Walker introduced the subject explaining that 
Higgins ‘would like to hear the Norwegian system discussed, or some application 
 
This is significant because, although Lyne made his speech early in the debate of 
1897, he sowed the seed of a future resolution. 
                                            
58 Hunt, American Precedents in Australian Federation, p.14. 
59 OR, 26 March 1897, p.159. 
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or modification of that system’.60 Later Reid made a lengthy and erudite speech on 
the topic in which he referred to several other models that adopted a similar 
procedure though with different conditions according to their different situations. 
According to Reid the system was used in Sweden, Belgium, France and Austro-
Hungary. He closed with the comment that ‘In Norway the two houses, if they 
disagree over a bill, meet together’.61 Some delegates, John Downer for example, 
thought the idea too ‘foreign’ and he made his feelings very clear by forcefully 
criticising those who ‘rush from dear old England, and ramble all over the 
Continent, taking precedents in the most ruthless and reckless way’. He exhorted 
them to ‘keep to one line, and that is the British Constitution’.62 In Pierson’s terms 
he was calling for delegates to stick to a well-known path and articulating the 
instincts of many delegates. Joseph Carruthers later added that the method was 
also used in Ireland: ‘The proposal is that laid down in the Government of Ireland 
Bill, the principle that the two houses shall deliberate and vote together thereon, 
and shall adopt or reject the bill’, though with different conditions according to 
individual circumstances.63
It fell to Isaacs to explain thoroughly the Norwegian system for the benefit of the 
delegates. In Norway, he explained, the two houses were both elected at the same 
time and on the same basis. They then met as one body and divided themselves 
into two parts: ‘one three-fourths of the number, the other the remaining one-fourth’ 
as Isaacs put it. If the two houses could not agree on a Bill they then met together 
to vote on it and a two-thirds majority was required to carry it. Though clearly well 
acquainted with the Norwegian practice, Isaacs concluded his speech by claiming 
he found the system unsuitable for Australia because it would be undemocratic 
‘bringing all the advantages of equal representation into the joint deliberations of 
the two bodies’. By this he meant that, for him, equal representation of the States, 
as decided upon for the Senate, was undemocratic and to carry the imbalance into 
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63 Ibid., 21 September 1897, p.940. 
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a joint sitting would give the smaller States too much power.64 This was the 
prevailing view of those who opposed the idea. But the proposal also had its 
supporters. Among these were Patrick Glynn, George Reid, James Walker and 
Philip Fysh. Fysh, who supported the idea in principle, was less than enthusiastic, 
calling it a ‘last resort’ and Walker saw it as ‘the most admirable system to settle 
those matters provided that the proportion is sufficient to safeguard the interests of 
the states’. 65 On the question of the suitability or otherwise of the Norwegian 
system of joint sittings Walker’s remark opened a long and tedious discussion on 
the majority necessary if such a provision was introduced. After much careful 
mathematics and heated argument this point was settled at a three-fifths majority 
to pass a Bill, but this was to become redundant in the final stages of the 
Constitution when a simple majority was agreed upon.66
The question on whether the procedure should be adopted was finally put in an 
amendment by Carruthers.
 
67 The amendment attracted a fiery debate with Isaacs 
commenting ‘this proposal has been pitch-forked into this debate at the eleventh 
hour without the slightest pretence to analogy, without the slightest pretence to 
adaptability to our constitution, and I do sincerely hope that the Committee will 
reject it’.68 He was to be disappointed. The amendment to include a joint sitting as 
part of the procedure to settle disagreements between the houses was passed 30–
11.69
Switzerland, as a Constitution of recent origin, was also a closely studied model for 
the Convention delegates. Switzerland’s Constitution, established in 1848 and 
revised in 1874, drew heavily on the United States Constitution except for the office 
 It is clear that at the end of the day the majority of delegates were prepared to 
temper their ardour for the British Constitution with a dose of pragmatism 
reinforced by painful lessons learned in the parliaments of their respective 
Colonies. 
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65 Ibid., pp.934, 971. 
66 Ibid., 20 September 1897, p.895. 
67 Ibid., 21 September 1897, p.933. 
68 Ibid., p.939. 
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of President. The Swiss Parliament in 1897 was bicameral with a popularly elected 
National Council, the lower house, and the States’ elected Council, the upper 
house. The powers of the two houses were equal. From the elected members of 
both houses of Parliament seven members were elected to form the Federal 
Council, which became the ‘supreme executive and directorial authority of the 
Confederation’. Each member of the Council had equal rights and each was head 
of a Department, or Minister, and the Council acted in the same way as a Cabinet 
in a Westminster government. Important decisions were taken by a majority of the 
Council members. The presidency of the Council rotated annually but the President 
had no special powers, the role being more of a public relations responsibility.70
The composition of the Swiss executive aroused the most interest among the 
delegates. Baker, an admirer of the United States system brought it to the attention 
of the Convention in 1891. He recommended adoption of the Swiss executive 
system, saying it had been in place for forty-three years and worked well.
 
71 Deakin 
however, was dismissive of Baker’s views saying such a system would not work in 
Australia where responsible government was a better option.72 Isaacs also 
dismissed the Swiss executive model, saying that if we were to have the Swiss 
executive perhaps we should abolish the Governor-General. He later scornfully 
commented that the members of the Swiss executive were ‘mere heads of 
departments’.73 A spirited debate then took place on the concept of the Swiss form 
of executive: John Gordon and William Trenwith expressed support for the idea, 
but Deakin and Isaacs were sceptical and disdainful.74 Barton added the comment 
that the Swiss style of executive would do away with party government and he did 
not believe that the Swiss Constitution had ‘proper safeguards for liberty’ as did the 
British system.75
                                            
70 History of Switzerland: Federal Constitution 1848, p.5. 
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The concept never got beyond debate, proving to be too extreme or too different 
from the British system of ‘responsible government’ to which most of the delegates 
were committed. Nor did the idea appeal as a solution to a pressing problem, as 
had the Norwegian concept of a joint sitting to resolve disputes. Yet the debate 
was enlightening in providing insight into the scope of the research and the pattern 
of thinking among the delegates. It did reveal just how dedicated they were on the 
whole to the ‘British’ system, again an example of the influence of their heritage. 
Other aspects of the Swiss model were also discussed at the Conventions: equal 
powers of the two houses and equal representation in the Senate. Downer claimed 
that the two houses of the Swiss Parliament had equal powers, though he could 
not see how this could be achieved in Australia. Deakin contradicted him on this 
point saying that the tenure of the Swiss Council of States made it inferior to the 
National Council. He offered no evidence for this conclusion nor is it evident in the 
Swiss Constitution, so it is difficult to decide what he meant by this comment.76
The issue of equal representations for the Swiss equivalent of the States, the 
Cantons, was also raised. The gradual evolution of the Swiss Constitution had 
influenced representation in the upper house and John Cockburn patiently 
explained that, in his opinion, there was equal representation: two councillors for 
each Canton for the major Cantons, while the smaller or half Cantons were given 
one each.
 
77 Higgins disagreed saying the Swiss did not have equal representation 
even though they had formed their Constitution on the model of the United States: 
‘Some … cantons or half cantons return only one member, whilst other cantons 
return two’.78 Downer also argued that the base principle in the Swiss Constitution 
was equal representation of the States, or Cantons, in the upper house: a 
discussion which suggests that their knowledge of the Swiss Constitution was 
unreliable.79
                                            
76 Ibid., 29 March 1897, pp.213; 30 March, 1897, p.291. 
77 Ibid., 30 March 1897, p.342. 
78 Ibid., 15 April 1897, p.645. 
79 Ibid., 9 September 1897, p.268. 
 In fact, the Swiss approach to equal representation was clearly based 
on the population of the Cantons but this was not what the majority of the 
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Australian delegates wanted. They wanted completely equal representation for 
each individual state with no regard to populations. 
Though the executive model of the Swiss Constitution was not seriously 
considered by the delegates, Switzerland provided another model which was 
eventually adopted, with modifications, for the Australian Constitution: the 
referendum. Referenda were an integral part of Swiss governance and attracted 
much attention from the delegates. In Switzerland referenda were, and still are, a 
feature of both provincial and national Governance. 
Lyne was the first to introduce the subject. Speaking on the issue of disagreement 
between the houses, he explained that in the draft Australian Constitution: ‘There is 
no power to bring the two houses together. There is no referendum … such as the 
Swiss Constitution gives’. He was arguing against equal representation in the 
Senate, which he and others saw as undemocratic, and thought that a referendum 
would restore the population imbalance in cases of disagreement.80 Trenwith 
indicated that he favoured the referendum ‘as a means of settling disputes’.81 
O’Connor said a referendum ‘may be all very well in a small country like 
Switzerland, but would be very unsatisfactory for the complicated political 
questions that would arise in Australia’ and that ‘it is impossible to arrive at a 
satisfactory conclusion by the referendum’.82 Bernhard Wise and Patrick Glynn 
agreed ‘that an institution which would override parliament was not British’. 83 
Edward Braddon complained that the referendum would not do at all in the case of 
a deadlock between the Senate and the House of Representatives because ‘it is 
obvious that the smaller States must go to the wall’.84
Isaacs helpfully provided a succinct summary of the complex and frequently 
changing referendum situation in Switzerland in 1897 as he understood it. He 
explained that the Federal Constitution could be amended at any time through the 
 
                                            
80 Ibid., 15 April 1897, p.652. 
81 Ibid., 20 March 1897, p.333. 
82 Ibid., 24 March 1897, pp.56-57. 
83 Ibid., 16 September 1897, p.647. 
84 Ibid., 24 March 1897, p.65. 
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normal procedures and without a referendum. When one of the Houses passed a 
resolution for amendment of the Federal Constitution and the other did not agree; 
or when 50,000 Swiss voters demanded amendment the question was in either 
case submitted to a vote of the Swiss people. If the majority of the Swiss citizens 
then pronounced in the affirmative, there would be a new election of both councils 
for the purpose of preparing amendments.85 Charles Grant remained unconvinced 
and firmly against referendums on the basis that the Senate should be a 
permanent body like the Senate of Canada or the House of Lords, which he saw as 
‘one of the models of our Constitution’. He felt very strongly that the Senate was 
being defiled by the elective principle and that the referendum was even more 
humiliating.86
if, … we could have arranged for an exploration party to go through all the 
various libraries of the colonies, and burn all the works of reference on the 
American, Canadian, and Swiss constitutions, we should at least have been 
saved some hours of very eloquent dissertation.
 
Solomon, while supporting the idea of a dual referendum, one that included the 
States as well as the populace, expressed impatience at the frequent references to 
other Constitutions saying: 
87
Solomon was probably expressing the views of other delegates, impatient at 
lengthy debates and declamatory speeches which did not always enhance the 
discussions but delayed decisions. He had a point, but at least the speeches do 
show that some delegates had been doing some reading whereas others seemed 
to be making it up as they went along. Solomon could also have been expressing 
impatience with the introduction of aspects of foreign Constitutions because, in his 
mind and the minds of many other delegates already determined on the British 
system eventually adopted, they were irrelevant and time wasting. Carruthers 
  
                                            
85 Ibid., 16 September 1897, p.667. 
86 Ibid., p.706. 
87 Ibid., 17 September 1897, p.747. 
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thought that the referendum should be used as in ‘Switzerland, to say both when a 
law should pass and when a law should not pass’.88
The referendum in relation to the disagreement debate was only part of the 
complex series of procedures proposed for use in this situation. But after much 
debate and fulmination it was eventually excised from the final clause, leaving a 
double dissolution followed, if necessary, by a joint sitting, as solutions to the 
problem.
 
89 The excision of the referendum from the provisions for settling a 
disagreement between the houses was achieved by Carruthers who moved an 
amendment that simply omitted any reference to a referendum.90 Kingston tried to 
reinstate it but his amendment failed by 30 to 11 and that of Carruthers’ passed by 
29 to 12. 91
                                            
88 Ibid., 20 September 1897, p.861. 
89 Australian Constitution, Section 57. 
90 OR, 20 September 1897, p.930. 
91 Ibid., 21 September 1897, p.967. 
 This suggests that the referendum as a means of settling disputes was 
never readily embraced by the delegates though it did reappear as the means of 
changing the Constitution (Section 128). 
As can be seen in the debates on the Swiss Constitution, delegates were often 
vague on detail about other Constitutions, which weakened their arguments if 
challenged. Perhaps they had not spent enough time in the libraries. In this a 
pattern can be seen to emerge of the imprecise knowledge of other Constitutions 
which suggests that the delegates were not really interested in solutions beyond 
the Westminster system and were reluctant to adopt unfamiliar procedures. 
Downer was correct in his assumption that the concept of equal powers in the 
Senate would not be accepted for Australia, with delegates fixated on responsible 
government as in the British example. In this aspect Switzerland was not to be a 
model for Australia. In spite of the time spent debating the Swiss model, it was not 
seriously considered by the delegates, although it has been frequently referred to 
as a model for Australia. Its example was followed only in relation to the 
referendum and only then on the issue of constitutional change. 
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It was left to Glynn to introduce another model with some thoughts on the situation 
in France, thoughts which revealed that, following the pattern already observed, he 
was not altogether sure of his facts. Glynn supported the notion that the ‘Senate 
could not justly be asked to act merely as a registering machine in the case of 
money bills’. A House of Lords he said may be required to yield in case of conflict 
(as an unelected institution) but the French Senate which ‘sprang from universal 
suffrage’ could not reasonably be required to efface itself.92 In fact the French 
Senate at this time was part of the Third Republic established in 1870. It was 
elected by mayors and councillors in departments (counties) throughout France, 
not by the general populace and, as was typical of upper houses of that period, 
was dominated by conservative and rural interests. France was not referred to 
again as a model.93
                                            
92 Ibid., p.962. 
 
Though the delegates referred to many and various constitutions some of their 
arguments are unconvincing and the unavoidable impression is that they were not 
seriously interested in any but the British model. Only if a procedure in another 
constitution offered some solution to problems they recognised from history or their 
experience, as in the case of Norway and the joint sitting, Switzerland and the 
referendum, and the United States with equal representation in the Senate (which 
will be examined in the following chapter), were they prepared to overcome their 
predilection for the British model. If any innovation or departure from the ‘lamp of 
experience’ was to be accepted it had to be fashioned to fit the Australian situation, 
as demonstrated by the inclusion of a joint sitting and the referendum in Australia’s 
constitution. The passage of the 1832 Reform Act licensed them to innovate 
without turning their backs on their past. 
93 A Web of English History ‘European history’. http://www.historyhome.co.uk/europe/3rd-rep.html. 
Accessed 17 July 2008. 
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Chapter 6 
A Proper Forum for Sober Second Thought: the Senates of 
Canada and the United States as models for the Australian Senate 
 
The dangers of democracy brought out some extravagant language expressed 
forcefully by such as Alexander Hamilton of the United States, who warned of the 
‘impetuosity and fickleness of the popular House’, and Canadian historian Alpheus 
Todd, who expressed the need for a ‘counterpoise to democratic ascendancy’ and 
‘a proper forum for sober second thought’.1 This danger is a theme which runs 
through the entire narrative of upper houses, even though in so many cases the 
reality has proven that the vision is delusional, not least in the case of Canada 
where the nominated Senate became, in the words of Professor Stephen Leacock, 
a ‘refuge of place hunting politicians and a reward for partisan adherence’.2
Canada and the United States were both British derived communities and occupy 
the same continent. Yet they differ markedly in their Constitutions. What did 
Australia learn from their examples and what did it copy or adopt for its own 
Constitution? Canada was in a very similar situation to Australia when it created its 
Constitution in 1864, being a British Colony, which remained as part of the British 
 The 
vision however, persisted, and the Constitutions of both the United States and 
Canada established upper houses at least partly based on this fear. These upper 
houses and constitutions are frequently cited by historians as models for Australia 
and this chapter will examine how much influence they had on the decisions of the 
Australian Convention delegates in the design of their Senate. 
                                            
1 James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, vol.1, (London: Macmillan, 1889), p.147; J.A. 
Marriott, Second Chambers: An Inductive Study in Political Science, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
1910), p.4. 
2 J.A. Marriott, Second Chambers - an Inductive Study in Political Science, new, revised and part 
rewritten ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927), p.98. 
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Empire after it gained independence. For these reasons it was regarded in the 
early days as the major model for Australia. In view of these factors this chapter 
will treat Canada first. 
The influence of the Canadian example on the delegates to the Australian 
Federation Conventions will be first examined by discussing Canada’s history and 
progress towards federation. This will be followed by a discussion on the Canadian 
situation at the time of the Australian Conventions to compare the differences and 
the similarities, and then by an examination of the comments of the delegates in 
relation to the Canadian example. 
The history of Canada differs in many respects from that of Australia as does its 
government. The major historical difference is that the Canadian territory was first 
settled by the French and there has always existed a significant French population. 
Nevertheless its Constitution, established in 1867, was regarded as a likely model 
for Australia. This is not only because it too was a British Colony, but especially 
because it had already successfully federated under the Crown, complete with a 
bicameral Parliament which included an upper house, the Senate. 
Canada’s British colonial history dates from 1763 and the Treaty of Paris when 
France formally ceded Canada to England after its defeat in the Seven Years 
War.3
                                            
3 John G. Bourinot, Canada under British Rule, 1760 - 1900, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1900), p.38. 
 Subsequently Canada, or Quebec as it was then known, was governed 
directly by Britain until 1774, when a Governor and Council, with the power to 
make ordinances or laws in relation to the government of the Colony, were 
appointed. At that time Quebec comprised several separate provinces, and 
representative government was acquired by them in stages: Nova Scotia, 1758, 
Prince Edward Island, 1773, New Brunswick, when it was created in 1784, Upper 
and Lower Canada (now Ontario and Quebec), 1791, and Newfoundland, 1832. In 
1791, in an attempt to ease tensions between the French and English 
communities, the Province of Quebec was divided into the provinces of Upper 
Canada, with a predominantly English population, and Lower Canada, with a 
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predominantly French population.4 Each province gained a Legislative Assembly 
and a Council. The Assembly of Upper Canada, which adopted English law, had 
sixteen elected members and the Council seven members who were nominated for 
life.5 John Graves Simcoe (the first Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada from 
1791-1796) believed that the province should be made 'as nearly as may be a 
perfect image and transcript of the British Government and Constitution'.6
It was first envisaged that the Council would evolve into a hereditary chamber on 
the lines of the House of Lords and provision was made in the Constitution for the 
King to award hereditary titles to members of the Council in order to create a kind 
of aristocracy—the Colony’s equivalent of the House of Lords.
 
7 This proved to be 
unworkable and unacceptable. The idea was ridiculed in the British Parliament 
when the new Constitution came up for debate and Charles James Fox, a 
prominent British Whig politician, passionately derided the idea as ‘a kind of 
second-rate, half-hearted House of Lords in the wild woodland’ which would ‘stink 
in the nostrils of the natives’;8 strong language. Fox saw the futility of pioneer 
peerages and ridiculed the idea of an appointed legislative council. He argued that 
in a frontier society individuals would succeed or fail on their own talents and 
toughness. He saw that colonial nobility, instead of attracting respect, would excite 
only envy and ridicule. In spite of this scorn the provision remained in the 
Constitution but was never implemented, becoming a dead letter.9
Confederation was the major milestone in the development of British constitutional 
practice in Canada and it was to this model that Australian Federationists looked 
for direction. The ‘Act of Union’ was drawn up at the Quebec Conference in 1864 
 Responsible 
Government followed for the other Provinces between 1848 and 1855 and 
Confederation of all the Provinces came in 1867. 
                                            
4 William B. Hamilton, The Transfer of Institutions, (Durnam N.C., London: Duke University 
Commonwealth Studies Center, 1964), p.61. 
5 Bourinot, Canada under British Rule, 1760– 1900, pp.91-2. 
6 Ged Martin, Bunyip Aristocracy, (Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), p.27. 
7 Bourinot, Canada under British Rule, 1760–1900, p.92. 
8 W.R. Wilson, ‘Historical Narratives of Early Canada’, (Parliament of Canada, 2004). 
http://www.uppercanadahistory.ca/pp/pp1.html. Accessed 19 June 2008. 
9 Martin, Bunyip Aristocracy, p.24. A similar proposal was rejected in New South Wales in 1854. 
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and subsequently passed by the Imperial Parliament as the British North America 
Act (BNA). The Quebec Conference, whose directing spirit was Prime Minister 
John Macdonald, took eighteen days and passed seventy-two resolutions, in sharp 
contrast to the debates on the Australian Constitution, which took several 
months.10
At the Conference it was agreed that the Senate should represent the Provinces in 
proportion to population, and there were proposals that it be elected subject to age 
and property qualifications. However this was ruled out in favour of an appointed 
house, though still with a property qualification.
 The Quebec debates included lengthy discussions about the form the 
upper house should take, but there was never any question of whether there 
should, in fact, be an upper house. 
11 This was intended to create a 
wise and conservative house, and the ‘proper forum for sober second thought’ 
suggested by parliamentary writer Alpheus Todd. Todd saw a Second Chamber as 
a necessary institution in Colonies entrusted with the powers of local self-
government. It would be a ‘counterpoise to democratic ascendancy in the popular 
and most powerful assembly’ and afford some protection against ‘hasty and ill-
considered legislation and action arising from the impulsive first thought of the 
Lower House’.12
Thus the debates leading to federation and held between politicians representing 
governments of the future states, were influenced by both a legacy of bicameralism 
and also, in some measure, due to the inherent instincts of the Federationists 
which were firmly focused on British tradition and a perception of themselves as 
British. Prime Minister Macdonald, according to Bourinot, ‘aimed … to follow as 
 This phobia of the dangers of democracy was a recurring theme in 
arguments in support of a second chamber throughout the British world. It is found 
in comments by the delegates to the Australian Conventions and was a thought in 
the minds of many of them when considering the Senate and it clearly was a factor 
in the Canadian deliberations. 
                                            
10 Bourinot, Canada under British Rule, 1760–1900, pp.206, 290. 
11 British North America Act, 1867, Section 4(23). 
12 A. Todd, Parliamentary Govt. in the British Colonies, p.698. Quoted in Marriott, Second 
Chambers - An Inductive Study in Political Science, p.96. 
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closely as possible the fundamental principles of English Parliamentary 
government’.13
Canada perhaps, was hardly a free agent; English prepossessions might 
account for adherence to the English model, alike in 1791, in 1840, and in 
1867, but it is important to note that the British Government held control over 
the structure of Government and the Act. The British North America Act is in 
fact the template of the Constitution.
 As in Australia this attitude, so clearly expressed by Macdonald, 
can be explained in part, by the notion of path dependency. In Canada, at the time 
of federation, it was to the familiar political pattern that the Federationists, all 
experienced practitioners, instinctively turned. Marriott has noted the Canadian 
deliberations were conducted under the watchful eye of the British Government, a 
factor that was far less important in Australia. 
14
The precipitating factor for Canadian Federation was the American Civil War which 
had just concluded (1861–1865). The war filled Canadians with grave doubts about 
the United States Federal system and some uneasiness about the stability of their 
neighbour. Consequently, the American model of relatively powerful States and a 
less powerful central Government was rejected in favour of an exactly opposite 
model: the Act limited the powers of the Provinces by explicitly listing those 
subjects delegated to them by the Central Government and the residual issues 
became the responsibility of the Central Government.
 
The BNA, 1867, is an Imperial Act of the British Government and it united the 
Canadian provinces into a single federation called the Dominion of Canada. As 
Marriott noted, it is the basis of the Canadian Constitution. 
15
The evidence shows that Canadian Federationists were motivated by a strong 
disposition to follow the old familiar pattern as a basis for the new legislature. The 
result was a Constitution in a traditional and comforting mould, which had worked 
 Otherwise the system of 
government put in place followed the same pattern as governments in the 
Provinces—formed with the assistance and approval of the British Colonial Office. 
                                            
13 Bourinot, Canada under British Rule, 1760–1900, p.209. 
14 Marriott, Second Chambers - an Inductive Study in Political Science, p.2. 
15 British North America Act, 1867, Section 91. 
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for the Canadians in the past. The strong British influence, amounting almost to 
control, is evident in the preamble to the Act which explicitly states that the 
colonies desired ‘to be federally united into one Dominion under the Crown … with 
a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom.’16 In the original 
draft of the bill the union was actually to be called the ‘Kingdom of Canada’ and the 
amendment to the Dominion of Canada came from the imperial ministry: the 
phrase the ‘Mother Country’ seems apposite here.17
Initially there were four units or Provinces in the Canadian Federation: Ontario, 
Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick.
 The Constitution of Canada 
was one of which delegates to the Australian Conventions would have been aware 
and, some at least, familiar with its structure, provisions, and its efficacy or 
otherwise in practice. 
18 It was slightly different for the Senate 
where the Constitution specified that ‘Canada shall be deemed to consist of Three 
Divisions: Ontario; Quebec; and the Maritime Provinces: Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick.19 Each Division returned twenty-four senators, a total of seventy-two. 
The Act gave the Governor authority to admit new members to the Federation by 
the passing of appropriate Acts by the Imperial Parliament and by 1880 all the 
Provinces, which comprised the whole of modern Canada except Newfoundland, 
had been admitted. By 1910 there were eighty-seven members of the Senate, 
distributed in accordance with relevant Acts.20 New members were accorded 
representation in the Senate on an equal basis with the original Provinces in order 
to maintain equality of representation.21
                                            
16 Ibid. 
17 Bourinot, Canada under British Rule, 1760–1900, p.215. 
18 British North America Act, 1867, Section 5. 
19 Ibid., Section 22. 
20 Ibid., Notes to the Constitution, No. 75. 
21 Marriott, Second Chambers - An Inductive Study in Political Science, pp.141-152. 
 The new Canadian Parliament of 1867 
comprised the classic trinity of British legislatures: the Queen or Sovereign 
(represented by the Governor-General), the Senate and the House of Commons. 
In Canada even the name of the lower house was taken from Britain, though 
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rejected in Australia as inappropriate due to its class connotations. ‘It raises a class 
distinction’ quoth Patrick Glynn of South Australia.22
Members of the first Canadian Senate were appointed for life by the Governor-
General and there was a provision that more Senators could be added in equal 
proportions for the provinces on recommendation from the Queen.
 
23 The presiding 
officer of the Senate was called the Speaker and also appointed by the Governor-
General. An upper limit on the number of Senators, initially seventy-eight, 
precluded the ‘swamping’ of the house in the case of disagreement. The 
qualifications for senators included the requirement that they must be possessed of 
property worth $4,000 net in their home provinces and be at least thirty years of 
age. The Constitution provided for a similar limitation on the powers of the Senate 
as in the British upper house. The Canadian version is that the powers of the 
houses are equal but only the lower house can originate money bills and any Bill, 
including money bills, must pass both Houses before it can become law. The 
Central Parliament in Canada also has the unique power to veto provincial 
legislation if thought necessary.24
The major differences between the Canadian and Australian Senates are that the 
Senators in Australia are elected, not nominated; they each serve a term of six 
years and half of them retire every three years and another election is held. In 
contrast the Canadian Senators were nominated for life. There are no property 
requirements in Australia as there were in Canada in 1897, the age limit is twenty-
one, not thirty, and the presiding officer is not a nominated Speaker but a Senator 
elected as President by the other Senators. These features of the Australian 
Senate owe more to the United States model than either the British or Canadian. 
The time factor is an important consideration here in that the Canadian model, 
enacted in 1867, was based on the provincial constitutions originally structured in 
 This was unlikely to find favour in Australia in 
1897, as was Section 56 which gives the Sovereign the power to annul any Act of 
the Central Government of Canada. 
                                            
22 OR, 14 April 1897, p.628. 
23 British North America Act, 1867. Section 26. Since 1965 Senators must retire at the age of 75. 
24 Bourinot, Canada under British Rule, 1760–1900, p.321. 
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the 18th century. By the 1890s ideas about Government had changed to more 
democratic and independent views. 
The Canadian Senate was thus only a model for Australia at a very general level. 
The British model of a Monarch, an upper house and a lower house and 
responsible Government are features of both legislatures. Equal representation in 
the Senate is a similar feature, though in Canada some smaller provinces are 
combined for representation. There the similarities end.25
E.R. Hunt claims that Henry Parkes was an advocate of the Canadian model in 
1890, but was opposed by Griffith who ‘defeated’ him on the question.
 The Canadian model 
was discussed thoroughly at the 1890 Australian Conference, and not always in 
positive terms. In the end it was features of the American Federal structure the 
delegates found to be the better model for an Australian Senate, persuaded 
perhaps by Inglis-Clark or, more likely, the work of James Bryce (see chapter 2). 
 26
I venture to say that I have never alluded to the Canadian Constitution in 
any way that would justify the inference that I have any intention, so far as I 
may have the power, of copying it. I only alluded to it once, and that was in 
my letter to Mr. Gillies, which opened the correspondence on this subject. 
Since then I have never alluded, except by way of illustration, to the 
Dominion Government, either in speech or in writing. This is what I said in 
my letter of October 30th, 1889:-‘The scheme of Federal Government, it is 
assumed, would necessarily follow close upon the type of the Dominion 
Government of Canada’.
 In spite of 
Hunt’s claims, Parkes, in a speech to the 1890 Conference, vehemently denied 
being a strong advocate of the Canadian model, claiming he had only mentioned it 
in correspondence with Duncan Gillies, then Premier of Victoria, in the pre-
convention years: 
27
                                            
25 Bourinot gives a comprehensive list of the differences between the two Constitutions in 1900; 
Ibid., pp.315–326. 
26 Hunt claimed that Parkes desired a Canadian type federation but that this was defeated by 
Griffith’s eloquence. E.M. Hunt, American Precedents in Australian Federation, (New York: 
Columbia University Press; London P. S. King, Ltd., 1930), p.19. 
27 OR, 13 February 1890, p.80. 
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Parkes also attended the Convention of 1891, but as chairman made few 
contributions to the actual debate. He did not survive to attend the Convention of 
1897. 
Gillies followed Parkes in 1890 with the comment: ‘I have no doubt in my own mind 
but that we shall find the Canadian Constitution is about the best basis that we can 
select’.28
Griffith’s major speech on the subject in 1891, while admittedly eloquent, was not 
especially critical of the Canadian model, though neither did he advocate it; nor did 
he mention Parkes’ speech.
 These remarks were made early in the process and support the view that 
Canada was initially looked upon as a likely model, but further debate made it clear 
that most delegates did not agree. Though the general attitude to Canada as a 
model for Federation was rejection, the model of the upper house was closely 
considered. 
29 Both Deakin and Playford were much more 
vehement in their opposition, Deakin declaring ‘I have no ambition to see a second 
chamber in these colonies which should be a mere replica of the Canadian Upper 
House, which is confessedly inadequate for the position which it occupies’.30 
Playford was equally hostile to the Canadian example. In his speech to the 1890 
Conference he said ‘I am quite certain that if we are to build up a Federation on the 
Canadian lines, the colony of South Australia will never agree to it’.31
The Draft Constitution for Australia, drawn up by Andrew Inglis Clark in 1891, 
demonstrates that he had considered the Canadian model carefully and was not 
impressed: ‘I am persuaded that the people of the Australian Colonies are not 
prepared to accept a Senate on the model of that of the Canadian Dominion’.
 
32
                                            
28 Ibid., p.93. 
29 Ibid., 4 March 1891, p.30. 
30 Ibid., 5 March 1891, p.74. 
31 Ibid., 10 February 1890, p.17. 
32 John M. Williams, The Australian Constitution: A Documentary History, (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2005), p.68. 
 In 
his draft Clark rejected the idea of nomination of Senators for life, though not 
nomination itself, instead proposing a fixed term as in the United States, and he 
was possibly strongly influential in the decision of 1891. 
Chapter 6: A Proper Forum for Sober Second Thought 
 
 
166 
 
 
As with Clark, the principal objection by the delegates was to the appointment of 
Canadian Senators for life by the Governor-General. John Macrossan said he 
would be ‘utterly opposed to the idea’. 33 No doubt the experiences of some of the 
delegates with their own upper houses persuaded them to reject this course. As we 
have seen in 1891 the decision was to have the Senators nominated by the States’ 
Parliaments but by the time of the 1897 Convention election of Senators by adult 
(male) suffrage and for a limited term, replaced this decision. Objections to the 
nomination system were that it was not in the spirit of federation and could easily 
lead to ‘improper patronage’.34
The ubiquitous subjects of power over money Bills, equal representation in the 
Senate and co-ordinate houses, were the major issues where the Canadian 
example was cited. Griffith was especially heated in his objection to the limitation of 
the Senate’s power over money bills, calling the idea a ‘fetish’. He fumed that ‘they 
have the English system in Canada … [where] the powers of the senate are 
naturally and properly restricted’. He was referring to the non-elected nature of 
both institutions as a reason for the restriction, but in his ideal Australian Senate 
this would not apply as the senators would be elected.
 The property qualification and a minimum age limit 
for senators different to that of the electorate, were other features of the Canadian 
model which were rejected, but with little comment. 
35
The Canadian model was also considered on the topic of equal representation for 
the States in the Senate. This was a thorny topic and brought forth a comment 
from Higgins who argued that in Canada they did not have equal representation.
 In spite of fervent 
resistance by the smaller states Australia eventually adopted the English and 
Canadian examples and restricted the power of the upper house over money bills. 
In Britain and Canada the only limitation on the upper house is that it cannot 
originate money bills; there are no special provisions for amendments or rejections. 
36
                                            
33 OR, 12 February 1890, p.73. 
34 Ibid., 24 March 1897, p.80. 
35 Ibid., 5 March 1891, p.64. 
36 Ibid., 25 March 1897, p.99. 
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Trenwith agreed with him.37 The argument was not cogent as the peculiarities of 
Canadian geography and history and the different pattern of settlement there 
played a large part in all the decisions on the issue of equal representation. Some 
of the inequalities of the provinces were overcome by combining smaller provinces 
into one entity for Senate purposes: initially Nova Scotia and New Brunswick as the 
Maritime Provinces, but the principle of equal representation was generally 
observed, though more on a population basis.38
The question of admission of new states to the Australian Federation brought out 
more comparisons with the Canadian model, which makes provision for new states 
on an equal basis with original states. Canadian history was a strong factor in 
Canada’s decision in that there was a hope that those parts of the continent not 
originally included in the Constitution would eventually join. Clark recognised this 
point in his argument that some states might not join the Australian Federation if all 
the conditions were not to their liking and suggested, without mentioning any 
limitation or conditions, that if states did not join at first they may come in later, as 
in Canada.
 
39
The issue of equal representation led into the question of increasing the number of 
Senators. Holder raised the topic in the debate on deadlocks, advising that adding 
upper house members had occurred in South Australia ‘and to a certain extent in 
Canada’.
 The possibility of adding new states to the Australian Constitution was 
less crucial than in Canada but there was a possibility that Queensland might 
divide into three states in the future and require equal representation on that basis. 
This was not a prospect that the larger states welcomed. The solution was that 
only original States, those that had signed the Constitution, would be entitled to all 
the privileges included in it, such as equal representation in the Senate and a 
guarantee of five seats in the lower house. This provision was unique to Australia. 
40
                                            
37 Ibid., 30 March 1897, pp.330, 342. 
38 British North America Act 1867, Section 22. 
39 OR, 11 February 1890, p.29. 
40 Ibid., 14 September 1897, p.562. 
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ensure the continuity of equal representation. This is the key to settling deadlocks 
between the houses in Canada and equates to the British position. Formal 
provision was not made for deadlocks in the Canadian Constitution, in contrast to 
the unwieldy legislation put in place in Australia. The Canadian example was not 
considered appropriate and new Senators can only be added in Australia in equal 
proportions for the States and to retain the nexus between the lower house and 
upper house: ‘the number of Senators must always be as nearly as practicable half 
the number of the lower house’.41 Isaac Isaacs fought vigorously against the nexus 
provision right through the Conventions, making an impressive speech against it in 
1898 which Barton described as ‘very elaborate and admirable’. Isaacs considered 
the provision would tie the lower house ‘hand and foot to the Senate because its 
numbers cannot be extended as the requirements of the population demand’ and 
as ‘absolutely novel’ in any constitution.42
The idea of co-ordinate powers of the two houses also brought Canada into the 
discussion when Downer supported this concept by saying co-ordinate powers 
applied in Canada. He was immediately contradicted by Isaacs and hastily 
withdrew his assertion. Though a minor correction it does illustrate again that 
delegates were not always sure of their facts and were occasionally speculating. In 
this case Isaacs knew better, he at least seemed sure of his facts, and Downer 
was quick to retract, which suggests he was not.
 
43
There was mild disagreement over the name the ‘Commonwealth’ as compared 
with the name of Canada as a Dominion. Grant claimed that the ‘great and general’ 
unpopularity of the Dominion Government was due in large part to its ‘unfamiliar’ 
name. He did not like ‘Commonwealth’ either, pressing instead for ‘United 
Australia’. This led to an argument about the name of the lower house and 
whether, like Canada, it should be known as the ‘Commons’. Symon scathingly 
asked if they knew the meaning of the term ‘commons’, implying that it was not to 
 
                                            
41 Australian Constitution, Section 7. 
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distinguish between the common people and those he called the ‘nobs’. This 
brought out some humour with Reid sardonically commenting ‘Nobs Mr Symon’ 
and Barton asking if there were any Lords there to ‘distinguish’?44
That the Senate of the United States was one of two major models for Australia’s 
upper house is undeniable. Garran has shown that the British Constitution was 
also a model for the United States Constitution, which was, in effect, intended to be 
a republican version of the British Government with the Monarch replaced by an 
 An awkward 
comment and a sarcastic play on the words of Symon, who was something of a 
pedant. 
The delegates learned a lot from the Canadian Constitution, though mostly in a 
negative sense, especially in regard to the lifetime appointment of senators. Nor 
did they copy the system of adding new senators, or equal representation for new 
states. These are important variations which can be seen both as illustrating the 
acceptance of advances in the concept of democracy and as a recognition of the 
problems that could be caused if the privilege of equal representation in the Senate 
was given to new States. 
Turning from the Canadian model what did the delegates learn from the United 
States example? It is generally accepted that the Australian Senate owes a lot to 
the United States Senate in its structure. What influence did the United States 
example have on the Convention delegates? Was it another example, if by a 
circuitous route, of path dependence? This section will examine the influence of the 
United States by discussing the history of the United States and its progress 
towards federation, the situation there at the time of the Australian Conventions, 
and comparing the differences and the similarities, followed by an examination of 
the comments of the delegates in relation to the United States to understand their 
attitudes and opinions on the subject. 
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elected president.45
It is all very well to compare the position we are taking up here with the 
position in America. … We have had nothing else but this American 
Constitution from all sides of the House and to bolster up every kind of 
opinion, and I have come to the conclusion that the American Constitution is 
such a many-sided one that it can be used to back up every argument on 
every possible side of the federation question.
 A clear line of descent can be traced from Britain to the United 
States to the Australian Constitution. 
Not everyone approved of the reliance on the United States example and Vaiben 
Solomon expressed his displeasure forcefully: 
46
The United States began existence as a Federation of thirteen original English 
colonies in the late 18th century. They were essentially self-governing under the 
Crown and there were two chambers in all but two, Pennsylvania and Georgia, a 
pattern repeated in the 1787 Constitution.
 
Solomon was no doubt enunciating the thoughts of several of the delegates and he 
was correct in that the model of the United States was frequently invoked in the 
convention debates and sometimes on opposite sides of the same question. 
47
The shape of the United States Constitution is derivative and the British heritage is 
evident in the structure of its Senate. James Madison (1751-1836), a delegate to 
 The origins of the Federal Constitution 
were based upon conflict and rebellion against the rule of the British monarchy. 
The result was a staunchly republican United States, which, as a model, sits 
awkwardly with the equally staunch monarchical views of the Australian 
Convention delegates. Nevertheless, the delegates took many lessons from the 
United States experience, especially in the structure of the Senate. The major 
feature of the United States model that attracted the interest of the delegates was 
that it successfully combined two elements of the electorate into the legislature: the 
lower house on a popular vote; the Senate, or upper house, on a state vote. 
                                            
45 Robert Randolph Garran, The Coming Commonwealth, an Australian Handbook of Federal 
Government, (Sydney, London: Angus & Robertson, Simpkin, Marshall, 1897), p.58. 
46 OR, 17 September 1897, p.747. 
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the American Constitutional Convention in 1776 and co-author of the Federalist 
Essays, a primary source for interpretation of the United States Constitution, 
considered that the Senate's role was ‘first to protect the people against their rulers 
[and] secondly to protect the people against the transient impressions into which 
they themselves might be led’.48 Alexander Hamilton, another co-author of The 
Federalist Essays, saw one of the objectives of the Senate as ‘To restrain the 
impetuosity and fickleness of the popular House, and against the effects of gusts of 
passion or sudden changes of opinion in the people’.49 These early examples of 
the fear of the ogre of democracy were to be repeated by the Canadians and the 
Australians over a century later, as they structured their upper houses. While 
Australia drew many of its ideas for its Senate from America, the Americans drew 
on writers such as Montesquieu and his L’Esprit des lois (The Spirit of the Laws) as 
well as Aristotle’s Politics, to divide their government into the executive, judicial, 
and legislative branches. The Constitution itself was derived from Magna Carta, the 
common law traditions of Germanic tribes and Roman legal theory. The traditions 
of the British House of Commons and the Athenian assembly were followed for the 
design of the House of Representatives and the name for their upper house, the 
Senate, was borrowed from Republican Rome. In a departure from the ancient and 
European traditions, one of America’s first nations, the Algonquin, provided the 
word caucus for certain meetings.50
The United States Senate is a component part of its Government which follows the 
classic tripartite structure inherited from the British Government and the original 
American States. The legislature, known as the Congress, consists of two bodies: 
a Senate and a House of Representatives. Their functions resemble those of the 
two-chambered British Parliament, which had, before 1787, suggested the creation 
of a bicameral legislature in all but three of the original thirteen States of the 
Confederation. This was in keeping with the Imperial authorities controlling the 
destinies of the Colonies by ensuring that British traditions were upheld. The third 
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component, the executive, is an elected President who was to hold office for four 
years.51
The claims of independent States, with different populations, to equal 
representation in the proposed central, federal government, determined the 
establishment and structure of the United States Senate. The arrangement, known 
as the ‘Connecticut Compromise’, was adopted at the Federal Convention (1787). 
The arrangement provided the several states with equal representation in the 
upper house together with proportional representation in the lower house, in order 
to balance the representation of large and small States in the Government. Without 
this inducement it would have been difficult to persuade the smaller states to join 
the federation and without this imperative there might have been no upper house in 
the American Government. This is why Bryce regarded ‘this masterpiece of the 
Constitution-makers’ as a ‘happy accident’.
 The President is the Chief Executive and appoints his own Ministers, who 
are not elected representatives. This is the most important difference between the 
American and the Australian Constitutions: in Australia Ministers are appointed by 
the Governor-General on advice from the Prime Minister and must be elected 
members of Parliament and Ministers are responsible to parliament: this is the 
essence of responsible government. 
52
There are few positions more demonstrable than that there should be ... 
some permanent body to correct the prejudices, check the intemperate 
passions, and regulate the fluctuations of a popular assembly.
  
Yet the fear of a ‘popular assembly’ was also a major consideration in the 
establishment of the United States Senate, a view frequently and forcibly 
expressed by Alexander Hamilton at the Federal Conventions in 1787: 
53
He reiterated his concerns later in the same speech: popular Assemblies were, he 
claimed, ‘frequently misguided by ignorance, by sudden impulses, and the intrigues 
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of ambitious men, and … some firm barrier against these operations was 
necessary’.54 At the time of the Australian Federation Conventions in the 1890s, 
the United States Senate comprised two Senators for each State. A Senator had to 
be over thirty years of age, a United States citizen for nine years, and an inhabitant 
of the State for which he was chosen. The Vice-President of the United States, 
who was elected at the same time as the President, was ex officio President of the 
Senate. He had no vote except when a casting vote was required. Senators were 
originally nominated by the State legislatures and, in 1787, numbered twenty-six. 
By 1897 the addition of Senators from new states had increased this to seventy-
six.55
it undergoes an unceasing process of gradual change and renewal, like a 
lake into which streams bring fresh water to replace that which the issuing 
river carries out.
 Each Senator served a term of six years and one third retired every two 
years at the time of the election of the House of Representatives (the mid-term 
elections) thus giving the Senate a perpetual existence. Bryce put it in poetical 
terms: 
56
The powers of the United States Senate are threefold: legislative, executive, and 
judicial. The legislative powers of the Senate are the same as those of the House 
of Representatives except that it cannot initiate bills for raising revenue, though it 
may propose amendments to the Bills or reject them.
 
57
The Senate’s executive powers include approval or disapproval of the President’s 
nominations for Federal officers, including judges, ministers of State, and 
ambassadors, and to approve, by a majority of two-thirds, treaties made by the 
President. If a treaty does not achieve this majority then it fails. The judicial 
 Otherwise its legislative 
function is to pass Bills along with the House of Representatives: a Bill must pass 
both houses and becomes an Act of Congress on the assent of the President. If 
the President withholds consent and returns a Bill for reconsideration, it can still 
become law if passed a second time by a two-thirds majority of each house. 
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function of the Senate is to sit as a court for the trial of impeachments preferred by 
the House of Representatives. These functions were not adopted for the Australian 
Senate. 
That the United States was an important model for the delegates is clear from the 
number of times it was discussed in the debates and, though it was not always 
considered a good model, admiration was expressed eloquently by several 
delegates. Playford addressing the 1890 Conference argued: 
We require something in the shape of the Government of the United States, 
where clearly defined powers are given to the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, and where all other powers not specified are left to be 
exercised by the local States and constituencies.58
I regard the Senate of the United States as being one of the grandest 
representative bodies in existence. It is quite equal to, if it does not surpass, 
the British House of Lords.
 
Macrossan also spoke warmly of the United States: 
59
The first issue to be raised—and on the first day of the 1890 Conference—in 
relation to the US model, was the procedures of the United States Convention in 
1787 when, Playford argued, the Americans had not admitted the press to their 
Constitutional Convention.
 
60 This was an example Australia did not follow, and the 
press and public were admitted to all formal deliberations on the creation of the 
Australian Constitution, though not without dissension. Crisp tells us that George 
Dibbs in particular, and in accordance with his stated views on popular participation 
in constitutional change, fiercely opposed a formal motion by William McMillan to 
restrict public access to the proceedings. Dibbs argued for the admission of the 
press and the public because then ‘there will be no feeling that this is a secret 
enclave to take away the liberties of the people’.61
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in mind and suggests that the Conventions themselves were modelled on the 
United States and Canadian precedents. 
Deakin was another delegate who discussed the United States at the 1890 
Conference. In a long speech he commended the American model and explained 
some of its features: 
That Government which has been supposed by some persons to be an 
artificial creation and not a natural growth—the Government of the United 
States-is a closely-allied offshoot from the British Constitution. 
Deakin recognised the legacy of the British system in the United States 
Government, which for the Australians gave added validity to it as a model. He 
then introduced the possibility of the Constitution requiring amendments and, 
without naming it and in a prescient moment, suggested a referendum might be the 
solution as in some American States: 
The ablest jurists in the United States consider the great difficulty of 
amending their Constitution to be a serious defect; but they find no such 
defect in their State Constitutions, where a safety-valve [referendum] has 
been provided in the appeal to the people.62
The main function of the 1890 Conference was to arrange for the 1891 Convention, 
and by then things had moved on. To begin with, Clark, who was the senior 
Tasmanian delegate to the 1890 Conference, had drafted a Constitution based on 
both the United States and the Canadian models but with variations to allow for the 
Australian situation.
 
These comments, though generalised and included in rhetorical and formal 
speeches, introduced the Constitution of the United States as a serious possible 
model for the proposed Australian Constitution and it continued to be a major 
theme throughout the Conventions, the Senate attracting particular attention. 
63
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 All the delegates were given copies of Clark’s Constitution 
before the opening of the Convention, more evidence that the United States model 
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was on the table from the beginning. The Convention worked on a series of 
predefined Resolutions which Baker refers to here: 
only two words in all the resolutions which we have passed which are not 
identical with the American Constitution are those at the end of resolution No. 
1 in the second series, because the American Senate can initiate a bill 
imposing taxation.64
Baker was incorrect here as the United States Senate had never been given the 
power to initiate bills imposing taxation.
 
65
A number of delegates preferred the British model. Parkes, for example, indicated 
his preference by using the instance, as discussed in another chapter, of the tragic 
incident with Charles Sumner to compare the United States Senate unfavourably 
with the House of Lords.
 This comment, from a generally well-
informed delegate, is another example of the inexactitude of many delegates’ 
knowledge of other constitutions, coupled with an apparent willingness to make 
claims which could not be substantiated. This was a frequent occurrence when 
delegates discussed the Constitutions of other countries. Some of our ‘founding 
fathers’ it seems had feet of clay. 
66
We cannot follow the model of the United States Constitution, because our 
constitution is totally different. We cannot, as a senate, perform executive 
functions when we have responsible government and a ministry responsible 
to the House of Representatives.
 Similarly Jennings complained that: 
67
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He was not the only delegate to note the discordance between responsible 
government as practised in the Australian Colonies and the executive model of the 
United States. 
In addition to Clark’s pre-circulated draft, the United States was brought into the 
1891 debate by Baker with the comment that so many ideas came from America, 
including the composition of the Senate in: 
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providing for the election of a senate composed of an equal number of 
members from each province, with periodical retirements, constituting a 
body with continuity and perpetual existence.68
Other ideas sought from the United States included the powers to be assigned to 
the proposed Australian Senate, a crucial issue in the debates. In the opening 
discussions in 1891, James Munro, a supporter of the British system of responsible 
government, observed that: ‘In the United States the real executive power is in the 
senate, because the senate can veto the appointments made by the President, and 
there is no responsible government’.
 
69 Macrossan also raised this point when 
supporting equal powers over money bills ‘I have no fear of the senate ultimately 
becoming the master of the House of Representatives as it has become, to some 
extent, in the United States’.70
Comparison with the United States was also brought in on the question of the 
number of Senators for each State. Baker raised the issue in 1891, as being a 
copy of the United States system.
 Munro and Macrossan were referring to the powers 
of the United States’ Senate over appointments to positions in the executive and 
the judiciary, but which would not apply to the Australian model of responsible 
Government, where those powers were to be reserved to the lower house. 
71 Munro sounded a caution about the proposal 
of eight senators for each of the seven states (he included NZ in 1891) which 
would mean fifty-six Senators. He suggested that might be impractical.72 Clark 
chimed in with the thought that the number of states in the commonwealth of 
Australia will never be anything like the number of states in America.73 Adye 
Douglas grumbled that ‘we have taken the United States as our example’. He 
clearly did not think this was a good thing, especially in relation to the limitation of 
the Senate’s power over money bills.74
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 The final decision in the draft Bill of 1891 
provided for eight Senators for each State. This was to change by 1897. The very 
different situation in the United States in terms of numbers of Senators made a 
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comparison meaningless. In America each State has two senators and this has 
never changed or been seriously challenged. New States are also allocated two 
Senators.75
The vexed question of whether senators should be selected by the State 
Legislatures or elected by the population was another subject for comparison with 
the United States where the senators were selected by their State parliaments. 
Griffith, Deakin, Cockburn and Playford SA, early expressed unfavourable views on 
the United States system in this matter. Griffith presented his views of the system, 
in a roundabout way, as open to corruption: ‘It has been found in the United States 
that the election of members to the state parliaments may often be determined by 
the views held by the candidates as to the proper persons to be elected to the 
Senate’. Cockburn concurred, also claiming that the system distorted the elections 
of States’ parliaments. On the other hand, the United States system did have its 
advocates.
 Two factors influenced the delegates in applying different provisions for 
Australia. The first was that the larger number of States in America meant that the 
number of senators was always enough to form a viable chamber. In Australia, two 
senators from each state would not have been enough to form an effective 
debating group, hence the decision first for eight, and finally six, senators for each 
State making a house of thirty-six members. 
76
This is a point on which we can consult the experience of America, where 
exactly the same clause has worked for 100 years. I have never learned that 
they desire to alter their mode of electing senators.
 Playford for example thought Australia could do no better than to 
adopt the United States form of election: 
77
The matter went to a vote with the result that senators be ‘directly chosen by the 
houses of the parliament of the several states’. A strong vote in support of the 
method ensued with thirty-four in favour and six against.
 
78
                                            
75 Ibid., 26 March 1897, p.162. 
76 Ibid., 2 April 1891, p.592—598. 
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 This also was to change 
by 1897. 
Chapter 6: A Proper Forum for Sober Second Thought 
 
 
179 
 
 
In the Convention of 1897, the United States Senate was still regarded as a model 
and looked to for precedent on several issues. Some of these were major and 
caused considerable angst among the delegates. Included were powers of the 
Senate, equal representation of the States in the Senate, election of senators and 
how to manage deadlocks. Other issues were minor or raised little controversy and 
were either accepted for the Australian Senate or rejected as unsuitable. Less 
controversial issues were: new states, term of office; secession; constitutional 
changes; and the name of the Federation. 
The United States example was introduced into the 1897 Convention by Isaacs 
who came in on the issue of Senate powers. He recalled that the United States 
delegates to the Philadelphian Convention debates had also argued over the 
distribution of powers. One party sought equal powers for both houses, the other 
wanted the same situation as in Britain, where the lower house was more 
powerful.79 The argument Isaacs referred to took place in the United States in 1787 
before the British Reform Bill of 1832 had weakened the Lords, and which, at that 
time, still enjoyed putative equal powers with the Commons. In the event the 
United States adopted a compromise which Isaacs saw as ‘now a principle’: the 
power of the United States Senate to alter or amend money bills but not originate 
them. Isaacs did not approve of this. Downer as a proponent of equal powers for 
the Senate agreed with Isaacs, arguing ‘the only possible way of preventing 
Federation ultimately resulting in amalgamation was to have the House 
representing the States at least co-ordinate with the House representing the 
people’.80
Solomon favoured the British model over the United States and in a clear example 
of what we now call path dependence, argued that ‘It is far better to take the 
Constitution which the mother-country had adopted’, a path familiar to the self-
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governing colonies of Australia, whereas he saw that in America the States had 
had governments which were ‘antagonistic to one another’.81
Carruthers, Cockburn, Solomon and Higgins all raised the United States 
Constitution as a model with varying degrees of respect or rejection. Higgins began 
with the thought that the adoption of the model of the United States would be ‘a 
step backward’.
 
82 Carruthers continued with a negative comparison claiming 
Australia was more progressive by the institution of manhood suffrage and equal 
political rights. On this premise he dismissed the United States as a model for 
Australia because ‘no such reforms have been wrung from the ruling authorities’ 
and asked ‘Why go to America and have the story told to us of the building up of 
the constitution there?’83 Cockburn was concerned that the powers of the States 
‘may be gradually encroached upon and … reduced to comparative insignificance’ 
even with a powerful Senate as in the United States.84
Delegates also offered historical information about the United States constitution in 
the general discussions. The examples were mostly in the form of warnings. Lyne 
for example warned that the United States Senate was not created as ‘the portion 
of Parliamentary machinery which it afterwards became’. The originators he said 
were ‘groping to a large extent without any guide’ and in its original conception the 
Senate was conceived as a check upon ‘the great power of the President’.
 It seems the mood had 
changed somewhat since 1891 and the delegates were now less convinced that 
the United States Constitution was such a good model. 
85 Baker 
considered that it had ‘in many respects turned out differently to that which its 
authors contemplated’ and Downer considered the United States Constitution ‘by 
no means a perfect one’. The Americans, he said, did not know about responsible 
Government and based their Constitution ‘largely on the writings of Montesquieu’.86
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Deakin more thoughtfully suggested that although the Senate was supposed to 
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protect State rights the American experience indicated that that would not 
necessarily eventuate. States’ rights, he thought, would be fought for at least as 
earnestly in the House of Representatives as in the Senate. The founders of the 
American Constitution, he said, found the event falsified their predictions and the 
Senate was never ‘one whit in advance of the House of Representatives’ in 
defending States’ interests.87 Gordon became impatient with these history lessons, 
which he did not think ‘helped very much’ and expostulated: ‘The flowers of a 
hundred years have bloomed and perished on the graves of these gentlemen’ and 
added melodramatically that the history of the American Senate: ‘has not much 
more to do with our present position than the evolutionary struggles of our 
anthropoid ancestors have to do with our actions in this convention’.88 It was left to 
Barton to point out that the American Constitution was an attempt to ‘photograph’ 
the English Constitution but that the ideals of responsible government had not then 
been reached and if the United States constitution had been made much later 
‘there would be much nearer approach to a responsible government in that 
Constitution’.89
Higgins, always a critic of the concept of a Senate, had an original thought about 
the composition of the United States Government. It was, he argued, a 
compromise between a confederacy and a federation: ‘the English guns were at 
the gates and they could not afford to have any state standing out so they 
compromised by having two houses: the house of confederacy and the house of 
Federation’ where the majority would rule.
 The British lineage of the United States Constitution is often 
overlooked by commentators who depict the choices as a simple binary: British or 
American. 
90
The major issue in the comparison with the United States example was whether 
the Senate should have equal powers with the House of Representatives. This 
applied to all legislation but particularly to money bills because the upper house in 
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the United States was limited in its power. This was a sticking point as it had been 
in America. O’Connor pointed out that the powers of the two houses in the United 
States were not equal. He also claimed that equal powers were ‘practically 
impossible in any country’.91 The major argument against equal powers was that 
with responsible government, where the executive is part of the lower house, equal 
powers are not practical. Higgins considered that there was no analogy with the 
United States because they did not have responsible government, though the 
Senate did have the power to amend bills imposing taxation if not to initiate them.92
restrain the impetuosity and fickleness of the popular House, and against 
the effects of gusts of passion or sudden changes of opinion in the people.
 
The different allocation of powers in the United States rendered any comparison on 
this score irrelevant but this did not silence the delegates on the issue and during 
the debate Lyne held forth on what he thought should be the role of the United 
States Senate in addition to its executive powers and quoted Alexander Hamilton 
saying it should: 
Correct the democratic recklessness of the House of Representatives and 
the monarchical ambition of the President. 
and 
93
It is not clear why Lyne felt it necessary to quote Hamilton on these unspecified 
and unofficial roles for the United States Senate but it does suggest that he thought 
they should apply to the Australian Senate. It also illustrates yet again the fear that 
democracy might be carried too far. Lyne continued that then: ‘The propensity of a 
single and numerous assembly to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent 
passion is restrained’.
 
94
This imagined role of upper houses as a restraint on lower houses appears again 
and again in discussions. It is a role that has never been given official status but 
resides permanently in the minds of many observers, undoubtedly stemming from 
 
                                            
91 Ibid., 24 March 1897, p.51. 
92 Ibid., 25 March 1897, p.98. 
93 Ibid., 26 March 1897, p.158. 
94 Ibid. 
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the original oligarchic ascendancy of the upper house in original legislatures, 
especially the British House of Lords. 
Baker waxed eloquent on the United States situation saying though the Senate 
could not initiate Bills imposing taxation, they could initiate Bills to appropriate 
revenue. Again Baker was inaccurate because Section 7, Clause 1 of the 
Constitution stated explicitly ‘All Bills for raising revenue shall originate in the 
House of Representatives’. This sort of error was disturbingly prevalent in the 
debates. He went on to argue that in many Federations very large powers were 
given to the Councils of State or upper houses, particularly in regard to approving 
or appointing executive officers and said it was these powers that preserved the 
rights of the States intact.95 Downer also wanted co-ordinate powers for the two 
houses. The United States, he argued, while limiting power on the initiation of 
Taxation Bills, balanced it with stronger executive power and control of foreign 
affairs, which made the Senate the ‘pre-eminent body’. He considered that America 
had copied Britain because it wanted to make its Government as ‘analogous’ to the 
British Government as possible. 96 In this Downer echoed Robert Garran’s 
conclusion and was correct in that the United States legislature adopted many 
features from the British model, though whether they had ‘wanted to’ is debatable. 
It may have happened subconsciously. Downer implied in this speech that copying 
Britain was a good thing and should also be done in Australia; remarks which 
demonstrated the strength of the urge to emulate Britain, a recurring theme in the 
debates. Glynn also had something to say about the United States Senate, arguing 
that ‘Every clause of the constitution, I believe, has been recast on the principle of 
allowing equal powers to the upper and lower houses; therefore there cannot be 
much danger in this bogy of the upper house’.97
                                            
95 Ibid., 23 March 1897, p.31. 
96 Ibid., 29 March 1897, p.209. 
97 Ibid., 23 March 1897, p.281. 
 He made this comment during the 
debate on equal representation and sidestepped the main issue to argue in a 
rather imprecise speech for equal powers for the proposed Senate, the dangers of 
which he thought had been overstated. Trenwith saw it differently: ‘the American 
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people sought to make a compromise between responsible government and 
autocratic government making their little King only able to exercise his autocratic 
powers for a period and associating him with the Senate in some administrative 
matters’.98 Cockburn argued that the federal authority could encroach on State 
rights because this had occurred ‘even in America’ where the Senate was so 
powerful.99
The other major issue, at least in the minds of some delegates, was equal 
representation in the Senate. It is clear that the principle of equal representation of 
the colonies in the upper house was derived from the United States Constitution as 
a way to arrange the composition of the upper house in Australia. On the whole it 
was agreed that such a provision was necessary in order to persuade the smaller 
colonies to accept Federation, as had been the case in the United States and 
recognised as the ‘Connecticut Compromise’. Not everyone agreed with the 
principle. The most vociferous opponent of equal representation was Higgins who 
never ceased to oppose the idea, even when it was passed into reality. He used 
the United States as a model of failure on this issue and argued that the United 
States was not happy with the system: ‘Even in America there has been discontent 
with this equal representation. The people of New York say, and with good reason, 
that with their five or six millions of people they are only returning two senators, 
while Nevada, with 30,000 has the same right to return two senators’.
 But in spite of much vigorous support for some increase in the powers 
of the Senate on the lines of the United States example, the British system of 
responsible government was to be continued in the Australian Constitution. 
100
Even some of those who supported the system were lukewarm about its 
advantages but used the United States compromise to support the case for its 
adoption. Wise said that the example of the United States had persuaded him to 
the view that ‘equal representation in the Senate was a practical necessity’.
 
101
                                            
98 Ibid., 30 March 1897, p.334. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid., 25 March 1897, p.101. 
101 Ibid., p.106. 
 
Lyne was another delegate against the system, if not so vehemently as Higgins. As 
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with other representatives of the larger colonies he considered equal 
representation to be undemocratic and asked, rhetorically, ‘What right has 
Tasmania to have as strong a power in the administration of New South Wales as 
New South Wales?’102 He considered that the United States did not ‘set out with 
the idea of the Senate as it ultimately emerged’ and he had always ‘as long as I 
have given the matter a thought’ been against equal representation in the 
Senate.103 Isaacs saw the United States Constitution as an attempt to have the 
bicameral system and, by analogy, to be as close as possible to the British 
Constitution. He argued that the provision for equal representation was included as 
a ‘provision for extraordinary emergencies’ and because those (smaller) states 
would not come in on any other basis, opponents of the idea were forced to give 
way and yield to the ‘Connecticut Compromise’. He implied by this speech that 
Australian delegates should also yield to the inevitable.104 Trenwith went on to say 
he reluctantly supported the idea as providing a balance against the possibility of 
the larger states combining to oppress the smaller ones, or the smaller states 
under this system ‘combining to infringe the rights of the larger states’, but he 
thought both were ‘improbable contingencies’, a thought which rather robbed his 
argument of relevance.105 Higgins returned to the fray with the claim that ‘the 
system has been absolutely futile and not served its purpose’.106 The issue arose 
again in September and Higgins again returned to his theme. He suggested that 
the idea was ‘one of the chief causes of the civil war’ in the United States.107 To 
support his claim he provided a long drawn out analogy to do with the slave states 
having equal representation, which suggests that he would have clutched at any 
straw to establish his case. He continued his argument with the comment that ‘the 
system was adopted under pressure in America and would not be adopted if they 
had to start again’.108
                                            
102 Ibid., 26 March 1897, pp.157-8. 
103 Ibid., p.158. 
104 Ibid., 26 March 1897, p.175. 
105 Ibid., 30 March 1897, p.336. 
106 Ibid., 15 April 1897, p.647. 
107 Ibid., 9 September 1897, p.264. 
108 Ibid., 10 September 1897, p.349. 
 Symon argued that equal representation was necessary and 
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‘an essential part’ of the United States system. He claimed that in all federations on 
‘true federal principles’ there has been equal representation.109
The clause providing for equal representation in the Senate was passed as read 
with a majority of 36 to 5.
 
110
The method of choosing Senators was another major issue, but while in 1891 it 
had provoked animated arguments, by 1897 the issue was settled. In 1891 the 
draft Bill proposed that Senators should be chosen by the Parliaments of each 
State. There had been conflict over whether Senators should be chosen in this 
way, or elected by the community. By 1897 the draft clauses from the Constitution 
committee for discussion by the delegates read ‘The members for each State shall 
be directly chosen by the people of the State as one electorate’.
 The threat of the smaller states not accepting 
Federation in the United States unless they had equal representation had been a 
real one and with the horrors of the war of independence still fresh in their 
memories the admission of the smaller states was seen as crucial by the United 
States Constitution builders. It is arguable that this was not such an imperative in 
the Australian case, though there was a possibility that the smaller states would not 
join, but the instinct to follow the United States example was strong; besides Clark 
had included this provision in his early draft. 
111 This suggests 
that arguments put forward in 1891 and in the preliminary discussions in Adelaide 
in April 1897 had persuaded many delegates to change their minds on this issue. 
However the subject was far from closed. The matter was raised by several 
delegates in the preliminary discussions of the 1897 Convention with reference to 
the American experience. Higgins opened the subject to warn against following the 
United States example of nomination by the States because ‘they have the 
senators elected by the State parliaments which brings Federal politics into the 
arena of local parliaments ... this causes some disruption to state elections’.112
                                            
109 Ibid., p.293. 
110 Ibid., p.355. 
111 Ibid., 15 April 1897, p.641. 
112 Ibid., 25 March 1897, p.102. 
 
Isaacs also considered nomination a bad thing: ‘the history of recent years 
Chapter 6: A Proper Forum for Sober Second Thought 
 
 
187 
 
 
discloses … the bad working of the system’. The ‘State legislatures have frequently 
failed … to elect at all’. He gave alarming examples of some things that had 
occurred in the United States because the State legislatures had the power of 
nomination. This, he said, ‘cannot arise in a popular election at all’.113 Fysh 
seemed a bit confused but he clearly supported the nomination idea. ‘The Senate’ 
he claimed, had ‘stood the test of 100 years and is now elected by Congress’.114 
He was immediately put right on this point by Isaacs and Barton, and hastily 
amended his speech saying he meant ‘by the State legislatures as … proposed 
under the Commonwealth Bill of 1891’; another egregious error on the part of a 
delegate.115 Forrest, also a supporter of nomination, pointed out that the United 
States Senate had been elected by the States for over 100 years.116 He was 
countered by Isaacs who said the ‘feeling in favour of an election of the Senate 
was gaining ground in America’.117 Later, in September 1897, Higgins warned that 
the United States Senate was becoming a house to ‘represent the rich men and 
the trusts’ because in the less populous states one or two ‘big silver men’ can get 
whoever they want elected.118 Downer confessed he had come round to election 
and deviating from the American system, for the purpose of making the Senate 
stronger and directly representing the people.119 Holder thought that direct election 
of senators by the community was a better representation of the individual 
states.120 Some of these speeches were made in the preliminary discussions in 
March 1897. When the Clause (Clause 10) came up for debate in September, the 
election issue was not further discussed, more attention being paid to the idea of 
each State being one electorate.121
                                            
113 Ibid., 26 March 1897, pp.176-7. 
114 Ibid., 29 March 1897, p.244. 
115 Ibid., p.244. 
116 Ibid., p.248. 
117 Ibid., p.177. 
118 Ibid., 9 September 1897, p.265. 
119 Ibid., 10 September 1897, p.372. 
120 Ibid., 13 September 1897, p.387. 
121 Ibid., 21 September 1897, p.989. 
 In this matter, the example of the United States 
had been first adopted but discarded in 1897 in favour of senate elections. 
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On other issues the comparisons with the United States Senate were not 
controversial. These included the admission of new States, term of office, 
secession, constitutional changes, name, and deadlocks. On these there was 
general agreement that the United States had little to offer, but the fact that they 
were cited reveals the extent of the dependence on the United States example. 
The comments of the delegates on these issues offer insights into their thinking on 
the United States model. For example the possibility of admitting new states was 
an issue in which the United States was cited but raised little comment. As with the 
model of Canada the possibility of adding new states to the Australian Constitution 
was less crucial than in the United States and the example was not followed. 
The subject of the term of office for senators was also compared to the United 
States experience. United States Senators are elected for a term of six years with 
one third retiring every two years, when Congress dissolves after its two year term. 
In the draft Bill produced by Clark, the term of office for Australian Senators was 
fixed at six years with retirement of half the members every two years.122 This was 
changed to every three years to match the terms of the Colonial Parliaments. 
Though the principle was accepted from Clark’s draft, there was little reference to 
the United States on this issue. The concept of the Senate having a continuous 
existence and Senators more security of tenure than the lower house, to enable 
members to focus more on the questions of the day than on re-election, was 
accepted without much discussion, in a way similar to the passive acceptance of 
the need for an upper house at all. Only Deakin referred to the United States on 
this point saying ‘What makes the power of the United States Senate is not its 
executive authority, but its fixed and longer tenure of office’.123
                                            
122 Reynolds, 'A. I. Clark's American Sympathies and His Influence on Australian Federation', p.69. 
123 OR, 30 March 1897, p.291. 
 The absence of 
comment from the delegates on this issue suggests that the work of Clark in his 
draft Bill, strongly influenced by the American Constitution, convinced the 
delegates that this was a sound provision. It is also true that ‘continuous existence’ 
has a long history in legislatures and was the method used in Colonial Parliaments. 
Of course, the House of Lords had a continuous existence par excellence. 
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The topic of secession was introduced by Symon124 and Lyne and they agreed that 
secession should be ruled out because the American experience with their 
Confederation showed that if secession was not prohibited it would be a weak link. 
‘We must frame a Constitution from which there shall be no secession … or else 
the same troubles which arose in the United States … will arise here’.125 Symon 
went on to suggest that the ability to secede had been one of the main causes of 
the ‘fratricidal war’ in the United States and felt that a ‘binding contract’ must be 
made between all the colonies.126 The subject was discussed animatedly in the 
preliminary discussions in Adelaide (1897) with speakers being unanimous in the 
opinion that there should be a clear provision in the Constitution that there should 
be no secession. This was accepted by the drafting committee which produced the 
version of the Bill to be debated. In the preamble were the words ‘The people have 
agreed to form one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth’ and these words remain 
in the preamble to the Constitution.127
The issue of changes to the Constitution also invited comparisons with the United 
States, mostly negative. The United States Constitution provides that to effect a 
change either two thirds of both houses, or … ‘two thirds of the several states’, 
shall call a convention for the purpose of proposing amendments, and 
amendments must be ratified by three fourths of the states. Turner, in the early 
days of the 1897 Convention, announced that he considered these conditions to be 
‘difficult to bring into operation’. He hinged this on the relative powers of the States 
in America and those in Australia. He assessed Australian States as having seven 
times the power of an American state.
 
128
                                            
124 Ibid., 25 March 1897, p.128. 
125 Ibid., 26 March 1897, p.162. 
126 Ibid., 25 March 1897, p.128. 
127 Ibid., 14 April 1897, p.620. 
128 Ibid., 24 March 1897, p.49. 
 Later Isaacs and Cockburn voiced their 
disapproval of the United States system. Isaacs claimed that ‘In America there are 
loud and frequent complaints concerning the difficulty of altering the Constitution’. 
He added a graphic quote from an otherwise unidentified Mr Stead, that there 
‘exists an almost intolerable state of things there … arising … from the iron grasp 
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of the dead hand’.129 Cockburn further argued that ‘An amendment of the 
Constitution should not be made too easy, but on the other hand it should not be 
made too difficult. In America it is too difficult’.130
In the light of the American experience the name of the federation also came in for 
some discussion. Clause 1 of the draft constitution stated, ‘this Act may be cited as 
‘The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia’. Symon strenuously objected 
to the term Commonwealth saying that it should simply be Australia, ‘because we 
want the name of the country over which this constitution is to extend … The word 
"Commonwealth" is not an expression of any form of Government. If it is, it is 
utterly inapplicable. The word “Commonwealth” is associated with "Republic"’.
 The final result in the Australian 
Constitution has similarities to the United States example but has made the 
process more onerous rather than less. In Australia changes to the Constitution 
can only be brought about by an absolute majority of both houses of parliament 
and approved in a referendum by an absolute majority of voters and a majority of 
voters in a majority of States. Although the United States example was not 
slavishly copied it did provide a template for the Australian decision. 
131 
He went further and discussed the fact that the word Commonwealth had been 
used before in England: ‘Hon. Members know that the word "Commonwealth" was 
adopted in England 200 years ago. It was done by Act of Parliament, which used 
the expression "Commonwealth" because they had beheaded their king’. Braddon 
helpfully added: ‘They could not call it a kingdom, because they had not a king’.132
                                            
129 Ibid., 20 April 1897, p.1021. He was probably referring to W.T. Stead, editor of the Pall Mall 
Gazette and an extremely well known journalist of his day. 
130 Ibid., p.1022. 
131 Ibid., 14 April 1897, p.617. 
132 Ibid., p.616. 
 
There was then some desultory discussion of what exactly was the name of the 
United States Constitution and various suggestions, or guesses were made but no 
one seemed to be very clear or even interested and there was little support for 
Symon’s suggestion. In the event the Clause was accepted as read. (The name on 
the constitution of the United States is simply ‘The United States Constitution’.) 
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The model of the United States on how to deal with deadlocks raised little 
controversy because the delegates seemed unaware of the system used in the 
United States to settle disagreements. The delegates were of the opinion that there 
was no mechanism for resolving disputes between the Houses in the United States 
and that most problems were resolved along party lines. However, Marriott had 
pointed out that in the United States any dispute is settled by a conference of 
members of both houses, appointed by the President of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives; its report is generally accepted by both 
Houses.133 The Conference system has, in fact, been used by Congress since 
1789 and is regarded as such an important part of the legislative process that the 
conferences are sometimes called the third house of Congress. The first sitting of 
such a conference took place in 1789, just two days after the first Congress sat.134
He thought that ‘a deadlock in the United States can be safely left to burn itself out’ 
and that ‘disputes between the two houses in the United States have no effect on 
 
The debate on this subject is the strongest indication of the gaps in the delegates’ 
knowledge and understanding of other Constitutions, particularly one on which they 
based much reliance as a model. Their ignorance of the existence of the 
Conference system in the United States would suggest that on this issue the 
United States did not seem to be a relevant example, but it still appeared in the 
heated discussion on that topic. The lack of knowledge is made clear by Deakin 
and McMillan whose major point on the subject in regard to the United States was 
that as deadlocks did not occur in Congress it should not be deemed necessary to 
cater for such an eventuality in Australia. Deakin, who could see no analogy 
between any Australian Government and that of the United States, came straight to 
the point: 
It seems to me that the difference between responsible government as we 
know it and the United States Government tells altogether in favour of the 
necessity of our insisting upon some solution of deadlocks. 
                                            
133 Marriott, Second Chambers - An Inductive Study in Political Science, p.70. 
134 David R. Tarr and Ann O'Connor, eds, Congress A to Z, vol. 3 (Washington: Congressional 
Quarterly Inc., 1999), pp.3-4. 
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the executive government’.135 The debate on this issue emphasises the blissful 
ignorance of the details of the American system on the part of the delegates even 
though it might have been a useful concept. Similarly the subject of the 
Conferences held in the United States to settle differences between the Senate 
and the House of Representatives, is also mostly absent from the discussion of 
historians of the issue. Only Marriott mentioned it briefly but did not elaborate or 
give details. Another example of the gaps in the delegates’ knowledge of the 
United States has been provided by Alex C. Castles in his essay ‘Andrew Inglis 
Clark and the American Constitutional System’.136
The examples and models of Canada and the United States set precedents for the 
designers of the Australian Constitution. From that example they mainly drew their 
decision that the Senate would have equal powers with the House of 
Representatives in all but the imposition of taxation. From the United States they 
adopted the system of equal representation in the Senate and the system of six 
year terms with half the members retiring every three years. The major factor in the 
design of the Senate was equal representation of the States without regard for their 
populations. This was taken directly from the example of the United States and the 
vote on this issue suggests that, in spite of passionate arguments that this was 
undemocratic, the example of the United States was a mindset that no amount of 
persuasion would shift. 
 Castles explains that Clark’s first 
draft of 1891 included a clause on the powers of the High Court and in this it varies 
from the United States model. This caused some confusion for Isaac Isaacs, 
Edmund Barton and others. Higgins thought it was in the United States 
Constitution, Isaacs wasn’t sure and Barton contributed ‘I fancy it is in some part of 
the American Constitution’. As Castles comments it was surprising that Barton and 
others had only a superficial knowledge of the American Constitution in which they 
were placing great confidence. 
                                            
135 OR, 15 September 1897, p. 587-8. 
136 Alex C. Castles, 'Andrew Inglis Clark and the American Constitutional System', in An Australian 
Democrat: The Life, Work, and Consequences of Andrew Inglis Clark, ed. Marcus Haward and 
James Warden, (Hobart: Centre for Tasmanian Historical Studies, University of Tasmania, 1995), 
pp.15-6. 
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The debates revealed some alarming defects in the delegate’s  knowledge of these 
Constitutions and a certain lack of interest, suggesting that they came to the 
Conventions with the deeply held conviction that British was best, and where that 
did not fit, then the United States Constitution, also of British descent, was 
substituted. The dismissal of the Canadian system was largely due to the 
nomination system, not the overall structure which also closely followed the British 
system. It is clear that the Unites States was an important model for the delegates 
in spite of major differences in their Constitutions and major gaps in the delegates’ 
knowledge of some aspects, notably Conferences. Canada was not so influential 
because some of its provisions, such as the nomination of senators for life did not 
appeal to the Australian delegates, even though the basic structure is similar. 
Again it is clear that the delegates were deeply influenced by what Bolton has 
called the ‘subliminal’ influences in their adherence to the idea of a bicameral 
system, most especially the British example. With this they were all familiar, both 
from their British heritage and through their participation in their respective colonial 
governments modelled on the British. Though they were willing to express their 
knowledge and opinion of other more modern examples, they were not really 
viewed seriously unless they offered a solution to a problem as did the United 
States system of a States House. 
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Chapter 7 
The Inherent Sacredness of Sovereign Power1
We shape our buildings and afterwards our buildings shape us.
: Parliamentary 
Architecture and the Australian Senate 
2
The monumental classic structure that is Victoria’s Parliament House crowns the 
rise of Spring Street in Melbourne with a grandeur and confidence worthy of any 
royal palace. The finest example of classical architecture in Australia, it was 
designed by a Scottish-trained architect, Peter Kerr, and stands on the slopes of 
Eastern Hill, the highest point of central Melbourne.
 Winston Spencer Churchill, 28 
October 1943. 
 
3 It is an excellent example of 
the symbolic aspects of the power and authority of rulers that—in Clifford Geertz’s 
terms—‘epitomizes the inherent sacredness of sovereign power’. Gwenda Robb, in 
her Master’s Thesis on Victoria’s Parliament House, has claimed that ‘Melbourne 
(and therefore her architects) saw itself as a latter-day Rome’.4
This chapter will argue that the British parliament, as well as being the principal 
influence on the structure of the legislatures as shown in previous chapters, was 
also the predominant influence on the architecture, inside and out, of the Australian 
Parliament and the predominant influence on the buildings of other Westminster 
style legislatures. Even in that great republic the United States, Westminster 
 I would argue that 
in fact they saw the new Parliament building more as a latter-day Westminster 
Palace as so many aspects were drawn from that edifice. 
                                            
1 Clifford Geertz, 'Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power', in Culture 
and Its Creators, ed. Joseph Ben-David and Terry Nichols Clark, (Chicago & London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1977), p.151. 
2 Quoted in Gavin Stamp, 'We Shape Our Buildings and Afterwards They Shape Us: Sir Giles 
Gilbert Scott and the Rebuilding of the House of Commons', in The Houses of Parliament: History 
Art Architecture, (London: Merrell, 2000), p.149. 
3 Gavin Souter, Acts 0f Parliament, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1988), p.36. 
4 Gwenda Robb, 'The Role of Sculptural and Architectural Decoration in Parliament House, Victoria' 
(Unpublished Masters Thesis, Monash, 1993), p.14. 
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influences are discernible in its Capitol despite the prevailing atmosphere of the 
time (1787) of a rejection of British tradition. I will argue that even though the 
architectural styles varied in execution they are variations on the theme of 
monumentalism beginning with the parliament building in Westminster from the 
13th century. First I will examine individual parliamentary architecture to show how 
the traditions of monumentalism pervaded ideas for the buildings and study the 
origins of each building and how it was realised in its final form. This will be 
followed by an analysis of the internal layout and décor of the Australian Colonial 
upper houses and how the styles followed the dictates of the Westminster system, 
even when not strictly appropriate. In developing this argument it was important to 
pay detailed attention to the colonial parliaments where most of the delegates had 
cut their political teeth.5
The almost predestined architectural magnificence of Government buildings is a 
tangible manifestation of the significance of architecture in public life. Government 
buildings are in a direct line of descent from the royal palaces of kings and 
sovereigns. Monumental buildings housing national Governments, typically located 
at the centre of cities, are deliberately given a monumental style to exude the 
status and authority which they assume. Designed to elicit ‘a feeling of awe, or at 
least respect’ they both intimidate and reassure the governed with their strength, 
size and grandeur and are the most visible and ubiquitous symbol of the power, 
prestige and authority of Government.
 
6 The effect of this vision can be 
overwhelming. Aneurin Bevan, the British Labour politician elected to the House of 
Commons in 1929, vividly described the effect the grandeur of the House of 
Commons had on him when he first entered. It was he said ‘profoundly intimidating’ 
and that his first impression was that he was in church.7
                                            
5 The research was augmented by personal observation on field trips to each Parliament except 
Western Australia. 
6 Ibid., p.12. 
7 Aneurin Bevan, In Place of Fear, (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1952), pp.5-7. 
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People perceive greater status in impressive buildings than in other art forms 
because buildings are the ‘more durable, stable symbols’.8 Alain de Botton, in his 
book The Architecture of Happiness, argues that architecture is important, both to 
the onlooker and the occupier, because we are ‘different people in different places’: 
those inside absorb prestige from their magnificent environment and those outside 
perceive power in the spectacle.9 Edward Shils, an American sociologist, also 
considered that such buildings, as well as impressing the onlooker, bestow 
charisma as well as prestige on their occupants and that individuals achieve 
charisma in relation to the active centers of the social order with which they are 
associated.10 Geertz sees such monumental buildings as persuading people to 
perceive power in the same way that sacred buildings, such as churches and 
temples, persuade us to look for a God. Within these impressive buildings the rites 
and images through which sovereign power is exerted, ‘are cultural phenomena 
and historically constructed’.11 Occupants of such buildings, affected by the 
atmosphere of power and dignity, tend to respond accordingly with decorum and 
respectful behaviour, though this is usually reinforced by strict rules of conduct. 
Typically, monumental government buildings exist at the political centre of any 
complexly organised society.12
The major model for all Australia’s parliament buildings was undoubtedly the 
Palace of Westminster. Despite its predominantly Victorian exterior, modern 
Westminster is the product of nearly one thousand years of architectural 
development as a centre of government and a royal residence. In this respect 
 Consider the Government buildings of Westminster, 
Washington, Canberra (since 1988) and the Australian colonial parliaments; most 
are centrally located, all are imposing, architecturally dominant, and set in a vista 
which enhances their consequence. The effect of such a vision can be 
overwhelming. 
                                            
8 Robb, 'The Role of Sculptural and Architectural Decoration in Parliament House, Victoria'. 
Introduction. 
9 Alain de Botton, The Architecture of Happiness, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2006), p.13. 
10 Quoted in Geertz, 'Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power', p.151. 
11 Ibid., p.152. 
12 Ibid. 
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William Hamilton’s comment on ‘devotion to ancient precedent’13 is apt, as many 
features of the building are based upon what went before, and this is a pattern that 
is evident in all the examples studied in this chapter.14 The present building is a 
successor to the original Royal Palace on the site occupied by Monarchs from 
Henry III (1207-1272) to Henry VII (1485-1509). The original Palace of 
Westminster was first used by the Parliament in Henry III’s reign and Henry VII 
allowed the Parliament occupancy of Westminster after he moved to the nearby 
York House (later the palace of Whitehall) in 1529.15 The building served as a 
Parliament until a disastrous fire in 1834 which destroyed much of the palace and 
completely gutted St Stephen's, a church which had been adapted to serve as the 
debating chamber of the House of Commons.16 Edward VI gave St Stephen’s to 
the Commons as their first permanent Chamber and it conferred on Parliament a 
heritage of Royal and ecclesiastical ethos that is carried on in many other 
Parliament buildings, such as Capitol Hill in the United States, and Canada’s 
ornate Gothic structure in Ottawa, and even in modern parliaments, such as 
Canberra’s late 20th century edifice.17 After the fire, Westminster Palace was 
slowly rebuilt and the first sitting in the magnificent new structure took place on 30 
May 1850.18
To achieve such grandeur and size as in the new Palace takes much time in 
discussions, planning and actual construction, and delay is a major feature of the 
development of most Parliamentary buildings. The most common first step towards 
such an enterprise is to hold an architectural competition, a precedent set by the 
 This is the majestic building which now occupies the ancient site in 
London. 
                                            
13 William B. Hamilton, The Transfer of Institutions, (Durnam N.C., London: Duke University 
Commonwealth Studies Center, 1964), p.59. 
14 David Cannadine, 'The Palace of Westminster as a Palace of Varieties', in The Houses of 
Parliament: History Art Architecture, ed., Iain Ross, p.49. 
15 John Goodall, 'The Medieval Palace of Westminster', in Ibid, p.55. For a detailed history of the 
site and buildings for Westminster see Arnold Wright and Philip Smith, Parliament, Past, Present 
and Future: A popular and picturesque account of a thousand years in the Palace of Westminster, 
the Home of the Mother of Parliaments, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1902.) 
16 Jacqueline Riding, ‘St Stephen's Chapel: From the Crown to the People’, BBC History: 2005-04-
02. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history. Accessed 12 December 2008. 
17 Goodall, 'The Medieval Palace of Westminster', pp.56-62. 
18 M.H. Port, The Houses of Parliament, (London: Yale University Press, 1976), p.146. 
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United States in 1792, for the design of their Capitol. Westminster and then 
Ottawa, followed suit, and thus established a tradition. In Australia, Victoria, South 
Australia, Queensland, and Western Australia, as well as the new capital in 
Canberra, followed this tradition, in a clear example of path dependence in both a 
cultural and economic situation. 
The architectural competition to design the new building for Westminster was won 
by architect Charles Barry. There is little doubt that his basic design was influenced 
by the way the old Palace had developed over the years to accommodate the 
activities of Parliament. There were two chambers as the major features and, with 
similar ancillary facilities such as libraries, it echoed the design of the old Palace. 
This is a pattern which has now been adopted by many modern legislatures as a 
basic structure for their buildings. 
The conditions of the Westminster competition included a requirement that the 
building was to be in the Gothic or Elizabethan style.19 Of those alternatives Barry 
preferred Gothic, which came to be regarded as the ‘national’ style, but he was not 
entirely at ease in that medium and turned for assistance to Augustus Welby 
Pugin, who had decided to devote himself entirely to Gothic architecture. Historian 
David Cannadine has argued that Barry’s instructions were to design a building 
that was more like a royal residence than a democratic legislature, ‘instantly 
antique and self consciously historical, richly ornamented, and full of allusions to 
the national past, to which it provided a powerful physical link’.20
                                            
19 Andrea Frederickson, 'Parliament's Genius Loci: The Politics of Place after the Fire', in The 
Houses of Parliament: History Art Architecture, ed. Iain Ross, p.100. 
20 Cannadine, 'The Palace of Westminster as a Palace of Varieties', p.15. 
 In response to 
these instructions the new Palace of Westminster emerged as a perpendicular 
gothic extravaganza that magically fulfilled its role as a symbol of power, wealth 
and authority. Barry correctly calculated that the public expected a building that, in 
emphasising the age and dignity of the institution of Parliament, would reflect its 
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national pride. It also fulfilled Barry's architectural criteria for ‘grandeur of outline’ 
and ‘richness of detail’.21
The rebuilding of the Palace of Westminster was guided then by the desire to imply 
tradition in a carefully staged architectural programme that both borrowed from and 
added to the historical associations of the Westminster setting and demonstrated 
continuity with a suitable past, perceived as the nation’s Golden Age.
 
22
Australia has six State parliament houses and they are an assorted architectural 
collection, even though they have a similar staunchly British heritage and a faithful 
adherence to the basic concept of Westminster. This was the crucial model for 
Australia’s colonial parliaments, in anticipation at least but, due to financial 
constraints, some were perforce executed on a more modest financial and 
architectural scale. The first Parliament in Australia was in New South Wales and 
when its Council was extended in 1843 a new chamber was erected to adjoin the 
existing chamber. In the book, The First Parliament, Donald Ellsmore wrote that 
‘The new chamber … must have been influenced by the Gothic styling of Pugin 
and Barry’s Houses of Parliament’.
 In line with 
this philosophy the new building retained within itself the age-old symbols, rituals 
and traditions that had grown up over the centuries of the life of the Parliament. 
The Canadian Federal and Australian Colonial Parliaments, whose existence as 
bicameral legislatures began after the completion of the new Westminster Palace, 
adopted the package wholesale. Only the United States departed from the 
traditions in any significant way but even there evidence of British traditional 
procedures can be identified in several areas. 
23
As the Australian Senate is the focus of this thesis the first Australian parliament 
building to be dealt with in this chapter is the provisional Federal Parliament 
 Although he did not use the term this was a 
clear instance of path dependence at work. 
                                            
21 Alexandra Wedgewood, 'The New Palace of Westminster', in The Houses of Parliament, ed. Iain 
Ross, p.116. 
22 Frederickson, 'Parliament's Genius Loci: The Politics of Place after the Fire', p.99. 
23 Donald Ellsmore, 'The Colony's First Parliament House', in Australia's First Parliament, ed. Maisy 
Stapleton (Sydney: Parliament of New South Wales, 1987), p.38. 
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building in Canberra, opened in 1927. It is a byzantine tale as the project was 
beset by problems and delays, but the underlying vision which gave it shape was in 
the minds of the delegates who crafted the Constitution, many of whom went on to 
hold the reins of power in the new nation.24
Australia’s Federal Parliament began its life in Victoria’s Parliament House in 
Melbourne until a capital city with a Federal Parliament House could be 
established, though it was not envisaged that the occupation would last for 26 
years (1901 – 1927). Senators, as members of the Federal Parliament’s upper 
house, occupied the ornate Victorian Council chamber, surrounded by elaborate 
architecture and an interior decor which could not have failed to impress them. 
Several had also visited Britain, some in an official capacity which had brought 
them into close contact with the Imperial Government, and could have experienced 
first hand the magnificence of the House of Lords.
 A discussion of the various colonial 
parliament buildings, how they evolved and could have influenced the convention 
delegates, will follow. 
25
The new provisional building faithfully fulfilled the suggestion of the ‘Report of the 
Federal Capital Advisory Committee’ that the new building would be ‘simple but 
decorous’ and is why the first Federal parliament building was by far the most 
 These encounters would 
surely have influenced their ideas on a design for their future chamber in the 
proposed Federal Parliament House in Canberra. How different from the reality 
that was to come in 1927 when, at last, a Federal Parliament House was opened in 
the new Federal Capital, Canberra. A lack of time and finance had caused the 
initial plan for a splendid monumental building to be reluctantly postponed and led 
to the decision to erect instead a provisional building. The dream was not 
abandoned however, but put on hold until circumstances permitted the construction 
of a more ambitious project to fulfill the aspirations held since the 1890s. 
                                            
24 Eighteen delegates went on to become Members of the House of Representatives, five of whom 
served terms as Prime Minister, and ten became Senators, one of whom served a term as 
President. http://www.aph.gov.au/library/index.htm, Accessed 30 August 2008. 
25 E.M. Hunt, American Precedents in Australian Federation, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
London P. S. King, Ltd., 1930), p.16. 
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modest and unpretentious parliament building in Australia.26 It has since become 
an object of affection for its heritage and simple dignity, especially since the 
opening of its impressive replacement in 1988, which finally fulfilled the 
‘monumental’ vision. Thomas Givens, then President of the Senate, made the 
reference to Canberra as ‘The Cinderella of Australia’ in 1923, in protest at the 
decision to erect a provisional building. His words aptly describe Canberra’s first 
Parliament House in relation to those of the State Parliaments.27
The erection of the first Federal Parliament building was fraught with difficulties and 
the many vicissitudes and delays forced Canberra to make do with the ‘Provisional’ 
Parliament House for over 60 years. The beginning of it all was when the American 
architect, Walter Burley Griffin, was selected by competition in 1911 to design the 
projected new city. Griffin’s designs included the expected grand Parliament 
building on a prominent site and, following a well-trodden path, a further 
 Several difficult 
and unfortunate circumstances and delays contributed to this unpretentious 
outcome. The first delay was due to the provision in the Constitution that the 
Capital would be in New South Wales and not less than 100 miles from Sydney, a 
condition imposed to appease the conflicting claims of Melbourne and Sydney to 
be the Federal capital. The priority then was to find a suitable site. Fulfilling this 
provision was by no means an easy task and was not successful until 1911. The 
time span is not surprising as in the early years of the 20th century travel was 
difficult: there were only a few train and coach services and horses were the main 
means of personal transport. For West Australians, and those in far north 
Queensland the New South Wales southern tablelands must have seemed a long 
way away. It is not surprising then that these citizens of the newly-federated nation 
took comfort in a Senate’s role as a States’ House. Things at last began to move 
when the chosen site of Canberra was finally gazetted in 1913. 
                                            
26 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Federal Capital Advisory Committee: 
Construction of Canberra: First General Report, Melbourne: 1920-21, Buildings, sections 38, 40. 
p.11. 
27 The Honorable Thomas Givens, Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, Report 
Together with Minutes of Evidence, Appendices and Plans Relating to the Proposed Erection of 
Provisional Parliament House, Canberra, (Melbourne: Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1923), p.11. 
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architectural competition was announced in 1913 for the design of the Parliament 
building. Sadly, this competition had to be cancelled and the whole project was 
brought to a standstill by the advent of the Great War (World War I) in 1914. The 
competition was withdrawn and not revived and it was not until 1921 that renewed 
efforts were made to establish the Parliament in Canberra.28
The conditions of the competition allow us to understand the intentions of the 
government for their Federal Parliament building. The booklet for entrants to the 
competition (Federal Parliament House Architectural Competition) was distributed 
on an international scale and discussed a stage set with ‘monumental Government 
structures sharply defined’. The requirements for the Chambers, including the 
Senate, were simply stated as a ‘Session Chamber’—‘a light and airy room, to seat 
initial membership of 50 with lateral tier benches and provision for ultimate 
expansion to seat a possible membership of 150’. It was to include a President’s 
Dais and seating and accommodation for the ceremonial openings of parliament, 
when the members of the House of Representatives would be present. Right from 
the beginning the stage was set to follow Westminster’s medieval traditions.
 
29
By 1921, after the delays of the war years, the establishment of a proper Federal 
Seat of Government was becoming urgent. Yet the expense of a large permanent 
building when there was still a huge war debt seemed too costly and the time 
required to conduct an international architectural competition and then raise a 
monumental building, made such a project impractical. A faster, more economical 
 As 
bicameralism was by now well established for the Federal Parliament, which had 
already sat in Melbourne for thirteen years, it is not surprising that entrants to the 
competition were instructed to design along traditional lines, and there were no 
departures from the established pattern of two chambers and supporting facilities 
in the instructions to entrants. 
                                            
28 Gay Hogan, Parliament House Canberra, 1927, Records Relating to the Design, Construction 
and Opening of the Provisional Parliament House, (Canberra: Australian Archives, 1997), pp.9–10. 
29 Commonwealth of Australia, 'Federal Parliament House Architectural Competition', (Albert J. 
Mullett, Government printer for the State of Victoria, 1914), p.9. 
Chapter 7: The Inherent Sacredness of Sovereign Power 
 
 
203 
 
solution was sought.30
The Advisory Committee considered that the time was not yet ripe for the 
erection of the permanent monumental Parliament House at Canberra, for the 
reasons that it might be expected to cost anything up to two or two and a half 
million pounds: that the actual construction of the building would take perhaps 
seven years or longer, and that a former Government of the Commonwealth 
had made a promise to the architects of the world that when the erection of 
the permanent building was contemplated the design of the building would be 
selected as the result of a world-wide competition.
 After much debate a recommendation by the Committee of 
Public Works for a provisional building was accepted and financed by Parliament in 
August 1923. 
31
With this recommendation the idea of a monumental building was put aside in 
favour of a more efficient, economical and timely structure. The Minister for Works 
and Railways (P.G. Stewart) said of the proposal, at the ceremony of the turning of 
the first sod: ‘While its design is on simple and economic lines, it will be 
substantially constructed in brick and will be of a commodious and comfortable 
character, presenting a good appearance architecturally’.
 
32
The Federal Capital Advisory Committee, formed to advise the government on the 
project, recommended in its first report in 1921, that the building should be ‘without 
pretension either in scale or architectural adornment’ and ‘the external architecture 
simple but decorous’.
 It was hoped that a 
Provisional Parliament House, as opposed to a ‘temporary’ building, could be 
constructed quite quickly and still be impressive enough to be respected as the 
Parliament, until more prosperous times when a traditional grand edifice could be 
constructed. This did not to happen until 1988. 
33
                                            
30 Hogan, Parliament House Canberra, 1927, p.10. 
31 Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, Report Together with Minutes of Evidence, 
Appendices and Plans Relating to the Proposed Erection of Provisional Parliament House, 
Canberra, p.17. 
32 Hogan, Parliament House Canberra, 1927, p.13. 
33 Federal Capital Advisory Committee, Construction of Canberra: First General Report, 
(Melbourne: Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1921), p.11. 
 It is important to note that this decision reflected the lack of 
funding and was in no way intended as a departure from the Westminster tradition 
of ‘monumentalism’ which was still contemplated as a project for the future. 
Unpretentiousness was definitely achieved in the resulting plain but elegant, two-
Chapter 7: The Inherent Sacredness of Sovereign Power 
 
 
204 
 
storey white building, described as of ‘stripped classical’ style. It is plain and 
functional, with verandahs and colonnades and strong horizontal lines.34
The Westminster Chair, as I remember it, is of most elaborate Gothic 
canopied design, … quite out of keeping with the simple, severe, free 
renaissance character of the Canberra building.
 
John Smith Murdoch, a Scottish architect and the first Australian Commonwealth 
architect, was commissioned to design the building. He was not an admirer of 
ornate or ‘monumental’ architecture as is evidenced in his dismay when the Empire 
Parliamentary Association presented a faithful copy of the Pugin designed House 
of Commons Speaker’s Chair to the House of Representatives. As he expressed it: 
35
His dismay was ignored. In his formal letter of thanks to the Speaker of the House 
of Commons, the Australian Speaker at the time (W. A. Watt) advised that the gift 
had been ‘most cordially received by the Members of the House of 
Representatives’. He also apologised for a delay in the formal acknowledgement 
as being due to the architect (Murdoch) who had ‘expressed some misgivings as to 
whether a Gothic chair would be in keeping with such a plain interior as is 
contemplated at Canberra’. However ‘we eventually succeeded in having the 
technical objection withdrawn’.
 
36
There were protests against a provisional building and the Senate tried to reject the 
suggestion while, as already stated, Thomas Givens thought it would make the 
 The ornate chair still occupies its place in the 
Chamber and one can understand the architect’s objection. However, he was 
facing more powerful forces in the shape of the members of the executive of the 
Commonwealth Branch of the Association, as well the inexorable forces of tradition 
on the part of the parliamentarians and was ‘persuaded’ to give way. 
                                            
34 Old Parliament House website http://www.oph.gov.au/content. Accessed 10 April 2008. 
35 J.S. Murdoch to Mr Gale, Honorary Secretary, Australian Branch, Empire Parliamentary 
Association, 5 August 1925. NAA A1, 1923/20992, Erection of Provisional Parliament House, 
Canberra. Copies of many of these records are also available in the papers of Professor Gordon 
Stanley Reid, and the research file for his unpublished chronology of the Federal Parliament 1901-
1988, NLA MS 8371. 
36 W.A. Watt, Speaker of the House of Commons to J.H. Whitley, Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, 6 October 1925. Copy in the papers of Professor Gordon Stanley Reid, folio 
4.3.14, NLA MS 8371. 
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‘Federal Capital City the Cinderella of Australia’.37
I can say that the proposed building, although called a provisional 
structure, will prove so comfortable that there will be no great haste 
exhibited by members to erect and occupy an ornate permanent 
building.
 Murdoch’s ‘plain interior’ also 
caused some criticism and he defended it in his evidence to the committee: 
38
The final buildings, erected between 1856 and 1904, evolved from the early 
Colonial legislatures which had been accommodated in convenient places, often a 
room in the House of the Governor. More spacious buildings to accommodate the 
  
This explains why Australia’s first Parliament was anything but ‘monumental’, and 
instead is a simple and unadorned building, though with an understated elegance 
and its own charm and appeal. It is now known as ‘Old Parliament House’, (instead 
of the ‘Provisional Parliament House’ under which label it spent its first 62 years). 
The building does not exude authority or power in the way of other more 
monumental buildings, but nevertheless, over the years it has achieved respect 
and affection as an icon which in itself is a subtle source of power. The vision of a 
monumental building for Australia was never relinquished but held on to through 
the Depression and the Second World War, and finally accomplished in 1988 when 
a splendid representation of authority and power was achieved in a New 
Parliament House building. Designed on a modern and less aggressive or 
ornamental concept of Parliamentary architecture it successfully follows the 
Westminster tradition by fulfilling the concept of monumentalism. 
Long before the Canberra enterprise all of Australia’s six Colonies had erected 
Parliamentary buildings, some of them ornate and monumental, others on a more 
modest scale. In most cases they had begun with a Council building to house the 
unicameral government before the advent of self-government in the 1850s and with 
it the adoption of the bicameral structure. 
                                            
37 The Honorable Thomas Givens, Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, 'Report 
Together with Minutes of Evidence, Appendices and Plans Relating to the Proposed Erection of 
Provisional Parliament House, Canberra ', p.11. 
38 Ibid., p.24. 
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enlarged councils followed and eventually, with self-government and bicameralism, 
a move was made to more suitable and sometimes purpose built premises. The 
two oldest Colonies, New South Wales and Tasmania, never undertook the 
building of a completely new House, though New South Wales aspired to on 
several occasions.39
Not all of Australia’s Parliaments are of the monumental style. As noted the two 
oldest, in New South Wales and Tasmania, are quite modest, and again the issue 
was finance. New South Wales appropriated a wing from the Sydney General 
Hospital in 1829, and Tasmania’s first Council met from 1841 in the ‘Long Room’ in 
 The time just never seemed right and, given some of the 
obstacles faced by other jurisdictions in their efforts to build a suitably grand 
edifice, this is not surprising. 
The decision to build a Parliament was always momentous, involving much 
discussion on cost, site, and style. Once a decision was made and a site selected, 
Queensland, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, and in the 20th 
century the Australian Commonwealth, followed the example set by Westminster in 
1835 and held architectural competitions for the design of their buildings. New 
South Wales also held an architectural competition in 1860 but the winning design, 
a predictably gothic and monumental structure, was never executed. The 
architectural styles differ somewhat in derivation, from the Roman grandeur of 
Victoria, to Western Australia’s Federation Classical and Queensland’s French 
Renaissance. These deviations do not contradict the argument that Westminster 
was the model for the colonial Parliament Houses. Though the architectural styles 
varied, the concept of architectural competitions leading to monumentalism was 
carried out in all except the Federal Capital, and that was more due to bad luck 
than to lack of aspiration. Further, all the finished buildings followed the basic 
Westminster plan of two debating Chambers plus supporting services, such as 
libraries and a central hall demonstrating clearly the influence of the British 
tradition. 
                                            
39 New South Wales Parliamentary Library, 'Proposals to Build a New State Parliament House in 
Sydney, 1856-1969', in Reference Monograph No. 3 (Sydney: New South Wales Parliament, 1970), 
p.6. 
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Customs House in Hobart, opened in 1840. Both of these legislatures gradually 
extended and adapted the accommodation and it was further extended and 
renovated to accommodate the new bicameral structures. 
The failure to build a new Parliament on the advent of self-government in New 
South Wales is why its Parliament building is the oldest in Australia. The building 
became the seat of government in 1829 and, although much extended and 
renovated, is still the seat of Parliament today. Tasmania has the next oldest 
building, which was originally the Customs House and it has been occupied by the 
gradually enlarging legislature since 1840 and remains the home of Tasmania’s 
parliament. In contrast, Victoria opened a new Parliament House in 1856 
(completed in 1892) and South Australia’s current building dates from 5 June, 
1889, when the House of Assembly first occupied its chamber. The building was 
not then complete having only one chamber, and the Council had to wait until 
1939, fifty years later, before it was finally able to move into more spacious 
accommodation. 
Queensland, which became a separate colony in 1859, began to build its 
Parliament in 1865. First occupied in 1868 it was completed in 1889.40
The New South Wales building is a modest, low building of colonial aspect. It was 
gradually adapted from its medical origins to accommodate a bicameral legislature 
in 1856, and has been described as ‘a building consisting of the remains of an old 
hospital and a second-hand iron house’.
 Western 
Australia was even later as it did not achieve self-government until 1890. The 
Parliament building was first occupied, though not completed, in 1904, which, when 
compared with the others, is a surprisingly brief period of construction. 
41
                                            
40 Bruce Buchanan and Associates, 'The History of Parliament House, Queensland', (Brisbane: 
State Works Department, Queensland 1983), p.37. 
41 New South Wales Parliamentary Library, 'Proposals to Build a New State Parliament House in 
Sydney, 1856-1969', p.7. 
 The reference to an iron house is 
because, faced with a need to accommodate a two-chamber legislature at a time of 
an acute shortage of labour and building materials, a hasty decision was made to 
purchase a prefabricated iron building imported from England. The building, which 
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has a façade cast in imitation masonry with pilasters and mouldings, was modified 
to serve as the Chamber of the Legislative Council and annexed to the original 
building. The building and the ‘iron shed’ are still the home of the New South Wales 
Parliament despite attempts to replace them with a more traditionally grand and 
monumental structure. 
There was always a desire in New South Wales to build a more prestigious home 
for the Parliament because of the perceived unsuitability of the accommodation, 
plus an aspiration for something more in keeping with the role of the building. To 
this end, and following the tradition set by Westminster, an architectural 
competition was announced in 1860. The winning design, by Henry Lynn, 
proposed a grandiose scheme of neo-Gothic design, elaborate and ornamental 
with turrets, pointed Gothic windows and a bell tower.42 According to the Sydney 
Morning Herald it ‘bore a general resemblance to the Doge’s Palace, at Venice’, a 
building dating from the 14th century and recognised as one of the great buildings 
of the world. It is described as ‘Italian Gothic with a strong planar façade and on 
slender columns and arches’.43
That is the tortuous tale as to why New South Wales does not sport a splendid and 
monumental Parliament building. But why doesn’t Tasmania? This is because 
Tasmania’s original historic structure is not quite as low key as that of New South 
 The monumentalism of the design is clear and its 
Gothic theme loyally echoed the Westminster tradition. Such a building would have 
been a spectacular addition to the Sydney skyline and fulfilled all the requirements 
of a ‘monumental’ Parliament. Its extravagant splendour would have also been a 
challenge to the Victorian edifice and a tribute to the grandiloquence of 
Westminster, itself a Gothic temple. However, it was not to be. There is little doubt 
that the enormous costs associated with such an enterprise, and a reluctance to 
face the equally enormous challenge of actual construction, as well as arguments 
about the merits of the project, denied Sydney a grand architectural and 
traditionally monumental Parliament building. 
                                            
42 Ibid., p.13. 
43 The Web Site of Venice; http://www.venetia.it/m_ducale_eng.htm. Accessed 10 April 2008. 
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Wales, though neither is it as grand and imposing as some other Australian 
parliamentary buildings. In classic Georgian style it is a pleasantly plain, stone, 
two-storey, convict built structure, fronted on its lower level by a colonnade, and 
commands a prominent site in Hobart overlooking Sullivans Cove. 
There was no ambitious architectural competition to design a new Parliament 
House for Tasmania. Instead the building, originally Customs House and first 
occupied by the Legislative Council in 1841, has been adapted and extended to 
serve as the Parliament House until the present day. Designed by the Government 
architect John Lee Archer, an English trained architect with an engineering 
background and, due to its Customs House origins, situated close to the waters of 
the Derwent,44 it is a classically plain building and its soft sandstone façade and 
heritage aspects are major features.45
For both New South Wales and Tasmania the historic legacies of their buildings 
add an extra dimension to their value to the citizens of their States. Their history 
and longevity, visible in their appearance, both inside and out, palpable during 
ceremonial occasions and memorable from significant events in the past, is as 
impressive and reassuring as a grand imposing building. As English historian 
Emma Crewe has argued ‘The visible presence of history is seen as powerful in 
itself’ and the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu contends that ‘to possess things from the 
past is to master time, and this mastery is social power’.
 
46
Victoria, South Australia, Queensland and Western Australia, in contrast to New 
South Wales and Tasmania, all chose to go down the monumental path to erect 
grand, imposing structures which convey power and authority visibly and 
aggressively. Of all the Australian State Parliament buildings Victoria’s is by far the 
 Heritage buildings in this 
way possess an intrinsic value and convey a subtle aura of power as well as of 
reassuring continuity. 
                                            
44 John Chilcott, 'History of Government in Tasmania', (Hobart: nd.), p.32. Held in Parliamentary 
Library, Tasmania. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Emma Crewe, Lords of Parliament, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 
2005), p.213. Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction, (New York and London: Routledge, 1979), pp.71-2. 
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most splendid and compares well with the impressive pile of the British Parliament, 
(opened in 1850) in its ostentatious concepts of grandeur and strength. Work 
began on the building in 1856, immediately after the granting of self-government. It 
was also first occupied in 1856, before it was completed, which was not until 1892 
following a series of the sort of delays that seem unavoidable in such grand 
schemes, and it lacked the finishing touch of the proposed grandiose dome.47
Peter Kerr was the architect of Parliament House, Melbourne, and his design was 
described as a ‘magnificent classic design for a building of colossal proportions’. 
To the observer it is all of that. The west façade fronting Spring Street, is in the 
Roman Doric order of architecture with an escalation of sweeping steps (41 in all) 
rising to the impressive and massive colonnade which is flanked by wings taking 
the frontage to more than 90 metres across and rising to 23 metres. The temple 
like approach adds an ecclesiastical aura and inspires awe, respect and 
admiration.
 Yet it 
is a true interpretation of the monumental style of Government architecture, huge, 
imposing, and self-assured. 
48
South Australia experienced the usual hesitations and delays in the construction of 
its monumental Parliament House and in some ways they were rather more 
dramatic than most as the State had to endure, in the centre of Adelaide, the 
mortifying vision of half a house for half a century. The story began in 1874 when 
 
South Australia’s present building was planned as another truly monumental 
structure in the Westminster tradition. Less graceful than that of Victoria its weighty 
solid design in light-grey marble, unambiguously proclaims strength, power and 
authority. A classical design, it has majestic marble columns with Corinthian 
capitals lining the front façade. Situated on the corner of North Terrace and King 
William Road in central Adelaide, the building is an outstanding city landmark and 
betrays its British inheritance in its commanding profile. 
                                            
47 Robb, 'The Role of Sculptural and Architectural Decoration in Parliament House, Victoria'. 
Introduction. 
48 Ibid., p.11. Clerk of the Parliaments, 'The Parliament of Victoria and Parliament House', 
(Melbourne: Parliament of Victoria, 1985), pp.18-19 
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an architectural competition was held to design a general plan for the proposed 
new Houses of Parliament. Detailed drawings were to be provided to allow for only 
half of it to be built immediately.49 This was, perhaps, the first mistake, as the half 
house concept was to be perpetuated into the 20th century. The winners of the 
competition were architects Edmund Wright and Lloyd Taylor, but their design was 
to be severely hindered by indecision and conflict and it was not until 1877 that 
work on the foundations began. It soon stopped due, again, to financial and 
constitutional complications and wrangles between the two houses. The exposed 
foundations lay there as a reproof to the legislators and an embarrassment for the 
citizens for six years. It was not until 1881 that work could proceed and Architect-
in-Chief E.J. Woods was commissioned to supervise the construction of the West 
Wing. The Assembly chamber was finally completed in 1889 and formally opened 
on 5 June. Adelaide then had to wait until 1939 for the second chamber which was 
only completed because of the generosity of Sir J. Langdon Bonython, the owner 
of the Adelaide Advertiser.50
Queensland’s Parliament House in Brisbane is unquestionably imposing, though in 
an attractive and unaggressive way, asserting power and authority with a gracious 
air. Opened on 4 August 1868, the general opinion of Queenslanders held their 
new Parliament House to be the ‘finest building in Queensland’.
 At the time of the Federal Convention, held in the 
Assembly Chamber of Adelaide’s Parliament in 1897, only the Assembly Chamber 
was completed and that was where the delegates debated. They sat in an 
unfinished Parliament which, nevertheless, exhibited all the signs of a Westminster 
style monumental building in evolution. 
51
                                            
49 Pat Stretton, The Life and Times of Old Parliament House, (Adelaide: Old Parliament House, 
1988), p.28. 
50 Ibid., p.44. 
51 Parliament of Queensland, 'Parliament House, Queensland', (Brisbane: Parliament of 
Queensland, nd.), 
 Following 
tradition an Australia wide architectural competition was held in 1863 and won by 
Charles Tiffin, the Colonial Architect. Disputes and disagreements about the 
competition result meant that the winning design was never used. Instead a design 
of Tiffin’s for another building, a ‘block of buildings to be erected at the corner of 
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Queen and William Streets’, was adapted to the needs of a Parliament. The design 
of this building was for a Revival Classic building in French Renaissance style and 
conveniently and adequately fulfills the Westminster criteria for monumentalism 
and architectural splendour in a Parliament building.52 An imposing and elegant, 
arcaded building, it is situated in a commanding position on the corner of George 
and Alice Streets, and overlooks the extensive Botanic Gardens. Characterised by 
solid colonnades which keep the building cool in summer, the building, begun in 
1865, was first occupied in 1868 and completed in 1889.53
The first stage of the building was described by the architects as ‘of federation, 
academic, classical’, style, a complex yet vague description.
 
Western Australia’s Parliament building was opened in1904 after overcoming most 
of the usual obstacles of cost and design. The architect, Chief Architect of Western 
Australia, J.H. Grainger, was selected after all seventeen responses to a public 
tender for the design were found to be over budget. Grainger’s design was 
ambitious and certainly monumental, complete with the favoured dome, but fated 
not to be realised in full, the dome never made it. 
54 In its final 
appearance it is a simple and colonnaded two-storey building with arched windows 
and a three bay façade, in a creamy grey and white-grey stone, which gives the 
building a light and pleasing presentation. There are ‘entry porticoes at the north 
and south ends of the central colonnade with six-panel double timber doors’.55
                                            
52 Bruce Buchanan and Associates, 'The History of Parliament House, Queensland', p.13. 
53 Ibid., p.14. 
54 Phillip Pendal and David Black, House to House, (Perth: Parliament of Western Australia, 2004), 
p.88. 
55 Ibid., p.91. 
 It 
stands on a ‘shoulder of Mount Eliza’ overlooking Hay Street, Harvest Terrace and 
St Georges Terrace. It was not greeted with great enthusiasm; the Daily News 
commented that the external appearance was not an imposing one, and the 
Western Mail coolly considered that ‘though rather squat’ it showed some 
admirable design in its stonework. The building has gone through many extensions 
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and alterations since 1904, one of which obscured the elegant colonnaded front 
which became part of the dining room.56
The Convention delegates had lengthy discussions on where the Australian capital 
should be sited, but they did not consider the question of a Parliament building or a 
parliamentary precinct. That was left for Parliament when established and a site for 
the capital agreed upon. As we have seen, this undertaking underwent many 
delays and it was not until 1911 that serious consideration was given to the issue 
of a new Parliament building. The Members of Parliament of the day, many of 
whom were former delegates, were familiar with the colonial Parliamentary 
buildings and probably aware of the grandeur of Westminster, they also would 
have had some knowledge of the building in the United States, which was older 
than the new Westminster Palace and, as a colonial initiative, could have been 
looked upon as a model of procedure and style. 
 
Except for Western Australia these buildings would have been familiar to the 
Convention delegates and could have influenced their concepts of a parliament 
building, concepts which would have been carried through the years until the time 
finally arrived for its construction, though circumstances were then more difficult 
than they could have envisaged. 
After Federation many delegates went on to serve in Federal Parliament, ten of 
them to the Senate, in its temporary home in Melbourne’s Parliament House. The 
grandeur of their temporary home would have impressed them, but they would also 
have been aware of the difficulties inherent in the construction of such a building. 
These difficulties would have influenced the decision to postpone the building of a 
monumental parliament until more prosperous times, and instead build a 
provisional Parliament House for Canberra. Nevertheless it is clear that a 
traditional monumental building for the new Federal Capital was planned from the 
beginning and achieved in 1988, even though the provision of a Parliament House 
was not a Constitutional requirement. 
                                            
56 Ibid., pp.87-94. 
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Nor would it have escaped their attention that the pattern of monumentalism had 
been adopted across the Pacific in Canada and the United States, where both had 
built impressively large and ornate seats of Government. The United States 
Congress building, established when the cornerstone was laid on 18 September, 
1793, is the older, while the magnificent Canadian edifice was completed in 1866, 
and is another reminder of the effect that I have referred to as path dependence 
and tradition, as the truly amazing Gothic design undoubtedly was inspired by 
Westminster.57
The site chosen for the Capitol was, in the words of the first architect, L’Enfant, ‘a 
pedestal waiting for a monument’.
 The United States and Canada both established their Parliament 
buildings within a Parliamentary precinct, which included supporting Government 
buildings along with the legislative accommodation. Canada’s Parliament complex 
is situated in Ottawa on Parliament Hill while the United States Congress is 
situated on Capitol Hill in Washington. 
58 The building is the centrepiece of the complex 
of Congressional office and library buildings and the legislative chambers. It is an 
imposing sight dominating the Washington skyline and presenting an unforgettable 
portrait of power and sovereignty. The whole is regarded as a fine example of 19th 
century, neoclassical architecture, combining function with aesthetics. Greece and 
Rome were the inspirations for the designs to evoke the ideals of the nations’ 
founders as they framed their new republic.59
Of the buildings under consideration this was the first to be the subject of an 
architectural competition, but it was not successful and instead, in 1793, a plan 
submitted by a Scottish trained physician Dr William Thornton was adopted. The 
 A huge marble-clad cast iron dome, 
constructed between 1855 and 1856, dominates the profile, its pure 19th century 
arrogance almost overwhelming the classical façade of the original building. 
Though lacking the ornamental abundance and unique setting of Westminster, the 
Capitol, with its huge white dome, quickly became an American icon. 
                                            
57 Alan Gowans, The Canadian Encyclopedia, Historica Foundation of Canada, 2007, ‘Parliament 
Buildings’, p.1. http://thecanadianencyclopedia.com. Accessed 10 September 2007. 
58 United States Building Website ‘How the Location for the Capitol Was Chosen’ 
http://www.aoc.gov/cc/capitol/capitol_location.cfm. Accessed June 23 2008. 
59 Ibid. 
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building was eventually partly occupied in late 1800, but it was not turned over to 
the Commissioner of Public Buildings until 1830.60 As with other aging buildings 
the Capitol has been ‘built and rebuilt, added to and burned, rebuilt and extended’ 
and modified over the years from 1793, including the replacement of the original 
dome, and it continues to be extended and modernised.61
Whimsical Gothic architecture is a phrase that has been used to describe the 
amazing Canadian Parliamentary complex in Ottawa. Begun in 1859 it was 
completed in 1866 and was the very epitome of monumentalism, with its 
magnificent Gothic spires ‘soaring towers, flying buttresses, vaulted roofs and 
pointed arches’. It has been described as the finest pile of stones in Canada.
 Its essential three bay 
profile has remained intact, and it retains its familiar appearance, the huge dome 
conferring a confident air of continuity, authority and sovereignty. 
62
The complex post-dates both the new Westminster Palace in London which 
opened in 1850, and the United States Capitol, first occupied in 1800, buildings 
which could have inspired the Canadians to construct a monumental edifice to 
equal, or even challenge, those creations. The arrangement consists of the 
Parliament building and two departmental buildings, overlooking the city. From a 
distance it looks almost like a fairy palace and the ornate circular Library building in 
the style of a Gothic Cathedral Chapter House, is superb.
 
Building commenced before Federation during the life of the colony of Canada, and 
it was immediately adopted as the Parliament of the Federation in 1867. 
63
                                            
60 Ibid. 
61 J. McIver Weatherford, Tribes on the Hill, (New York: Rawson, Wade Publishers, Inc., 1981), 
pp.14-15. 
 One commentator has 
62 Hans Tammemagi, Parliament Hill: The Heart and Soul of Canada, (Parliament of Canada, nd.) 
http://www.ttrn.com/dchanstammemagiparliament.htm. Accessed 2 September 2008. 
63 Joseph Bureau, Handbook to the Parliamentary and Departmental Buildings, Canada, (Ottawa: 
Canadian Institute for Historical Microproductions, 1867), p.11. Janet Wright, Crown Assets: The 
Architecture of the Department of Public Works, 1867-1967, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1997), p.8. 
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argued that the ‘buildings are undoubtedly the finest example of Gothic revival in 
North America’.64
Canada followed the United States example by holding a competition in 1859 for 
the design of the building. It was won by Messrs. Thomas Fuller and Chilion Jones. 
Unhappily construction was delayed soon after commencement because the site 
selected, Old Barrack Hill, proved to be unsuitable. There were to be further delays 
and the site was closed down in 1861. Construction resumed in 1863 and in 1867 
the new Canadian Dominion was formed and the Federal Government took over 
the building.
 
65 Sadly the original buildings, except the library, were destroyed by 
fire in 1916, however in ‘design and function the original buildings, were essentially 
similar to the present Parliament Buildings completed in 1921’.66
The buildings represent the external faces of the Parliaments and most of them in 
this selection have followed Westminster, certainly in the concept of 
monumentalism. The essential elements of grandeur, extravagance and authority 
have been included, even in cases where deviation and more simplicity might have 
been expected, such as the republic of the United States. In addition, the basic 
design component of two chambers supported by a library, refreshment rooms and 
other supporting offices is ubiquitous, confirming the tradition of the Westminster 
system of an upper and a lower house, and all enclosed in a grand display 
 
Canada’s magnificent building comprehensively fulfills all the requirements for a 
building expressing sovereign power. It is imposing, dominating, architecturally 
glorious and set on a magnificent site. It exudes power, splendour and authority to 
a great degree while also promising security. Its Gothic style follows the example of 
the new Palace of Westminster, as Canada was a loyal and obedient member of 
the British Empire, and to some extent that of the United States also, because, as 
well as fulfilling the traditionally monumental and imposing requirement, it has the 
supporting parliamentary buildings on the same site. 
                                            
64 Chris Lund, Stones of History. Canada's Houses of Parliament; a Photographic Essay, (Ottawa: 
National Film Board of Canada, 1967), p.11. 
65 Bureau, Handbook to the Parliamentary and Departmental Buildings, Canada, p.11. 
66 'The Canadian Houses of Parliament', (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1953). 
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designed to impress. Borne on the forces of tradition, path dependence and public 
expectation the predilection towards monumentalism in such buildings was 
irresistible, however varied the final architectural creation. These influences on 
Australia’s first Parliament were muted by the circumstances obtaining in the 
country at the time, but corrected in the 1980s, a more prosperous era for 
Australia, when a magnificent new building was constructed as originally envisaged 
by Walter Burley Griffin, the architect of the city of Canberra. The new building 
fulfils all the requirements of a Parliament: it is commanding, impressive, and 
architecturally significant, though in a lower key than the 19th century examples 
just considered. It expresses authority and confidence without arrogance, and has 
deliberately avoided ornamental monumentalism, as such a building would not 
have had the approval of the electorate. 
From the buildings and external architecture let us now cross the threshold and 
return to the Australian Senate to consider the internal aspects of upper chambers 
in these buildings and how the Australian example was influenced by the historical 
precedents of sumptuousness, majesty and splendour, as displayed in the 
chamber of the House of Lords, while restrained by economic paucity, the 
influences of 20th century architectural styles and the ideas of its architect. Again 
the influence of Westminster is discernible in all the chambers examined here, and, 
as with the buildings, even in cases where deviation or even outright contrast might 
have been expected. In this section I will compare and contrast the similarities and 
differences of approach in the various upper houses, their dependence on the 
Westminster model and their relevance to Australia’s Senate chamber. 
The nomenclature of ‘upper’ house is the key to their relatively grander décor and 
accoutrements. The tradition, stemming from Westminster, that Councils and the 
Senate are ‘upper chambers’, regardless of the constitutional actuality, is reflected 
in their internal architecture, a gesture of conformity with the grandeur of the House 
of Lords. The major similarity is found in the seating arrangements and general 
layout of the chambers. In upper houses they usually follow the pattern of a 
Presiding Officer at the head of the Chamber with the members seated to the 
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President’s right and left and facing each other across a central aisle. The origin of 
seating arrangements, particularly the confrontational aspect, is frequently ascribed 
to the example of the House of Commons in Westminster. The Commons originally 
had no fixed chamber, but from 1376, and possibly before that, they usually sat in 
the Chapter House of Westminster Abbey, and, later, in the monastic refectory.67 
From 1547 the Commons occupied St Stephen’s Chapel.68 According to 
Jacqueline Riding, an English parliamentary historian, it is generally believed that 
in the Chapel, remodelled for the purpose, members sat in the medieval choir stalls 
which had been increased and lengthened to accommodate them. They sat facing 
one another on the benches along the north and south walls, and the Speaker’s 
chair occupied the place where the altar had been. This almost accidental physical 
configuration is held by some historians of Parliament and former British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill, to be of great constitutional significance, in that it 
encouraged the two-party system to develop. This, Churchill believed, was the 
essence of British Parliamentary democracy.69
This does not explain why the Lords, and upper houses in general, also adopted 
this basic pattern but, in fact, the Lords’ Chamber traditionally divided in this way, 
though for different reasons. Seating in the House of Lords was and is governed by 
strict and arcane rules, some of which were not adopted by other Westminster 
Upper Houses because they are simply redundant. The main rule though, is 
usually adhered to, and that is the seating of members of the Government to the 
right of the Presiding Officer and the opposition to the left. The tradition in the 
Lords, which does not occur in other Parliaments, is due to the presence in the 
 The rectangular shape of St 
Stephen’s Chapel, and the resulting seating arrangements, were retained in the 
Commons in the new Palace of Westminster in 1850. Sketches of the Roman 
Senate also show this configuration suggesting that serendipity might have had 
less to do with it than is sometimes claimed. 
                                            
67 Cannadine, 'The Palace of Westminster as a Palace of Varieties', p.55. 
68 Arthur Irwin Dasent, The Speakers of the House of Commons, (London: Lond. Lane, 1911), 
41.8.41; Cannadine, 'The Palace of Westminster as a Palace of Varieties', p.62. 
69 Stamp, 'We Shape Our Buildings and Afterwards They Shape Us: Sir Giles Gilbert Scott and the 
Rebuilding of the House of Commons', p.149. 
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Chamber of the Bishops, the Lords spiritual, which is unique to Westminster. There 
the ‘Lords spiritual sit in order on benches to the right of the king, and the Lords 
temporal to his left’.70 This is still the pattern of the House of Lords and is laid down 
in the Standing Orders. By convention, it is also the practice that Government 
members occupy seats to the right of the throne and Opposition members the 
seats to the left. Unaligned members sit on the cross benches facing the throne. 
Other seating arrangements in the Lords refer to such esoteric locations as the 
Steps of the Throne and where privileged persons may sit.71
Only Canada, Tasmania and New South Wales, have strictly followed the 
confrontational pattern of seating facing across the aisle for their upper chambers. 
Other Australian Colonial Councils and the Senate preferred to slightly modify this 
by converting the cross benches into an elongated horseshoe or U-shape. Notably, 
only the United States Senate rejected the Lords’ layout altogether, favouring a 
concentric semi-circular pattern where the presiding officer sits on a raised platform 
at the centre. The Democratic Party members always sit to the right and the 
Republicans to the left of the central aisle, whichever party is in the majority.
 
72
Although the various chambers differ slightly in seating layouts, apart from the 
United States the basic principle originating in the House of Lords (and in the 
Roman Curia) has been observed, with opposing parties facing each other across 
a central aisle and, as in the House of Lords, cross-benches provided across the 
aisle facing the presiding officer, or accommodation in the semi-circular rear seats 
of the U-shape to allow for non-aligned members. Though the United States 
Senate has a semi-circular arrangement, opposing parties still sit in separate 
sections. Otherwise the tradition of opposing members has informed the structure 
and format of the seating in all subsequent chambers, including the present 
chambers of the Lords and the Commons. 
 
                                            
70 Henry S. Cobb, 'The Staging of Ceremonies in the House of Lords', in The Houses of Parliament: 
History Art Architecture, ed. Iain Ross, p.35. 
71 House of Lords, 'Companion to the Standing Orders and Guide to the Proceedings of the House 
of Lords', (London: House of Lords, 2007),1.32, 1.33,1.34,1.35; Kenneth Bradshaw and David 
Pring, Parliament and Congress, (London: Quartet Books, 1972), p.175. 
72 James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, (London: Macmillan, 1888), vol.1. p.57. Bradshaw 
and Pring, Parliament and Congress, p.197. 
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The U-shaped layout is peculiar to Australia. It has two straight sides on either side 
of the Presiding Officer in the traditional confrontational pattern, and rear seating 
curving around the back of the chamber and designated as cross benches. 
Clement McIntyre, an Australian historian, has argued that the ‘oppositional seating 
arrangements assume and encourage the division of members into two distinct 
groups that face each other’. This arrangement was justified in the design brief for 
the 1988 Australian Parliament—because all seats more or less face the chair, 
unaligned parties can be seated in a neutral position and a large Government 
majority can spread into opposition side of the chamber without compromising the 
basic oppositional character of the chamber.73
A new chamber was built for the unicameral Legislative Council in New South 
Wales in 1856 and, on the advent of bicameralism soon after, this Chamber 
became the Assembly Chamber. In 1878 as the number of members of the 
Assembly increased additional seating was installed in the chamber as semi-
circular cross-benches across the back of the chamber, forming the U-shape.
 
74 
The Council was then accommodated in the ‘big tin shed’ where the seating was 
confrontational with cross-benches, as in the Lords. This was one of the earliest 
attempts to accommodate a Council Chamber after bicameralism, the others being 
Tasmania and Victoria where the Council Chambers also date from1856. In 
Tasmania the layout is traditionally confrontational, in Victoria it was made U-
shaped. Historians have signally failed to explain why the decision to adopt this 
layout in Victoria was made, except for the example set by New South Wales.75
                                            
73 Clement Macintyre, 'Parliamentary Architecture and Political Culture', in the Australian Senate 
Occasional Lecture Series, (Canberra: May 2008). 
74 Carol Liston, 'The Legislature of New South Wales', in Maisy Stapleton ed., Australia's First 
Parliament, p.54. 
75 Sources consulted include Robb, 'The Role of Sculptural and Architectural Decoration in 
Parliament House, Victoria'. N. Chlebnikowski, 'The Historic Development of the Building of 
Parliament House' (B.Arch Thesis, University of Melbourne, 1971); George Jenkins, A Short History 
and Description of the Parliament House, Melbourne, (Melbourne: Royal Commission on Parliament 
Buildings, 1886); Raymond Wright, A People's Counsel: A History of the Parliament of Victoria 
1856-1990, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1992), Parliament of Victoria, 'Parliament House 
Victoria: Birth of a Building', (Parliament of Victoria, 2001). Discussions with officers of the 
Parliament also brought no results. 
 
Later buildings have all adopted the U-shape as did the Provisional Parliament 
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House in 1927 though, as noted above, the Architectural Competition in 1911 
called for ‘lateral tier benches’.76
Other major features of the layout of upper house chambers concern the Presiding 
Officer and officials. The Presiding Officer in the Lords is the Lord Chancellor. 
Chosen by the Prime Minister he or she is a member of the cabinet and the 
Government’s chief legal adviser. This is an ex-officio appointment in the same 
way that the Vice-President of the United States acts ex-officio as the Presiding 
Officer of the United States Senate.
 
(For seating arrangements in the Upper Chambers discussed see Appendix 2) 
77 The Lord Chancellor sits at the head of the 
chamber but below the throne on an extraordinary seat known as the ‘woolsack’. 
This is a scarlet, square couch which gets its name from the fact that it was 
originally stuffed with sheep shearings to symbolise the importance of what was, in 
the 14th century, England’s staple trade.78 Judges and serjeants-at-law occupy 
four other similar but smaller woolsacks in the centre, and behind is the Clerk’s 
Table, furnished with two dispatch boxes, from which Government and main 
Opposition Party front-bench spokesmen speak.79
At the time of the establishment of its colonial Parliaments and of the Australian 
Conventions, the Lords chamber was (and still is) the very epitome of an ‘upper’ 
House with its extravagant architecture and traditions of grandeur and solemnity. 
 Facing the Throne and below 
the Table, are the crossbenches occupied by peers who adhere to no party. Apart 
from the woolsack, these traditions have been generally followed in most 
Parliaments and a table below the President’s desk is provided for the Clerks and 
Chairman of Committees, with an extension down the centre from where the 
leaders of the parties address the members. Not all Chambers are exactly the 
same; the table in the South Australian Council Chamber, for example, does not 
have an extension and the party leaders address the Chamber from their seats on 
the front bench. 
                                            
76 Commonwealth of Australia, 'Federal Parliament House Architectural Competition', p.9. 
77 Bradshaw and Pring, Parliament and Congress, p.61. 
78 Sir Harry Boyne, The Houses of Parliament, (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1981), p.38. 
79 Donald Shell, The House of Lords, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p.100. 
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As Crewe put it ‘The Lords chamber is infinitely grander than that of the Commons, 
with a spacious, comfortable and ornate debating chamber’.80 On entering the 
chamber the overwhelming impression is one of richness and colour and a wealth 
of fabulous and vivid mediaeval ornament. The amazing, golden, throne canopy is 
the glittering centrepiece and the rich, deep red upholstery, the deep blue carpet 
with two swords lengths picked out in red, dark carved wood furniture, panelled 
walls, vast paintings and rich ornamentation, enhance the dazzling effect.81
The English House of Lords, with its fretted roof and windows rich with the 
figures of departed kings, its majestic throne, its Lord Chancellor in his wig 
on the woolsack, its benches of lawn-sleeved bishops, its bar where the 
Commons throng at a great debate, is not only more gorgeous and 
picturesque in externals, but appeals far more powerfully to the historical 
imagination, for it seems to carry the middle ages down into the modern 
world.
 
In a book read by many Convention delegates Bryce described it like this: 
82
The past is everywhere: soaring arches, the luxuriance of sculpted dead 
kings sprouting from the mouldings, painted historical tableaux on the walls, 
marble statues of deceased parliamentarians. The ceremonies seem of 
another era, binding the everyday to ancient splendour; and the names, 
titles and families of some hereditary peers are a roll call of national 
history.
 
Crewe was also moved to purple prose by the magnificence of the chamber: 
83
Crewe saw the spectacle of the Lords chamber as presenting ‘a seductive version 
of the nation's history, apparently unfolding in perfect continuity from the place in 
which one stands’, though it also has some qualities which ‘jar on the nerves’: a 
‘public school atmosphere; elaborate architecture; and the historical 
 
                                            
80 Crewe, Lords of Parliament, p.1. 
81 Boyne, The Houses of Parliament, p. 38. Sir Robert Cooke, The Palace of Westminster: Houses 
of Parliament, (London: Burton Skira Ltd, 1987), p.135. The blue carpet referred to by Boyne was 
replaced in 1984 as an exact replica of the original to Pugin’s design. The two sword lengths 
according to Lord Cathcart (Hansard, 6 November, 1984) were omitted in the 1984 carpet as they 
were regarded as superfluous having never been needed in Lords. The two sword lengths are now 
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touch and no harm would be done. Lord Cathcart, Hansard, 6 November 1984. 
82 Bryce, The American Commonwealth, p.156. 
83 Crewe, Lords of Parliament, p.9. 
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associations’.84 The architects Barry and Pugin were responsible for the lavish 
decoration of the Lords chamber and for making it more spectacular than the 
Commons.85 We should note here that many of Australia’s Convention delegates 
had travelled to the metropolis and may well have visited Westminster, particularly 
Graham Berry, who had served as the Victorian Agent-General in London from 
1886 until 1891. Henry Higgins too, had spent some time in London on his 
extended honeymoon trip in 1886, and Patrick McMahon Glynn studied law at the 
Middle Temple during 1878-79.86
Following the tradition of the Lords most colonial Upper Houses are more 
sumptuous and grandiose than the lower houses. In Australia the most flamboyant 
example is in Victoria’s Council Chamber, which is a symphony of gilt and scarlet, 
with elegant pillars, elaborate carvings and decorations. Significantly, this chamber 
was the home of the federal Parliament for the first 27 years of its existence, which 
surely reinforced the predilections of many members, including many former 
delegates. The opulence of Victoria’s council chamber reflects the fact that the 
Parliament was built in an era of prosperity and confidence for the Colony, as a 
result of the wealth derived from the gold rush. The same cannot be said about the 
chamber of the Australian Federal Senate of 1927 which was constructed in an era 
of economic stringency and time constraints and followed the edict of the 
Parliament that ‘The Legislative Chambers and other apartments would be 
embellished internally with restraint’.
 
87 This was because the building proposed 
was not designed to be the permanent parliament building; that had to be 
postponed until more propitious times because of a lack of funds and time. 
                                            
84 Ibid., p.9. 
85 Shell, The House of Lords, p.100. 
86 John Rickard, H.B.Higgins: The Rebel as Judge, (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p.66; 
Gerald O’Collins, Patrick McMahon Glynn: A Founder of the Australian Commonwealth, 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965), p.15. 
87 Federal Capital Advisory Committee, 'Construction of Canberra: First General Report', 
(Melbourne: Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1920-21), p.11. 
As a 
result it is neither grandiose nor sumptuous. However, even in its simplicity the 
chamber echoes its patrician heritage, with faint reminders of the grandeur 
associated with the House of Lords, especially in the deep, red décor of the seating 
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and dark wood paneling, which combine to give it a quiet warmth and charm. Many 
traditions, rituals, symbols, and procedures were adopted from the Lords by 
Australia via the Colonial Parliaments, and they clothe the simplicity of the 
Chamber with an air of dignity. In 1988 the new Australian Parliament House also 
followed this ancient tradition, though in rather less rich shades. 
In the design of the Provisional Parliament House for Australia, many ideas were 
considered. Some participants in the enterprise spoke from their experience of 
international chambers, as well as the more familiar colonial examples. Architect 
Murdoch claimed: 
I have had opportunities of inspecting Parliament Houses in other countries 
of the world, notably at Westminster, Washington, Ottawa, Toronto, and I 
have also visited the Parliament Houses in Berlin, Paris, and Vienna.88
He was a well travelled man and from his experiences in regard to the chamber 
layout, and subliminally persuaded perhaps by the power of tradition, Murdoch 
favoured the British model of parallel benches facing each other. Lively discussion 
about the layout of the seats is recorded in the ‘First General Report of the Federal 
Capital Advisory Committee’ on 18 July 1921. Percy Thomas Owen, Director-
General of Works, argued for the ‘horse-shoe’ or U-shape, which he said ‘is much 
the better; each member is equidistant and … there is a much better distribution’.
 
89 
William Watt, then Speaker of the House of Representatives, argued that ‘it should 
be a semi-circular chamber, and not the rectangular one provided on the plan’.90 
Murdoch himself, as noted above, commented that he had seen many Parliament 
Houses and favoured the system used in the British Houses of Parliament because 
everybody can see the speaker.91
                                            
88 John Smith Murdoch, Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, 'Report Together with 
Minutes of Evidence, Appendices and Plans Relating to the Proposed Erection of Provisional 
Parliament House, Canberra', p.24. 
89 Percy Thomas Owen, Director-General of Works, Department of Works and Railways, in Ibid., 
p.2. 
90 The Right Honorable William Alexander Watt, Speaker of the House of Representatives, in Ibid., 
p.28. 
91 John Smith Murdoch, Ibid. 
 The seating layout which was finally 
recommended in the Report was that it be semi-circular and facing the Presiding 
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Officer who would sit in the centre of the long wall.92 Though this was accepted by 
Cabinet, in fact, the final design was for the U-shaped layout and the presiding 
officer in the centre of the rear or short wall.93 Despite an intensive search of the 
relevant records it is not clear when the change, subtle though it was, was made. 
The only clue is in comments in Hansard and elsewhere that the architects had 
long discussions with members of Parliament and the Presiding Officers and 
Officials, about the layout. This could have been when the changes were made.94 
The earliest plan of the new Parliament (1923) shows the U-shape pattern in the 
Representatives chamber but a blank on the Senate Chamber. Later plans from 
1924 all show the U-shape in both chambers. As far as I am aware the archives do 
not contain any plan that shows anything other than a U-shaped chamber closely 
resembling the Mother parliament.95
The chamber, opened in 1927, following the traditional style of Australian Colonial 
Councils, is oblong: the presiding officer is seated at one end with members 
arranged in rows in an elongated U-shape. The seats to the left and right of the 
president face each other across the clerks’ table in a straight line and then curve 
to the central aisle at the back of the chamber. Following the Westminster tradition 
Government members are seated to the right of the presiding officer and 
opposition members to the left, while independents and smaller parties take the 
cross-benches on either side of a central aisle at the apex of the U. In the centre is 
 
(Historic Plans for Australia’s Senate are at Appendix 3.) 
                                            
92 Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, Report Together with Minutes of Evidence, 
Appendices and Plans Relating to the Proposed Erection of Provisional Parliament House, 
Canberra', pp. xvi, xviii, 24. 
93 Cabinet Minutes, Monday 23 July, 1923, NAA: A2718, VOLUME I PART I. (This exact format is 
necessary to access the document via the NAA website.) 
94 See Senator Grant, CPD, 8 August 1923, p.2263; Federal Capital Advisory Committee, 
'Construction of Canberra: Final Report', (Melbourne: The Government of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1926), ‘Building Works’, p.13. 
95 A comment from the Federal Parliamentary Education Office argues that the U-shape is 
characteristic of Australian chambers and suggests that this is because it encourages debate and 
participation, but it does not say where or when it originated. Parliamentary Education Office, 
Parliament of Australia, ‘Senate Now’, 11 September 2007. 
http://www.peo.gov.au/students/now_senate. Accessed 11 September 2007. 
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the Clerk’s Table, from which Government and Opposition Party front-bench 
spokesmen addressed the Chamber. 
The six Legislative Councils of the Australian States generally exhibit their 
inheritance in rich decoration, though in varying degrees of grandeur. Though all 
have their particular characteristics, each 19th century Council Chamber reveals a 
general adherence to the basic layout and décor. In addition to the use of deep red 
leather for the seats and carpets, there are panelled walls, carved dark timber 
ornamentation and, in some, columns, paintings and sculptures. Even in the New 
South Wales building, the sumptuous decorations have successfully disguised the 
basic structure, originally a prefabricated shell of corrugated iron, with grandeur 
and dignity. 
(For illustrations of the Upper Chambers discussed see Appendix 4.) 
The Chamber of the Victorian Council is particularly grand and as a rich example of 
the several aspects of Australia’s debt to British traditions it deserves some extra 
consideration. It is the only Australian colonial parliament building which was 
embarked upon in an atmosphere of prosperity and confidence, though completed 
in changed economic circumstances which modified the original design but did not 
compromise the initial confident and optimistic tone. Easily the most ornate interior 
of any Parliament in Australia it loyally echoes the tradition of Westminster in 
exuberant style and the impact on anyone entering the chamber from any direction 
is tremendous.96
                                            
96 Robb, 'The Role of Sculptural and Architectural Decoration in Parliament House, Victoria', p.7. 
Plus fieldwork observations, 22-29 November, 2005. 
 The Chamber again follows the basic pattern of an oblong shape 
furnished in red and with galleries to accommodate the public and the press. 
Seating is arranged in the elongated U-shaped pattern and obeys the tradition of 
Government members seated to the right of the President and the Opposition to 
the left. Public galleries are at ground level opposite the President’s Chair and also 
upstairs around the sides of the Chamber, and the Press Gallery is at the 
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Chamber’s west end at ground level.97
The initial powerful impact on the observer viewing the chamber is created by the 
spectacle of the huge Corinthian monolithic columns of Tasmanian freestone which 
rise from the crimson floor.
 The woodwork is dark, polished Australian 
cedar, ornately carved, and the deep crimson upholstery is in keeping with the 
Westminster tradition. A table down the centre holds reference books and lecterns 
from where the leaders of the parties make their speeches. More than any other 
Council chamber in Australia, Victoria’s echoes all the grandeur of the House of 
Lords, lacking only the ancient connections and the hereditary and monarchical 
presence. 
98 Modelled by sculptor J.S. Mackennal, each is a single 
piece of Tasmanian freestone, fluted, cream coloured and rising to gold-leaf tipped 
acanthus capitals.99
The columns support a vaulted, coffered and enriched ceiling which for beauty of 
design and elaborate ornamentation stands unrivalled in Australia.
 The church-like ambience created by the columns is enhanced 
by two more columns placed at the eastern and western ends of the Chamber. 
Those on the eastern end stand on either side of the President’s canopy in the 
place where an altar would stand if this was a religious temple, and enhance the 
reverent atmosphere. 
100 Adorned at 
the sides by more sculptures and bas-reliefs, the richly detailed ceiling includes a 
myriad minor details and numerous references to assorted symbols of Government 
from Westminster and antiquity.101
                                            
97 K.J. Turnbull and Michael Cheshire, photographer, Parliament House, Victoria, (Melbourne: J.A. 
Fraser, c1976). 
98 Souter, Acts 0f Parliament, p.37. 
99 David Saunders, Historic Buildings of Victoria, (Brisbane: The Jacaranda Press, 1966), p.156. 
100 Jenkins, A Short History and Description of the Parliament House, Melbourne, p.31. 
101 Souter, Acts 0f Parliament, p.37. Robb, 'The Role of Sculptural and Architectural Decoration in 
Parliament House, Victoria', p.27; Saunders, Historic Buildings of Victoria, p.152. 
 Fitted into the roof spandrels are symbolic and 
allegorical figures, imperial Hanoverian eagles are perched on the arches at the 
west and east ends, and Tudor roses fill the panels of the vaulted roof. Running 
along the ceiling’s north and south sides are sculptures of female figures each 
symbolising concepts that the young Colony valued such as ‘Justice’, ‘Mercy’, 
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‘Wisdom’, ‘Victory’, ‘Statecraft’, ‘Architecture’, ‘Liberty’, ‘Fame’ and the ‘Horn of 
Plenty’ or ‘Prosperity’.102
The whole spectacle is crowned by the ornate, scalloped, pillared and carved 
President’s canopy at the eastern end of the Chamber facing the councillors. The 
canopy is a tribute to the Westminster cloth of estate and throne canopy.
 
103 Three-
dimensional figures of the Royal Coat of Arms, the gilt Lion with the Royal Arms, 
and the silver Unicorn supporting a shield bearing the Arms of Melbourne, 
surmount the canopy, and a representation of the Imperial State Crown rests on 
top of the pediment. Behind the President’s Chair is the Vice-Regal Chair used by 
the Governor of Victoria for the formal opening of each new Session of 
Parliament.104
In New South Wales, as in other Council Chambers, the dominant colour is red. 
There are red carpets, red upholstery, red curtains and red wall-paper. The 
panelling and furniture of Australian red cedar complements the red of the 
furnishings and gold glistens in the fabrics and from the brass fittings and fixtures 
to add splendor to the scene.
 The whole spectacle is a powerful statement of the pride and 
devotion of the Colony to its British heritage and firm adhesion to the traditions of 
the Monarchy. 
105
The chamber is the traditional oblong with a Presidential dais in a carved recess at 
the head of the chamber and the Imperial Coat of Arms above. They remained in 
position until replaced in 2006 by the New South Wales Arms: the present ousting 
the past. The seating was arranged in the confrontational pattern with a table down 
the centre aisle and followed the rule of Government members seated to the right 
of the President and Opposition members to the left. Cross-benches at the West 
end of the chamber facing the President’s dais were installed to accommodate 
 
                                            
102 Parliament of Victoria, 'Parliament House Victoria: Birth of a Building', p.18. 
103 Robb, 'The Role of Sculptural and Architectural Decoration in Parliament House, Victoria'. p.27. 
104 Ibid. pp.28, 36. 
105 Personal fieldwork observations on visits May 2004, November 2007 and discussions with 
parliamentary officials; Legislative Council, ‘The Chamber’, p.1, 
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/common.nsf/key/LCAboutChamber. Accessed 11 
October 2007. 
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independents or non-affiliated Councillors. In the centre of the President’s dais is 
an elaborate Vice-Regal chair. Four windows line the long north wall and there are 
galleries for the public and press on the ground floor and at the first floor level. 
Another gallery above the President’s dais is reserved for the press on one side 
and Hansard reporters on the other.106
The Chamber has, through its long life been bandaged, propped up, eaten by white 
ants, painted, and finally restored to its 1890s glory, and remains the meeting place 
of New South Wales Legislative Council after 150 years.
 
107
The Tasmanian Legislative Council Chamber, which the Council moved into in 
1856, is also magnificent, if smaller. Dominated by a high ceiling and clerestory 
windows, it is highly ornate and loyal to the Westminster tradition in all its grandeur. 
Following the standard pattern it is oblong and has red upholstery and carpets, its 
walls are panelled with highly polished New South Wales cedar and above the 
panelling the wall and the ceiling are hand stencilled in a classical design. The 
President sits on a dais under a cedar canopy facing the Members, who are seated 
on two rows of benches that face each other across the Chamber and with a centre 
table for the clerks. The Westminster tradition of Government Councillors sitting to 
the right of the president and Opposition Councillors to the left, is officially adhered 
to but, as a small Council with only 15 members (2008), members can choose their 
own seats, though generally the Leader and Deputy Leader of the Government sit 
to the right of the president and the longest serving members sit closer to the 
President.
 Designed in the 19th 
century the ‘iron’ chamber clearly demonstrates adherence to the Westminster 
example and loyalty to Britain in its presentation. The removal of the imperial coat 
of arms in 2006 suggests that it has taken a long time for this attachment to 
weaken. 
108
                                            
106 John D. Evans and Russell D. Grove, in Maisy Stapleton, ed., Australia's First Parliament. p.142. 
 There are no cross benches. A large portrait of Queen Victoria hangs 
on the southern wall opposite one entrance to the Chamber measuring 15 feet 
107 C.Brady, ‘Celebrating 150 Years of Democracy in a Big Tin Shed’, NSW Parliament, 
www.parliament.nsw.gov.au. Accessed 10 July 2008. 
108 Chilcott, 'History of Government in Tasmania', p.25. 
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(457.2cm) by 8 feet (1450cm) and with a handsomely carved and gilded frame it is 
a striking statement of loyalty to the British crown.109
Adelaide’s Council Chamber is more modern being completed in 1939. Before that 
the Council continued to sit in the original Parliament built for the unicameral 
Legislative Council opened in 1843. When the new bicameral Parliament building 
was opened in 1889 only the Assembly chamber was completed and the Council 
had to wait until 1939 to occupy its new building. After the Assembly moved to the 
new building the seating in the old chamber, now the Council chamber, was 
rearranged in the confrontational pattern along each side of the long wall with the 
President at the head of the chamber.
 
There are individual seats on either side of the President’s dais known as the 
President’s Reserve. Behind them and to the President’s right is the area reserved 
for the Hansard staff who record the debates. The corresponding area to the 
President’s left is reserved for members of the press. The public gallery is at the 
other end of the Chamber from the President’s dais and can be accessed by the 
public via doors to the left of the Chamber. The Tasmanian Council Chamber is 
small but splendid and has remained almost entirely in its original condition except 
for necessary maintenance. 
110 The new Council Chamber, opened in 
1939, was arranged in the traditional Australian U-shape. Again there is the oblong 
shaped space with red furnishings and carpet. Corinthian columns, fluted and 
cream coloured, support the ceiling, and galleries surround the Chamber on three 
sides on the ground floor and on four sides on the first floor, to accommodate the 
public, the press and Hansard reporters.111 A carving of the Royal Arms is carved 
into the door of the Chamber.112
The furniture, other than the President’s chair, is of Queensland maple, and was 
initially upholstered in brown morocco which has a red appearance, though now it 
 
                                            
109 Fieldwork observations and discussions with parliamentary officials, 15-19 January 2008. 
110 Stretton, The Life and Times of Old Parliament House, p.45. 
111 Fieldwork observations and discussions with parliamentary officials, November 2006, August 
2007; G.D. Combe, The Parliament of South Australia: An outline of its history, its proceedings and 
its buildings, (Adelaide: The Parliament of South Australia 1982), p.34. 
112 Ibid., p.35. 
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is of red leather to match the red carpet. The Presidential dais is at the northern 
end of the chamber between two columns and accommodates the Vice-Regal chair 
which is also the President’s chair. The absence of extravagant ornamentation 
conveys an atmosphere of calm and dignity and reflects the more recent date of 
the completion of the chamber in 1939, and the change in tastes away from 
elaborate ornamentation in the 20th century. Nevertheless the Chamber exhibits 
strong evidence of the influence of Westminster and plainly demonstrates its 
loyalty to the British tradition. 
Queensland’s Legislative Council no longer exists having been abolished in 1922. 
The Council chamber however remains and its Westminster heritage is evident in 
the original architectural features dating from 1868. It is more restrained than the 
Victorian chamber but an appropriately stately appearance is conveyed by its 
space and height and the four large windows on each side, which reach from the 
floor to the galleries above. The galleries extend around the room and have an 
equal number of windows on each side. They are particularly handsome with 
Colebrookdale railings. Coloured glass, imported from England, embellishes the 
doors leading into the Chamber, while the desk and chair of the President add 
gravitas to the scene from their raised dais under a separate canopy supported by 
four Corinthian columns. The Vice-Regal Chair was presented to the Parliament by 
Queen Victoria. Upholstered in red velvet it has the traditional carving of the 
imperial crown on the back panel. Over the chair and under the canopy, is a carved 
representation of the royal arms.113
The leather-seated benches for members, originally red, and the red carpet, 
followed the traditional colour of upper houses and the seating was arranged in the 
elongated U-shape with a central aisle from the entrance.
 
114
                                            
113 Fieldwork observations and discussions with parliamentary officials, 18-21 April, 2006. 
Parliament of Queensland, 'Parliament House, Queensland', (Brisbane: Parliament of Queensland, 
nd.) 
114 Ibid. 
 The walls were 
originally creams, stone colours and pale green and the original furniture, including 
the President’s desk and chair and the leather-seated benches, was made from 
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Queensland yellow wood and built by John Petrie’s firm in 1870.115
Western Australia’s upper house, dating from 1904, was a more recent 
construction than other Australian Council chambers but still closely followed the 
ancient traditions of Westminster: an oblong chamber with the seats arranged in 
the U-shape. An elaborate President’s canopy or recess, flaunts the Imperial Coat 
of Arms above, and a President’s chair with a carved crown, which also serves as 
the Vice-Regal Chair, within. In its place in front of the President’s desk is the time-
honored Clerk’s Table. The benches and carpets are red, although the carpet is 
more flamboyant than usual, with the red background chequered with Western 
Australia’s emblematic swans in black and white and Royal Crowns ‘giving a most 
elaborate effect’. A report on the opening of the chamber in 1904 comments: 
‘Above the galleries the walls and ceiling are pure white and the plaster ceilings 
have an embossed pattern’. The galleries are of jarrah dark-stained and varnished 
and extend around the room.
 The 
Queensland Legislative Council Chamber was a true descendant of the British 
tradition and would have been familiar to the Queensland delegates to the first 
Constitutional Convention in 1891. 
116
Across the Pacific things also genuflect to the Westminster heritage, in particular 
the Canadian Senate Chamber, which is known as the Red Chamber because of 
its traditional colouring. Opened in 1867 the chamber follows tradition, being 
oblong and with the seating arranged in parallel lines facing across the central 
aisle. Following the Westminster tradition, Government Senators sit to the right of 
the throne and other Senators to the left. There are no cross benches.
 They are open to the public, except for the gallery 
section behind the President’s chair, which is reserved for the press. 
117
                                            
115 Bruce Buchanan and Associates, 'The History of Parliament House, Queensland', Section.5.3. 
116 Brian de Garis, 'Constitutional and Political Development', in The House on the Hill, ed. David 
Black, (Perth: Parliament of Western Australian, 1991), p.87. 
 Second 
floor galleries extend around the chamber. Tall, ceiling height arches at the north 
end, frame the Speaker’s canopy, presenting a magnificent spectacle of crimson 
117 Senate of Canada Fact Sheet, ‘The Red Chamber’, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/about/process/senate/factsheet/redchamber-ehtm. Accessed 10 
July 2008. 
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and gold and conveying the reverential atmosphere of a church. Within the canopy 
an oak throne or vice-regal chair, upholstered in red velvet, displays a carved 
Royal Coat of Arms. A consort’s chair and the Speaker’s chair, upholstered and 
elaborately carved, complete the picture.118 A marble bust of Queen Victoria 
surveys the spectacle from a perch above the Thrones and below the gallery, and 
a mace lies on the clerk’s table with its crown placed in the direction of the throne 
when the Chamber is in session.119
Though not so obvious as in the Canadian Senate, traces of the traditional 
Westminster symbols are even present in the United States Senate chamber, 
mainly the red of the seating, though the configuration deviates from the standard 
pattern. The seats are arranged in a semi-circle facing the presiding officer at the 
centre.
 
120 His chair is set upon a two-tiered platform dais, and around him are 
various officers and employees of the Senate, who have defined roles.121 Great 
galleries on all four sides run back over the lobbies. One is for the President of the 
United States, others are for the ladies, the press and the public. There is an open 
space behind the senators for their visitors and members of foreign legislatures. 
There are no windows but light enters through sky lights in the ceiling.122
The buildings and Chambers in this analysis present a consistent concept of what 
a Parliament building and an upper chamber should convey to observers: clear 
statements of authority, power and awe. The influence of Westminster is clearly 
discernible in all of them and the influence of ancient Greece and Rome, though 
less apparent, are subtle reminders of the heritage of antiquity. All impart a sense 
of the inherent sacredness of sovereign power. The chamber of the 1927 
Australian Senate is a true inheritor of the Westminster tradition filtered through the 
colonial Houses, even though restrained by economic stringency and the ideas of 
its architect. From the influences of Westminster on the internal presentation of the 
 
                                            
118 The Canadian Houses of Parliament, ‘The Senate’, (Ottawa, Queens Printer 1953). 
119 Senate of Canada Fact Sheet, ‘The Red Chamber’. 
120 Bryce, The American Commonwealth, p.153. 
121 Mildred Amer, ‘Guide to Individuals Seated on the Senate Dais’, Congressional Research 
Service, Report to Congress, 6 December 2006, pp. 98-397. 
122 Bryce, The American Commonwealth, p.153. 
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chambers, the next chapter will survey the symbols and procedures, also derived 
from Westminster and which enhance the reverent atmosphere of the Chambers, 
to determine how they have been adopted for use in traditional procedures and 
ceremonies in Australia. 
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Chapter 8 
 
The Ritual is Real in Politics: Tradition, Ritual, Symbolism and 
Ceremony in the Australian Senate 
 
Politics is expressed through symbolism.1
In April 1901, Joseph Chamberlain, then British Colonial Secretary, wrote to the 
first Governor-General of Australia, Lord Hopetoun, to offer advice on the 
‘procedure to be followed in connexion with the opening of the first Parliament of 
the Commonwealth’ which was to take place on 9 May 1901. In great detail 
Chamberlain directed that the Governor-General, on the advice of his ministers, 
should appoint the necessary officers of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
as well as Commissioners who would administer the Oath to the members of both 
Houses. This would ensure that when each House met for the first time there 
would be the means of administering the Oath and a Clerk to call someone to 
move the election of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives. The more formal ceremony of the opening of Parliament by the 
Governor-General could then proceed in the traditional manner. The letter was 
copied to the Prime Minister of Australia, Edmund Barton. In this way the 
Westminster tradition was set as a precedent in the new federal Parliament.
 David Kertzer. 
2
The correspondence indicates that it was not only buildings and interior 
decorations, as discussed in the previous chapter, that were adopted by 
Westminster-derived Parliaments, but also colourful traditions, powerful symbols, 
elaborate rituals and impressive ceremonies from the House of Lords, even some 
dating from ancient times. These adaptations further emphasise the links and 
 
                                            
1 David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1988), p.2. 
2 Joseph Chamberlain to Lord Hopetoun, 14 March 1901, copied to Edmund Barton, 17 April 1901, 
NAA: A6, 1901/999. 
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continuity of patterns of ruling and government through the centuries. This chapter 
will examine the traditions, symbols and rituals of the Australian Senate to define 
their historical origins. It will argue that the most dominant traditions and symbols 
are derived directly from the British Monarchy via the House of Lords and some 
can be traced back to early Britain and antiquity. 
Tradition is a many layered word, generally interpreted as a set of inherited 
customs or practices carried out in certain circumstances, simple ones such as 
birthday celebrations or funeral practices, or more elaborate and public events 
such as the opening of Parliament. On a theoretical level Michael Polanyi has 
argued that traditions can be seen as being ‘transmitted to us from the past but … 
are our own interpretations of the past’ validating the significance of particular 
social situations.3 Raymond Williams defines the word in several ways including 
that of a general process of ‘handing down’ while entailing a ‘strong sense of 
respect and duty’ and that the word moves towards ‘age-old’ and ‘ceremony, duty 
and respect’.4 These definitions can be related to the actions of Australian 
Parliaments in uncritically adopting many of the symbols, practices and procedures 
of the British system, out of a sense of respect and duty, when they do not always 
make sense. The British legacy can be seen most clearly in the appointment, 
without question, of an Usher of the Black Rod in all Australian upper houses, an 
office which assumed the titles and dress of its English counterpart, even though 
its ceremonial relevance to the Australian legislatures was minimal. The theory of 
path dependence is again useful here to explain the practice. As Collier and Collier 
have put it: ‘sometimes what is presumed to have been a choice is in fact deeply 
embedded in antecedent conditions’.5
New South Wales set the pace in Australia in 1843 by consciously modelling 
parliamentary procedures on those of the British Parliament, relying on the 
 
                                            
3 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Critical Philosophy, (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1958), p.160. 
4 Raymond Williams, Key Words: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, (London: Fontana/Croom 
Helm, 1976), pp.268-9. 
5 Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1991), p.27. 
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‘encyclopaedic advice of May’s Parliamentary Practice’.6 This work was first 
published in 1841 and, constantly updated, remains the bible of Parliamentary 
procedure throughout Australia.7 In addition to May’s advice, and though each 
State and the Commonwealth adopted slightly different rules, Colonial Parliaments 
provided from the beginning that their procedures would be based on British 
practice. In fact it was usual to adopt outright ‘the Rules, Forms, and Usages of the 
Imperial Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland’ with the proviso that they could be 
changed, added to or otherwise altered in the course of business.8
In all cases not hereinafter provided for, resort shall be had to the Rules, 
Forms and Practice, of the Upper House of the Imperial Parliament; which 
shall be followed so far as they can be applied.
 The Standing 
Orders, which laid down the rules for procedures and practices for the Legislative 
Council of New South Wales for 1856, provided that: 
9
The reliance on British parliamentary practice was continued in 1901 when the first 
Clerk of the Australian Parliaments, Edwin Gordon Blackmore, who drafted the 
Standing Orders for both Houses, suggested to Alfred Deakin, then Attorney-
General, that the Standing Orders for the new Parliament should be drafted by the 
two Chief Clerks.
 
10 The first standing order of the resulting draft for both Houses 
read ‘In all cases not provided for hereinafter, or by Sessional or other Orders, 
resort shall be had to the rules, forms and practice, of the Commons House of the 
Imperial Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland in force at the time of the adoption 
of these Orders, which shall be followed as far as they can be applied to the 
proceedings of the Senate (or House)’.11
The force of the past is also evident in the United States legislature in the way 
traditions, procedures and nomenclature, were adapted from various sources and 
 
                                            
6 Carol Liston, ‘The Legislature of New South Wales’ in Maisy Stapleton, ed., Australia's First 
Parliament (Sydney: Parliament of New South Wales, 2002), p.62. 
7 Erskine May, Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of 
Parliament, ed. C. J. Boulton. Twenty-first edition, (London: Butterworths, 1989). 
8 See the Victorian Constitution 1855, Section 34. 
9 Standing Rules and Orders of the Legislative Council of New South Wales, 1856, Paragraph 1. 
10 E.G. Blackmore to Alfred Deakin, 14 January 1901; Deakin Papers. NLA MS 1540 14/559-60. 
11 Blackmore to Prime Minister, Edmund Barton, 22 April 1901. NAA: A6, 1901/1090. 
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blended to structure their Congress. Many paradigms were drawn from antiquity, 
even the word ‘Congress’ comes from Latin and the related words ‘congregate’ and 
‘gregarious’. J. McIver Weatherford, an American historian, argues that the 
continuity between modern Congress and earlier political forms is more than 
etymological trivia because, just as words preserve forgotten and obsolete 
meanings, so our political institutions preserve within themselves long-forgotten 
residues from our common tribal ancestry.12
As noted in Chapter 6, as well as the examples from antiquity the Americans also 
adopted ideas from Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des lois (Spirit of the Laws) and 
Aristotle’s Politics. They derived their Constitution from several sources: ‘the 
Magna Carta, the common law traditions of Germanic tribes and Roman legal 
theory’.
 
13 In addition, the United States’ House of Representatives was based 
closely on traditions from the British House of Commons and the ancient Athenian 
Assembly, and in choosing a title for the upper house of Congress they borrowed 
the name of the Senate of Republican Rome.14
The dependence on the past is also clearly evident in the complicated rituals of 
legislative practices, which are often supported by symbols and based on tradition. 
In the Australian Senate, tradition, rituals and symbols pervade many of the 
procedures and ceremonies which take place in the course of business and with 
which they enjoy a symbiotic relationship. In most cases they can be traced back 
directly to the practice in the House of Lords. In that splendid, gilded Chamber and 
cradle of much parliamentary procedure, many elaborate ceremonies evolved, 
together with ritualised behaviour and rules incomprehensible to the uninitiated.
 In the United States these 
examples make clear the powerful influence of the past and the seductive power of 
familiar forms and practices when structuring Governments, even when a rejection 
of much of the past is a theme in the process. 
15
                                            
12 J. McIver Weatherford, Tribes on the Hill, (New York: Rawson, Wade Publishers, Inc., 1981), 
p.21. 
13 Ibid., p.6. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Emma Crewe, Lords of Parliament, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 
2005), p.21. 
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The strictures governing who may or may not enter the Chamber and when, are 
almost inviolable and are articulated in its Standing Orders, which is almost a 
sacred text to peers, and provided the basic model for the standing orders of 
Australia’s parliaments. This irrefutable text is interpreted and administered by 
priestly clerks in wigs and gowns, who ensure compliance with the various 
traditions, such as bowing at certain times to those almost holy objects: the Cloth 
of Estate and the Mace, powerful symbols of monarchy.16
It is clear to any observer that, in the words of the parliamentary paper Balancing 
Tradition and Progress, ‘Ritual pervades parliamentary practice’.
 Not all of the traditions 
and ceremonies carried on in the Lords were adopted by Australian Parliaments 
but enough of them were to demonstrate a strong allegiance to the example of the 
Mother of Parliaments. 
17 American 
academic David Kertzer, in his work Ritual, Politics and Power, asked ‘What is it 
about ritual that is so compelling?’ Answering his own question he argued that it 
‘helps societies deal with many kinds of interpersonal conflicts that threaten to 
poison social life and tear the community apart’. Judicial procedures especially he 
found, from the simplest societies to modern nation states, are highly ritualised and 
the rites of the law court are not so very different from rites of the royal court. In 
both cases ritual works to ensure that the image of sacredness and of legitimacy is 
fostered, aggressive behaviour sharply contained, and lines of authority 
bolstered.18 Kerster argued that ritual helps us deal with the chaos of human 
experience and put it into a coherent framework. In the case of politics he was 
surprised ‘by the ubiquity of political rites and perplexed that scholars had 
attributed so little significance to them’.19
                                            
16 Ibid. 
17 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 'Balancing Tradition and Progress: Procedures for 
the Opening of Parliament', (Canberra: The Parliament of Australia, 2001), Section 3.17, p.26. 
18 Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power, p.132 
19 Ibid., p.x. 
 He further argued that studies of political 
rites remain underdeveloped and largely ignored by the mainstream of the 
discipline. Yet it is clear that politics are expressed through ritual and symbolism 
even if few political observers have ever taken it seriously, viewing ritual as mere 
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embellishment for more important or ‘real’ political activities. Little has been 
published on parliamentary ritual and that which has is mostly by the Parliaments 
themselves for educational purposes. Even the participants do not always find 
them a subject for serious discussion. That ritual is an integral part of politics, in 
modern societies as well as ancient, cannot be denied, and without it any political 
system would find it difficult to function.20
Though apparently meaningless in some situations, ritual is in fact an important 
instrument of society, but few people are aware of its subtle yet potent effects on 
participants and observers. One of its most common uses, especially within an 
organisation, is to socialise new members to the values and expectations that 
make up its culture and to instill inspiration and a sense of awe. In this way ritual is 
a significant part of Parliamentary procedure and is also found in many 
establishments from schools to social clubs. In modern western societies, and 
more so in non-Western societies, people associate ritual with religion or the law. 
This becomes clear when researching the word ‘ritual’ in library or search 
catalogues where the references are dominated by the anthropological aspect. Yet 
in modern society the processes of politics are encompassed by elaborate rites 
interacting with one another and with the public.
 
21
Major and minor rituals frequently interrupt parliamentary proceedings in the House 
of Lords. The most flamboyant and regular are the ‘Introduction Ceremony’ where 
a new peer is introduced to the Chamber and which can occur at any time, and the 
State opening of Parliament, which in Westminster occurs after a general election 
or every November when Parliament reassembles after the summer break. The 
‘Introduction Ceremony’ is for newly created peers who must be ceremonially 
introduced before they take their seat.
 
22 They are escorted into the chamber by the 
Garter King of Arms, Black Rod and two enrobed 'sponsors' chosen from the same 
rank of peers.23
                                            
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., p.29. 
22 Donald Shell, The House of Lords, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p.87. 
23 Crewe, Lords of Parliament, p.12. 
 Many other rituals take place in the Lords at different times, some 
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even daily. For example every sitting day begins with the Lord Chancellor’s 
procession into the Chamber and every year the Royal Assent ceremony, 
transforming Bills into Acts, takes place, as well as Prorogation, which brings the 
parliamentary session to an end. There are others less well known, such as the 
Lord Chancellor’s breakfast reception for the judges, which are not followed by 
Australian Parliaments simply because they are not relevant.24
The argument in favour of these time-honoured rituals is that they are important 
tools for ensuring the orderly conduct of business and transcend the perception of 
peculiar and repetitive actions. This applies especially to the ritualisation of 
debate—the key component of the business of the legislatures. The rituals of 
debate in most upper houses have a close similarity and are basically 
precautionary, to prevent unseemly behaviour, manage conflict and define the 
relationship of members to one another. They convey a principle of equality 
between the members, and are enshrined in the Standing Orders of each 
legislature following the practice in the Lords. Kertzer sees such rituals as ‘a form 
of rhetoric’ or ‘the propagation of a message through a complex symbolic 
performance’.
 Ceremonies, 
symbols and rituals are not so frequent or so elaborate in Australia, Canada or the 
United States, nevertheless they do exist and are regarded as important in bringing 
dignity, authority and a sense of community and consequence to the proceedings. 
25 They are emulated not only in parliaments throughout the British 
world but also in institutions from local councils to corporate Board rooms. E.P. 
Thompson called it ‘the clubbability’ of the English.26
In most upper houses debates were conducted by a Presiding Officer or a deputy 
and they too must abide by set procedures or rituals in the process. The office in 
the Lords was occupied by the Lord Chancellor, an ex officio appointment, or, in 
 It goes without saying that the 
Conventions themselves were conducted according to these rules. 
                                            
24 Ibid., pp.204-5. 
25 Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power, p.101. 
26 E.P Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), 
p.738. 
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his absence, by a Lord Speaker or Deputy Speaker. 27  The Speaker in the Lords 
did not intervene in debate or have the controlling power to maintain order as in 
Australian upper houses, but only announced the next amendment or called the 
divisions and put questions on motions submitted. Order was maintained by the 
members themselves obeying the Standing Orders and dealing as a body with 
unacceptable conduct.28 Bills were debated by the whole House ‘in committee’ in 
the chamber and this required the Lord Speaker or deputy speaker to hand over to 
the Chairman of Committees (or his deputy) who sat at the Table. The Chairman of 
Committees was a salaried appointment made by the House itself and the holder 
withdrew entirely from party politics. The formality of dissolving into the Committee 
of the Whole mostly signified that the rules of debate were less restrictive. The 
Lord Chairman was Chairman of all committees of the House of Lords, unless the 
House directed otherwise.29 There was no requirement for political impartiality on 
the part of the Lord Chancellor who, as a senior member of the Government, spoke 
and voted in the House and when the House went into Committee he moved to sit 
on the government front bench.30 Most Australian and Canadian Parliaments and 
the United States Congress have similar rules and procedures though the Senators 
address not the whole house but the President, who also has the duty of ensuring 
an orderly conduct of business. In Australia this is laid down in the Standing Orders 
drawn up in 1901 and this rule was introduced in 1925.31 In the Lords the Lord 
Chancellor had the added responsibility of sitting judicially in the Law Courts as 
well as other important duties in relation to the administration of the judicial system, 
but this was only the case in the House of Lords.32
                                            
27 There have been recent changes to procedures in the House of Lords but this discussion will 
focus on the situation at the time of the establishment of the Australian Federal Parliament as that 
would have been the model for the decisions of the delegates and officials. For a discussion on the 
recent changes see Meg Russell, Reforming the House of Lords, Lessons from Overseas, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2000). 
28 Crewe, Lords of Parliament, p.188. 
29 Shell, The House of Lords, p.95. 
30 Ibid., p.94. 
 
31 Standing orders and other orders of the Senate, Standing Order 186(1). ‘In speaking in debate a 
senator addresses the President, or the Chair of Committees in committee of the whole.’ 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/pubs/standing_orders/index.htm. Accessed 4 September 2008.  
32 Shell, The House of Lords, p.94. 
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Presiding officers are managed in a different way in Australia and Canada because 
of the different structure of the membership of their Houses: members are either 
nominated or elected, but have not inherited their seats as have the peers in the 
Lords. Nor is the Presidency an ex officio appointment; the holder is a senator and 
in Australia is elected to the office by the other senators. The role of Chairman of 
Committees is filled by an elected deputy President.33
Following the example of the Lords each upper house conducts debates in 
accordance with their individual Standing Orders. In the United States Senate 
these are known as the Standing Rules and they evolved slowly from the early 
days of proceedings and are not so obscure in their origins or rationale. For the 
Australian Senate E.G. Blackmore, (Clerk of the House of Representatives in 1901, 
and Clerk of the 1897 Federal Convention and the South Australian Legislative 
Council) drafted the standing orders for both Houses.
 In the Canadian Senate, an 
unelected house, the Presiding Officer, known as the Speaker, is appointed by the 
Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister. In all Australian jurisdictions 
the presiding officer controls the debate and also votes in divisions as an elected 
State representative. 
34 In 1885 he had produced 
the Manual of Practice, Procedure, and Usage for the South Australian House of 
Assembly, which was based upon ‘the Rules, Forms, and Practice of the House of 
Commons’.35 The Senate Journal 1901-2 records that Blackmore’s draft orders 
should be temporarily adopted until the Senate adopted those recommended by a 
committee to be appointed to prepare them. Senator Symon then suggested that 
those of either branch of any State Parliament should be considered by the 
committee for temporary adoption by the Senate. This was accepted and the 
Standing Orders of the South Australian Legislative Council were adopted 
temporarily.36
                                            
33 J.R. Odgers, Australian Senate Practice, Fifth ed. (Canberra: AGPS, 1976), Chapter 5. 
34 Blackmore to Prime Minister, Edmund Barton, 22 April 1901, NAA, A6 1901/1090. 
35 Edwin Gordon Blackmore, Manual of the Practice, Procedure, and Usage of the House of 
Assembly of the Province of South Australia, (Adelaide: E. Spiller, Government Printer, North 
Terrace, 1885), 
36 The Senate Journal, No.9. 5, 6 June 1901. Motion 7. 
 Section 50 of the Australian Constitution provides for the production 
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of ‘Rules and Orders’ for both chambers and all Australia’s Colonies had also 
provided for them in their first bicameral Constitutions.37
Some of the rules in the Lords have an obvious purpose, mostly to ensure that 
debate is orderly and courteous. These include forbidding peers to belittle or offend 
other peers: ‘All personal, sharp or taxing speeches are to be forborn’.
 
38
A Senator shall not use offensive words against either House of Parliament or 
of a House of a State or Territory parliament or any member of such House.
 This rule 
also applies in other jurisdictions though couched in different words. The Standing 
Orders in the Australian Senate state:  
39
In the Lords tradition obliges members to address the whole House, never an 
individual, not even the presiding officer, as all peers are considered equals.
 
40 
Other rules are more obscure and again are as much related to courtesy as to 
prohibition, such as the ban on walking between the Woolsack (Lord Chancellor) 
and the speaker, or rising when the Lord Chancellor or his deputy is on his feet. 
Nor may a peer speak more than once in the same debate, except the mover of a 
motion who has the right of reply. Other rules concern such things as always 
referring to other peers in the third person.41
                                            
37 NSW, 1855, Section 35; Victoria 1855, Section 34; Tasmania, 1854, Section 29; South Australia 
1855-6, Section 27; Queensland 1867, Section 8; Western Australia 1890, Section 34. 
38 Shell, The House of Lords, p.89. 
39 Section 193 (3). 
40 Shell, The House of Lords, pp.88-9.  
41 Crewe, Lords of Parliament, p.8. 
 A further refinement on this 
convention is that senior military members are always ‘gallant’, and senior legal 
peers always ‘learned’, members of the same party refer to one another as ‘my 
noble friend’ and relatives as ‘my noble kinsman’. Peers making maiden speeches 
are expected to avoid controversy to allow the next speaker always to congratulate 
them, and peers are not supposed to read their speeches, described in the 
Companion to the Standing Orders as ‘alien to the custom of the House and an 
obstacle to good debate’. However, this can be avoided by permitted use of 
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‘extended notes’.42 Rules of debate like these are also in force in the Australian 
Senate though worded differently.43
As has been noted the Vice-President of the United States acts as presiding officer 
of the Senate, an ex officio appointment in the same way as the Lord Chancellor is 
ex officio Speaker of the House of Lords. Unlike the Lord Chancellor he has no 
vote except a casting vote, if numbers are equally divided. Though he is the 
presiding officer, he is not a member of the Government, as is the Lord Chancellor. 
If he is not available the Senate chooses one of its number to be president pro tem. 
Like the Lord Chancellor the Vice-President has no authority in matters of order as 
such questions are held to be a matter for the Senate itself, as in the House of 
Lords. This is a difference from the Australian and Canadian Parliaments where 
the Presiding Officer is elected by the other Senators to the Presidency and 
controls the debate and also votes in Divisions as an elected representative of his 
State. When votes are equal the question passes in the negative.
 
44
Similar but less elaborate rules on naming apply in the United States, where a 
senator always addresses the Chair as ‘Mr. President’ and refers to other senators 
by their States, ‘The senior senator from Ohio’, ‘The junior senator from 
Tennessee’ depending on how long they have served in the Senate.
 
45 In Australia 
members address each other by name as there are more than two Senators from 
each State, an example of tradition giving way to practicalities. The quaint tradition 
or taboo which is common among the legislatures under discussion is that the 
other chamber must not be mentioned by name except in such a phrase as 
‘another body’ or ‘some other chamber’ in the United States or ‘another place’ in 
the House of Lords and Australian and Canadian Senates.46
                                            
42 Shell, The House of Lords, p.89. 
43 Standing Orders of the Senate, Chapter 31—Conduct of Senators and rules of debate. 
44 United States Constitution, Section 23. 
45 James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, vol.1, (London: Macmillan, 1889), p.156. 
46 Crewe, Lords of Parliament, p.89. 
 This is an example of 
the way traditions, which do not always make a great deal of sense, are carried on 
from the basic model of the British parliament. The reason for the tradition is 
unclear, but various sources have suggested that it originated in the British 
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Parliament and arose from the ancient friction and hostility between the two 
Houses.47 This is a taboo that has the effect of distorting speech patterns when a 
speaker is endeavouring to make a point without mentioning the main subject and 
can make debates even more incomprehensible to the observer.48
The most important ritual and the most dramatic, in the Lords and all other 
jurisdictions, are the Votes or Divisions, when the House must vote upon a Bill or 
amendment. Many questions are decided upon voices but others require a formal 
count. The formal procedure in the Lords begins when the mover of a motion says 
he wants to test the opinion of the House. The Speaker puts the question to the 
House and collects the voices to find if the peers agree or disagree. If this does not 
bring a clear result the division bell is rung to summon the other peers and remove 
strangers from the lobbies. The question is then put and the peers vote as ‘content’ 
or ‘not content’, by moving to the appropriate lobby where they are counted. This 
procedure is the essential part of passing or rejecting legislation and the 
culmination of a Bill’s, or amendment’s, progress into legislation.
 
49 The procedure 
is copied closely in upper houses in Australia, Canada and the United States.50
In contrast, the influence of the past on the use of symbols in upper houses can be 
interpreted on a less practical and more intangible level. Symbols carry a history of 
cognitive and emotional associations which makes symbolism a very powerful tool 
used and recognised by many organisations to maintain their identity and 
 
Voting practices, the actual decision-making process in upper Chambers, are 
almost exclusively based on the Lords’ example and are a paradigm of path 
dependence working through time, countries and legislatures. This is also evidence 
that tradition can be a genuine guide to efficient practice. 
                                            
47 Victorian Legislative Council, ‘A Sitting Day in the Legislative Council’, Information Sheet No. 14, 
Table Office, April 2005. p.4. Communication from the Assistant Clerk of the Parliamentary Archives 
in Westminster advised that its origin could not be established but the query would be referred to 
the Director of the History Trust. No further information has been forthcoming, 23 May 2008. 
48 Weatherford, Tribes on the Hill, pp.193-4. 
49 Shell, The House of Lords, p.91. 
50 David R. Tarr and Ann O’Connor, eds., Congress A to Z, vol.3. (Washington: Congressional 
Quarterly Inc., 1999), pp.444.5. 
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continuity.51 Symbolism can be seen quite clearly in the military, the religious, the 
legal and the political spheres, but, though not exclusive to Government, 
Government makes the most potent use of it in its routine activities. As Kertzer 
argues ‘The symbolic is real politics articulated in a special and often most 
powerful way’.52
Kertzer has forensically analysed the importance of symbolism in politics in his 
book Ritual, Politics, and Power and argued that it is ‘through symbolism we 
recognize who are the powerful and who are the weak’ and through the 
manipulation of symbols the powerful reinforce their authority.
 
53 This seems 
particularly pertinent to the use of symbols in Parliaments, where they are part of 
the ‘plethora of rituals and ceremonies, encrusted with symbols and decorated by 
splendid performances, that either constitute or punctuate business’ in the 
legislative chambers, and especially in the upper houses.54
Symbolism and ritual are natural partners and most of the symbols used in 
Parliaments are important components of recurring rituals. They provide the 
content of ritual which Kertzer has defined as ‘action wrapped in a web of 
symbolism’. It is the nature of these symbols and the ways they are used that tell 
us much about the nature and influence of ritual.
 The use of elaborate 
proceedings serves to intimidate, to overawe and also to exclude the observer by 
instilling a sense of deference and reverence. 
55
                                            
51 Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power, p.92. 
52 Ibid., p.5. n.24. 
53 Ibid., p.5. 
54 Crewe, Lords of Parliament, p.184. 
55 Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power, p.11. 
 The most prominent symbols to 
be found in Westminster Parliaments and which are discussed in this chapter are 
the Throne, the Mace and Black Rod, and the Bar of the House. There are many 
other minor examples but these will support my argument that the symbolism found 
in Westminster and echoed in other Westminster Parliaments can be traced to 
several motivations: history, path dependence, and an emotional attachment to the 
trappings of power. 
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The major symbol and certainly the most spectacular in the House of Lords, is the 
throne. Designed by Augustus Pugin (1812-1852) for the new Palace of 
Westminster, opened in 1850 and for which he was one of the architects, it was 
based on the throne of Solomon as described in the Bible: 
Moreover the king made a great throne of ivory, and overlaid it with pure gold. 
And there were six steps to the throne with a footstool of gold, which were 
fastened to the throne, and stays on each side of the sitting place, and two 
lions standing by the stays: and twelve lions stood there on the one side and 
the other upon the six steps. There was not the like made in any kingdom. (2 
Chronicles 9; 17-19, King James Version). 
As Riding explains, ‘the Old Testament description of King Solomon’s throne was 
of profound significance and demonstrated the biblical origins of kingship’. 
Solomon’s Throne was not faithfully reproduced in the new Westminster 
Parliament but this description provided a model for it and its setting as a symbol of 
‘supreme authority’.56 Both the provision and design of the British throne 
demonstrate the power and influence of antiquity on modern political symbols, 
carried through from Westminster to the several other Westminster style 
legislatures. The tradition of the throne in England goes back to the earliest times 
when one was provided for the king in Parliament. The basic characteristics of a 
throne were that it physically elevated the sitter above everyone assembled and 
had a footstool, a cushioned seat, a carpeted step or steps leading up to the seat 
itself, a canopy or cloth of estate and, finally, a dais placed before and/or below the 
seat. This ensured that the throne became the focus for royal ceremonial and 
protocol in the Chamber.57
The throne in the House of Lords is a grandiose affair and, enclosed in its 
awesome gilded canopy, dominates the Chamber. Complete with the basic 
elements of a throne, as discussed above, the chair itself is closely based on the 
early 14th century Coronation Chair in Westminster Abbey, a sturdy, foursquare 
creation with a gable back surmounted by a crown. Known as St Edward’s Chair, 
 
                                            
56 Christine Riding, ‘The aura of sacred mystery’, in Christine Riding and Jacqueline Riding, eds., 
The Houses of Parliament: History Art and Architecture, ed. Iain Ross (London: Merrell Publishers 
Limited, 2000), p.179. 
57 Ibid. 
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the Coronation Chair was first used by Edward II in 1308 and all subsequent 
Monarchs until Queen Victoria in 1838.58 The Pugin throne is made of gilded 
mahogany and embellished with glass, brass and embroidered textile and 
decorated with the richly embroidered Royal Arms and carved heraldic devices. A 
huge, glittering canopy, a solid structure of intricately carved and decorated wood, 
stands tall and dwarfs the throne and chairs below. Every portion of the throne, the 
chairs of state and the canopy are of the richest design, gilded and glowing with 
gold and colours. Riding describes the effect as ‘breathtaking’. Important 
components of the scene are the Chairs of State which are invested with 
decorations and motifs that declare their status; occasionally referred to as 
Consorts’ Chairs, they are for the use of Royal family members taking part in the 
ceremonies. The whole wondrous spectacle, visually amazing and spellbinding, 
also exudes a historical authenticity from its derivations from biblical legend and 
links with the past that transcend mere medievalism, and conveys an awesome 
sense of sovereign authority.59
The ancient tradition of a throne has been followed in Australian Parliaments and 
Canada in the more modest form of a Vice-Regal chair, to be used by the 
Governor or Governor-General when the monarch is not present. From this chair, 
in the various upper houses, the speech outlining the Government’s programme is 
delivered to the assembled Parliament at the Opening ceremony, a procedure 
which echoes the speech from the Throne in the House of Lords by the Monarch at 
the opening of the Westminster Parliament. Though vice-regal chairs represent the 
ornate throne in the House of Lords they can in no way compare with that 
magnificent gold, crimson and velvet creation—though the Canadian version 
comes close. Some chairs are more magnificent than others, but all are important 
symbols of British heritage and embody the main characteristics of the 
Westminster throne as ornate designs in fine wood with Gothic style carvings and 
 
                                            
58 Ibid., pp.186-7. 
59 Ibid., pp.179-187. 
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red velvet upholstery.60
Some variations in design occur. For example South Australia’s Vice-Regal Chair, 
which has been in use in the Legislative Council since 1855, also serves as the 
President’s chair and is surmounted by a richly carved representation of the 
Imperial Coat of Arms.
 In Canada the chair is actually called the ‘throne’ and in 
South Australia it was known as the ‘vice regal throne’ before it was transferred 
from the old Legislative Council chamber to the new one in 1939. As well as the 
Vice-Regal Chair there is usually also an ornate chair for the Presiding Officer, as 
in the Lords, where the Presiding Officer, the Lord Chancellor, sits on the 
Woolsack. The Presiding Officer’s Chair is also upholstered in red and of varying 
degrees of grandeur though on a less elaborate scale. It occupies a space 
immediately in front of the Vice-Regal Chair and is moved away on ceremonial 
occasions. 
61
                                            
60 Even the United States Senate at one time considered the installation of a (small) throne for use 
by the President. The idea was never implemented but the suggestion illustrates how strong were 
the influences of deeply held perceptions of a governing body. Weatherford, Tribes on the Hill, 
p.169. 
61 Gordon D Combe, Responsible Government in South Australia, (Adelaide: Parliament of South 
Australia, nd.), p.33. Personal observation on field work, 7 November, 2005. 
 This has been in use since 1855 and is of richly carved 
English oak upholstered in red velvet. It had originally been the Vice-Regal throne 
and was transferred to the new Chamber when responsible government was 
introduced. In a departure from the simplicity of the modern chamber, a Gothic 
carving of the Royal Coat of Arms, depicting the lion and the unicorn, adorns the 
back of the richly carved chair, plus a central crown. The evocative symbol of the 
Lion and the Unicorn is also incorporated in the richly ornamental Vice-Regal 
Chairs of New South Wales and the Canadian Senate, while other Vice-Regal 
Chairs (Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia and Canberra) are adorned with a 
crown to denote their royal links. The Canadian ‘Vice-Regal Throne’, as it is known, 
is an ornate affair with a massive, arched tall-back surmounted by a gable, as is 
the Westminster throne, and features carved gothic ornaments as well as the 
Imperial Coat of Arms. There is a consort’s chair similar to but smaller than the 
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Vice-Regal Throne and a heavily carved Speaker’s Chair with an upholstered 
buttoned tall-back and the Canadian coat of arms in a raised gold design.62
The most magnificent arrangement in Australia is in Victoria where the Vice-Regal 
Chair and the President’s chair are enclosed in an extravagant canopy which 
presents a microcosm of the decorative and ornamental scheme of the Council 
chamber as a whole, with Corinthian columns and decorative panels enriched with 
mouldings.
 
63 The symbols of the British Monarchy: the Royal Lion, the Crown and 
the Unicorn in separate sculptures surmount the canopy in splendid style. The 
Vice-Regal chair is of Australian cedar and its construction has been dated to ‘the 
last quarter of the 19th century’. It is identified by its carved and coloured crown 
and is ‘upholstered in maroon buttoned velvet’, while the President’s chair, also 
ornately carved, is upholstered in red buttoned velvet.64 Another magnificent chair 
is found in Tasmania’s Legislative Council and serves as both the President’s 
Chair and the Vice-Regal Chair. Dating from 1851 it was first used by the State 
Governor. Made of native blackwood the design is essentially of large cabriole 
pattern with the front legs terminating in lions’ paws and carved decorations of 
lions’ heads at the ends of the arms. A Royal Coat of Arms surmounts the 
buttoned, red velvet upholstered back.65
In New South Wales the Vice-Regal Chair, dating from 1856, was carved from red 
cedar. In the Louis Quatorze style it is upholstered in crimson velvet and has a 
crown carved into the upper back above the royal insignia to signify its royal status. 
Originally it was the President’s chair but is now only used by the Queen or her 
representative, the Governor of New South Wales.
 
66
                                            
62 Special Chair, Architect’s drawings, Chief Architect’s Office, DPW, ca.1878; Vice-Regal Chair, 
Consort Throne: 1.2:1; 1.2:2. Design for chair for Speaker of the Senate, T.D.Rankin, DPW, May 
1922, 1.2:3. 
63 Gwenda Robb, 'The Role of Sculptural and Architectural Decoration in Parliament House, 
Victoria' (Unpublished Masters Thesis, Monash, 1993), p.28. Also personal observations on field 
work, 7 November, 2005. 
64 Parliament House Furniture Survey from June 1984, Parliament of Victoria. 
65 Personal observations on field work January 2008. The Legislative Council of Tasmania, The 
Legislative Council of Tasmania; an Outline of Its History and Its Proceedings, (Hobart: Legislative 
Council of Tasmania, nd.), p.10. 
66 Stapleton, ed., Australia's First Parliament, p.133. 
 The President’s chair sits 
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directly in front of the Vice-Regal chair and in the centre of the chamber is the 
clerk’s table, described as ‘a very creditable piece of cabinet work’. All are made of 
red cedar and date from 1856.67
In 1927 the Australian Senate provided similar though plainer chairs for the 
Governor-General and Consort, of carved wood and upholstered in an ‘approved 
shade of red leather’ designed by the architect John Smith Murdoch. The Vice-
Regal Chair is appropriately surmounted by a carved crown and the consort’s chair 
is matching but unadorned. The President’s chair was presented by the Canadian 
Government in 1927. It is a plain but sturdy chair upholstered in red leather.
 
68 Thus 
does the Australian Senate acknowledge its British heritage.69
After the throne the Black Rod is the most visible symbol derived from the House of 
Lords and adopted by Australian and Canadian upper houses. A long, slender 
black staff of about 1.45 metres with silver or gilt ornamentation at the head, the 
centre and the foot, it is used as a symbol of authority. Though there are slight 
variations, the Rods are all very similar, each being black and having a head 
ornamentation, the Cap, surmounted by a Royal symbol and Emblem and attached 
to the upper section of the Rod by a silver or gilded casing. As the official was 
originally an officer of the Order of the Garter, the oldest and highest British Order 
of Chivalry founded in 1348 by Edward III, a representation of the Garter and its 
accompanying motto ‘Honi soit quit mal y pense’ (Shame to him who thinks evil of 
it) is often incorporated in the cap symbols. The foot sometimes has a gold 
sovereign as in the Westminster Rod, or other ornamentation, and the central joint 
is decorated with oak leaves or other leaf motif, for example in Canada maple 
leaves have been used.
 
70
                                            
67 New South Wales Parliament, ‘The Architecture and Decorations of Parliament House’, History 
Bulletin 2, 2007. 
68 Parliament House Senate Chamber, President of the Senate's chair, presented by the Canadian 
Government, NAA: A3560, 7644. 
69 The President of the United States Senate sits at the head of a two-tiered platform or dais and 
other officials are seated below in accordance with rigid rules which are almost as arcane as those 
of the House of Lords. (CRS Report for Congress, 6 Dec 2006). 
70 Jan Potter and Monique Grenon, 'The Usher of the Black Rod', (Senate of Canada, nd.), p.6. 
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The Rod as a sign of authority and a staff of office dates back to antiquity. Among 
the early Greeks a long staff used by judges, priests and military leaders as a mark 
of their authority, was known as the sceptre. In another example a bundle of rods 
bound about the shaft of an axe and carried before the Consul or High Magistrate 
were the Roman fasces, probably Etruscan in origin, and were the insignia of 
official authority. The bound bundle of rods represent the strength of a united 
republic and the central axe symbolizes authority with might.71 In Westminster the 
rod symbol has been seen in various guises—black and white rods, silver sticks, 
maces, sceptres, or the Field Marshal’s baton.72 The Black Rod has the same 
authority as a mace and the Usher of the Black Rod carries his in the course of his 
ceremonial duties which include as: First Usher of the Court and Kingdom; 
Principal Usher of the Order of the Garter; and Official of the House of Lords. In the 
latter capacity he is to maintain order, including the power to arrest a peer for 
offences noted by the House, and to serve as messenger from the Lords to the 
Commons. In all these capacities the officer derives his authority from the rod or 
staff which symbolizes that authority.73 In the Lords, he is joined by the Yeoman 
Usher and the doorkeepers, who as well as ceremonial duties, are responsible for 
ensuring that respect is shown for the chamber, its peers and their symbols.74
The duties of the Black Rod in Australia have deviated from that of the official in 
the House of Lords and been adapted to Australian requirements, the holder 
becoming the administration officer or also holding the office of Clerk Assistant, 
one of the senior officials of the Chamber. In Canada there has been an Usher of 
 
These, without the additional officers, are also the duties of Black Rod in Australian 
Parliaments, often with the added responsibility of managing many administrative 
matters. 
                                            
71 Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, Time traveler 2. A symbolic 
representation of the fasces was adopted by the United States and appeared on a coin from 1916 
to 1945, a bronze model is featured on either side of the United States flag in the House of 
Representative, and representations appear on the Seal of the Senate, among other places. Office 
of the Clerk of the House of Representatives: The House Chamber, p.1. 
72 Alan Mansfield, Ceremonial Costume: Court, Civil and Civic Costume from 1660 to the Present 
Day, (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1980), p.31. 
73 Ibid., pp.31-2. 
74 Crewe, Lords of Parliament, p.194. 
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the Black Rod since 1791 and that office is usually held by a person of military 
background, as in Westminster. In the United States the remnants of the tradition 
are evident in the office of a Sergeant-at-Arms in both Houses.75 They serve as 
protocol and chief law enforcement officers and carry out administrative functions. 
The name of the officer is clearly derived from Westminster tradition, and carried 
further by the officer in the House of Representatives who even carries a mace.76 
An Australian Black Rod was duly appointed to the Federal Parliament of Australia 
on Federation in 1901. A memo from E.G.Blackmore, Clerk of the Parliaments, to 
the Prime Minister dated 19 April 1901 advises that an officer, George Upward, 
had accepted the position and it was duly gazetted on 19 July 1901 along with 
other Parliamentary officials for the new parliament. Upward and other officials had 
transferred from the Victorian Parliament to the Federal Parliament.77 As well as 
the ceremonial aspect of the office, administrative duties form a major part of the 
duties of this officer in Federal Parliament.78
As an Officer of the House of Lords, Black Rod appears, from the 17th century at 
least, to have worn contemporary clothes embellished by the addition of the staff 
and badge and chain of office. From the end of the 18th century he wore official 
court dress in the House and at Court functions and in the 1908 edition of Dress 
Worn at Court he was ordered to wear in the House a black cloth court suit. The 
black rod and chain of office were added to the costume when on ceremonial 
duties.
 
79
                                            
75 The spelling used for this office is either ‘Sergeant’ or ‘Serjeant’ according to each parliament’s 
decision. 
76 Tarr, Congress A to Z, pp.381-2. 
77 E.G. Blackmore to the Prime Minister, Edmund Barton, 19 April 1901, NAA, A6, 1901/1000. 
78 Odgers, Australian Senate Practice, p.139. 
79 Mansfield, Ceremonial Costume: Court, Civil and Civic Costume from 1660 to the Present Day, 
pp.31-2. 
 The holders of this office in Australia and Canada also originally wore 
court dress on ceremonial occasions, except the South Australian official who wore 
evening dress with wig and gown. Most have now dropped the traditional costume 
in favour of contemporary clothing and the office is now open to women. In Canada 
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however the officer still wears a court type frock-coat and also carries a ‘fore and 
aft’ bicorn Admiral’s hat.80
Australia’s Parliaments adopted the tradition of a Black Rod at different times, 
mostly at the advent of bicameralism in the 1850s. Before that, as there was only 
one chamber, no Black Rod was necessary for communication between the 
Houses and a Sergeant-at-Arms carried out the other duties until the new two-
Chamber Parliaments were inaugurated. In New South Wales the Office of Black 
Rod was established in 1856 in accordance with the practice in Canada and Great 
Britain and it was adopted as the servant of the upper house as well as the 
President’s disciplinary officer.
 
81 A memo from the President of the Legislative 
Council in New South Wales in 1856 to Major Lockyer, the first Usher of the Black 
Rod, outlined some of the duties expected of him and made it clear that he, as 
Black Rod, was the senior officer in the Chamber in regard to keeping order.82
South Australia did not create this office on the advent of bicameralism and, from 
the inauguration of a bicameral Parliament in 1856, functions usually carried out by 
Black Rod were discharged by the Sergeant-at-Arms in the Council, an officer 
more usually attached to the Assembly. In 1953 Parliament was informed that the 
Sovereign would personally open a number of Parliaments in the course of the 
Royal visit to the Commonwealth in 1954. Buckingham Palace then advised the 
Governor of South Australia that traditionally the Queen could not enter the Council 
Chamber unless escorted by such an officer, who was traditionally the Monarch’s 
representative in Parliament.
 
83  Whereupon the office of Gentleman Usher of the 
Black Rod was created in the Legislative Council, later to be modified to Usher of 
the Black Rod.84
                                            
80 Usher of the Black Rod of the Senate of Canada, 'The Usher of the Black Rod', (Senate of 
Canada, nd.), p.6. 
81 Carol Liston, ‘The Legislature of New South Wales’, p.55. 
82 Alfred Stephens, President of the Legislative Council, to Major Lockyer, Usher of the Black Rod, 
25 August 1856. NSW Parliamentary Archives, No.56/7. 
83 Information from Trevor Blowes, Black Rod, Legislative Council of South Australia, December 
2007. 
84 See Legislative Council Docket No.22 of 1953 concerning the Royal Opening of the Parliament of 
South Australia 1954. 
 This is a clear example of the strength of the Westminster 
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tradition in Australia’s Parliaments and of the links to the British Crown, which 
remain a powerful influence on their procedures. In Western Australia the office of 
Black Rod was instituted in 1891, after the inauguration of responsible Government 
in 1890, and before the first sitting of the Legislative Council.85
The Rods themselves are pure derivations of the original artefact in the House of 
Lords where several versions have been used over the years from about 1361. 
The present Rod dates from 1883, some earlier Rods having been retained by the 
incumbents on relinquishing the office; made from ebony it measures three and a 
half feet in length (106.68 cm). The cap is a gold lion holding a shield and 
surmounted by a gilt and crimson enameled crown bearing the initials ‘E vii R’ 
(Edward VII Rex). The Garter, in blue enamel, with the motto of the Order in gilt, 
surrounds the Rod, and at the centre is a gold orb embossed with oak leaves, the 
basic design at the top and bottom. At the bottom the gold knob is surmounted by a 
1904 gold sovereign. The basic design of the Rod seems to have altered little since 
the 17th century and Australian Parliaments have continued the tradition with minor 
variations.
 
86
The Legislative Council of New South Wales has three Black Rods; the earliest 
dates from 1856 and was referred to as a ‘baton’ in the Sydney Morning Herald.
 
87
                                            
85 Correspondence with the Parliamentary Education Officer, Parliament of Western Australia, 20 
December 2007. 
86 Maurice Bond and David Beamish, The Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod, (London: HMSO, 
1976), p.15. 
87 Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 1856. 
 
It is of enamelled blackwood, capped with a silver crown and a silver band 
embossed with a kangaroo and emu and is 1.45 metres in length. No longer used 
as a functional symbol, it has been retained as an item of historical importance. 
This is what has also become of the Queensland Rod since the abolition of its 
Council (upper house) in 1922. The Black Rod in current use in New South Wales 
dates from around 1901 and is a wooden Rod, enameled Black, with a cap of cast 
silver, silver bands along its length and a silver ferrule base. The carved cap is a 
replica of St Edward’s Crown, beneath which, on either side and enclosed in 
sprays of wattle leaves, are two shields. One shield is inscribed with the letters 
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‘L.C.’ (Legislative Council) and the other bears an early unofficial Australian Coat of 
Arms. About 5.6cm from the base is a silver ornamented band within which the 
words ‘Legislative Council’ are engraved. A third Black Rod was presented to the 
Council in 1974 to commemorate the first meeting of the Council in 1824.88
South Australia’s Rod is 1.5 metres long, of polished ebonite and surmounted by 
the Crown. It has the Royal Arms in gold on one side and the State emblem (the 
piping shrike) on the other. On the occasion of the royal visit in 1954 the Black Rod 
was borrowed from New South Wales and was then used as a model for the new 
South Australian Black Rod which was delivered to the Council on 3 June 1954.
 
89 
Tasmania’s Rod is shorter than others at 75cm, otherwise it follows the standard 
pattern, though more closely relating to the Westminster Rod than other Australian 
examples. Made of ebony, it has a carved gold lion holding the motto of the Order 
of the Garter and the base is stamped with the Imperial Coat of Arms. The origin of 
Tasmania’s Rod has never been established, despite extensive searches in the 
Archives Office of Tasmania and the archives of the Parliamentary Library in 
Hobart, but it is believed to date from the inauguration of the bicameral parliament 
in 1856.90
                                            
88 Stapleton, ed., Australia's First Parliament, p.131. 
89 Information from Jan Davis, Clerk of the Legislative Council of South Australian Parliament, 3 
June 2008. 
90 Tasmanian Parliamentary Library Backgrounder, ‘Legislative Council Chamber’ in The Legislative 
Council of Tasmania; an Outline of Its History and Its Proceedings, November 2006, p.12. 
Information from Terry Newman, Tasmanian Parliamentary Historian, June 2008. 
 The Canadian version also closely follows the Westminster example. 
One metre in length, it is of turned ebony capped by a gold lion sitting upon a 
golden orb holding a shield and surmounted by a crown with the Royal cipher, over 
which is the garter bearing the motto of the order. In the middle is a gilded silver 
orb embossed with maple leaves and repeated at the base, and a 1904 gold 
sovereign embellishes the ‘knocking end’. Presented to Canada by the then British 
Prime Minister David Lloyd George, in 1918 it was to replace the original which 
was lost in the parliamentary fire of 1916. It cannot be substantiated that the 
original Black Rod was of exactly the same design as the new one as no 
documents or photographs of the original can be found, possibly also destroyed in 
Chapter 8: The Ritual is Real in Politics 
 
 
258 
 
the fire.91 The artefact of the Western Australian Parliament departs further from 
tradition than any of the others. Specially designed for Western Australia by the 
Crown Jeweller it was presented to the Council to mark the visit of the monarch in 
1954. Essentially the same as other Black Rods except it is surmounted by a 
golden swan and is without any Royal insignia or reference to the Order of the 
Garter. The lack of Royal insignia on Western Australia’s Rod is in contrast to the 
Parliament of South Australia which acquired its artefact at about the same time. 
South Australia closely followed the Westminster tradition in design, copying the 
Rod of New South Wales, while Western Australia departed from tradition to 
incorporate the state rather than the royal emblem at its head. This contrast 
suggests some distancing from the legacy of the British tradition and may reflect 
the passage of time and some weakening of the links with the Monarch. Before the 
acquisition of the new Rod in 1954 the officer in Western Australia’s parliament 
used a snooker or pool cue, painted black, for his ceremonial duty at the opening 
of parliament ceremony—an ingenious and economical solution to an unusual 
problem, and a determination to continue with the traditional ceremony in spite of 
the lack of the major symbol.92
Until 1951 Victoria was also without a Black Rod, although the office was 
established at the time of bicameralism. In 1951 a rod of wood and plaster was 
made and used but was too fragile for its ceremonial role of knocking three times 
on the door of the Legislative Assembly to summon the members to the opening of 
Parliament ceremony. Without a suitable implement the dignified Usher of the 
Black Rod had perforce to turn around to kick the door three times with the heel of 
his shoe; a different less ingenious approach to the problem than that of Western 
Australia. Dignity and tradition were restored and upheld when the present Black 
Rod was presented to Parliament to celebrate its centenary in 1952, which meant 
that Victoria was properly equipped for the Queen’s visit in 1954.
 
93
                                            
91 Potter and Grenon, 'The Usher of the Black Rod', p.6. Correspondence from France Belisle, 
Archivist of the Senate of Canada, 16 May 2008. 
92 Communication from Chris Hunt, Usher of the Black Rod, Western Australian Parliament, 13 May 
2008. 
93 Unknown, 'Presentation of the Black Rod', Industrial Victoria, September 1952, p.340. 
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Victorian Rod followed the standard pattern of the artifact. Made of fiddleback 
blackwood it is 1.3 metres long, and the head, foot and central joint are fashioned 
from sterling silver and gilded. It is capped by the Royal Coat of Arms and the coat 
of arms of Victoria in bas-relief, surmounted by a Royal Crown and attached to the 
upper section of the Rod by a fluted necking. The middle and base features of the 
Rod bear deep ornamental mouldings based on acanthus leaf designs and is 
tipped with an 1872 silver florin.94
The Black Rod in the Australian Federal Parliament was made especially for the 
Provisional Parliament building in Canberra, opened in 1927, and, as in South 
Australia, the design was based on the artefact used in New South Wales. 
Originally made of timber it was remade of ebony for the opening of the current 
(‘New’) Parliament House in 1988. Headed by a silver crown above the Australian 
coat of arms it is 1.37 metres long and is in three sections with plain silver bands at 
the centre and another about two thirds down engraved with the words ‘Canberra 
9
 Victoria closely followed the traditional design, 
again in contrast to Western Australia, which acquired its Rod two years later in 
1954. 
th May 1927’. The bottom of the rod has a silver cap.95
The mace is another ubiquitous and medieval symbol which lingers as part of the 
theatre of Westminster parliaments and also in the United States’ lower house. It 
has similar antecedents to the Black Rod as both are descendants of the tradition 
of staffs as symbols of authority. A mace is usually found in the lower houses of 
 
The various approaches to dealing with the tradition of the Black Rod illustrate the 
point of the unquestioning adoption of Westminster traditions for Australian 
Parliaments. The lack of such an officer in South Australia until requested by the 
Palace, and the improvisations of Victoria and Western Australia when there was 
no implement for the officer to perform the ceremonial duties, clearly demonstrate 
the strength of the forces of tradition and path dependence. 
                                            
94 Raymond Wright, A People's Counsel: A History of the Parliament of Victoria 1856-1990, 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.187. 
95 Communication from Andrea Griffiths, Usher of the Black Rod, The Senate, Parliament of 
Australia, 16 November 2007. 
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Australia where it is a dramatic symbol of Royal Authority and representing the 
authority delegated to the House of Commons by the Monarch in the past. It lies on 
the Table in front of the Speaker of the lower house when Members are in debate 
and when the house dissolves into the Committee of the Whole House it is placed 
under the table in accordance with House of Commons practice. It is carried in and 
out of the chamber by the Serjeant-at-Arms in a procession at the beginning and 
end of each day and must be in position before the debate can proceed. This 
procedure also applies in the House of Lords, which has two Maces because the 
Lord Chancellor is both Speaker and Lord Chancellor. The Lords’ Mace is carried 
in a procession into the Chamber by the Yeoman Usher (of the Black Rod, deputy 
to the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod), placed on the Woolsack behind the 
Lord Chancellor and remains there during the debate.96
A mace is a staff with a massive metal head directly derived from a primitive war 
club originally designed to pierce armour and was a weapon allowed to medieval 
clerics who were forbidden to shed blood by the sword. It became ornate and richly 
decorated as it came into ceremonial use.
 
97 The tradition of a mace in the upper 
house is only otherwise observed in Canada where it is placed on the table in the 
Senate when the chamber is in session. It lies on the table with its crown placed in 
the direction of the throne (chair). Made of brass and gold, the 1.6 metre long mace 
dates from the mid-19th century and is carried into the Chamber during the 
Speaker’s Parade which starts and ends each sitting of the Senate—another 
example of continuing the traditions of the House of Lords but one that has not 
been followed by the Australian Parliaments, where the mace is a symbol only in 
the lower houses.98
The Black Rod and the mace are both visible and important icons in the 
proceedings of Parliaments. A third icon, the Bar of the House, is less obvious or 
ornamental, though that in the House of Lords is quite large and ornate. It is at the 
entry into the Chamber opposite the Throne and is a potent symbol of exclusion 
 
                                            
96 Crewe, Lords of Parliament, p.186. 
97 Clerk of the Senate of Canada, 'The Senate Mace', (Unpublished: c.1966.). 
98 Ibid. 
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and privilege. It serves to define where the Upper Chamber begins and beyond 
which only Members and Clerks can pass. It is also to this Bar that witnesses and 
persons ordered into custody for breach of privilege are brought and where 
counsel stand when pleading before the House. The exclusion aspect of the Bar is 
most evident at the ceremony of the Opening of Parliament when members of the 
House of Commons are summoned to the Lords Chamber to hear the speech from 
the throne.99
All Westminster Parliaments follow this tradition, though in a more modest style 
and in the different upper chambers the Bar is either a low door or gate. In the case 
of the House of Lords it is a panelled construction about three feet (91.44cm) high, 
nine feet (2.74m) wide and three (91.44cm) deep with posts at each corner and an 
enclosed space for the Speaker when attending the opening of Parliament 
ceremony. It is decorated with symbols, the monogram V.R. (Victoria Regina) and 
small figures of the lion and the unicorn holding shields surmount the two inner 
posts.
 They are not permitted beyond the Bar, but have to jostle 
uncomfortably together in the small space to face the monarch to listen to the 
speech from the throne. 
100 Behind it is a metal rail which can be opened to allow the MPs to 
assemble closer to the Bar on ceremonial occasions.101
This symbol is present in all Australian upper chambers and Canada, and is a 
direct derivation from the House of Lords, though none are so grand, and in 
several Councils it is represented by a brass rail which can be closed or retracted, 
as in the House of Commons. This is true of South Australia and Tasmania. In New 
South Wales it is a brass gate, in Queensland it no longer exists, though a 
photograph of the Chamber circa 1869 shows that there was a bar, although it is 
not clear what it was made of, how it worked, or what shape it was.
 
102
                                            
99 Crewe, Lords of Parliament, p.211. 
100 Sir Robert Cooke, The Palace of Westminster: Houses of Parliament, (London: Burton Skira Ltd, 
1987), p.144. Arnold Wright and Philip Smith, Parliament Past and Present, a popular and 
picturesque account of a thousand years in the Palace of Westminster, the home of the mother of 
Parliaments, (London, Hutchinson & Co., 1902), p.244. 
101 Information from the House of Lords Information Office, 20 November, 2007. Crewe, Lords of 
Parliament, p.211. 
102 Correspondence from Joanna Fear, Research librarian, Queensland Parliament, 10 May 2008. 
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Canadian Senate it is a brass railing just inside the main entrance and across two 
passages on either side of the Clerks’ Table. A wooden barrier covers the central 
section. In Victoria it is an elaborately carved gate rather than a rail but ‘there is a 
place where a rail, may be placed, if required’.103 In Western Australia it is a brass 
bar some 8cm in diameter which can be withdrawn into the wooden balustrade at 
the entrance to the chamber.104 The Bar of the Australian Senate in the 1927 
Provisional Parliament House, is composed of two simply carved, waist high doors 
of blackbean and blackwood, across the central entrance of the Chamber opposite 
the President’s chair. The Report which describes the Bar also mentions that they 
will be placed in ‘a similar position to those in the present senate’.105
The Bar is most prominent at the remarkable and historic ceremony of the Opening 
of Parliament held in all Westminster Parliaments. This is a tradition which shows 
the disjunction between the ‘Commons political primacy and ceremonial inferiority’, 
and is no longer really a valid procedure, yet it endures, sustained by the strength 
of tradition and supported by elaborate and spectacular ritual and symbolism.
 At that time 
the Senate sat in the Victorian Council Chamber and this remark demonstrates 
again the dependence on past practice in the design of Legislative chambers. 
106
                                            
103 Clerk of the Parliaments, The Parliament of Victoria and Parliament House, (Melbourne: 
Parliament of Victoria, 1985), p.21. 
104 Correspondence from the Parliamentary Education Office, Parliament of Western Australia, 20 
December 2007. 
105 Federal Capital Advisory Committee, 'Construction of Canberra, First General Report', 
(Melbourne: The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1921), p.4. 
106 Crewe, pp.211-12. 
 In 
this ceremony the members of the lower house are invited to the upper house 
chamber to hear the Governor deliver the speech from the Vice-Regal Chair which 
announces the Government’s programme. The House of Lords’ practice of keeping 
the lower house members outside the Bar is not followed in all Australian 
Parliaments or the Canadian Senate, which underlines the anachronistic nature of 
the procedure. For reasons of comfort and space, except for Tasmania and 
Victoria, members of the lower houses are invited into the chamber to hear the 
speech from the Governor, and in the Federal Parliament they have always been 
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accommodated in the Chamber to hear the speech from the Governor-General.107 
In Tasmania’s Parliament they are accommodated behind the Bar on specially 
provided seats and in Victoria they assemble at the Bar of the House, or other 
vantage points at the side of the chamber, but are not allowed to enter the floor of 
the House. There are exceptions to this rule in Victoria, and the Speaker, Premier, 
Deputy Premier and Leader of the Opposition and Deputy Leader of the Opposition 
parties are assigned seats on the floor of the House, a departure from traditional 
practice in favour of preserving the dignity of senior members of the lower 
house.108 In Western Australia members of the House of Representatives enter the 
Council chamber via the withdrawn bar to stand behind the back row of Council 
seats. In South Australia they enter the chamber and take seats at the rear while 
Councillors sit at the front.109
Ceremony is a traditional aspect that plays an important part in the proceedings of 
all upper houses and again the major example, indeed the progenitor, of many of 
the ceremonies that occur in Australian Parliaments can be traced back to 
Westminster. Yet ceremony is sometimes dismissed as being of little 
consequence. Goldwin Smith, the Canadian historian, saw the Canadian Senate 
as surrounded with ‘derisive state’ and that the ceremonious environment was 
‘merely the trappings of impotence’.
 
110 Others regard ceremonies as integral to the 
parliamentary institution but consider that they need to be inspiring and dignified as 
well as honest and meaningful to participants and observers.111
                                            
107 Correspondence from Andrea Griffiths, Usher of the Black Rod, Parliament of Australia, 3 
December 2007. 
108 Information from John Breukel, Senior Reference Librarian, Parliament of Victoria, 19 November 
2007. 
109 Communication from the Chris Hunt, Usher of the Black Rod, Parliament of Western Australia, 
20 December 2007, and Trevor Blowes, Black Rod, Parliament of South Australia, 19 November, 
2007. 
110 J.A. Marriott, Second Chambers–an Inductive Study in Political Science, (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1910), pp.142-3. 
111 Parliament of Australia, 'Balancing Tradition and Progress: Procedures for the Opening of 
Parliament', Section 3.44, p.33. 
 There is also a 
strong emotional component in ceremony in that impressive ceremonies can move 
an observer in ways that rational discussion cannot. In this way the most public 
and regular ceremony, as well as the most impressive, in the House of Lords is, 
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again, the opening of Parliament ceremony, held when the Monarch from her 
throne, opens a new Parliament in the Lords Chamber. Such a glorious spectacle 
moves observers to feel awe and respect for the participants and, through them, 
for the institution, as well as inspiring loyalty to the system. The British Parliament 
opening ceremony takes place in London annually in November, or at the opening 
of a new parliament after an election. Australian and Canadian Parliaments also 
faithfully stage this ceremony, though in modified style and usually only at the 
inauguration of a new Parliament. Nor is it such a public spectacle as in 
Westminster—Governors and the Governor-General arrive at Parliament in 
limousines and then disappear into the building where the ceremony is carried out 
before invited guests.112
The spectacular and awesome ceremony is imbued with ritual and symbols. In 
London it begins with a royal procession and the Monarch’s royal progress through 
the streets of London in her golden coach. Ensconced on her throne the Monarch 
then sends Black Rod to the Commons to fetch the Members of Parliament. This is 
followed by the ritual of the Serjeant-at-Arms slamming the door of the Commons 
in Black Rod’s face, who then knocks three times with his Rod to demand entrance 
and request the members’ attendance on the Monarch in the Lords. The hostile 
reception by the Commons is intended to indicate its independence from the 
Crown and that never again will a monarch so overreach his authority as Charles I 
did in 1642, precipitating civil war by riding to Parliament to arrest five MPs.
 
113 After 
responding to the summons and arriving at the Lords’ Chamber, the MPs have to 
crowd together with the Speaker in the centre, in the small space between the 
entrance and the bar, at the opposite end of the Chamber from the Monarch to 
listen to the speech from the throne outlining the Government’s programme.114
                                            
112 This elaborate ceremony has no place in the United States Congress due to the different 
relationships between their two houses and the different structure of their legislatures. 
113 Crewe, Lords of Parliament, p.211. 
114 Ibid. 
 
Crewe has colourfully described the opening ceremony in the Lords as a glittering 
occasion: ‘The State opening of Parliament in London, when the monarch, who has 
iconic status in the Chamber, gathers her Lords about her and sheds stardust of 
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almost superhuman status over them’ and within the Lords’ Chamber spectacle 
dominates the proceedings.115
The opening ceremony began almost accidentally with the acquisition of York 
Palace (later Whitehall Palace) by the king, which gave him a new and more 
convenient residence only a few hundred yards from the Palace of Westminster. 
When Parliament opened in 1536, the King and the Lords rode from York Palace to 
the Palace of Westminster and Parliament was opened in the then White Chamber, 
or House of Lords, instead of in the Painted Chamber as before. The origin of the 
current Westminster ceremony and the role of Black Rod originated in the early 
17th century when the Usher of the Black Rod summoned the House of Commons 
to attend the sovereign in the House of Lords. This was a period of conflict and civil 
war between the Commons and the King and it became tradition to close the door 
of the Commons Chamber in the face of Black Rod who then used his Rod to 
knock on the door three times for admission. This ritual is re-enacted at every 
Opening of Parliament in Britain and in Australia and as a reminder of the authority 
and independence of Parliament from the sovereign.
  
116 The ritual opening of 
Parliament, emulating the custom of the British Houses of Parliament, began in 
Australia in New South Wales in 1856 with the establishment of the bicameral 
legislature and the tradition has been followed by all the colonial parliaments 
since.117
Thus began, with occasional deviations, the regular practice of opening parliament 
in the upper house (or House of Lords), which continues to the present day and is 
copied by the Australian Parliaments and the Canadian Parliament with tradition 
being the only justification for such an elaborate ceremony.  Here is a clear case of 
the adoption of tradition as in path dependence though based upon a genuine 
legacy from the Westminster institution.
 
118
                                            
115 Ibid., p.22. 
116 Liston, ‘The Legislature of New South Wales;’ p.55. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Henry S. Cobb, 'The Staging of Ceremonies in the House of Lords', in The Houses of 
Parliament: History Art Architecture, 2000), p.35. 
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The opening of the first Australian Commonwealth Parliament was a challenge for 
the officials and Parliamentarians and, as discussed above, advice was provided to 
the Governor-General, Lord Hopetoun by Joseph Chamberlain and passed on to 
the Prime Minister. The letter reveals that it was planned to follow tradition in this 
matter in Federal Parliament as in the colonial legislatures. At this stage there was 
also much agitation over whether the Prince of Wales could open the first 
Parliament in 1901, as the Constitution clearly stated that this was the prerogative 
of the Governor-General. The problem was overcome by the Prince making a 
welcome speech and the Governor-General opening Parliament.119
Further advice on procedure was also sought in 1903 by Blackmore, the Clerk of 
the Senate, from the Clerk of the Parliaments in Westminster (H.J.L. Graham). In a 
long and detailed reply Graham advised of daily procedure in the Lords’ Chamber 
as carried out in the Westminster Parliament.
 
120 The correspondence is clear 
evidence of the derivative nature of parliamentary ceremony in Australia, ceremony 
which, according to a paper by the House of Representatives, brings to members a 
sense of a new beginning, unified purpose, commitment to their electors and to 
their role, and a connection with the institution of Parliament, its long history and 
the struggle to achieve democracy.121
A further important example of the derivation of practice, demonstrating how ritual 
can become a major element of the business and proceedings of an ancient and 
continuing institution, is the number of officials who carry out the administrative 
duties required for Parliaments to function smoothly. The major players in the 
drama of upper houses are, of course, the members, elected or appointed, but they 
are supported by an army of administrators and officials, many of whose offices 
date back to medieval times and the traditions of the Lords, as shown in the case 
of the Black Rod. Some of these traditional offices are undertaken by elected 
members of the House while others are professional appointments. Among the 
 
                                            
119 Hopetoun to Barton, February 1901.Barton Papers, NLA ms-ms51-1-761-s1. 
120 H.J.L. Graham to E.G.Blackmore, 28 July 1903, NAA, A6, 1901/1090 
121 Parliament of Australia, 'Balancing Tradition and Progress: Procedures for the Opening of 
Parliament', p.26. 
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official roles carried out by members of Australian and Canadian Parliaments, 
which includes the President and the Deputy President, is that of the party ‘whips’ 
an office which is an exact derivation of the tradition in the House of Lords. The 
term ‘whip’ derives from the foxhunting tradition of having a whipper-in for the fox 
hounds to prevent them from straying off on their own business and aptly describes 
the main duty of the parliamentary party whips, who are appointed by their party 
and, as well as managing other business in the Chamber, keep track of the party 
members to ensure that they are present for the all important business of voting in 
divisions.122
The most important professional officials of the House are the Clerks, also derived 
from the practice in the Lords. Not all of the officials in the House of Lords were 
adopted by the Australian Parliaments but, as Reid and Forrest explain, ‘Only one 
or two of the more esoteric positions failed to make the journey, presumably on the 
grounds of economy and size’ but enough of them were to prove the point that path 
dependence was a strong factor in their adoption.
 
123 In the Lords the Clerk of the 
House is also the Clerk of the Parliaments and there is a Deputy Clerk and a 
number of Assistant Clerks with varying responsibilities. Clerks service select 
committees, ensure that formal records are kept and prepare the order papers for 
each day’s business.124 The practice is followed almost exactly in the Australian, 
Canadian and United States Senates. The Melbourne Argus reported in 1901 that 
George Jenkins, Clerk of the House, and E.G.Blackmore, Clerk of the Senate, had 
discussions with the Prime Minister, Edmund Barton concerning the officers 
required for both houses of the new Federal Parliament and ‘settled the issue’.125
This is not an exhaustive account of the support staff and there are other 
apparently minor appointments, such as ‘Doorkeepers’ which have evolved into 
significant officials. ‘Doorkeepers’ were first appointed to supervise who came in 
 
                                            
122 Kenneth Bradshaw and David Pring, Parliament and Congress, (London: Quartet Books, 1972), 
p.30. Party whips also feature in the United States Senate. 
123 G.S. Reid and Martyn Forrest, Australia's First Commonwealth Parliament, (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1989), p.399. 
124 Shell, The House of Lords, p.97. Weatherford, Tribes on the Hill, p.222. 
125 Argus, 15 April 1901. 
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and left the chamber and to guard the Chamber doors when a division was called. 
In the Lords they wear white ties and tailcoats and a large gold badge for 
identification. This office has not been adopted in Australian Councils or the Senate 
but it has been adopted in the United States Congress. 
A final example of the strength of tradition is in the name of the formal record, 
which in the Lords is known as Hansard because it was initially printed by Thomas 
Curson Hansard from 1809. The name has remained even though the production 
was taken over by Parliament in 1909. The clinging to the name by later Australian 
and Canadian Parliaments prolongs the tradition for no logical reason and, though 
the name is different in the United States, the tradition of keeping a record is 
adhered to in the Congressional Record. Though this is, at first glance, a practical 
procedure rather than just another ritual, Weatherford saw it not as an account of 
the decision-making process but an account of the ritual process.126
This summary of the principal symbols, rituals and ceremonies included in 
Australia’s parliamentary practices is an attempt to trace their origins and 
purposes. It is clear from the foregoing that the influence of Westminster has been 
powerful and almost inescapable, even when impractical. The examples chosen 
show clearly the legacy of Westminster in the Parliaments of Australia, Canada 
and the United States. The phenomenon is not unique to Legislatures and can be 
found in other organisations which have existed for many years. What is different is 
the transfer of symbols, rituals and ceremonies, almost unchanged, across 
continents and cultures and even centuries. Even though Westminster-style 
parliaments all legitimately claim an inheritance from Great Britain, it is notable that 
many of the adoptions are all but meaningless in their new location, except that 
they add theatre and importance and a display of authority. They can be traced to 
many factors: tradition; the Westminster legacy; the desire to belong to a greater 
whole; and the fact they are part of a tradition long established. The most powerful 
influence that emerged from close scrutiny was the emotional reward derived from 
 
                                            
126 Weatherford, Tribes on the Hill, p.200. 
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replicating age-old icons and customs that establish continuity and maintain 
reassuring links with the past. 
Conclusion: The Upper House we Had to Have 
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Conclusion: The Upper House we Had to Have 
The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.1
In addition, many delegates, cautious and conservative as they were, were 
unnerved by the prospect of untrammelled democracy. An upper house was 
frequently seen as a protection against the masses and necessary to restrain the 
impulsive democratically elected lower house by acting as a ‘counterpoise to 
democratic fervour’ and to ‘limit potential excesses of first chambers’.
 Karl 
Marx. 
 
Why does Australia have a Senate? This thesis has argued that the heart ruled, in 
part, the head. The men who created the Senate had a deep attachment to Britain 
and its institutions and many were seduced by the historical authority of the House 
of Lords. They could see themselves sitting on its red leather benches. Moreover 
the overwhelming number of delegates had cut their political teeth in bicameral 
colonial parliaments. To depart from this basic model would be to turn their backs 
on themselves. At the same time they felt able to adjust the structure of the system 
to some degree by the example of the mother of parliaments itself. The frequent 
reference to the Reform Act of 1832 underscores their belief that the British 
Constitution was organic. 
2
There were other influences, of course, many of them practical and stemming from 
the delegates’ own parliamentary experience. The passionate debate that led to 
the provision of a method of dealing with deadlocks between the Houses, for 
  
                                                 
1 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte:with explanatory notes, (New York: New 
York, International Publishers, 1964), p.15. 
2 J.A. Marriott, Second Chambers - an Inductive Study in Political Science (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1910), p.3. Donald Shell, The House of Lords, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp.1-
2. 
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example, clearly revealed the delegates’ experience of such conflict in their 
Colonial Parliaments, where it had sometimes threatened the stability of 
Government. The method finally arrived at was a cumbersome process, daunting 
in its final solution of a dissolution of both houses followed by a general election. 
The possibility of conflict was recognised by the delegates and demonstrates the 
inherent instability of bicameralism which is strongly influenced by the composition 
of the upper house. The decision to have an elected Senate for Australia grew out 
of this possibility, in that upper houses elected on other than a democratic basis 
can be perceived as inequitable. 
Another finding refutes the assumption held by many that the Australian 
Government is a hybrid of the Washington and Westminster systems, a so-called 
Washminster hybrid. In fact the findings of this thesis show that the Australian 
Federal Government is in many respects a true descendant of Westminster, except 
for the non-hereditary nature of the composition of its upper house. This becomes 
clearer on observing the buildings, the chambers, the rituals, practices and 
procedures of the Australian Senate and their direct derivation from Westminster, 
even when not really practical or necessary—though the argument that ritual and 
procedure are necessary to promote respect and confidence, is a valid one. 
That the existence of the Senate was not determined at the Federation 
Conventions of 1891 and 1897-8 is another finding. Despite many weeks of debate 
on a new Constitution for the Australian Commonwealth by the 84 delegates, the 
fact is that bicameralism was set in stone from the beginning, even before the 
beginning, as foreshadowed by Parkes in his speech in 1889.3
                                                 
3 Ken Halliday, Parkes Federation Call to the People, (Observatory Hill, New South Wales: National 
Trust of Australia, 1999), p.23. 
 The final 
establishment of a bicameral system, which included a Senate, followed almost 
exactly the pattern of the Australian Colonies and the Government of Great Britain. 
The major departure was of course in the membership of the Senate. In this the 
delegates looked to the model of the United States and justified the establishment 
of an upper house, or Senate, as a States’ House, where each State had equal 
Conclusion: The Upper House we Had to Have 
 
 
272 
 
 
representation. This solved both the questions of the role of an upper house and its 
membership and made up for the impossibility of exactly replicating the House of 
Lords. 
Though the research shows many delegates read quite widely, some more than 
others, it was clear that any views opposed to the establishment of an upper house 
were not taken seriously. This was most clearly demonstrated by the dismissal of 
the efforts of the New South Wales Labour Party to send delegates to the 1898 
Convention and the absence of any opposition to a Senate expressed at the 
Conventions. Some delegates did express misgivings, such as Henry Higgins of 
Victoria, but his comments were mild and infrequent and drew no response. The 
minds of the delegates were set upon the establishment of an upper house as part 
of the bicameral system. This was decided quite without any direction, or even 
suggestion, by the British Government, or that the Constitution needed the 
approval of that body, as is clear from the absence of any comments on that 
aspect in the debates. Approval was sought and obtained from Britain on the final 
version of the Constitution and the celebrations of the delegates in London at the 
acceptance of the Constitution by the British Government, clearly demonstrated 
their respect and a certain deference in their attitude to Westminster.4 Though they 
sought independence and self-government they were not prepared to ‘cut the 
painter’: that is sever all ties with Britain and the Empire.5 The newly formed, 
independent, self-governing nation of Australia was not to be allowed to let go of 
the British connection, not because the British insisted, but because the decision-
makers did. An insistence on retaining ties with Britain is a view expressed by 
many influential convention delegates including Higgins, Deakin, Turner and 
Peacock.6
Their attitude was in stark contrast to the views becoming popular in Sydney in the 
1890s and expressed by the popular Bulletin magazine, whose motto was 
 
                                                 
4 J.A. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, (Oxford: Oxford, 1962), vol.1, p. 190. 
5 This is boating reference to a rope attached to the bow of a small boat for tying it to a ship, quay, 
etc. meaning do not cut the connection to the mother ship. 
6 G. McDonald, ‘The Political and Social Ideology of the Australian Founding Fathers’ (Unpublished 
PhD Thesis, University of Queensland, 1967), p.40. 
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’Australia for the Australians’. Edited by journalist J.F. Archibald, who hoped for a 
self-reliant, even independent Australia, the magazine was widely read and 
admired.7
Many had had experience of government in their Colonies and they respected and 
admired Britain, which they regarded as their homeland, and the British system of 
Government. This was reinforced by the fact that the six Australian colonies had 
adopted the bicameral system on achieving self-government, some even using the 
appointment method for members of their upper houses, or Legislative Councils. 
The appointment method stemmed from the view, held in the very early days, that 
it could lead to a colonial nobility.
 For many reasons  however, continuing membership of the empire was 
not inconsistent with large measures of self-reliance and independence. 
A lack of confidence was also apparent in the debates when the delegates referred 
frequently to the opinions of recognised writers and thinkers to support their 
arguments. These selected ideas and views were underpinned by the life 
experiences of the delegates who were, for the most part, successful, prosperous 
and educated citizens. Their readings gave them food for thought and a framework 
for debate. Though the evidence shows that the authorities were not greatly 
influential in changing attitudes or opinions, they were used to validate and support 
their arguments. The reliance on authorities as a crutch for their beliefs 
demonstrated a conflict in the delegates’ ideas between the need for the support of 
authorities in their decisions and their earnest endeavours to create an 
independent nation. At the same time we have seen numerous instances where 
the delegates were simply wrong on the details of the models they introduced into 
the debate. Clearly politicians are not always great students of politics. 
8
                                                 
7 Ibid., p.42. Sylvia Lawson, The Archibald Paradox: A Strange Case of Authorship, (Ringwood, 
Victoria: Penguin Books, 1983). 
8 See: Ged Martin, Bunyip Aristocracy, (Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986). 
 This idea clearly demonstrates the strength of 
the inclination towards doing things as they had always been done, even if 
demonstrably impractical and anachronistic, as shown in the continuing 
performance of the mediaeval ceremony of the Opening of Parliament with its 
underlying theme of defying the Monarch. The concept of path dependence, as 
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developed in political science, helps explain this phenomenon, the powerful urge to 
imitate the past, and which cannot be denied. The delegates were haunted not only 
by their forebears but by their own experience. 
The strongest precedents for the delegates’ decisions were the six Australian 
colonial houses, because nearly all the delegates had been members of their 
Colony’s legislature. These had been closely modelled on the Westminster system 
which itself goes back to the Middle Ages and some of the historical traditions go 
back even to ancient times. In addition to the influence of the colonial parliaments, 
other constitutions were drawn into the debates; the referendum, used to settle 
Constitutional change, was drawn from Switzerland which used them extensively, 
the joint sitting, used to settle disputes between the houses, came from Norway 
and the major one of a Senate as a States’ House where the states were equally 
represented, from the United States. Though other constitutions were discussed in 
the debates, some at length, delegates’ knowledge of them including the major 
models of the House of Lords and the United States was not always sound. This 
did not deter them from suggesting them as models or dismissing them as having 
nothing to offer. 
Though other models were hotly debated, in fact little was adopted from them, 
except where they offered a solution to a problem not answered by the 
Westminster model, as shown above. The major problem was with deadlocks and 
arose from the bitter experiences of the lower house delegates in their Colonial 
Parliaments where the upper house had refused to pass legislation. This led to a 
long and acrimonious debate of the subject. Some delegates objected to any 
system to deal with deadlocks on the grounds that they did not have them in 
Westminster or Washington, an indication of the imperfect knowledge of the 
delegates. In Westminster at that time the solution, a drastic one, was to appoint 
more members of the upper house, a strategy which had been used in some 
colonial parliaments, while in the United States there was a system of holding 
Conferences between the houses which had become a very important part of 
Congressional business. 
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The weight of tradition is most clearly evident in the adoption of many of the 
procedures and practices by the Australian Senate which are a direct derivation 
from the House of Lords. What is more surprising is the lack of records on this 
aspect. The introduction of many of the procedures, symbols, and appointments 
were made by experienced officials, most of whom came from the Colonial 
parliaments. The writing of the Standing Orders for the Senate by the Clerk of the 
Parliaments E.G. Blackmore, is an illustration of this. The politicians relied on their 
senior officials to manage the more mundane aspects of parliamentary procedure, 
hence the scarcity of discussion on these things in official records such as 
Hansard. The ceremonial and architectural aspects of the parliaments, where the 
delegates had served their political apprenticeships, are the strongest and most 
visible indication of the influence of the Westminster traditions that pervade the 
upper houses of Australia, including the Senate. From the grandeur of the 
buildings, to the shape and seating layout of the Chambers, the red colouring, the 
ranking of officials and members, Westminster was the model in almost every 
detail. The extension of the confrontational layout to an elongated U-shaped 
pattern, which has become the norm for Australia, was but a minor variation on a 
time-honoured theme. 
Marx was correct to point to the importance of tradition in conditioning the ‘brain’ of 
the living but he was wrong to describe it as a nightmare. The men, and they were 
all men, who created the Senate, did so willingly and enthusiastically. Although 
many of delegates subsequently sought election to the House of Representatives 
the majority saw themselves as ideal candidates for places on the red leather 
benches of an august House of review, a bastion against democracy or at least a 
check on hasty legislation, wise guardians of a British future for their new nation. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Schedule of Books recommended by Richard Baker 
 
Author  Title City Publisher 
Adams and  
Cunningham 
1887  Swiss Confederation London MacMillan & Co. 
Bagehot 1877  The English Constitution London H.S.King & Co. 
Bluntschli 1885 Theory of State  
Federal Government 
in Canada 
Oxford Clarendon Press 
Bourinot 1887 Federal Government  
in Canada 
Baltimore   Massey 
Bourinot 1888 Manual of the 
Constitution of Canada 
Montreal Dawson Bros. 
Bryce 1889 The American  
Commonwealth 
London MacMillan & Co. 
Creswell 1890 History of the Dominion  
Of Canada 
Oxford Clarendon Press 
De Tocqueville 1887 Democracy in America London Longman, Green 
& Co. 
Dicey 1886 England’s case against 
Home Rule 
London J.Murray 
Dicey 1887 The Law of the 
Constitution 
London MacMillan 
Dicey April 
1890 
The Referendum London Contemporary 
Review 
Forsayth 1869 Cases and opinions on 
Constitutional Law 
London Stevens &  
Haynes 
Freeman July 
1890 
The Referendum London Universal  
Review 
Gavan Duffy Feb., 
1890 
The Road to Australian  
Federation 
London Contemporary 
Review 
Goldwin Smith July 
1887 
The Canadian 
Constitution 
London Contemporary 
Review 
Hamilton Madison  
and Jay 
1875 The Federalist Papers 
(This edition contains an 
epitome of the  
discussions of the  
Philadelphia Convention) 
Philadel- 
phia 
J.B.Lippincott 
& Co. 
Freeman  On Presidential  
Government 
Not 
specified 
Not specified 
 
Hansard (Canadian) 1865 British North American 
Debates 
Quebec Hunter, Rose, & Co. 
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Schedule of Books recommended by Richard Baker 
 
 
 
Author  Title City Publisher 
Kent 1858 Commentaries on  
American Law 
Boston Little, Brown & Co. 
Lowell Feb. 
1888 
English and American 
Federation 
London Fortnightly Review 
Monro 1889 Constitution of Canada Cambridge University Press 
 
Montesquieu  Esprit de Lois Not specified Not specified 
Parkin 1890 Five Lectures on the 
Constitution of Canada 
Adelaide Register Newspaper 
Story 1854 On the American 
Constitution 
New York Harper Bros. 
Tarring 1887 Laws relating to the 
Colonies 
London Stevens &Haynes 
Todd 1880 Parliamentary  
Government in the 
Colonies 
London Longman, Green 
 & Co. 
Webster 1879 Speeches London Sampson, 
Low & Co. 
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Roman Curia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From: www.vroma.org/~bmcmanus/curiaplan.jpg. Accessed 12 December 2008. 
 
 
Lords’ Chamber 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          From: Donald Shell, The House of Lords, p.85. 
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New South Wales 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         From: Maisy Stapleton, Australia's First Parliament. p.142. 
 
Tasmania 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           From: The Legislative Council of Tasmania: an outline of its history and 
                             proceedings. p.3. 
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Victoria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          From: Parliament House, Vol.2.  Public Works Dept. 1981. 
                                             
 
South Australia 
 
South Australia 
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                                          From the pamphlet ‘The Parliament of South Australia’. 
Queensland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                From: Queensland State Archives, Parliament House, Legislative Chamber and Gallery, 1923, 
                   Item 588535. 
 
 
 
 
Western Australia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From: http://www.parliament.wa.gov.au/plans/council/les_council.htm. Accessed 12 December 2008. 
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United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From: United States Web Site 
 
 
 
 
From: http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/art/special/Desks/chambermap.cfm. Accessed 23 April 2008. 
 
Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              Plan received from France Belisle, Canadian Senate 
                                            Archivist, 16 April, 2008. 
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Plan of Provisional Parliament House showing Senate with U-shaped seating layout. Senate is 
shown lower right. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From: Provisional Houses of Parliament: architectural plan September 1922. Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Public Works, Report 1923. 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 
Architectural Plans of Australia’s Provisional Parliament House showing 
proposed seating layouts 
285 
 
 
 
 
Ground Floor Plan of Parliament House, 1923, showing a blank Senate floor. 
 
 
 
From: NAA A2541 P302/2 1925-29 
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Plan of Senate layout 1925 showing the horse-shoe shape  
 
 
 
                    From: NAA 76/1266 1925 
 
Plan of Senate layout 1926 showing the U-shaped layout which was adopted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                From: NAA A2617/1 SECTION 76/1672. 
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The House of Lords 
 
 
From: House of Lords website 
http://www.explore.parliament.uk/cms/ResourceImages/Lords_Chamber.jpg. Accessed 17 October 
2008. 
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New South Wales Legislative Council Chamber 
 
 
From: Courtesy of New South Wales Parliament. 
Tasmanian Legislative Council Chamber 
 
From:  Tasmanian Parliamentary Library  
http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/tpl/Backg/LCCHamber.htm. Accessed 17 October 2008. 
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Victorian Legislative Council Chamber 
 
From: Michael Cheshire, Parliament House, Victoria. Pamphlet. 
South Australian Legislative Council Chamber 
 
From: G.D.Combe, The Parliament of South Australia, 1982. 
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The Legislative Council Chamber of Western Australia 
 
From: Courtesy of the Western Australian Parliament. 
Queensland Legislative Council 
Chamber 
 
From: Parliament House Queensland pamphlet. 
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The United States Senate Chamber 
 
From: United States Website 
senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/image/108th_Congress.htm
Accessed 27 July 2008 
The Canadian Senate Chamber 
 
From the Library of the Parliament of Canada. 
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The Senate Chamber of Australia’s 
Provisional Parliament House 
 
 
From: Picasaweb.google.com. Accessed 11 August 2008. 
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